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This study was inspired by two personal experiences in the course of my twenty year career in relief 
and development work; the experiences were in two communities; at different points in time; in two 
different countries and in spatial terms, approximately four thousand kilometres apart. Notwithstanding 
the distance between them and differences in terms of cultural and traditional considerations; the two 
communities had two things in common; they were both rural and poor. At the same time however, 
they displayed a degree of assertiveness that is uncommon in many a poor rural community in Africa.  
 
In both experiences, the two communities had been victims of a natural disaster during which they had 
benefited from relief assistance delivered by NGOs; the relief assistance was greatly appreciated. In the 
aftermath of the emergency phase, the NGOs remained in the communities to implement post-disaster 
mitigation and preparedness interventions; the goal of the interventions was to reduce the 
communities’ vulnerability against similar threats in the future.  The NGOs’ donors concurred that 
building the resilience of the communities against future threats to their welfare was the right course of 
action in the post-disaster phase of the interventions. To this effect, the funding provided was strictly 
earmarked for longer term disaster mitigation interventions; at that point in time however, the 
communities’ expressed and most pressing felt needs were in respect of the short to medium term post-
disaster period. Such differences of opinion resulted in the communities adamantly refusing to 
participate in the planned interventions. My first reaction in both experiences was one of irritation by 
what at the time, I perceived as unreasonable behaviour and ungratefulness on the part of the 
communities. In time and on reflection however, I came to realise that there was nothing unreasonable 
about the behaviour of the communities; they were simply exercising their right to be involved in 
decisions on matters that affect their lives. I am grateful to the two communities; in Gwanda District 
(Zimbabwe) and Bagamoyo District (Tanzania) for the assertive position they took; such assertiveness 
was to be the trigger factor for further reflection on the challenges NGOs face in pursuit of their noble 
mission of serving the poor and disadvantaged in society. In time, such reflection was to influence my 
choice of the subject of study.  
 
At some point during the study, I encountered some challenges and considered de-registering; I extend 
my gratitude to Professor Frik de Beer and Dr. Derica Kotze of the Department of Development 
Studies at UNISA for their support and interventions at the time. Part of the support resulted in the 
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assignment Professor Hennie Swanepoel as my new supervisor; the guidance and support he provided 
saw me finally reach this stage. To Professor Swanepoel, I extend my sincere gratitude. 
 
In organising the field work, former colleagues; Pamela Indiaka, Tabitha Matolo and Joseph Mbalu did 
a sterling job in facilitating contact with public authorities and the permission to conduct the study in 
Machakos District. The research assistants; John Mutongoi, Agnes Mwikali and Thomas Mutuku did 
an equally sterling job; often working long hours in order to get the field work completed on time. I am 
grateful to them all for their support and contribution at this critical stage of the study. 
 
Finally, throughout the study, my family was behind me all the time; my husband Nelson and my 
twins, Nigel and Natasha; the twins started university when the study was well under way. Whenever 
the twins noticed I was lagging behind my own deadlines, their regular reminders of the possibility that 
they would complete their degrees before I completed mine were to act as the greatest motivation to 
keep me focused and avoid the implied embarrassment! I extend my sincere gratitude to my husband 



























Non Governmental Organisations have been operating in Africa since the 1940’s; then, their work was 
heavily biased towards relief work. From the 1980s however, the role of NGOs evolved to include 
development; understandably, African governments were finding it increasingly difficult to provide 
adequate levels of basic services for their people. To this effect and initially; NGOs got involved in 
development as short term "gap fillers" in the provision of basic services; health and education 
amongst others. As Africa’s development discourse continued unabated, NGOs were recognised by 
donors and host governments alike, as indispensible to the provision of such services; in time however, 
they became the subject of criticism for allegedly failing to irreversibly ameliorate the conditions of the 
poor. 
In delivering services, NGOs work in a complex partnership characterised by power imbalances. The 
partnership involves donors who own the means of production which facilitate NGOs’ work and host 
governments who “own” the humanitarian space which NGOs need to fulfil their humanitarian 
mandate. While seemingly poor and powerless, the communities served wield the power to facilitate or 
block the success of NGO interventions through their commitment and/or lack thereof; respectively; 
NGOs’ contribution is their skills and humanitarian spirit. The success of NGO interventions is a 
function of resources, humanitarian space and the goodwill that donors, host governments and the 
communities served bring to the partnership table respectively.  
The study sought to establish why between 2001-2006; NGO post-drought rehabilitation through to 
development interventions failed to irreversibly reduce vulnerability against drought in communities in 
Machakos District and the extent to which power imbalances which characterise “partnerships for 
development” contributed to the failure by NGOs to fulfil their mandate.  
The study revealed that NGOs are unwaveringly committed to their humanitarian mandate however; 
the power imbalances that characterise “partnerships for development” and in particular, that between 
NGOs’ and donors militated against the fulfilment of their mandate in Machakos District. When NGOs 
fail to deliver on their mandate; they lose credibility amongst the other partners and this reinforces the 





Key Concepts  
Development partnerships; community participation; empowerment; impact; sustainability; 
accountability.  
 
Areas for further study: 
 
The study was limited to post-drought mitigation and preparedness interventions in Machakos District 
which by expert opinion (agro-ecological classification) is semi-arid or marginal; as such, the District 
has the potential for self sufficiency in food security. This is the possible explanation for lack of 
enthusiasm by donors in funding longer term food security interventions in the District following the 
drought of 1999-2001. It may well turn out that had the interventions been in the very arid Districts 
and/or in other development sectors, the picture with respect to donor interest might have been very 
different. With respect to the host government; food security issues are politically sensitive; to this 
effect, that public authorities’ decisions on priorities and targeting might have been different had the 
interventions been in other less politically sensitive development sectors; cannot be ruled out. Finally, 
with respect to the communities and as the saying goes, “a hungry man is a very angry man”; that some 
of the negative sentiments expressed about the interventions can be attributed to this very fact cannot 
be ruled out either. Against this background, studies in the arid Districts in Kenya or elsewhere and/or 
in other development sectors would go a long way towards increasing NGOs’ knowledge on the factors 
which influence the behaviour of the various stakeholders in partnerships for development in different 
contexts. An increase in such knowledge would broaden the nature and scope of strategies and options 
available to NGOs to overcome the factors that act as constraints to the realisation of their cherished 
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1.1  Background 
According to Meredith (1985: 153), the end of colonial rule in Sub Sahara Africa (hereafter referred to 
as Africa) came amidst jubilation; and the mood of euphoria aroused by the advent of self rule was 
raised to even greater heights as nationalist politicians campaigning for power made one lavish promise 
after another. However, deeply affected by mass poverty, meagre resources, disease and illiteracy as 
the continent was, there were no easy solutions to meaningful development; consequently, the 
honeymoon was short lived leaving behind a sense of unfulfilled expectations. More than half a 
century on and for a number of reasons, the African leadership has failed to reverse the state of 
underdevelopment which characterised the states they reclaimed from the colonial powers. Such a state 
of affairs was what prompted Timberlake to write a book in 1988 whose title was “…Africa in 
crisis…” the work was inspired by the devastating famine experienced in the Horn of Africa in the 
early eighties. The work was an account of his reflections (Timberlake 1988: x) on what he referred to 
as "…environmental bankruptcy…" on the continent. The primary focus of the work was indeed on 
environmental bankruptcy; however, he went on to articulate other fundamental socio-economic and 
political issues underwriting such a state of bankruptcy; within and outside Africa. Close to three 
decades after the well documented famine in the horn of Africa, the continent is still in crisis and 
environmental bankruptcy is but only one manifestation of the complex problems that has left the 
continent’s social, economic and political fabric in tatters.  
 
Development scholars and political analysts amongst them Rodney (1971); Davidson (1992) and 
McMichael (2004), cite colonial legacy, poor economic policies; political instability and corruption as 
amongst the most significant contributory factors to under-development in Africa. With respect to a 
colonial legacy, McMichael (2004: 25) argues that while it was acknowledged that independence in the 
colonies was imminent, the attitudes prevailing in London. Paris, Brussels and Lisbon were such that; 
such a development was not synonymous with loss of influence in how the independent states would 
be managed. He supports his argument by citing the British Committee on Colonial Policy which in 
1957; advised the then Prime Minister that while Britain could still exercise control in the colonies, it 
was most important to ensure that British standards and methods of doing business permeated the life 
of  the colonies even after they became independent states . In addition, McMichael (2004: 25-26) 
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observes that such a post independence agenda was facilitated and easily realised by amongst other 
things, some Africans who stood to gain from decolonisation. To secure such gains, they formed 
indigenous elite groups which readily collaborated and cooperated with colonial administrators in 
return for support in their campaigns to assume power once independence was conferred on the 
colonies. Once in power and in order to appease the former colonial masters to who they owed their 
positions, the economic policies they pursued turned out “poor”; understandably, just like in the 
colonial days, they were designed to serve not the interests of the masses but those of small elite 
groups. 
 
With respect to political instability, Shah (2010) argues that yet again; this can be traced to a colonial 
legacy in so far as by creating artificial boundaries; colonial powers brought together many different 
ethnic groups and constructed equally artificial “nations” out of them. Needless to say, such arbitrarily 
created “nations” neither reflected the ethnic make-up of the original traditional kingdoms nor had the 
ability to accommodate the cultural diversity that characterized the ethnic groups which formed the 
new nation states at independence. Shah (2010) links the political instability and corruption which has 
characterised the continent to the diversity of ethnic groups forced into an artificial oneness by the 
arbitrary drawing of borders. He cites the example of the civil war in Angola which tore the country 
apart for close to three decades and which he argues, can be traced to competition by ethnically aligned 
groups for the control of resources; mainly diamonds and offshore oil. These views are supported by 
McMillan (2005: 4) who notes that the civil war lasted as long as it did because the warring groups 
enjoyed the support of western and North American governments and their multinational corporations. 
The variety and scope of such support at any given point in time was a function of the prevailing 
economic interests of these governments and their multinationals; with the result that neither side could 
be guaranteed of a decisive victory at any specific point in time hence the war raged on for as long as it 
did. The involvement of multinational corporations was to give rise to another phenomenon, 
corruption; McMillan (2005: 7) observes that corruption was rampant amongst Angolan officials on 
both sides; they not only diverted oil revenues into personal off-shore bank accounts but also took 
bribes from corporate executives in exchange for access to the oil reserves. He cites a corruption court 
case involving senior executives of the French corporate Elf in which by their own admission; the 
executives revealed that the company had regularly made payments both to sides; the government and 
the insurgents. In addition, the executives revealed that in 1991, the corporate had opened a US$2 




As is evident from the foregoing, the arguments by development scholars and political analysts alike; 
that a colonial legacy, poor policies, political instability and corruption are significant contributory 
factor to the under-development in Africa appear to be plausible not least, because they are interrelated. 
Thus and as McMichael (2004: 26) notes, poor economic policies can be traced to a colonial legacy 
whereby Africans who stood to gain from decolonisation perpetuated colonial policies which did little 
if anything to serve the interests of the masses. Poor economic policies generate poverty and misery 
amongst the masses and in such situations, competition for scarce resources is inevitable; and, if one of 
the competing groups cannot get their hands on the resources; their disgruntlement might well find 
expression in dissent and/or even armed resistance leading to political instability. In the face of threats 
to their hold on power and the benefits associated with such power, the ruling class may well resort to 
corrupt practices to mobilise the financial resources with which to maintain their hold on power. 
Unfortunately, in a situation in which in the operating environment in the new global political economy 
is highly competitive and business will stop at nothing to realise the profit motive and African 
governments often turn a blind eye to; nurture and/or promote or even encourage corruption, Africa is 
not likely to get out of the crisis soon. Over the decades, numerous forums have been convened year-
in; year-out at various levels to discuss what needs and should be done to reverse such a state of under-
development on the continent. Notwithstanding these initiatives and while some progress has been 
made over the years however, that the crises in Africa rage on unabated is evident up to the present 
day, in the standards of daily living; in the levels of illiteracy and the less than optimal health, 
economic and social welfare status of the masses as the following highlights reveal.  
 
1.1.1 Economic and social welfare considerations 
In measuring the progress made by Africa in development; in the economic sphere, there is evidence to 
suggest that in the 1980’s; the continent actually regressed rather than make progress. Such evidence is 
provided in the annual United Nations Human Development Report of the year 2000 in which it is 
stated (UNDP 2000: 181), that between 1980 and 1990, the continent’s  per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) decreased from US $692 to $614 or a decline of approximately 11 percent. During the 
same period, the combined average for all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) a category into which 
Africa falls, the decrease was minimal, from US $258 to 257 or a decline of approximately 4 percent; 
in relative terms therefore, Africa lagged behind LDCs as a group, by some 7 percentage points. The 
dawn of the new millennium saw improvements in Africa (UNDP 2002: 193) whereby in 2000, per 
capita GDP had risen to (US) $1,690 or an impressive 175 percent increase on the 1990 figure 
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however, at that point in time, the combined average for LDCs had risen to US $1,216; a 373 percent 
increase on the 1990 figures or more than double the increase posted by Africa.  
 
At the Fifty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly held in 2000, (United Nations 2000), 
member states adopted a resolution in which they made a commitment to attain a set of eight clearly 
defined development goals to be realised by the year 2015, the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The goals were with respect to the eradication of poverty; achieving universal primary 
education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving 
maternal health; combating disease and in particular, HIV/Aids; ensuring environmental sustainability 
and developing global partnerships for development. Five years into the MDGs in 2005, further strides 
had been made in Africa and according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2008: 
232), per capita GDP had increased to US $1,998 or an 18 percent increase on the 2000 figures. In 
relative terms however, the continent still lagged behind for the combined average for LDCs increased 
to US $1,499 or a 23 percent increase during the same period. As is evident from the three periods 
cited above, Africa’s performance lagged behind that of LDCs as a group; in addition, it is reported 
(UNDP 2002: 18) that between the periods 1990 and 1999, China excluded, the recorded reduction in 
the world's population living on less than (US) $1a day was from 28.1 to 24.5 percent or a reduction of 
3.6 percentage points; in real terms however, the number actually increased by 2 percent from 916 to 
936 million. During the period, Africa’s contribution to this category of people was the highest at 47.7 
in 1990 and 46.7 percent in 1999; while Africa’s contribution was the highest during the respective 
periods; all the same, the 1 percent reduction represents some improvement it can be argued. In real 
terms however (number of people), there was an increase of nearly 24 percent from 242 to 300 million 
people in this category. This is a sharp contrast to South Asia, one of the least developed regions in the 
world where the level of poverty reduction recorded in 1990 and 1999 was 44 and 36.9 respectively or 
a reduction of 16 percent; and in real terms, a reduction of some 5 million people (from 495 to 490 
million) or 1 percent.   
 
In the 1980’s and as pressure mounted for African governments to fulfil the promises they had made 
during the liberation struggle era but which for lack of resources, they could not fulfil; they resorted 
foreign borrowing from donor governments and multilateral institutions alike; this marked the 
beginning of Africa’s foreign debt crisis. Understandably, relative to comparable regions; African 




Report of 2008 (UNDP 2008: 288) in which it is stated that in 1990 and 2002, imports and exports 
were 26 and 27 percent of GDP respectively or a negligible positive balance of a mere 1.0 percent. 
During the same period (UNDP 2004: 201), the ratio of debt servicing expressed as a percentage of 
GDP was 20.4 and 10.6 percent respectively; quite an achievement it can be argued, especially given 
that African economies are driven by the export of primary commodities at the same time as the 
continent had posted a negligible positive balance of 1 percent in the import/export ratio. However, 
such an achievement could only have been at the expense of some other equally pressing obligations 
and in particular, the provision of basic services to the people. In 2005 (UNDP 2008: 288) the 
continent’s import/export ratio was recorded 35 and 33 percent respectively or a negative 2 percent; by 
implication, export earnings could not even cover the cost of the imports let alone generate a surplus 
with which to service debts; the provision of basic services must have dropped to an even lower level 
on the priority list.   
 
On Africa sliding into a debt crisis, Schwab (2001:131-132) observes that this can be traced to the 
practice by many an African government to use borrowed funds to finance unproductive sectors and in 
particular, over-inflated bureaucracies. He cites the example of Ghana where in 1993, even with a total 
US $5.3 billion worth of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) development assistance 
since independence in 1957 or on average, close to US5150 million a year, the country failed to 
promote food security through appropriate measures to raise productivity. During the same period, the 
manufacturing sector was in a state of decline due to neglect and the only sectors in which growth took 
place were transportation, wholesale and retail. But then, these subsectors generated little in the way of 
foreign earnings for recapitalisation into the country’s economy; debt servicing and/or a surplus for the 
provision of basic services for the masses. Such inappropriate use of borrowed funds saw Africa sink 
deeper and deeper into debt and according to Shah (2005a) whereas in 1970, Africa’s debt was just 
under $11 billion, by 2002, it was over $ 295 billion or twenty seven times higher. In a situation in 
which the level of debt was increasing as alluded to by Shah, Schwab (2001:132) concludes the trend 
of a reduction in the debt servicing ratio expressed as a percentage of GDP between 1990 and 2002 
was not so much a reflection of a reducing level of debt and/or improvements in the economic 
performance of the continent but rather, a reflection of African governments’ limited financial capacity 




1.1.2 Health considerations  
It is reported (UNDP: 2008: 264) that between 1970-1975 life expectancy in Africa was 46.0 years 
increasing to 49.1 years during the period 2000-2005 or an increase of 6.7 percent; the combined 
averages for LDCs during the two periods were 44.6 and 52.7 years respectively or an increase of 18.2 
percent. It is apparent from these figures that during the period under review, whereas Africa’s position 
was better than the combined average of LDCs during the period 1970-1975, the continent lagged 
behind the LDC group during the period 2000-2005. With respect to infant mortality rates (0-1 years), 
the report (UNDP: 2008: 264) has it that in 1970, the rates in Africa and the LDCs were reported as 
144 and 152 per thousand live births respectively. By 2005, both groups had made some gains with 
Africa’s rate down to 102 or a reduction of 29 percent; the combined average for LDCs was down to 
97 or a reduction of 49 percent. At the respective points in time, the same trend is evident in average 
child mortality rates (0-5years) which in Africa were 244 and 172 per 1000 live births or a reduction of 
29 percent while the combined average rates for the LDCs were 245 and 153 or a reduction of 37 
percent. Yet again, whereas Africa’s position was slightly better in 1970 by the year 2005, the gains 
made by the continent were far below the combined average for LDCs. With respect to the closely 
related health indicator, maternal mortality rate; in 1990 (UNDP 1999a: 171), the rate in Africa was 
1041 per 100,000 births while the figure for LDCs stood at 979. Ten years later in the year 2000, 
(United Nations 2005: 23), Africa posted a figure of 920 or a reduction of 11 percent while the 
combined average for the LDCs was 450 or a reduction of 54 percent. Another important health 
indicator is access to improved sanitation and water sources; between 1990 and 2004 (UNDP: 2008: 
254), the number of people with sustainable access to improved sanitation in Africa was 32 and 37 
percent respectively or an increase of 15.6 percent; the combined average for the LDCs was 22 and 37 
percent respectively or an increase of 68.2 percent. With respect access to improved water sources, in 
Africa, the figures stood at 48 and 56 percent or an increase of 16.7 percent while the figures for LDCs 
were 51 and 59 percent respectively or an increase of 15.7 percent. In many respects in the sphere of 
health; Africa was ahead of the LDCs combined at specific points in time; over time however, the 
continent lagged behind and while with respect to access to safe water, in relative terms, Africa did not 
lag behind the LDCs in 2004 however, it can be argued that a one percentage point difference is 
negligible.  
 
Discussion on health would be incomplete without making reference to the HIV/AIDS scourge. 




hitherto, African governments played down the prevalence of the disease in a bid to protect their tourist 
industries. However, for the years  2001 and 2003, UNAIDS (2004: 190) reported that the number of 
people infected with the virus the world over was 34.9 and 37 million respectively; of these people, a 
staggering 23.8 and 25 million respectively, were in Africa. Africa’s contribution to the scourge during 
both years thus remained constant at approximately 68 percent of the global total. In addition, the 
report’s estimate of the global total of children (0-14years) living with the virus (UNAIDS 2004: 192) 
was 2 and 2.1 million in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Of these numbers, 1.8 and 1.9 million 
respectively, were in Africa or a constant 90 percent of the global total of this category during the two 
periods. The phenomenon has been explained as a reflection of lack of access to health services and 
treatment since the prevalence of the disease amongst children is a result of in-utero transmission by 
infected expectant mothers; they subsequently deliver babies which are already infected by the virus. 
Lack of access to health facilities and services is hardly surprising for it is reported (UNDP 2002: 169) 
that during the period 1990-9, Africa was the only region amongst the LDCs with countries in which 
per capita expenditure on health was only $5 if not  less. In addition, the continent was in 1998, the 
only region with countries in which the number of physicians per 100,000 population was five or less.  
 
According to Dixon, McDonald and Roberts (2002: 232) HIV/AIDS prevalence and mortality rates in 
Africa are highest amongst the economically productive age; he cites the example of South Africa for 
which mining is one of the largest industries and for which it is estimated that around 60 percent of the 
workforce is aged between 30 and 44 years; the very age group in which prevalence rates are highest. 
Elsewhere on the continent, if it is assumed that the largest industry whatever it may be; employs a 
comparable proportion of the 30 and 44 years group, this points to a situation in which even if the 
political environment had been conducive to productivity and economic growth, the human capital 
deficit created by the scourge is a gap that Africa would still have found difficult to fill. In the past two 
or so decades, HIV/AIDS has been a major contributor to Africa’s record of high mortality rates and 
this has given rise to yet another social welfare dilemma, that of Aids orphans. As at the end of 2003, 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA 2004: 7) estimated the number of Aids 
orphans at 43.4 million with the number expected to increase to 50 million by 2010. Furthermore, the 
orphan crisis had resulted in changes in the composition of households whereby the phenomenon 
“child-headed households” and/or households in which grandparents assumed guardianship of their 
orphaned grandchildren had become the order of the day in some communities. In rural settings in 
Africa, the elderly are a category of people who are neither in gainful employment nor have a pension 
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to live on; under the circumstances and for lack of means, the orphaned grandchildren under their care 
are often forced to drop out of school at an early age. Such grandparents-reared orphans ultimately get 
caught up in a “poverty trap” for with little or no education and/or skills, their chances of getting a job 
in a shrunken and already saturated job market and are slim; many end up as street children and later in 
life, street people. 
 
1.1.3     Education and literacy level considerations 
In 1960, Africa’s population was estimated at 240 million (UNDP 1995: 187) and notwithstanding 
such a population size, Meredith (1985: 306-7) observes at the dawn of independence, only a few 
countries could boast of a university enrolment of more than two hundred students in any given year. 
Such a situation was inevitable for in Kenya for example, Eshiwani (1990: 1-2) notes that before 
independence, the educational system for Africans had been designed primarily to meet the needs of 
the colonial power and in particular, to ensure that the colonies would be self sufficient in financing 
their own development and not become a burden on the Imperial Treasury. The colonial system of 
education was thus narrow in scope since the primary objective was to produce a labour force capable 
of taking instructions for maximum productivity and efficiency on the farms. In 1963, (Eshwani 1990: 
3) independence ushered in a new era that changed the occupational roles of Africans in so far as they 
had to assume responsibility for the management of their sovereign states. Such a development of 
necessity meant that newly independent Kenya had to have the human capital with the pre-requisite 
and "appropriate" education; in the right quantities and of a quality that adequately prepared Kenyans 
for the new roles they were to play in running their own affairs.  
 
With respect to quantity, Timberlake (1988: 4) notes that during the period 1960-1980, school 
enrolment grew faster in Africa than in any other developing region; however, maintaining and/or 
making improvements in the quality of education proved difficult and a trend that soon emerged was 
one of lowering standards in order to get as many students as possible to attain tertiary education. 
According to Nieuwenhuis (1996: 22), another factor compromising the quality of education was that 
for lack of resources, ministries of education could not meet the increased demand for trained teachers 
to make for an optimal teacher-pupil ratio. Faced with such a situation, they resorted to appointing 
untrained or less qualified teachers to ease the pressure exerted by large classes on the teaching corps. 
The consequent lowering of educational standards (Timberlake 1988: 4) was that African students 




examinations so they can be at the same pre-university level as their local counterparts. In turn, what 
this meant was that African governments sponsoring their nationals in universities abroad had to keep 
them there longer implying higher costs which they could ill afford at a time that their economies were 
not doing so well as illustrated earlier. For those who did not make it to universities abroad; local 
colleges and universities turned out to be “…mass production institutions...” producing hundreds of 
graduates but who after graduation, were idle for months or even years because of a lack of 
employment opportunities.  
 
The trend of pupil enrolment “en masse” continued unabated for two decades however, in time and 
restricted by increasingly dwindling resources, the pace slowed down and according to a United 
Nations Development Programme report (UNDP 2002: 180), during the period 1985-7 and 1995-7, the 
majority of LDCs spending less than 5 percent of their Gross National Product (GNP) on education 
were in Africa. Furthermore (UNDP 2002: 152), at the dawn of the new millennium in the year 2000, 
the combined gross enrolment for primary, secondary and tertiary schools in Africa was only 42 
percent of the total population of school going age groups while adult literacy levels stood at 61.5 
percent. In the context of Africa, there is a positive correlation between the level of education and 
employment prospects; income and personal/household wellbeing of which food security is an 
important dimension. Likewise, there is a positive correlation between literacy levels and optimal 
health (through a better understanding of the cause and effect of disease); in a situation in which the 
performance of the educational sector was less than optimal, the less than optimal socioeconomic 
welfare and health status of the majority of Africa’s peoples was inevitable. 
 
1.1.4 Security considerations 
It is reported (UNDP 2002: 17) that during the period 1990 – 1999, Africa had the highest number of 
war casualties, some 1.5 million out of a global total of 3.0 million or 50 percent; this in the main was a 
result of the fact that during the period, no less than twelve countries or 25 percent of the countries 
making up the continent were at war. Scwab (2001) gives a catalogue of both civil and cross border 
wars that have been witnessed on the continent during the past three decades or so; in West Africa 
(Swab 2001: 36-38), he cites the example of Sierra Leone where a civil war raged from 1991 to1999 
and in the process, millions of people lost their lives while hundreds of thousand lost their limbs. In 
Central Africa, Scwab (2001: 56-58) notes that the civil war which ended the rule of Mobutu started as 
a low key obscure guerrilla movement offensive thirty years earlier in then Zaire; in time however,  it 
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developed into a full blown war in 1996. Furthermore, while the objective of the war namely, to depose 
Mobutu was realised in a mere seven months; the ensuing internal power struggles turned the conflict 
into a regional war as Zimbabwe and Angola on the one hand and on the other hand, Rwanda and 
Uganda were drawn into the conflict in support of opposing sides. In the Horn of Africa, (Scwab 2001: 
73) a civil war which broke out in Somalia in 1991 continues unabated to the present day with the sad 
result that the country cannot be classified as a sovereign state; under the circumstances and by United 
Nations definition, citizens of Somalia have been “stateless” since then. Finally, in Southern Africa 
(Scwab 2001: 84-86) and while during their struggle for independence, the three major ethnic groups in 
Angola had fought a common enemy, the Portuguese; at independence in 1975 the groups turned on 
each other in a civil war that was to last until 2002. There were many other wars on the continent 
during the period it suffices to mention only the long drawn ones.  
 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2002: Annex 5), during 
the periods 1992 and 2001, Africa is on record as having generated approximately 5.6 and 3.6 million 
refugees respectively or 31 and 30 percent of world total which then stood at 17.8  and 12 million. 
Conflicts not only generate asylum seekers and refugees but also internally displaced people (IDPs) 
within the country at war. With respect to IDPs, the agency (UNHCR 2002: Table 13) also reported 
that in 2006, the agency assisted a global total of 10,285,400 of this category and of this number, 
4,333,400 or 42 percent was generated by the five top IDP producing countries in Africa at the time 
namely, Democratic Republic of Congo; Liberia; Somalia; Sudan and Uganda. According to Harsch 
(2003), war situations, be they civil or cross border, take the countries at war backwards in terms of 
development because first of all, they result in the destruction of infrastructure and human capital to 
varying degrees. Secondly, in such situations, expenditure on defence becomes the top priority and 
inevitably; resources are diverted from productive sectors and the provision of basic services to 
financing the war effort. Thirdly, the negative effects of conflict are not necessarily confined to the 
countries at war but often spill over into neighbouring countries, even those at peace. In substantiating 
the views on the impact of conflict on neighbouring countries, Harsch cites the example of the conflict 
in Côte d'Ivoire which in 2002 which paralysed the 1,200 kilometre railway line linking neighbouring 
Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou to the Ivorian port city of Abidjan and further afield, Mali and 
Niger (through Burkina Faso). In a situation in which the “umbilical cord” of their trade was severed, 
the economies of these neighbouring countries were as it were; exsanguinated of their life blood; they 




in conflict to paralysing the economies of neighbouring countries; Burkina Faso and further afield, 
Mali and Niger.  
 
The negative effects of conflict on both the country in conflict and those neighbouring it also often go 
beyond economic development considerations as well as beyond the immediate and short term periods. 
The protection of and providing for the welfare of IDPs is the mandate of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) while with respect to refugees, it is the mandate of UNHCR.  All the same, 
while countries hosting these categories of displaced populations are spared of the burden of protecting 
them and providing for their welfare however, there are profound hidden long term costs for these 
countries. The hidden costs are in terms of the degree of pressure on land carrying capacity generated 
by mass population movements and the impact of such pressure on the environment. An example of 
such phenomenon is given by Kanyamibwa (2007: 7) in a study he conducted for the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP). The study established that in the Great Lakes region, in countries 
that had experienced protracted conflict situations namely; Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda; the impact of refugees and IDPs on the environment had been 
significant. This he noted, could be traced to the fact that with limited space for small gardening 
activities to supplement their World Food Programme (WFP) food rations, they dug and planted 
vegetables and crops everywhere, on river banks and steep slopes. Limitations in space also extended 
to the welfare of their domestic animals and over-grazing in catchment areas became the order of the 
day; a combination of these factors resulted in soil erosion on a large scale. He concluded that natural 
disasters such as drought and floods experienced by several countries in the region were probably 
linked to climate changes induced by environmental degradation. In turn, the environmental 
degradation could be directly linked to pressure on land carrying capacity generated by high 
concentrations of displaced populations at various points in time. The researcher concurs for in her 
experience in field work, environmental degradation is a distinguishing feature of the environs around 
IDP and refugee camps; it is easy even for a first time visitor to a refugee or IDP camp to accurately 
guess that they are approaching the camp; the degree of deforestation tells it all. Needless to say, such 
an impact on the environment has long lasting consequences for food security for both IDP and refugee 





1.1.5 Food Security consideration 
According to McCarthy (1986: 58), as far back as 1981, the word "crisis" was already being used in 
connection with Africa and the starkest evidence of the continent's creeping economic paralysis was 
the increasing need for food aid. McCarthy’s observations are supported in a report by the United 
Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO 2005a: 27) in which it is stated that by mid 1984, 
the agency had identified twenty-four countries or half of the continent as seriously affected by food 
insecurity and in need of food aid. At that point in time, the estimated combined population of the 
twenty four countries was estimated at 150 million and of this population, approximately 30-35 million 
or 20 percent were considered at risk. The report also states that during the period 1970-1980, the 
average annual growth rate of total agricultural production in Africa was 1.1 percent increasing to 1.7 
percent during the period 2000-2003. However in both relative and real terms, the continent was 
lagging behind for during both periods, the combined average growth rate for all developing countries 
was 2.8 and 3.1 percent respectively.  The above figures suggest that in relative terms, Africa’ s rate of 
growth in agricultural productivity was 54 percent between the two periods while that for all 
developing countries, the increase was 10.7 percent; in other words, Africa performed better than all 
developing countries combined during the period.  
 
The relative growth in agricultural production however did not translate into improved food security 
and this is evident in a report by FAO (2005a: 67) in which it is stated that a total of 1.5 million metric 
tonnes of food aid were disbursed to Africa between 1970-1980 with the quantity increasing to 3.5 
million metric tonnes in 2003 or an increase of 133 percent. For all the developing countries, the 
combined average of food aid disbursed was 10,214 million metric tonnes during the period 1970-1980 
and 8,773 million in 2003 or a decrease of 14 percent. The figures suggest that of the total food aid 
disbursed to all the developing countries during the period 1970-1980, approximately 15 percent was 
disbursed to Africa; the percentage more than doubled in 2003  approximately 40 percent. According 
to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1999a: 214) the trend in which the need for 
food aid in Africa was increasing is evident in the fact that in 1994/5, approximately 2.5 million metric 
tonnes or 40 percent of the total food aid disbursed to developing countries went to Africa. This speaks 
volumes for in 1995, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1998: 177) estimated 
Africa’s population at 555.7 million while the combined total of developing countries at 4,394 million; 




countries, Africa consumed close to half of the food aid disbursed to all developing countries 
combined.   
  
The backbone of many an African country’s economy is agriculture and a study conducted in 1998 by 
Bishop-Sambrook (2005: 4) revealed that the contribution of agriculture to GDP in Ethiopia, Malawi 
and Nigeria was 50, 36 and 32 percent respectively. The significant contribution of agriculture to 
African economies is supported in a report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA 2009a: 12) in which it is stated that African economies remain heavily dependent on 
agriculture for employment generation; aggregate output; foreign exchange earnings and tax revenue. 
At the same time however, it is noted in the report that in Africa, the agricultural sector in Africa 
suffers from under-capitalization; this is reflected in the low levels of irrigation (6 per cent of arable 
land compared to 40 per cent in Asia), inadequate land management, limited technology and limited 
access to credit and insurance schemes for farmers. In addition, poor roads; marketing infrastructure 
and poorly funded agriculture-related institutions of higher education, research and extension services 
limits the extent to which the potential for maximising productivity can be fully exploited . The 
combined effect of these factors is that in Africa, agriculture is characterized by weak linkages with 
other sectors including agro-processing and agribusiness and remains a relatively low priority area in 
public spending; in most countries, the sector receives less than 6 per cent of annual budgetary 
allocations, well below the objective of 10 per cent agreed by African leaders in Maputo in 2003. 
 
According to UNECA (2009a: 118) a combination of the factors cited above has resulted in a situation 
in which African agriculture remains largely traditional and is dominated by rural peasant farmers, 
smallholders and pastoralists; in addition; in addition, it remains heavily dependent on rain-fed crops. 
Depending on a critical input (rain) but for which farmers have little control, yields are often low and 
farmers can be trapped in a cycle of poverty and food insecurity for decades. There is evidence in 
support of these observations in an evaluation report of the US government response to the drought in 
Zimbabwe during the period 1991/3 in which Callihan, Eriksen &Hemck (1994; Annex D) note that at 
the household level, the level of decline in food production resulted in some 4.6 million or 43 percent 
of the population depending on food aid for survival. Understandably, poor rains in any given 
agricultural season mean that farmers cannot produce enough food for their own consumption let alone 
have a surplus to convert into cash with which to buy food and/or other basic necessities of daily 
living. According to a United Nations Development Programme report (UNDP/UNISDR 2005: 7), the 
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impact of climatic variability and/or a drought is generally higher in relatively simple and 
predominantly agricultural economies whereas in more complex and diversified economies, it is better 
absorbed. At the macro-economic level, such an impact is indirect and takes the form of knock-on 
effects on industries which add value to production and the export of weather-dependent products. To 
illustrate the-on effects, the reports cites the example of  Zimbabwe where during the drought in 
1991/1993; the country  a recorded  45 percent drop in agricultural production resulted in a 9 percent 
drop in manufacturing output; an 11 percent drop in GDP and a 62 percent decline in the value of the 
stock market. A similar situation was witnessed in Kenya during the drought of 1999-2001 where the 
cost to the economy was some $2.5 billion, a significant loss which can best be thought of as 2.5 
billion dollars of foregone development in terms for example, of hospitals and schools not built.  
 
Less than optimal agricultural productivity, the backbone of many an African economy further 
compounds the problems of governments already struggling to meet the basic daily needs of their 
people and for the rural household for which agricultural productivity is the one and only source of 
livelihood, it becomes a vicious circle whose implications go beyond nutritional considerations. Thus, 
with little or no “safety nets” on offer from the government, a normal coping mechanism for 
households is doing away with perceived “non-necessities”; for rural households, high on the list of 
“non necessities” is often the children’s education. Such a fate for children in drought stricken and 
food insecure communities is captured in a report by World Health Organisation on Mozambique 
(WHO 2002: 15) where during a drought in 2002/3, the agency expected higher levels of pupil 
absenteeism and a reduction in the levels of enrolment (drop outs) in the school year starting January 
2003.  In addition to simply lack of school fees, high absenteeism and school drop-out rates are often 
linked to the increased need by households for their children to contribute to family labour; searching 
for food and fetching water or caring for other family members; younger siblings and the elderly while 
parents go out in search of food. In a study conducted in the Somali region of Ethiopia on the impact of 
the 2006/7 drought, such a phenomenon was confirmed by the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF 2006); in one of the households studied, as the family’s small herd of sheep and goats started 
to die and the family’s income and basic food supply increasingly decreased, the parents sacrificed the 
education of their only daughter and had her working as a housemaid to supplement family income.  
In a drought situation and by implication, crop failure, the question of raising school fees in 




evident during the drought of 2002-2003 in Southern Africa where UNICEF reported (IRIN 2002) that 
the more than 10 percent school drop-out rate recorded could be attributed to the fact that families were 
forced to use school fees to meet the drought-induced rising costs of staple foods. In addition, even for 
those children whose parents did not sacrifice school fees for household food security, absenteeism 
was high for the children were too weak from hunger to make the often long walk to school. Such a 
positive correlation between the severity of a drought and school absenteeism was evident in the 
Ukambani region of Kenya (Eastern Province) during the drought of 1999.  According to the 
Machakos District (Eastern Province) annual report of 2000 (Government of Kenya 2000: 33), the rate 
of absenteeism from school and mosque related extracurricular activities was so high that the local 
branch of the Kenya Balal Moslem Mission lodged a formal complaint with the District authorities. 
The Mission’s concern was that parents were being forced to send their children to “dangerous” urban 
environments in search of low paying jobs to supplement family income. Although not so scientifically 
done; all the same, the records on school attendance trends kept by the Mission and schools in general 
were later adopted as an indicator for measuring the impact of a drought in rural communities in the 
Eastern Province as a whole. During a subsequent drought in 2006 in Kenya and taking into account 
the possible impact of the drought on school enrolment and attendance, the Daily Nation (2005) 
reported that the government had made a decision to waive school fees in the worst affected arid north 
and north eastern parts of the country. In addition, the government also introduced supplementary 
school feeding programmes as an incentive for parents to continue to send their children to school as 
well as to ensure that the children would have the level of energy necessary for them to concentrate in 
class and thus get maximum utility out of attending classes.  
According to FAO (2005b: 14), education has long been acclaimed as one of the most powerful 
engines for reducing hunger and poverty; lack of education thus undermines productivity, 
employability and earning capacity resulting in the perpetuation of hunger and poverty. FAO further 
notes that research shows that investments in education have resulted in higher returns than 
investments in physical capital and that in the rural areas where the vast majority of the world’s hungry 
people live, a farmer with four years of primary education was on average, almost 9 percent more 
productive than a farmer with no education. Indeed a phenomenon such as drought compromises 
productivity in predominantly agricultural communities and the implications go beyond nutritional 
considerations and/or the present; thus, when schooling is disrupted if not altogether abandoned in 
early childhood, the end result is low literacy levels within whole communities. In turn, lack of 
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education and low literacy levels limits productivity in later life in terms of employability and earning 
capacity. The implication of such a situation is that the next generation cannot afford to send their own 
children to school and there emerges a pattern of “inherited poverty” spanning across generations. The 
situation of the rural poor is further compounded by high population growth rates and according to the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2002: 165); between the period 1975-2000, the 
region’s population doubled from 303 to 606 million; it was expected to grow to 866 million or an 
increase of 42% by 2015. With an estimated average of 80 percent of Africa’s population living in 
rural areas coupled with low literacy levels and a corresponding lack of understanding of the demerits 
of poor child spacing practices, it can safely be assumed that the contribution of this group to such high 
population growth rates was and will continue to be substantial. Thus, even if weather patterns had 
remained stable over the years and there had been no episodes of drought, in time, individual 
household food production levels would have witnessed a decrease anyway; not least, because of a 
reduction in land carrying capacity due to high rates of population growth.  
 
Being generally poorer than their urban counterparts, why do rural folk have large families in a 
situation in which they can ill afford to adequately provide for them, one is inclined to ask? Hetch 
(1995: 403) argues that family size reflects a rational response to a concrete economic situation adding 
that the cost-benefit ratio of extra children is high for poor families in poor societies or those societies 
in which resources are extremely unequally distributed. The rationale for large families the argument 
continues; is that large families are a sort of compensatory mechanism for children are expected to and 
do contribute economically to the household resource base; in agricultural activities and/or in the 
informal economy from a very early age and they continue to do so throughout their lives. As such, 
(Hetch 1995: 404) manpower considerations are a driving force behind large families; she however 
cautions that the consequent high population growth rates mean a reduction in available resources for 
the sustenance of any given community. Hecht refers to the phenomenon as the "Tragedy of the 
Commons" in which in the face of an increasingly decreasing common resource, each actor in the 
community seeks to maximise his individual utility. In the process, increased exploitation is the only 
way to increase benefits but unfortunately, the cost in terms of environmental degradation is not borne 
by the actor alone but by all users, even whole communities. She concludes her argument by pointing 
out that regardless of the theories put forward to explain the deteriorating food security situation in the 
Third World; the equation is not complete when specific regional histories, economic and social 




It is apparent that food security issues cannot addressed in isolation for as Hetch argues, many factors  
influence the form and impact of environmental and food security issues; this suggests that in 
addressing food security issues, there is a need to look beyond simply ensuring that people have 
enough to eat for the day, week or month. This is important for humanitarian actors and especially for 
NGOs for in drought-induced food security crises, the preoccupation with life saving interventions may 
crowd out longer term strategies for reducing the vulnerability within communities by amongst other 
things, increasing community resilience against future droughts. Such a long term perspective and 
holistic approach is no longer a matter of choice if humanitarian actors are to realise their cherished 
goal of engaging grassroots communities in activities that lead to sustainable development. Changes in 
the ozone layer and global warming are phenomena which have been cited as major contributory 
factors to climatic change and its consequences on the predominantly agricultural economies in Africa; 
poor communities have limited if any control over such global phenomena. However, preserving land 
carrying capacity by amongst other things, making a contribution to environmental conservation; 
adapting agricultural practices to changing weather patterns and having the number of children that 
they can afford to provide for; are dimension of daily living which communities have the potential to 
control. To this effect, the promotion thereof should be part of a comprehensive mitigation package by 
humanitarian actors in their design of post drought “recovery through to development” interventions 
(activities designed to rebuild communities’ resilience against a future drought). The study seeks to 
examine the extent to which post drought recovery through to development interventions by 
humanitarian actors supported communities to take charge of those factors for which they have the 
potential to control; to promote their own food security and if not, to examine the underlying causes to 
such an outcome.  
 
1.2 The “Third Sector” Non Governmental Organisations 
1.2.1 Non Governmental Organisations 
According to Matenga (2001) Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been operating in Africa 
since the 1940’s however, it is since the 1980s that their role as development players offering an 
alternative approach to poverty alleviation and long-term sustainable development in poor 
communities in developing countries, gained prominence. Thus as African governments increasingly 
found it difficult to provide an optimal level of basic services for their people and the pressure on their 
meagre resources mounted due to amongst other things, the burden of foreign debt, they exploited the 
good will and humanitarian spirit that is the defining philosophy of NGOs. NGOs were thus welcomed 
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as short term "gap fillers" however, as the scope and nature of the problems widened, it became 
apparent that they would be in for a "long haul". A long haul it turned out to be indeed for more than 
half a century on and in the face of an increasingly deteriorating socioeconomic and political 
environment coupled with the poverty and misery generated in the process, the sector did not have to 
worry about "business opportunities" and/or “secure markets”! A combination of these “market 
conditions” have seen the sector grow and according to the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP 2002: 102), from a humble beginning way back in 1839 when the first NGO (the Anti-Slavery 
Society) was registered in the United States, the number of NGOs has since grown phenomenally. The 
most notable period of such growth was between the years 1914 and 2000 whereby in Europe and 
North America for example, their number grew from 1083 to 37,000 with a fifth of the NGOs in 
existence and operating internationally by the year 2000 having been established after 1990.  
 
Scholars at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI 1995: 1) attribute such a growth rate to a trend 
that emerged in the 1950's and 1960's in which hitherto, the relationship between NGOs and 
institutional donors had been one of each camp pursuing its own agenda with little interest in each 
other's activities and on occasions, the two camps were even suspicious of the other's motives. In time 
however, attitudes changed and according to the scholars (ODI 1995: 3), such a change in attitudes saw 
an increase in donor confidence in NGOs and a corresponding increase in the level of resources 
channelled through the sector. In addition and whereas hitherto, support had been mainly for relief 
operations, donors increasingly perceived support for NGO development interventions as a natural 
progression. Such new thinking in the donor community was welcomed by NGOs because for a long 
time hitherto; NGOs had been arguing that relief operations which are not followed up by "recovery 
through to development" interventions were tantamount to "fire fighting" exercises. A study carried out 
by Campanaro, Hepburn, Kowalska &Wang (2002: 14-15) revealed that to this effect, some NGOs had 
been making impressive strides in so far as they had been adapting relief programmes to incorporate 
development activities while others had gone further in such adaptation resulting in the emergence of 
the contiguum approach. The contiguum approach is more holistic in so far as relief, recovery and 
development phases of an intervention are viewed as overlapping as opposed to being viewed as a 
continuum in which one phase must take place before the next.  While this was expected to set the 
stage for a new approach to relief interventions (Campanaro et al. 2002:  24) for which the objective 
was to irreversibly increase community resilience against threats and hazards in their environment; this 




arrangements in the donor community in which relief and development departments existed and 
operated as separate and independent entities with little if any operational relationship between them. 
Such arrangements meant that often, technocrats in development departments were not well versed in 
relief issues and vice versa. In turn, such administration arrangements meant that it was difficult for 
NGOs to design, mobilise funds and implement recovery through to development interventions as a 
complete package. Under the circumstances, the planning of interventions continued to be fragmented; 
worse still, whereas a relief operation might have been well funded; on approaching development 
departments for post relief interventions, NGOs would be informed there are no funds for the purpose. 
In such a situation, NGOs would be forced to leave communities until the next disaster as such; their 
interventions continued to assume the form of “fire-fighting exercises”; understandably, with no 
interventions to reduce the vulnerability of communities to hazards in their environment, NGOs would 
be back in the communities when the next disaster struck.  
 
1.2.2 The Third Sector - a “thriving industry" 
Notwithstanding some of these contradictions in funding arrangements, the donor community 
continued to court and increase their engagement of NGOs as development aid partners (UNDP 2002: 
102); such a trend is evident between 1970-1990, a period during which the level of donor funding 
channelled through international NGOs by both institutional and private donors to developing countries 
increased seven-fold from USD 1.0 to 7.2 billion.  During the same period (UNDP 2002: 204-6), their 
governments' contribution to their international work rose from 20 to 36 percent; furthermore, in 1990 
and 2000, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) disbursed some 
$15,658 and $11,791 million (respectively) worth of Official Development Assistance (ODA) through 
NGOs. This represented approximately 3.0 percent of the total of $469 and $353 million disbursed in 
Africa by the organization during the respective years. At the individual donor country level, the 
Overseas Development Institute (OD1 1995: 2) reported that in the ten year period up to 1993/4, the 
United Kingdom increased its official funding of NGOs by almost 300 per percent from approximately 
£17.0 to £68.6 million. During the same period, Australia increased its ODA through NGOs from 
(Australian Dollars) $20 to $71 million or an increase from 1 to 6 percent; comparable expansions 
occurred in Finland, Norway and Sweden from the 1980's through to the early 1990's. Over and above 
such ODA funding through NGOs, another trend witnessed was the co-option of NGOs by donors as 
partners in the implementation of what are primarily the donors' own projects. In such “delegated 
project” arrangements, a donor surrenders all the funds earmarked for projects in a specified country to 
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an NGO on a “sub-contractual” basis. Country studies conducted by ODI indicate that in countries with 
a large and growing NGO presence, 5 percent if not more of bilateral aid funds were disbursed through 
such sub-contractual arrangements.  
 
As is evident from the above, the amount of resources mobilised and invested by NGOs in the quest to 
improve the situation of the poor and disadvantaged is of a level that many an African government has 
never been able to achieve in any given comparative period. Smillie (1995: 1) however argues that just 
like in the global political economy, more resources flow back to the NGOs’ home countries than do to 
the recipient countries and communities served. He cites an example of the United States where in the 
mid 90s, in the process of disbursing a staggering combined income of $400 billion in overseas aid, 
NGOs indirectly created 1.4 million jobs back home and directly, they created eight million jobs. This 
figure he argues; was higher than the estimated combined workforce of the Central and all Federal 
State governments during the period. In Canada, Smillie (1995: 1) notes that in 1993, the combined 
income of registered Canadian charities estimated at a staggering $62 billion benefited the country's 
economy in so far as over half of the amount was paid out in salaries and benefits to some 1.3 million 
people or 9 percent of the country's entire labour force at that point in time. Such a record of “industry” 
growth rate, income level and level of employment creation over the years is still but only a dream for 
many an African government and points to a sector which at the time was thriving; to date, it continues 
to thrive.  This is supported by Chege (1999: 1) who notes that a major shift in the funding of 
development in Africa, already under way for several years; was accelerating; Chege made these 
observations following an announcement by the United Sates embassy in Kenya at the time; that the 
US government would be channelling most of its development aid for Africa, estimated at some $711.3 
million through NGOs, rather than governments. At about the same time, the Dutch embassy in Kenya 
followed suit and announced that the Dutch government which spent $835 million in development 
assistance to sub-Saharan Africa in 1996-97, would be decreasing direct aid to governments and give 
more to NGOs. 
 
1.2.3 “NGOs - Achievers or Deceivers?  
Such was the title of a weekly British Broadcasting Corporation World Service live chat programme 
(BBC World Service: 2005) during which listeners from around the world phoned-in their views and 
opinions. An interesting comment made by a listener in South Africa was “…by its very nature, an 




sentiments are echoed by Abdul-Raheem (2000) who argues that while some NGOs are involved in the 
charity business out of a moral and/or political commitment, there are many who are doing it only for 
career purposes adding that “...if one is a disaster manager, what will they do if there are no more 
disasters...”?  He further argues that this was particularly true at a time when more and more NGO 
money was going into emergency operations rather than long term development work; he warned of 
the potential danger of emergencies being converted into permanent situations.  In support of these 
assertions, Abdul-Raheem (2001) cites the example of Ngara hitherto, a little known small town in 
north western Tanzania but which as a result of the influx of refugees escaping the genocide in 
neighbouring Rwanda in 1994, became the second-biggest human settlement after the state capital, 
Dar-es-Salaam. He further observes that in time, Ngara was totally controlled not by the government 
but by NGOs adding that suggestions by the government of Tanzania that long-term development work 
in Rwanda itself would actually persuade the refugees to go home were met with excuses. Amongst the 
excuses was that it was not their mandate; Abdul-Raheem concludes his observations and his 
arguments by alleging that for fear of losing their jobs and influence, many of the NGOs did not want 
the camps to be closed. 
Such sentiments bordering on allegations of a desire by NGOs for a permanent presence in 
communities are unfair it can be argued; however, Tandon (1995) argues that such allegations can be 
traced to the way some NGOs portray themselves. In turn, such portrayal can be traced to a self 
perception of some NGOs as purely functional regardless of the sphere in which they are engaged; 
welfare, development or refugee work. Perceiving themselves as purely functional, such NGOs focus 
on mere palliative interventions to reduce the effects of increasingly deteriorating social and economic 
conditions; as such, while they do good work in these fields, unwittingly, they perpetuate the very 
conditions that they seek to alleviate. He further argues that there are very few NGOs that might be 
considered as “thinking” NGOs which he defines as those NGOs that regularly and systematically 
evaluate what they are doing and how this influences or is influenced by issues related to state, society 
and development in the context of the broader global political economy. Tandon concludes that this 
one reason that they have come under fire for failure to “deliver” on their sustainable development 
agenda.  
Shivji (2006: 13) gives another perspective to the seemingly failure of NGOs to deliver and argues that 
while some NGOs may be appreciated by the people whom they purport to serve, ultimately NGOs 
derive not only their sustenance but also their legitimacy from the donor community. Thus, while many 
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NGOs are set up by morally motivated individuals with a genuine desire to “do something” to respond 
to the needs of the poor, it is also true that a substantial number of NGOs are set up to respond to what 
is perceived to be in vogue within the donor-community at any particular time. Tandon (1995) concurs 
and observes that with NGOs increasingly commissioned by donors; the state or even the corporate 
sector to do consultancy work for them or to be their implementing agencies for the delivery of 
services; prioritising what is in vogue with the donor-community was inevitable. In defence of his 
views, he argues that it is ironic that a non-governmental body is assigned by a government to do a 
governmental job funded by a donor agency which is an outfit of the government!  
According to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI 1996: 1-2) as donors increased their funding 
for NGO development work and the level of such funding began to account for a significant part of the 
overall aid programme, the former increased their demands for NGOs to demonstrate what the funds 
were achieving on the ground in terms of both the quantity and quality of interventions. On 
quantitative criteria, the performance of projects would be judged against the specific objectives for 
which the funds were provided for example, if the project involved the construction of a water point, 
donors wanted to see physical evidence that one had been constructed.  On qualitative criteria, a wider 
set of standards were used to assess the impact of the projects in terms of the extent to which the 
quality of life amongst the beneficiaries had changed for the better. INTRAC (2001: 1) quotes one 
Blankenberg as defining impact in terms of long-term and sustainable changes introduced by a given 
intervention in the lives of beneficiaries. The changes can be anticipated in line with specific objectives 
or unanticipated; unanticipated changes can extend to people not belonging to the primary beneficiary 
group. The impact of NGO intervention is increasingly the subject of scrutiny and scepticism and as 
implied by Shivji (2006: 13), this problem for NGOs can be traced to the irresistible temptation to 
respond to what is perceived to be in vogue within the donor-community at any particular time and not 
necessarily by the needs on the ground.  This view is supported by Nunnenkamp (2008: 1) who 
observed that NGOs from donor countries taken together have a strong tendency to replicate the aid 
allocation of their governments or “back donors”.  As such, with independent decision-making limited, 
NGOs that depend on government funds have little choice but to pursue those activities which are 
popular with donors. Such activities may not necessarily address the most pressing or the felt needs of 
the communities served as such; the activities will have little if any impact at all; worse still, they may 




It is evident from the foregoing that the power relationships between NGOs and their donors is skewed 
in favour of the latter and this can be traced to different and in some cases, even conflicting interests; 
this presents a challenge for NGOs for first of all, it means that their interventions are limited to what 
donors are interested in funding at that given point in time. Secondly, if NGOs must continue to access 
donor funding, then of necessity they must observe and strictly adhere to the conditions laid down by 
donors on what the funds can or cannot be used for; these conditions may well be in conflict with 
NGOs principles and values. Besides, compliance with donor conditions especially when they are in 
conflict with what and/or how the host government and the communities served would prefer to see 
interventions implemented is what has often led to allegations that NGOs are agents or even spies of 
their home governments and not advocates for the poor. Such a view which is implied by Abdul-
Raheem (2000) when he alleges that some of the most powerful foreign NGOs behave like civilian 
branches of their home governments who give them a lot of money. Such volumes of money at their 
disposal he further alleges, is evident in their extravagant lifestyles; he cites the nineties of which he 
says that foreign NGOs were easily identifiable by the latest models of four wheel drive vehicles they 
went around in; vehicles which earned them the nickname “4 x 4’s” and/or “development tourists”! As 
if the scepticism and ridicule in the host countries was not enough, back home Smillie (1995: 39) 
observed that often, NGOs were sarcastically described as latter day imperialists, exploiters and their 
staff as “…smiling faces going places…”  More than ten years on, the description of NGOs by sceptics 
was even harsher “…deceivers…”! 
On the increasing level of resources which flow through NGOs from their home governments, 
McGann and Johnstone (2006: 6) share the sentiments expressed by Abdul-Raheem and caution that 
such a level of resources presents problems for NGOs. The problems, the scholars explain; can be 
traced to the fact that such a level of resources raises questions about the credibility of NGOs for if the 
greater part of their funding comes from foreign donors, the possibility that donors are dictating their 
goals cannot be ruled out. Besides, large amounts of funding coupled with conditions donors impose 
on the funding renders NGOs susceptible to manipulation and thus the tendency to behave like 
extensions of their home governments. The same concerns are echoed by Edwards and Hulme (1998:8) 
who argue that while official funding encourages NGOs to become providers of social and economic 
services on a much larger scale than hitherto, it compromises their performance especially in other 
areas of development activities such as institutional development and advocacy. In addition, it weakens 
the legitimacy of NGOs as independent actors in society and distorts their accountability away from 
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their grassroots and internal constituencies to overemphasis on short-term quantitative outputs as 
demanded by donors. Besides, while their intentions are noble as articulated in their mission statements 
in which the notion “reducing vulnerability”, “poverty-reduction” and “sustainable development” 
feature prominently, Shivji (2006: 13) argues that NGOs face many constraints in their efforts to live 
out these notions. Amongst such constraints are first of all, NGOs are limited in decision making 
powers on what they can do where and when; these decisions lie with the donors who provide the 
funding for their work. Secondly, in a situation in which increasingly, donors are using criteria 
borrowed from the corporate sector for measuring the performance and success of NGOs, the notions 
are quickly forgotten and preoccupation with strategic plans and log frames becomes the priority. Thus, 
donors even dictate the “how” NGOs will work and in the process, the latter spend disproportionate 
amounts of time tabulating and quantifying outputs and consolidating them into reports which are often 
a non-negotiable pre-requisite for more funding. 
 
Impact or to be precise, lack of it is where NGOs have come under fire for if the definition of impact 
given earlier is an acceptable working definition, then the scepticism about the impact of NGO 
interventions is not unfounded. This premise is based on the fact that simplified, the criterion for 
measuring the success of NGO interventions (impact) translates into the degree and speed with which 
an NGO successfully “works itself out of a job” in any given community. The validity of such a 
simplified criterion it can be argued, lies in the fact that “working oneself out of a job” implies that the 
target communities have been successfully supported and nurtured into assuming responsibility for 
their own welfare in a sustainable manner and do not need external financial, material and/or technical 
support in the future. That being said and given that it is not uncommon to find an NGO working in the 
same community for years; this however does not make NGOs “deceivers”; on the contrary, dependent 
on donors for the means of production as they are, they do not always have the flexibility and/or the 
independence to make decisions on what they do, where, when and how. Under the circumstances, 
realising their cherished goal of sustainable development in such an operating environment becomes 
difficult if not impossible. Thus, regardless of the soundness of their vision and good intentions on how 
to move communities forward along the development continuum, in the final analysis, they can only do 
what is possible within the available means of production – means which they do not own and by 





The situation of NGOs is clearly unenviable and this is eloquently captured by Smillie (1995: 238) who 
said of them then “…Today’s NGOs are at a major interchange where several twelve lane major 
highways meet in a series of high overpasses, dark tunnels, tight curves and fast merging traffic...”   
Since then, the situation has changed little and if anything, the “Spaghetti Junction” implied by Smillie 
in which NGOs were caught more than fifteen years ago has since witnessed the “construction” of 
more lanes, overpasses, dark tunnels and tight curves in order to meet the needs of the ever growing 
“traffic” of stakeholders and interests. Thus, whereas prior to 1970, the only stakeholder group 
consisted of donor governments which provided NGOs with funding mainly for relief operations; in 
time and borrowing a leaf from donor governments; multilateral donors, the UN system, World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund followed suit and started courting NGOs as development partners.  
 
According to Damlamian (2006:5) the realisation by the global community that including business in 
the process of international development was desirable, coupled with pressure on business from civil 
society to give back something to the communities in which they made their profits and/or to make 
good the environmental damage their operations inflicted in these communities; the corporate sector 
did the same. Then there were the aid-recipient (host) governments for in a situation in which more 
development aid was being channelled through NGOs (Tandon 1991: 75); they were concerned about 
the constituencies from which the western NGOs derived their agendas and to which they were 
primarily accountable. Host governments thus became an important stakeholder if only to monitor 
what was perceived as NGO tendency to secrecy and non-transparency amongst other manifestations 
of mistrust. Finally and while beneficiary communities are not inclined to make “noise” about the 
quality of NGO interventions, by virtue of the fact that government donors started to demand that 
NGOS demonstrate the impact of their interventions in terms of the extent to which the quality of life 
amongst the beneficiaries had changed for the better; such “noise” was being made on their behalf. 
Indeed the “traffic” of stakeholders and interests was growing and this coupled with a widening scope 
in the variety of sectors NGOs were involved in due to availability of resources, the scope of 
accountability became even more complex.  
 
With respect to interests, donor “giving” decisions are increasingly influenced by factors ranging from 
political, security and economic considerations and even simply for publicity and in particular, the 
“CNN effect” (a term used to describe the impact and degree to which an event makes international 
headlines). For African governments, maintaining popularity and staying in power by amongst other 
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things, being seen to be a caring government and in the process, covering up their failures to 
adequately provide basic services for their people is important. To this effect, they decide what NGOs 
can do, where and when in their sovereign territories. Last but not least, the communities served also 
became an important stakeholder group for while in general they appreciate the services provided by 
NGOs, they increasingly demanded that they be involved in decision making on what is in their best 
interests. In the event that there is no goodness-of -fit between donor priorities and the needs on the 
ground meaning that available resources will be for interventions which do not necessarily meet the 
felt needs of the communities served or the targeting of communities as dictated by a host government 
is inappropriate, for the purpose of maintaining good relations, a tendency by NGOs is go by such the 
decisions of both donors and host governments alike. Under the circumstances however, NGO 
interventions will have little if any impact at all in so far as they will not be addressing community felt 
needs; “Caught at Crossroads” indeed NGOs are. However, notwithstanding such a dilemma, NGOs 
strive at all times to fulfil their mandate of meeting community felt needs; besides, notwithstanding the 
fact that primary responsibility for the welfare of communities primarily lies with governments, NGOs 
have invested more towards this end than the majority of African governments.  
 
According to Clark (2000; 4) this was clearly evident in Ethiopia where during the well documented 
famine crisis of 1984-85, NGOs were catapulted into high prominence because suspicious of the 
policies of the Mengistu regime, many international donors insisted on channelling relief aid through 
NGOs. Such prominence was a result of the visibility of NGOs in providing the only means of survival 
for and saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. This, NGOs were able to do for at the 
point in time, the government was overwhelmed by the severity of the drought besides, it had become 
almost paralysed by pressure from an escalating civil war waged by armed resistance groups. The same 
can be said of Kenya where according to Aklilu and Wekesa (2002: 1), barely recovering from a 
drought in 1996-1997, the country experienced a severe drought during the period 1999-2001. The 
drought, the worst witnessed in thirty seven years affected 4.4 million people; it was subsequently 
declared a national disaster and in response to the disaster, (Government of Kenya; World Food 
Programme &FEWSNET 2006: 4), NGOs took centre stage in a disaster relief operation coordinated 
by the Government of Kenya and supported financially by the international donor community 
including UN Agencies. The operation benefitted some 2.75 million people who during the crisis were 





1.3 The research problem: “Caught at Crossroads”  
It is said of the drought in Kenya in 1999-2001 (Government of Kenya; World Food Programme and 
FEWSNET 2006:2-3), that the cost of the relief operation was phenomenal with the Government of 
Kenya estimating that the combined cost of the emergency relief operation was approximately $190 
million with $102 million spent on food relief alone. According to Swift, Barton & Morton (2001: 3), 
as the drought came to an end; reflecting on the costs incurred during what was a mere palliative 
intervention and recalling that barely two years earlier, there had been another relief operation in 
response to the drought of 1996/7, there was increasing concern by both the Government of Kenya and 
donors about the social, economic and environmental cost of relief operations. The concerns were not 
baseless for according to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO 1996), the 
number of people that needed and benefited from food aid assistance during the 1996/7 drought was1.8 
million; pointing to an emerging trend in which the number of people in need of food was increasing 
with each subsequent drought episode. Such a trend evoked real fears of a creeping dependency 
syndrome; the fears were not baseless for according to Swift et al. (2001: 4), between 1997 and 1999, 
assessments carried out pointed to the potential for agricultural productivity of a level that could meet 
food requirements in some parts of the country. In a situation in which the number of people requiring 
food aid in 1999-2001 was higher than in 1997, it was concluded that readily available food aid and/or 
anticipation of food handouts during periods of drought was leading to laxity and failure by 
communities to exploit the potential for optimal food production that existed during agricultural 
seasons characterised by rainfall normal patterns.  
 
In addition to these internal reflections, an evaluation of the 1999-2001 emergency relief operations 
conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2001) revealed that first of all, the 
pattern of drought episodes in Kenya going back a few decades, was increasingly assuming a 
predictable cyclical pattern. Secondly, notwithstanding evidence of such an emerging predictable 
pattern, every drought episode had been managed as a crisis focusing on food relief without due 
attention paid to longer term mitigation measures and in particular, environmental protection measures. 
Thirdly, lack of a comprehensive drought policy was resulting in increased destruction of forests for 
income generation and in particular, charcoal; logging without replacing trees and uncontrolled 
clearing forests for agriculture. Fourthly, poor agricultural practices including stream bank and steep 
slope cultivation was accelerating soil erosion resulting in the silting of dams and pans usually used as 
dry weather water reservoirs. Fifthly, conflicting land-use interests for example, the prioritisation of 
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tourism and wildlife management; ranching and commercial forestry over agriculture was reducing 
household land assets. Finally, while some parts of Kenya notably, the Central, Rift Valley and 
Western Provinces were traditionally agriculturally productive, poor rural infrastructure made it 
difficult to move food commodities from these “green belts” of Kenya to the drier parts. The effect of 
poor infrastructure on food security in Kenya  is evident in the fact that according to the World Food 
Programme (WFP 2002: 6-7), the emergency relief appeal launched by the agency in 1999 was not so 
much for the usual donations-in-kind (food commodities) but instead, cash donations with which to 
purchase and transport maize from within Kenya itself! Food commodities would indeed be bought 
within Kenya itself for the green belts cited above had produced enough surpluses to cover a 
substantial part of the food deficit in the drier parts of the country. 
 
In the aftermath of the relief operation and in planning the recovery through to development 
interventions; stakeholders took into account the findings of the evaluation and the sentiments that the 
NGO community had been expressing all along that relief operations which are not followed by 
sustainable rehabilitation through to development interventions are tantamount to “fire-fighting” 
exercises. It turned out that at about the time that the drought struck in 1999, the Government of Kenya 
(2004: vii) had started an initiative to develop a National Disaster Management Policy however, the 
process had stalled as relief operations became the priority over the government’s normal daily 
business cycle. Shaken by the impact of the drought on communities and livestock as well as the cost, 
the process of developing a Disaster Management policy was resumed in 2001with the Office of the 
President consulting widely with other Government Ministries, the private sector, NGOs and other 
development partners.  Even as the policy was still in draft form, in 2001 and taking into account the 
draft provisions, donor governments and UN agencies pledged funding for a variety of post drought 
interventions for implementation by international NGOs while the Government of Kenya provided a 
modest amount of funding for local NGOs to do the same. To this effect, UNICEF (2001) launched an 
appeal for US$10.0 million for continuing nutritional support for its target groups (women and 
children) and mitigation activities; the construction of underground water sources and community 
gardening projects amongst others. The governments of Britain; Japan, Norway and the United States 
responded positively to the appeal however, the resources mobilised by UNICEF, some US$3.2 
million, fell far short of the requirements; understandably, development work does not evoke as much 




also provided funding directly to their home NGOs or through their development aid agencies; but 
again, the funds provided fell short of the interventions that NGOs had planned.  
 
According to World Agro-Forestry (2005:18), the failure of the 2004 long rains (March–June) 
particularly in the Coast and Eastern Provinces and to a lesser extend; the North-Eastern Province 
resulted in another drought in Kenya. This time round, an estimated 2.3 million people required food 
aid; in response, World Food Programme (2004) appealed for and mobilised food commodities to meet 
the food aid needs of the 2.3 million people; the cost was approximately US$82 million. This number 
of people requiring food aid represented a 16 percent reduction on the figure of 2.75 million people 
who received food aid during the 1999-2001 drought while the amount spent on food this time round 
($82 million) represented a 24 percent reduction on the $102 million worth of food distributed in 1999-
2001. Donor response to the recovery through to development interventions implemented by NGOs 
between 2001 and 2004 had indeed been limited at only 32 percent of the appeal all the same, a 
reduction in both the number of people requiring food aid in 2004 and the corresponding reduction in 
the cost of the relief operation suggested improvements in the resilience of communities against 
drought.  A possible explanation given for such improvements was that notwithstanding the less than 
optimal level of funding and the consequent limitations in the scope of the mitigation interventions 
implemented by NGOs between 2001 and 2004; the interventions had certainly made a difference in 
reducing the degree of vulnerability within communities.  
 
On their own part, NGOs argued that had they had adequate resources, vulnerability would have been 
reduced to an even higher level than the 16 percent recorded. The arguments by NGOs were noted 
however, according to the World Food Programme (2004); the 2004 drought was not as severe or as 
widespread as that of 1999-2001 which was on record as the worst in thirty-seven years. Against this 
background, the attribution of the reduction in vulnerability in communities to NGO interventions 
implemented between 2001 and 2004 raised questions with some stakeholder groups arguing that the 
reduction was but only a reflection of the fact that the 2004 drought was not as severe or as widespread 
as that of 1999-2001. In Machakos District according to the Government of Kenya (2011), in a 
situation in which the impact of the 2004 drought was not as severe relative to that of 1999-2001, 
NGOs found it even more difficult to secure funding from their traditional donors to consolidate the 
post-drought recovery through to development interventions they had started in 2001. All the same and 
with meagre resources mobilised from other sources, some NGOs remained in the communities 
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consolidating post drought recovery through to development interventions they had started in 2001 
albeit, on a reduced scale and narrower scope. This account was later confirmed by the NGOs 
themselves.  
 
Typical of a trend in which Kenya was experiencing a drought on average every two years, the Inter-
Agency Food Security Steering Group of the Government of Kenya’s (2005a: 4) reported a near total 
failure of the short rains (November-January) in twenty six Districts and estimated that 3.5 million 
people would require food aid between March 2006 and February 2007. Once again, the drought was 
declared a national disaster and according to a joint Food Security Update issued by the Government of 
Kenya, FEWSNET &WFP (2006: 3) the volume of food aid required to avert famine between March 
2006 and February 2007 was estimated at 396,525 metric tonnes at an estimated cost of $227.3 million. 
Notwithstanding the fact that during the period 1999-2001 and in 2004, donors had injected some (US) 
$102 million and $82 million worth food relief into drought relief operations respectively, typical of 
humanitarian emergency situations; the drought evoked sympathy from the international donor 
community and they generously responded without much persuasion. So much was the generosity that 
by April, $100 million or 44 percent of the total appeal had been mobilised; this is important to note for 
by then, the cyclical pattern of drought episodes and a trend of increasingly decreasing shorter intervals 
in the previous ten years had been established.  
 
The impact of the drought episodes of 1999-2001 and 2006 in Kenya suggests that the number of 
people in need of food aid in 2006 estimated at 3.5 million represented an increase of 27 percent 
increase on the 1999-2001figure of  2.75 million and 52 percent on the 2004 figure of 2.3 million 
people. In terms of the cost of food aid, there was an increase from $102 million in 1999-2001 to $227 
or approximately a 122 percent increase; this translates into a per capita expenditure on food aid of $27 
in 1999-2001 and $65 in 2006. The irony of it all is that while a phenomenal $100 million was 
mobilised for the 2006 relief operation within a relatively short period, donors had not shown the same 
enthusiasm in responding to the UNICEF appeal for funding for long term preventive, preparedness 
and mitigation measures in the aftermath of the 1999-2001 drought and even less so in the aftermath of 
the 2004 drought. Such lack of enthusiasm in funding long term mitigation measures is evident from 
the cited study carried out by Campanaro et al. in 2002; a period which coincided with the UNICEF 
appeal. It can thus be concluded that while increasingly, donors acknowledged the fact that longer term 




such acknowledgement did not always translate into concrete action in terms of availing funding for 
such interventions. Such a contradiction will be revisited in the chapter on relationships between NGOs 
and other stakeholders in humanitarian interventions.  
In a situation in which the number of people requiring food aid in 2006 was higher than that during the 
1999-2001 and 2004 drought episodes, it can be argued that notwithstanding the fact that NGOs had 
been implementing post-drought recovery through to development interventions since 2001, 
vulnerability within communities actually increased between the two periods; understandably, with 
limited resources, there was a limit to what they could do. Indeed, the nature and scope of interventions 
were limited by inadequate funding however; failure to reduce vulnerability within communities can 
also be the result of the quality of interventions and in particular, the implementation approaches and 
methods used. It is possible that the quality of interventions may have been compromised as elaborated 
earlier by what Edwards and Hulme (1998:8) observed as the tendency by NGOs to prioritise 
accountability upwards over their grassroots constituencies as well as overemphasis on short-term 
quantitative outputs as demanded by donors. This is particularly important for while some gains were 
made in 2004, these were reserved in 2006 as is evident from the increase in the number of people 
requiring food aid. That being said, such failure to sustainably reduce vulnerability within communities 
cannot be attributed exclusively to NGOs for while they may have been the only actors in the drought 
mitigation interventions; there are many “behind the scenes actors”. Such actors are represented first of 
all, by NGOs’ back donors (government, institutional and corporate alike) and it is possible that the 
post drought interventions implemented between 2001 and 2006 were limited in nature and scope by 
corresponding limitations in funding and/or by restrictions on what activities could be used for without 
due consideration of the most pressing needs the ground. Secondly, there are the host governments 
who wield the power to decide what NGOs will do where, when and even how and last but not least, 
there are the beneficiary communities themselves in who there will be no commitment to the 
interventions if they are not involved in decisions on the priority needs and what will be done about 
them in their interest. Community commitment and a sense of ownership are pre-requisites for the 
success in development interventions. 
As is evident from the foregoing, NGOs are but only one of a number of parties operating in a complex 
partnership which is often characterized by divergent and conflicting interests and motives. In such 
partnerships, first of all, donors are inarguably the “fiddlers” who by virtue of their “dollar power” 
name the “tune” in terms of decisions on what NGOs can do, where, when and in some cases, even 
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how. Secondly, host governments by virtue of their “turf power” hold the key to the nature, scope, 
where and when NGO humanitarian interventions can take place within their sovereign territories as 
such, the establishment of a country presence by an NGO is at the pleasure of the host government. 
The only exception is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for which the Geneva 
Conventions confer on the organisation, the “Right of Initiative” to intervene albeit, only in conflict 
situations. Finally there are the beneficiary communities themselves who at the height of a crisis are 
often highly susceptible to suggestions of what is in their best interests and are only too happy that 
someone is doing something about their situation. Such an attitude by beneficiary communities is 
illustrated by Narayan, Chambers, Shah & Petesch (2000: 224) in a study they carried out in which 
they quoted a villager in Zambia who stated “…Had it not been for PUSH (an NGO), we would be 
dead…”  However, the scholars caution that while deeply appreciated in many places, once the worst is 
over for the communities, NGOs do not systematically receive high ratings on criteria considered 
important by poor people some of who would like to be involved in decision making in community 
projects implemented by NGOs.  
In 1994, a “Code of Conduct” which spelt out the principles of conduct for NGOs in disaster response 
interventions was published by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR). The first 
of such principles (SCHR, 1994: 5) is that “…The humanitarian imperative comes first…” the Code 
also confers an obligation on humanitarian actors to provide humanitarian assistance whenever and 
wherever it is needed the most and in accordance with the principles of neutrality and impartiality. 
Originally eight international NGOs that became the Steering Committee signed up to the Code; many 
more have signed up since then. Recognising that strict adherence to the Code at all times is possible 
only when NGOs have the latitude to prioritise the most pressing needs in the communities they work, 
a recommendation made in the Code to donor governments (SCHR, 1994: 12) is they should provide 
funding with a guarantee of operational independence. Unfortunately, this is not always the case and 
Smillie and Minear (2003: 5) observe that while donors place the onus for quality, efficiency and 
effectiveness on service delivery agencies, the restricting and/or earmarking of funds for reasons other 
than the needs on the ground renders the agencies unable to meet the impact standards dictated by the 
same donors and/or perform to their own satisfaction in terms of strictly adhering to their principles 
and values.  
 
According to Smillie (1995: 2), earmarking funds for political interests was evident in Ethiopia where 




dismissed by western governments as exaggerations by a brutal pro-Soviet regime. During the period 
that western governments were denying that the situation was desperate, NGOs could not access funds 
from their governments to intervene in the humanitarian crisis and the limited interventions they 
carried out were facilitated by meagre resources mobilised from private sources. Likewise, host 
government decisions on what is to be done for communities in stress, when and how are often rooted 
in vested political interests and this is particularly so in the sensitive issue of food security. Thus, the 
“District” or some other administrative structure that an NGO might find itself allocated may not 
necessarily be where the most pressing needs are; in such situations, NGOs have two hard choices; to 
ignore the principle, “…The humanitarian imperative comes first…”  (SCHR, 1994: 5) and at least be 
seen to be doing something in the “here and now” or to strictly adhere to the principle but then risk 
being told to pack, go and practise their humanity elsewhere! 
 
With respect to communities, the researcher concurs with the views by Narayan et al. (2000: 224) that 
once the worst is over, NGOs do not necessarily receive high ratings on criteria considered important 
by the poor they serve and in particular, their involvement in decision making on the nature and scope 
of projects. The researcher has personal experience of such community attitudes in Zimbabwe in the 
aftermath of a drought relief operation implemented during the period 1991-1992. An NGO which had 
provided food relief food assistance in Gwanda District in Matebeleland South Province remained 
behind to engage communities in post-drought relief activities; unfortunately, the only funds the NGO 
had at its disposal were strictly earmarked for environmental conservation and in particular, the 
planting of indigenous trees. At a meeting with the community to discuss post drought interventions, 
the NGO was ridiculed when it announced that the funds available were for environmental 
conservation activities involving the planting of indigenous trees. Community opinion leaders reacted 
angrily with one telling the NGO that if that was the only assistance the NGO could provide for the 
community, it should look elsewhere for community engagement for they could not feed their children 
on trees! It turned out the most pressing felt needs within the community at that point in time, was the 
construction of water points and the restocking of their domestic herds. These felt needs it can be 
argued, were very sound not least, because they represented interventions which would address the 
needs of the present (food production and rebuilding livelihoods) and the future (increasing community 
assets and thus resilience against future droughts) in an ordered and logical manner.  
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Another experience that the researcher had was in a community in the coastal District of Bagamoyo in 
Tanzania in 2004/5; while the epicentre of the Tsunami which struck Asia was thousands of kilometres 
from the East African coastline; all the same, the effects were felt in three East African countries 
namely, Tanzania, Kenya and Somalia; albeit, not to the same degree as in Asia. With respect to 
people, the damage was limited to minor injuries however, damage to infrastructure was significant 
and thanks to the “CNN effect”, some $15 million including unsolicited donations was raised in an 
appeal launched by one NGO. The focus of the interventions would be the reconstruction and/or 
repairs to damaged houses and communally owned buildings; schools; clinics, churches and mosques 
amongst others. Given that the communities were predominantly rural and construction materials were 
readily available locally, the relief operation was completed ahead of schedule.  At the outset, it had 
been agreed with the donors that any funds left over could be rolled over into a second phase involving 
risk reduction and disaster preparedness interventions and specifically, against the impact of another 
Tsunami in the future. To this effect, the post disaster interventions planned involved building on local 
knowledge and traditional practices which had been known to be effective against comparable threats 
to community wellbeing in the past. The well considered intention of both the donor and the NGO was 
to render communities better prepared and to put into place, risk reduction measures to ensure that they 
would be able to cope unaided if ever faced with such a threat in the future.  At a meeting with the 
community to develop the work plan, the NGO was ridiculed with community opinion leaders arguing 
that there were more pressing urgent needs; in particular, they cited the number children that had died 
the previous year of malaria and malnutrition and were adamant that they would not be party to 
wasting money on so called disaster preparedness and risk reduction activities against a threat that 
scientists predict might not recur for decades!  
In addition to such community attitudes against what they perceive as mismatched priorities, attitudes 
within the NGO community have also been cited as a contributory factor for the seemingly lack of 
impact of their interventions and in particular, the use of labels like “poor”, “helpless” etc. to describe 
communities in stress. Narayan et al. (2000: 264) note that historically, many development 
professionals have given priority to and used the material aspect of people's lives to arrive at these 
labels. They further note that important as this is, poor people's views of wellbeing span across wide 
and varied experiences and meanings including material, physical, social, psychological and spiritual 
dimensions as such, the sole use of material criteria is misleading.  The researcher concurs with these 




resources for relief assistance can result in a situation in which in time, communities start believing 
that they are so poor that they cannot do anything to help themselves. Such was the basis of the well 
founded fears of the Kenya Government in 2001that readily available relief assistance as a response to 
the plight of the “poor and helpless” drought stricken communities would lead to dependency on food 
aid. Dependency syndrome regardless of its origin, compromises the survival instinct which is so 
natural to man and results in individuals or whole communities failing to activate instinctual defence 
and coping mechanism in the face of threats or hazards to their wellbeing.  
The phenomenon is evident in the experience of a retired Archbishop of the Anglican Church in Kenya 
(Gitari 2005) who at some point in time during his career; at the invitation of a community, he presided 
over a church service to pray for the survival of crops that were withering under unfavourable weather 
conditions. For two consecutive years hitherto, the weather conditions had been worse prompting an 
NGO to implement an emergency intervention involving the distribution of fertilizer to avert an 
imminent disaster; total crop failure. With weather conditions showing a marked improvement this 
time round and considering the situation being not so desperate, the NGO had rounded up the 
emergency intervention and left the community. Following the church service, the Archbishop went 
from one small holding to the next praying for the crops but in the process, he deliberately skipped one 
farm; the owner was surprised and asked why his farm had been ignored. The Archbishop’s response 
to the farmer was that his crops did not need prayers but instead, some honest and serious hard work in 
land preparation prior to planting followed by equally honest and serious hard work in the care of the 
crops during germination through to maturity! According to Tandon’s classification alluded to earlier, 
it is likely that the NGOs which had donated fertiliser perceived itself as purely functional as such, 
having provided assistance during the critical phase, it considered its job done. However, while the 
intervention did avert a disaster by preventing total crop failure during the bad years, an unintended 
outcome was the nurturing of dependency. At the same time, had the NGO not intervened, it would 
have come under fire for failing to fulfil its mandate of alleviating human suffering; for NGOs 
therefore, it is clearly a “lose-lose” situation! 
 
1.4 The Study 
 
1.4.1 Purpose of the study 
Following a drought episode in Kenya during the period 1999-2001, NGOs that were involved in the 
relief operations remained behind in communities implementing post-drought recovery through to 
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development interventions. Reflecting on the findings of an evaluation of the relief operation led by the 
UNDP, the interventions were carefully selected and aimed at increasing the resilience of the target 
communities against a similar phenomenon in the future. Amongst the interventions, health and 
nutrition education, provision of underground water sources and agricultural extension services 
featured prominently amongst a long list of planned activities. However, due to limited donor interest 
in funding the interventions, the nature and scope of the interventions were limited; all the same, when 
Kenya experienced another drought in 2004; the number of people affected and requiring food aid was 
16 percent less than that recorded during the drought of 1999-2001.  In the light of this development, it 
was assumed that amongst other factors and while limited in scope, the post drought interventions 
implemented by NGOs had made a contribution to increasing community resilience against the drought 
in 2004. However, another drought experienced in Kenya in 2006 proved such an assumption wrong 
for the number of people requiring food aid increased by some 52 percent on the 2004 figures and 
despite the gains made between 2001 and 2004 in terms of an increase in the resilience of communities 
against drought, the number of people vulnerable to drought in 2006 represented a 27 percent increase 
on the 1999-2001 figures.  A trend in which the number of people requiring food aid in 2006 increased 
by 27 and 52 percent on the 1999-2001 and 2004 figures respectively; suggested that people were more 
vulnerable in 2006 than they had been in 1999-2001and in 2004. The trend also suggests that not only 
had the post drought interventions implemented by NGOs between 2001 through to 2006 been 
unsustainable but more seriously, the gains made between 2001 and 2004 had been reversed. The study 
sought to examine and identify factors that contributed to the increase in the vulnerability of people to 
drought; draw important lessons from the experience and translate the lessons into recommendations 
which hopefully, will stimulate further debate on what NGOs can and should do for more effective 
interventions.  
1.4.2 Importance of the study   
Such a debate is important today and specifically in the context of Kenya, where it is apparent that in 
the past two decade or so, drought episodes have increasingly assumed a clearly identifiable and 
predictable cyclical pattern with the intervals between the episodes getting shorter. The search for 
approaches leading to a permanent solution in terms of sustainable development is no longer a matter 
of choice. Debate on permanent solutions to the sustainability of NGO interventions is important now 
more than ever before for as McGann and Johnstone (2006: 1) point out, NGOs have moved from 




every aspect of international relations and policymaking. Jennings (1995:13) concurs, adding that 
being frustrated with state inefficiency in programme management coupled with frequent misallocation 
of resources and an urban bias, official donors increasingly turned to NGOs as an alternative vehicle 
for channelling development assistance to the Third World. In addition, the economic crisis in the 90s 
coupled with pressure from international financial institutions for reductions in public sector spending 
resulted in many a southern government withdrawing from the provision of certain public services. 
NGOs moved in to fill in the gap and in the sphere of health for example, DeJong (1991: 4-5) notes 
that donors perceived NGOs as a viable alternative for service delivery; at the same time and in the 
face of declining resources and difficulties in providing adequate services for their people, host African 
governments increasingly recognized the contribution of NGOs in this sector and welcomed them.  
On the increasing reliance by donors on NGOs as an alternative vehicle through which to channel 
development assistance to the Third World, Chege (1999: 1) notes that this was clearly evident in a US 
policy adopted in 1992 in which the importance of working more closely with NGOs was emphasised; 
understandably, host governments were widely seen as corrupt and inefficient. In time, other major 
donors notably Britain and Germany followed suit; government-NGO partnerships became the trend 
and a survey conducted in the United States in 2005 (Williamson 2005) suggested that in general, 
NGOs were more trusted to do what is right than governments and business. The trust and confidence 
in NGOs eventually outstripped trust in states and enterprises in the US and Europe and in an operating 
environment characterised by such perfect conditions, NGOs unleashed their energy and zeal in pursuit 
of the fulfilment of their mandate. They became a positive force in influencing domestic and 
international policies and affairs; working to alleviate poverty; protecting human rights, preserving the 
environment and providing relief worldwide. Williamson however points outs that the popularity of 
NGOs with donors stimulated a parallel surge in interest in the responsibilities such privileged 
influence brought about adding that in what appeared to be a backlash against NGOs, debate amongst 
the various stakeholders increasingly focused on their accountability and more broadly, on their 
legitimacy.  
 
The observation of such a trend is shared by Jennings (1995: 14) who observed that the increased 
resources available to NGOs were correspondingly and increasingly accompanied by rising 
expectations among donors of what NGOs could deliver as well as demands for accountability. In 
many ways, the demands for accountability were provoked by the NGOs themselves for as Lee 
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(2004:4) points out, since the second half of the 1990’s, NGOs had been challenging companies, 
governments and multilateral organizations to become more transparent and accountable. In time, the 
tables turned on NGOs and according to Christensen (2004: 1-2), the do-good nature and the 
commitment of NGOs to their cause were no longer considered sufficient to produce positive results; 
they were increasingly required to demonstrate what their programmes accomplished on the ground. 
Such demands by stakeholders gained prominence in the aftermath of what was perceived as a 
horrifying failure of NGOs to discharge their mandate during the Rwanda genocide in 1994 during 
which it was alleged that refugee camps were used as recruiting and vehicle fuelling stations by 
organized bands of killers. Since then and increasingly, NGO performance, accountability and 
legitimacy has become the subject of scrutiny, suspicion or even outright scepticism as is evident from 
the terms that have used to describe them as alluded to earlier.  
 
Suspicion or even outright scepticism expressed by the public at large can be dismissed as an over-
reaction for in humanitarian disasters in particular, NGOs are hailed as champions of the humanitarian 
cause. However, suspicion and scepticism have been expressed in credible circles, by academics and 
political analysts alike; sources which cannot be easily dismissed. Amongst political analysts is 
DeGregori (2002) who argues that while NGOs are groups that claim to be the voice of the poor and 
powerless; groups who take to the streets in protest against the evils of globalization, multi-national 
corporations, modern technology and biotechnology, more often than not, such groups are not helping 
the poor but hurting them. He defends his views by citing the example of Southern Africa where he 
alleges that as drought, famine, disease and death was stalking the region in 1992/3, the anti-GM food 
campaigns and false fears spread by some NGOs hindered the relief efforts of the WFP. He concluded 
that like the multi-nationals that they criticize; the Green, anti-globalization and Environmental NGOs 
are revenue-maximizing organizations who make their money by marketing fear without any regard for 
the human cost adding that inducing fear and fundraising are their full-time jobs.  
 
In the host countries and while governments increasingly recognized and welcomed the contribution of 
NGOs, Campbell (1996; 9) observed that in states where government capacity was weak and local 
government had almost disintegrated under structural adjustment, a tendency by NGOs was to bypass 
state institutions and establish “parallel structures” for implementing their projects. In addition, the 
increasing tendency by donors to channel funds through NGOs resulted in competition for resources 




government circles. In turn, the resentment of NGOs by host governments often found expression in 
restrictive measures being taken against NGOs in order to curb their power and control over 
development resources and their influence on communities. Fear of influence on communities can 
extend to the political sphere and NGOs involved in civil rights education and advocacy have been 
accused of inciting the masses when a host government is under pressure to deliver on election 
promises. Vaknin (2005) argues that such a perception by host governments of NGO inciting the 
masses is not baseless for under the guise of think tanks and lobby groups, some NGOs are 
ideologically biased; he cites the example of the International Crisis Group which he alleges, had 
openly interfered on behalf of the opposition in parliamentary elections in Macedonia adding that 
others had done so in Belarus and Ukraine; in Zimbabwe and Israel amongst a long list of others. He 
concludes that no field of government activity is now exempt from the glare of NGO's adding that they 
serve as self-appointed witnesses, judges, jury and executioner rolled into one.  
 
In addition to imposing restrictions on when, where and how an NGO operates; the consequences of 
being perceived as interfering in domestic politics can extend to outright deregistration of the 
organisation. In turn, deregistration means that the resident and work permits of its expatriate staff are 
withdrawn and they must leave the country immediately with little time to plan the exit. Mbofana 
(2004) cites an example of such a reaction to perceived NGO “misconduct” by the government in 
Zimbabwe where in the disputed elections of 2002, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
made substantial gains. Realising that its grip on power since independence was sliding, the 
government blamed its misfortune on “campaigns of misinformation of the masses” by NGOs and in 
particular, those involved in civil rights education and advocacy. In the aftermath of the elections, the 
ruling ZANU-PF party tabled an NGO Bill in Parliament which required NGOs not only to declare 
their sources of funding but also to give detailed accounts of how they used the funds. More seriously, 
it empowered the government to deregister an NGO whose source and use of funding was considered 
“suspect”! The Bill was subsequently “fast tracked” through Parliament and conveniently passed as 
law a year before the Parliamentary elections of April 2005.  
 
When donors and host governments demand more accountability of NGOs by amongst other things, 
empirical evidence of the impact of interventions and/or are disgruntled by the lack thereof, NGOs can 
take comfort in attributing this to the need by these two categories of stakeholders to advance their own 
vested interests. However, when such demands and/or disgruntlement come from the poor and 
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disadvantaged communities served, they have to be taken seriously even when seemingly unjustified or 
unreasonable. Appeasing all the stakeholders in development partnerships is a tricky balancing act for 
NGOs for on the one hand; the economic, political and/or security interests of donors may well be such 
that there is no goodness of fit between the needs on the ground and what they or the communities 
perceive as the priorities. When there is no goodness of fit between the priorities of donors and the 
needs on the ground at the same time as NGOs are dependent on donors for resources inevitably, the 
choice of interventions will be limited to those for which donors will fund but which might not 
necessarily address the communities’ felt needs. Furthermore, while host governments are only too 
happy to “download” what is primarily their responsibility onto NGOs however, they do not always 
create the space which is a pre-requisite for NGOs to discharge their humanitarian mandate effectively. 
Worse still and in some instances, in the quest to cover up their failure to adequately provide for their 
peoples, some host governments have been promoting the idea that NGO services are a right and not a 
privilege! In the process, aid-induced dependency which is gradually degenerating into chronic 
proportions has become the order of the day in many a community in Africa. Regardless of the genesis 
of felt needs within communities, induced by governments for political mileage or otherwise; NGO 
interventions must always be designed such that they meet the felt needs of communities and no 
amount of blame apportioning will absolve them from accountability for failing to do so. At the same 
time and more importantly, interventions must be designed such that they do not render the said 
communities even more vulnerable and dependent than they were before the well intended 
interventions.  
 
On interventions that render communities even more vulnerable than they were hitherto, Dunford 
(1998) argues that this was the case in many a poor community when micro-financing development 
interventions became popular with donors in the late 1990s. NGOs embraced the concept in the belief 
that this was indeed an innovative approach to helping people escape poverty in the long term 
however, in their enthusiasm to use the approach for poverty alleviation; they increasingly adopted 
"best practice" performance standards of the commercial banking industry. In their enthusiasm, they 
completely overlooked the fact that in the first place, the failure of the market to meet the enormous 
demand of the poor for financial services could be traced to the performance standards of this very 
industry! Thus, notwithstanding the fact that NGOs principles and values are linked to the higher 
purpose of changing the conditions of the poor; "microfinance" became the main preoccupation and the 




very conditions they were trying to ameliorate. The end result was that the poor became poorer; 
Dunford (1998) cautioned NGOs to take note of the fact that “...the road to hell is often paved with 
good intentions...”  
 
These sentiments are worth noting for over the years, of the billions of dollars worth of development 
assistance injected into the continent by the donor community, a substantial portion channelled through 
NGOs; however, NGO sceptics argue that there is little to show for a good return on investment in 
terms of sustainable development. The real challenge for NGOs as implied earlier by Edwards and 
Hulme (1998:8) is their tendency to direct accountability “upwards” understandably; they continue to 
be heavily dependent on government, institutional and corporate sector donors for resources to 
facilitate their work. Borrel, Donini, Kent, Minear, Moomaw, Mowjee, Najam, Purdin, Walker & 
Wisner (2004:74) share these views and further observe that a growing trend is one of NGO 
programming decisions being driven by for what, where and when  funding is available. They caution 
of the danger that responding to the whims of donors may mean moving away from particular thematic 
or geographic areas in which they have developed expertise and instead, pursuing activities that are not 
likely to have any real impact. The scholars conclude that NGOs face enormous pressures to maintain 
their programme identity and integrity when faced with funders with particularistic agendas adding that 
if NGOs are indeed organizations whose values distinguish them from other actors, they follow donor 
fashions at their own risk.  
 
This last point is worth noting for this is what appears to have happened when micro-financing was 
fashionable with donors and NGOs embraced the concept wholesale but with disastrous consequences; 
rendering communities more vulnerable and poorer than they had been prior to the interventions. Such 
an outcome of NGO interventions is inexcusable and no amount of blame apportioning can absolve an 
NGO from creating such a situation amongst the poor and disadvantaged not least, because these 
categories are their very “raison d’etre”. In any case, it can be argued that the conditions which 
government, institutional and corporate donors attach to funding of NGO work are designed to meet 
their own accountability obligations to their constituencies; tax payers, member state shareholders and 
investor shareholders respectively. It can also be argued that the same can be said of host government 
for while the principle is selectively observed, at least in theory, whatever decisions they make on what 
NGOs can do, where and when is in part fulfilment of their accountability obligations to the people 
who conferred the mandate to rule on them. For NGOs and while rarely demanded; but as their “raison 
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d’etre”, accountability should primarily be to the communities they serve; at the same time and in 
order to keep the resources flowing in, they have to appease donors however, in situations in which 
often, NGO and donor priorities are divergent if not in conflict, NGOs often find themselves caught in 
the “Spaghetti Junction” implied by Smillie (1995: 238).  
 
In addition to identifying the factors that contributed to the increase in the vulnerability of people to 
drought in Kenya in 2006, the study also seeks to examine how multidirectional influences as 
represented by the interests and priorities of the various stakeholders in development partnerships 
impact the outcomes of NGO interventions. It is hoped that an analysis of such a complex and 
multifaceted interplay between divergent and often conflicting stakeholder interests and motivations 
will stimulate debate which will lead to further in depth studies on how the problem of what clearly is 
an unequal power relationship amongst the stakeholders in “partnership for development” can be 
resolved. This is more important now than ever before for perceived as they once were as the 
undisputed “champions of the humanitarian cause”; NGOs did not have to worry about their image and 
reputation as long as they were distributing alms to the poor.  In time however, with the winds of 
change blowing across the donor community, host governments and the beneficiary communities alike, 
these stakeholders increasingly demanded that NGOs be accountable upward, laterally and downward 
respectively.  Accountability to constituencies whose interests and motives are diverse and/or even 
conflicting means that there will be occasions during which NGOs are caught in the “Spaghetti 
Junction” implied by Smillie. Success in navigating their way out of such a dilemma requires NGOs to 
develop strategies that facilitate the realisation of their noble goal of sustainably improving the 
conditions of the poor and disadvantaged at the same time as meet the expectations of all the 
stakeholders in the partnership for development.  
1.4.3 Focus of the study  
The focus of the study is the then Machakos District in the then Eastern Province of Kenya of which 
the District capital Machakos Town is located approximately sixty-five kilometres south of the state 
capital, Nairobi. A new constitution promulgated in 2010 dissolved the Province and District system of 
Local Government administration and replaced them with a system of Counties, all the same, by virtue 
of the fact that during the period under study, the Local Government administrative system was one of 
Provinces and Districts, the study will be based on the old system. The District covered an area of 




fell into “Region Four” a category classified as semi-arid or marginal; understandably, only 26 percent 
of area covered by the District had only medium potential for agricultural production. In addition, 
agricultural activities were in the main, the cultivation of rain fed crops; this is the explanation for the 
fact that during the drought of 1999-2001; the worst recorded in thirty seven years, Machakos was 
severely affected along with thirty seven other Districts. According to the International Federation of 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC 2004: 1), 260,497 people or approximately 29 percent of 
Machakos District’s estimated population of 906,644 (1999 census) were affected by the drought and 
required food aid. In the aftermath of drought (Community Development Trust Fund 2002); a number 
of both international and local NGOs which had been involved in drought relief operations remained in 
the communities engaging them in drought mitigation and preparedness activities. In the main, the 
activities during this post drought phase were the construction of water sources, agriculture and other 
drought mitigation related projects; the goal of the activities and projects was to facilitate early 
recovery and enhance longer term food-sufficiency in the District. To this effect; in addition to the 
US$3.2 mobilised by UNICEF and disbursed through international NGOs for the purpose; donor 
governments also provided funding directly to their home NGOs.  
According to World Agro-Forestry (2005: 18), the failure of the 2004 long rains (March–June) dashed 
hopes for a good maize harvest in the marginal agricultural areas of Eastern, Central and Coast 
Provinces as well as the southern Maasai rangelands. In Eastern Province, of the thirteen Districts 
making up the Province, seven were affected and people needed food aid however, Machakos District 
was not amongst them. To this effect, there were no food aid interventions implemented either by the 
Government of Kenya or NGOs as people could meet their basic food requirements without external 
assistance. It did indeed appear that community resilience against drought in communities in Machakos 
had been strengthened to a level that had seen them “graduate” from reliance on food aid to being food 
secure even during a drought. However, when Kenya was struck by another drought in 2006 (Kenya 
Food Security Steering Group 2006), 29 percent of Machakos District population needed food aid with 
the figures in four of the twelve Divisions making up the District estimated to be as high as 50 percent.  
1.4.4 Statement of the research problem  
According to the Government of Kenya (2005b: 6), in 2002, the population of Machakos District was 
estimated at 954,082 while in 2008, it was projected to be around 1,056,535; if the year 2005 is taken 
as the mid-point between the two periods and it is assumed that the population growth rate remained 
fairly constant; at the beginning of 2006, the District’s population can be estimated at 1,005,308.  With 
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29 percent of the District’s population requiring food aid in 2006; this translates into an estimated 
291,539 people or 31,000 more than in 1999-2001 when the figure stood at 260,497. Such a 
development suggests that contrary to the impression given in 2004, not only were communities in 
Machakos District still vulnerable to droughts but even more people had become vulnerable. Against 
this background, it can be argued that the seeming reduction in the vulnerability of communities 
against drought in Machakos in 2004 was not sustainable because while in relative terms, the 
percentage of the District’s population vulnerable to drought in 1999-2001 was the same as in 2006; in 
real terms however, an even higher number of people were vulnerable to drought in 2006. 
1.4.5 The research questions 
The fact that the interventions were not sustainable raises the following questions: 
i) What were the factors that facilitated the gains made in terms of increased community resilience 
against drought in 2004? 
ii) What were the factors that contributed to a reversal in 2006, of the gains made in 2004? 
iii) What can NGOs do in the future, to build on the factors that facilitate the impact of their 
interventions and/or overcome the constraints that act against such an impact? 
 
1.4.6 Objectives of the study  
 
In order to answer the above question the objectives of the study are as follows:  
 
• To identify and analyse factors that facilitated gains made with respect to increased community 
resilience against drought between 2001 and 2004; through post drought recovery through to 
development interventions implemented by NGOs in Machakos District.  
 
• To examine and establish why the gains made during the period were reversed in 2006; to the 
extent that the degree of vulnerability to drought in communities reverted to the same level as it 
had been before the interventions of 2001-2004. 
 
• To explore and recommend how best NGOs can build on the facilitating factors and/or overcome 
the constraints for even greater impact in future interventions at the same time as meet the needs of 





1.4.7 Limitations to and scope of the study 
First of all, the study is focusing only on one of thirty seven and one of twenty six Districts in Kenya 
affected by the drought of 1999-2001 and 2006 respectively as such, the impact of NGO interventions 
in other Districts may present a completely different picture thus, conclusions made from this study 
may not necessarily apply to the other Districts. All the same, sceptics and critics of NGOs will argue 
that lack of observable impact of interventions even in one community let alone a whole District is 
inexcusable.  
 
Secondly, the study is focusing only on food security, a sector which inarguably, is a very sensitive 
one; according to Macrae &Zwi (1992: 301) food aid and food security issues have been used for 
political, economic and military purposes by governments of the day. In the political sphere, 
undermining the ability of communities to produce and/or to access food renders them destitute and 
dependent on the state or welfare agencies, such dependence makes them politically compliant. The 
views by these scholars are not baseless for during a drought in Zimbabwe in 2004; in an interview 
with the British Broadcasting Corporation (Focus on Africa 2004), the then Bishop of the Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Matebeleland alleged that the government was denying much-needed food aid and 
related food security support to targeted rural communities. The targeted communities the allegation 
continued; were those in the strongholds of the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC). The system used to deny MDC supporters of food aid and related post drought support (seeds; 
fertiliser etc.) involved a requirement that households produce a valid ruling party membership card as 
a precondition to receiving such aid. Food aid can also be used by the government of the day to portray 
the image of a caring government by claiming credit for mobilising food aid and/or food security 
support especially during droughts. At the same time, opposition groups often exaggerate the plight of 
the affected people in the hope that this will trigger anti-government public opinion to their political 
advantage. Against this background, caution has to be exercised in appraising accounts of the situation 
given by various groups and parties; for that the accounts and perceptions maybe influenced by 
political considerations cannot be ruled out.  
 
Thirdly, the study is limited to post drought recovery through to development interventions; this sector 
is but only one of a whole host of other sectors in which NGOs were involved in Machakos District 
during the period; it may well turn out that given the relatively low level of political interest in these 
other sectors and by implication less interference, NGO performance displays a completely different 
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picture. Fourthly, the period under scrutiny of necessity means that this is a historical study implying a 
heavy reliance on records of the institutions involved and the institutional memory of subjects at the 
community level. Depending on the organisational culture of the institutions involved, records dating 
back to 1999/2001 may be hard to come by. Finally, institutional memory of subjects at the community 
level going back close to ten years may be scanty for since then, Kenya has experienced three more 
severe droughts generalised across most parts of the country and the possibility that accounts of 
experiences will be mixed up cannot be ruled out.  
 
1.5 The research setting and design   
1.5.1 Research setting 
The research setting is Machakos District in the then Eastern Province in Kenya (up to 2010 when a 
new constitution abolished Districts and Provinces and replaced them by Counties). The rationale for 
the choice of Machakos is that the District was classified as marginal or semi-arid in terms of 
agricultural productivity relative to the arid northern parts of the country where agricultural 
productivity is severely hampered by climatic conditions and community livelihoods are limited to 
pastoral activities. In a situation in which Machakos District was by no means the worst in terms of the 
potential for agricultural productivity, it was expected that post drought recovery through to 
development interventions implemented by NGOs would see communities coping with future droughts 
without external assistance. This did not happen instead, two years after seeming gains in community 
resilience against drought in 2004, the gains were reversed with the result that in 2006, the percentage 
of the District’s population in need of food aid was back to the level of 1999-2001 at 29 percent. 
Against this background, it can be argued that the drought mitigation and preparedness activities 
implemented from 2001 through to 2006 had not been sustainable.  
 
1.5.2 Research design 
Mouton (1996: 107-108) defines research design as a set of guidelines and instructions to be followed 
in addressing the research problem; the rationale for a research design is thus to help the researcher to 
plan and structure a research project in such a way that the eventual validity of the research findings is 
maximized through either minimizing or where possible, eliminating potential error. In addition, 
Mouton (1996:38) emphasises that the overriding principle in the choice of the various techniques is 
that they must be appropriate for the task at hand. The task at hand was to establish why between 2001 




NGOs in Machakos District had not been sustainable resulting in increased vulnerability of 
communities to drought in 2006 relative to 1999.  According to Denzin (1989: 83) qualitative research 
goes beyond mere fact and surface appearances; it extends to the translation of history into experience 
and establishes the significance of the experience or a sequence of events through the voices and 
feelings of the person or persons affected in accordance with their own reality. Parker (2004: 159) 
concurs with this assertion adding that qualitative research is the study of processes and behaviours in 
their natural settings; through which the researcher tries to make sense of phenomena and the meanings 
that people attribute to them. In the light of this; by seeking to “make sense” of why vulnerability 
communities increased (history); to establish the meanings attributed to such phenomenon by the 
people affected (experience) and the extent to which it affected the quality of life in the affected 
communities; the study is primarily qualitative research in design. In the interventions however, NGOs 
were not the only actors as such, the study also sought to establish the views and opinions from the 
other stakeholders in the main, donors, the host government and the NGOs themselves for in 
partnerships for development, these stakeholders play different roles in such interventions; directly or 
indirectly.  
 
On reality, Chambers, Wedel & Rodwell (1992: 293) argue that it is what people perceive it to be; as 
such, although a conceptual base may guide the evaluation, it is important to recognise that multiple 
realities and perspectives may exist amongst the subjects. In the light of this, there was some 
quantitative dimension to the study in so far as there was a need to cross-validate the subjects’ 
“reality”; such validation was done by examining records of vital indicators published by the host 
government and as validated by UN agencies. The study is focusing on the period, 2001-2006; as such, 
temporary considerations are such that the research will be a historical and descriptive study; finally, in 
the light of the third objective namely, to stimulate debate on how best NGOs can navigate their way 
out of what is a labyrinth of vested and often conflicting interests which compromise the impact of 
NGO interventions, it is an applied research study.  
 
A detailed account of the research methodology is described in Chapter 5. 
 
 
1.5.3 The layout of the study 
This first chapter is an introduction to the study; the second chapter looks at the course of development 
in Africa and some of the contributory factors to the discourse in the continent’s development path and 
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which discourse has resulted in millions of people being dependent on food aid year in year out since 
the early 80’s. This will be followed by revisiting development theory to establish the extent to which 
the different schools of thought explain the discourse in Africa’s development path from the dawn of 
independence to the present. This will be important to examine for some scholars assert that the status 
African states as the “poor cousin” in the global political economy today and the problems such a 
status generates, food insecurity amongst others; can be traced to a colonial legacy. In turn, the global 
political economy is a creation of and is nurtured by post colonial powers’ governments and 
institutions’ desire to maintain their pre-independence status and hence the emergence of neo-
colonialism.  Condemned to the status of the “poor cousin” in the new world order and unable to 
provide optimal basic services and food security for their people, African states welcomed NGOs to fill 
in the gaps created by their unenviable situation. But then, in so filling in the gaps, NGOs are but only 
one party in a partnership in which the other parties are their “back-donors” (government, institutional 
and private) whose generosity facilitate their humanitarian ventures; the host governments on whose 
sovereign territories NGOs discharge their humanitarian mandate and last but not least, the 
communities which are the beneficiaries of their noble mission. Against this background, the fourth 
chapter will be an in-depth examination of the “goodness of fit” with respect to the interests, motives 
and behaviour of each of these important stakeholders and the extent to which these dimensions 
facilitate and/or act as constraints to goal attainment by NGOs. Field work will follow the completion 
of the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter will capture the research methodology used followed by data 
presentation and findings (chapter 6) and finally, conclusions and recommendations (chapter 7). 
  
It is hoped that amongst the recommendations will be issues that will stimulate debate within the NGO 
community on how to position themselves for optimal relationship management which meets the needs 
first of all, of the communities which are NGOs raison d’ etre; their “back donors” whose generosity 
facilitate their work and host governments who hold the “chip” to access to communities in need at any 










CHAPTER 2:  
 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AFRICA: 
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE DISCOURSE IN THE CONTINENT’S DEVELOPMENT PATH. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
More than two decades after Timberlake (1998: x) described Africa as a continent in crisis; the crises 
continue unabated and some scholars argue that a colonial legacy and events during the Cold War were 
major contributory factors to the status of African states as the “poor cousin” in the global political 
economy today. This chapter analyses the extent to which this argument is valid at the same time as 
examine what role if any, internal factors might have contributed to a situation in which African states 
continue to be dependent on external aid up to the present day. Indeed, aid has become the lifeline of 
many an African state; in making improvements in the basic infrastructure, industrial production, 
salaries for civil services, the provision of basic services and even food security of which NGOs are in 
the forefront.  
 
According to Kinfe (1995: 9) colonialism had its roots in a mixture of adventure, greed and idealism all 
which drove Europeans to foreign lands; by the end of the sixteenth century, England had developed a 
commercial sea fleet which made it possible for the colonial power to penetrate the furthest corners of 
the earth. Schwab (2001:14) shares these views and notes that the decline in the profitability of 
plantation economies in the West Indies; the upsurge in anti-slavery movement activism and in time, 
the abolition of slavery in 1805; created an income gap and the need for an alternative means for filling 
the gap. According to Shillington (2005: 301), as the impact of these developments started to be felt, 
Africa offered Britain, France, Germany and other European powers an open market that would fill the 
income gap created as well as garner them a trade surplus. Thus, with Africa opening up as an open 
market, the economies of Europe; hitherto running negative trade balances increasingly offset them by 
the income from overseas investments in Africa. According to Schwab (2001:15) the need to maintain 
these lucrative markets saw an increase in adventurous explorations of the African continent by 
Europeans and one outcome of the explorations was official claims of large swaths of the continent by 
European monarchs and their governments.  
 
Such claims according to Kinfe (1995:10), led to fierce competition and even conflict; the competition 
was taken to even greater heights as the Industrial Revolution sweeping across Europe at the end of the 
18th century increased the need for raw materials for the fast growing industries. In addition, the 
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Industrial Revolution triggered urban migration as people were driven from the countryside to the 
towns and cities in search of work in the factories; such a development resulted in a decline in 
agricultural productivity. In Britain for example, such a shift in the mode of livelihood from agriculture 
to wage earning in cities and towns meant that Britain could no longer feed her growing population. To 
his effect, the colonies increasingly came to be perceived as valuable and indispensable assets for 
continued access to cheap and reliable sources of raw materials for the growing industrial sector and 
food commodities for the growing urban population. Willis (1985: 121-122) shares these views and 
notes that the increasing dependence on overseas assets for both raw materials and food amongst the 
colonial powers fuelled territorial ambitions resulting in the emergence of a new power struggle in 
Europe. The power struggle intensified following the humiliating defeat of France by Germany in the 
Franco-Prussian war in 1870 and bitter about the defeat and humiliation, France sought to mobilise 
other colonial powers in a campaign of animosity against Germany.  To this effect and according de 
Blij & Muller (2003: 304), France came up with a plot to play the other colonial powers against 
Germany by convincing them that Germany was about to consolidate the victory by extending the 
aggression to the colonies. Aware of such a plot and in order to pre-empt it, the then German 
Chancellor, Otto van Bismarck was proactive and sought to secure Germany's interests; he 
subsequently engaged fourteen European nations in a dialogue whose goal was to prevent potential 
conflict in the colonies in the future.  
 
According to Willis (1985: 122), as the dialogue was underway, Bismarck took advantage of a border 
dispute between the Belgians in Congo and the Portuguese in Angola and hosted what came to be 
known as the Berlin Conference in 1884. During the conference, colonial boundaries were demarcated 
based on the spheres of economic interest of the main colonial powers notably, Britain, France, 
Belgium, Germany and Portugal and a code of international law concerning the colonial conquests 
already made in Africa was ratified; this marked the legitimisation of colonialism. With each having 
been allocated their own pieces of territory, the colonial powers got on with the business of managing 
their colonies. Smillie (1995: 2) notes that in Europe, the growth of towns and cities prompted by the 
Industrial Revolution saw improvements in the standards of living. At the same time however, such 
improvements could only be enjoyed by those in gainful employment and not the unemployed; the 
squalid living conditions and poverty amongst the unemployed was to be an important factor in the 




under which Europe was administered for no less than a century and in managing their respective 
colonies, the colonial powers simply extended the system to the colonies.  
 
2.2 Colonial  legacy 
2.2.1 The welfare state and state management systems  
In time, the welfare state system of state management was consolidated in the colonies and according 
to Smillie (1995: 2), it reached its epitome at about the same time that European colonial empires 
began to crumble. Unfortunately and notwithstanding the fact that the system was about to fall from 
grace back home; as Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and others began to withdraw from their 
colonies, they left behind the idea of the state as the provider and government as the nation's primary if 
not exclusive social arbiter and economic actor. The withdrawal of the colonial powers ushered in new 
governments who adopted the idea wholesale understandably, they lacked ideas of their own and this 
can be traced to the fact that under colonial rule, the new leaders had never been exposed to 
meaningful participation and/or hands-on experience in state management. As such, they were both 
politically and economically ill equipped to adapt the welfare state system even to a form which 
remotely resembled the system as it had operated in Europe. Under the circumstances, the system 
failed to work for the new African states; this is illustrated by Turok (1987:8) who quotes a group of 
Kenyans as saying “…For it (independence) to be more than word, the colonized must take charge of 
their own affairs and obliterate colonial social and economic forms, creating fresh ones in every 
sphere…”. They lamented that the entire colonial system had been passed on virtually intact and had 
been perpetuated in practically unchanged form in the previous two decade. The sentiments were an 
expression of disgruntlement by seemingly lack of reforms two decades into independence.  
 
Babu (1981: 38) makes similar observations on the perpetuation of colonial systems of state 
management and argues that the lack of meaningful change can be traced to the fact that first of all, the 
new leaders were really struggling to manage a transition of incredible complexity. Secondly, in a 
situation in which they did not have any ideas of their own, the new leaders did indeed hang onto and 
perpetuated colonial state management systems. He further argues that for a welfare system to work, it 
requires substantial amounts of resources which the new states did not have understandably; they had 
inherited backward economies based on subsistence farming. In time however, there was a realization 
that the welfare state system was not workable and the new leaders retreated unfortunately, as they 
retreated, the gap between human needs and the capacity of the state to meet them widened. Equally 
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unfortunate was the fact that this was a time when pressure from the claimants of the benefits of 
liberation was mounting. Potholm (1988: 148) notes that such a situation was inevitable for in the quest 
to galvanise public support for the end of colonialism and convinced that after independence, a lot 
could be accomplished; political leaders had raised expectations amongst the masses. After 
independence and with expectations high, the masses increased their demands for opportunities, 
rewards, security and meaningful changes in the standards of daily living but which demands could not 
be met for lack of resources. Failure to meet the demands was to sow the seeds for disgruntlement and 
later, civil strife and conflict; according to Ake (2006: 2), this was inevitable for in addition to failing 
to deliver for lack of resources; the new leaders administered their states in an unusually statist manner. 
Such a style of management was inherited from colonial administrators; they were the sole decision 
maker in the distribution of land; on who should produce what and how; in the legislation of taxes and 
on the form and scope of the instruments of control amongst other things.  
 
According to Windel (2009: 3) the statist management style of the new African leaders can be traced to 
a colonial heritage and in the sphere of education for example; for decades, colonial powers had left 
education for Africans to the missionaries however, the pressure exerted by the demands of expanding 
trade and administration forced the former to introduce state education in the colonies. Understandably, 
both the colonial administration and commercial enterprises needed local staff to fill in lower posts; 
posts which would have been difficult to fill with settlers and/or expatriates. Thus, with education 
designed to produce “miniature versions” of the colonial administrator and/or company executive, it 
was designed such that it would socialise Africans into the management styles of their prospective 
employers.  For those considered lacking in the potential for such jobs, the colonial educational system 
was designed (Ake 2006: 2) not to enlighten and empower them but instead, to ensure a productive 
labour force that would remain steadfast in the performance of often tedious and disagreeable tasks. A 
combination of lack of exposure to sound state management systems coupled with inappropriate 
education and training saw the new leaders manage their new sovereign territories using inherited 
obsolete state management systems which were unworkable in the new order. The effects of such an 
order of things will become apparent at a later stage in the text. 
 
2.2.2 Political ideology  
In the political sphere, Kinfe (1995: 109) notes that likewise, the new leaders were ill equipped to 
assume the mammoth task of establishing viable political institutions due to lack of experience; given, 




had, exposure. This in the main was because in British colonies for example, while there were no 
explicit clauses barring Africans from participating fully in political affairs all the same, the 
constitutions contained clauses which made such participation by Africans impossible. This is evident 
in the then Southern Rhodesia where according to historical records (Government of Zimbabwe: 
2006a), there was no explicit clause on racial segregation in the Constitution before 1969. Furthermore, 
as far back as 1923, the only explicitly spelt out criteria for eligibility to vote and/or be voted into 
political office was a stipulated minimum of immovable property formally owned; income (a minimum 
wage of a hundred pounds per year) and specified educational qualifications (ability to write fifty 
words in English). However, the criteria was covertly discriminatory against Africans for first of all, 
being predominantly rural as they were, ownership of immovable property (in the main, land), was not 
formalised in the form of possession of title deeds. Instead, acquisition was simply through a 
traditional inheritance system in which seniority amongst siblings and gender considerations were the 
main criteria. In the cities and towns, the housing provided for Africans in the townships belonged to 
the City or Town administration with Africans renting them from the said authorities. Secondly, not 
many Africans commanded the stipulated minimum income in those days for a common practice by 
colonial powers was to pay African workers “in kind”. An account by the researcher’s late mother who 
was a teacher from the mid-1930’s to the mid-1940’s was that she was often paid in food commodities; 
sugar, salt, cooking oil etc. and nearer Christmas, it was usually clothes and shoes; salary was rarely 
paid in cash Thirdly and according to Meredith (1985: 306)  in the 50`s, out of its combined population 
of about two hundred million, Africa’s  primary school enrolment stood at approximately 33.0 percent 
of the eligible age group and less than 3.0% of these obtained secondary school level education. Under 
the circumstances and in the then Southern Rhodesia for example, even if one was one was lucky to get 
an education and was able to write the required fifty words in English, the chances are that they did not 
officially own immovable property and/or command an income of a hundred pounds per year and thus 
would not be eligible to vote or be voted into political office.  
 
The result of such covert marginalisation of Africans in Southern Rhodesia, (Government of 
Zimbabwe: 2006a) was that in 1928, only 62 blacks out of a total electorate of 22 000 or 0.28 percent 
were eligible to vote or be voted into office and in 1956, the figure was 560 blacks out of a total 
electorate of 52 000 or 1.0 percent; negligible figures by any standard. The situation was slightly better 
in French colonies for according to Potholm (1988: 38), in addition to the absence of explicit clauses 
segregating colonial subjects from indigenous French citizens; in the French constitution, the colonial 
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power actually saw and treated the colonies as part of France. To this effect, colonial subjects were 
integrated economically and socially into the larger framework with a small number of elite Africans 
being gradually absorbed into French life. Furthermore, Knife (1995: 57) observes that a new 
constitution carved by the Fourth Republic in 1945 made provisions for the colonies to enjoy a wide 
measure of political, administrative and economic reforms as junior partners of France. Such a gesture 
was in recognition of the role that the colonies had played when Paris fell to the Germans in 1940 and 
in particular, the fact that for a period, Brazzaville in French Congo had actually hosted what was left 
of the French government. The gesture saw Africans play some role in French Parliamentary elections 
(Meredith 1985: 18), resulting in nine black elites being elected as deputies from amongst the six 
hundred or so legislators who made up the Constituent Assembly. In time however, it became apparent 
that the reforms altered little in the balance of power in the colonies for the number of deputies was so 
small that their impact in terms of influencing parliamentary decisions and policies was negligible. 
Besides, while pursuing this policy of integration in which an African could attain equal status with a 
Frenchman, Potholm (1988: 38) notes that this concession was not allowed to interfere with the view 
that colonies were a source of manpower for France, an outlet for goods from the metropolis and a 
source of raw materials.  
 
Schwab (2001:16) explains such covert or overt alienating arrangements as a manifestation of the 
fascism of colonialism whose agenda was removing the colonized from history; usurping any role they 
may have wished to play and socializing them into internalizing their inferiority. The lack of 
experience in running political institutions was to present a dilemma for the new African leadership for 
according to Kinfe (1995: 109), while in former British colonies for example, they had been exposed to 
the Westminster type of democracy however; the imperial power had not extended and/or applied the 
same democratic principles in administering the colonies. At the same time, they had also been 
exposed to the communist ideology and Stalin's one-party absolutism through the support and counsel 
the new leaders had enjoyed from Russia during their struggles for independence. However and yet 
again, exposure to communism is that is all they had had, but not hands on experience in such a system 
of state management. Besides, the argument continues, even if the new leaders had had hands on 
experience in both doctrines, neither of them were relevant to the new order in Africa characterized as 





On centralism and authoritarianism, Young (1994: 101) argues that notwithstanding the value tag 
placed on democratic principles and expounded by European colonial powers, they managed the 
colonies in an authoritative and absolutist style to assert their control and thus extract resources with no 
questions asked. He supports his argument by quoting a French official in Africa who is on record as 
stating that “...the European commandant is not posted to observe nature ...He has a mission... to 
impose regulations, to limit individual liberties...to collect taxes...” The same can be said of the 
Belgians in the Congo where Gann and Duignan (1979: 30) observed that following in the footsteps of 
the Dutch in Indonesia, King Leopold’s philosophy was that the colonies should be exploited, not by 
the operation of a market economy, but by state intervention and compulsory cultivation of cash crops 
to be distributed by and/or be sold by the state at controlled prices.  
 
The centralist and authoritarian nature of Stalin’s one-party absolutism needs no elaboration it suffices 
to mention that according to Rees (2003: 40-41); in the 1930’s, by abandoning the long-established 
Lenin era practice of “democratic centralism”, Stalin’s motive was to shift the locus of power.  Such a 
shift in the locus of power saw an end to a system of oligarchic rule and the erosion of mechanisms for 
collective leadership and accountability thereby establishing the perfect conditions for the personal 
dictatorship which characterised Stalin’s rule. With state management exposure limited to the 
Westminster type of democracy and Stalin’s one-party absolutism both of which were repressive and 
which repression the liberation struggles had been about, it was a dilemma for the new leaders. In a 
situation in which they were in no position come up with informed decisions of what would be in the 
best interests of their peoples, the new leaders resorted to experimenting with this, the other or a 
combination of political models. In this respect, Ayittey and Shirima (1999) cite the example of 
Tanzania where in 1967, the then President Nyerere castigated capitalism or the “money economy” 
arguing that it encouraged individual acquisitiveness and economic competition. Nyerere further 
argued that these attributes were foreign to Africa and contradicted the traditional forms of economic 
and social organisation based on socialist principles of communal ownership of the means of 
production and collective responsibility for the welfare and security of communities. Nyerere 
subsequently adopted an alternative political ideology; “African socialism” or “Ujamaa” to counteract 
what he referred to as the relentless pursuit of individual advancement; the concept took root and 
Tanzania became a nation of small-scale communalists.  
 
Nyerere (Shivji 2009) saw Tanzania essentially as a nation of village communities and villagization as 
a means of accelerating development and facilitating provision of health, education, water and other 
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social services; to this effect, in the early 1970s; Nyerere embarked on a forced villagization 
programme in order to consolidate “Ujamaa”. According to Ayittey and Shirima (1999); by 1976, 
some 13 million peasants had been forced into 8,000 cooperative villages. In addition to forced 
relocation, Nyerere introduced regulation requiring peasants to sell their produce exclusively to the 
government which would subsequently do the distribution at prices determined by the state. 
Notwithstanding the enthusiastic backing of the Ujaama socialist experiment by western donors and 
the generous funding provided to make it work, the results were disastrous. Some scholars argue that 
the philosophy was doomed to fail and Maghimbi (1992: 228) points out that in part, this can be traced 
to a misconception by Nyerere that simply decreeing that villages will “revert” to the traditional forms 
of living would automatically turn them into the pre-colonial homogenous, cooperating and 
collectively responsible entities he had envisaged. A misconception it was indeed for very few such 
villages genuinely fitted the definition of Ujamaa; Ayittey and Shirima (1999) concur adding that this 
was inevitable for the “Ujaama” philosophy was based upon a complete misunderstanding by Nyerere, 
of African cultural heritage in so far as he misread the communalism of African traditional life to mean 
that the means of production in indigenous Africa were communally owned when in fact they were 
privately owned.   
 
Ibhawoh and Dibua (2003) explain the failure of Ujamaa from another perspective arguing that while 
the philosophy was unique in its inward orientation and in its attention to social equity and distributive 
justice, it was self contradicting for it shared the same premise and fallacy of the concept 
“development” in so far as it was rooted in the belief that African peasants and rural dwellers were 
hapless victims of underdevelopment.  Another contradiction was that while believing that reverting to 
African traditional values would spare the peasantry of the vices of capitalism and take them to higher 
levels of social and material well being at the same time however, “material well being” was defined in 
terms of the Westernization of the peasantry. The scholars conclude that the contradictions inherent in 
taking people back to traditionalism at the same as the Ujamaa ideology sought as to improve the 
conditions of the peasants according to Western standards were bound to result in failure of the 
philosophy to address the problems it was seeking to address. Babu (1981: xv) views the failure of 
Ujamaa from an economic development perspective and argues that first of all, Nyerere overlooked the 
broader market dynamics for which the peasantry would be expected to manage and in a situation in 
which they were inadequately prepared for such a degree of responsibility, the philosophy was bound 




social values corresponding to pre-feudal modes of production. Under the circumstances and in a 
situation in which the peasantry were expected to deal with market dynamics of the day, yet again, 
Nyerere completely overlooked the need to transform the peasant into a new person with 
corresponding new values which would enable him to rise up to new challenges created by the 
development of both new forces and relations of production.  
 
Babu’s argument is supported by Hoselitz (1995: 17) who argues that economic development consists 
not merely in a change in production techniques but equally important, a corresponding reorientation 
of social norms and values. Ayittey and Shirima (1999) concur adding that instead of taking the 
peasantry through a reorientation forwards in terms of social values and norms to enable them to stay 
abreast of the market dynamics of the day, the approach actually took the peasantry backwards. The 
peasantry was indeed taken backwards for a report published by the OECD (1998) has it that by the 
close of the millennium, more than three quarters of the population in Tanzania was still rural with 
most farmers still using traditional hand-tool techniques which could rarely cultivate more than two 
hectares in any given season. Besides, according to Ayittey and Shirima (1999), the impact of forced 
resettlement into Ujamaa villages went beyond socio-economic development considerations for the 
high population density generated in the process later proved to be an ecological disaster. They cite a 
United Nations report which estimated that by 1991; about one-third of Tanzania was threatened by 
desertification due to deforestation, over-grazing, over-cultivation and population density in some parts 
of the country because of the government's policy of villagization that was vigorously pursued in the 
1970s.   
 
2.2.3 Urban biased economic policies 
According to Knife (1995: 12), Africa was underdeveloped from the very outset and such a state of 
underdevelopment could not have been more evident than in the interior; remote and lacking in basic 
infrastructure. Such inequalities of colonial planning can be traced to the fact that colonial powers had 
been interested in investing only in those parts of the interior which had the potential to develop into 
reliable sources of raw materials and food commodities in demand back home. There was no interest 
on the part of the colonial powers to invest in the general development of the interior and so the seeds 
of a dualistic mode of development were sewn. These views are supported by Swift (1984) who notes 
that the main colonial powers namely Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium established the terms on 
which Africa would participate in the world economy. Thus for example, Britain’s division of labour in 
 58 
the colonies saw the growing of coffee earmarked for Kenya; cotton for Sudan and for Ghana, the 
climate was considered perfect for cocoa plantations. Furthermore, the preferred sectors were provided 
with supporting infrastructure; storage facilities complemented by road and rail networks to link 
administrative centres to the belts and/or locations which were considered strategic to production for 
export and trade. Traditional African food crops (maize, cassava, or sorghum) were restricted to areas 
of low agricultural potential with little if any supporting infrastructure.  
 
The situation was no better in the French colonies for as Emeagwali (2003) observes, in Côte d’Ivoire 
for example, France considered the impact of colonial economic ventures on the conditions of the 
natives as externalities, if therefore any improvements were to be made in the condition of the natives, 
it was solely for the purpose of enhancing their performance as labourers! In addition to manpower, 
effective economic exploitation required infrastructure and in particular transport networks to move 
goods and labour from one part of the country to another. To this end, France invested heavily in the 
construction of roads, railways and harbours but only along those belts leading to the northern part of 
Côte d’Ivoire and the Sahel regions where French settlers had established plantations.  Offiong (1980: 
119) echoes these views adding that European powers did not establish colonial states to carry out a 
programme of political development or change but instead, to establish efficient and effective 
administrative states for the purposes of economic exploitation. At independence therefore, with the 
continent’s role in the world economy limited to simply a “source of raw materials” for industries in 
the home countries, industrial development was limited to those sectors and locations which facilitated 
the exploitation and export of these resources. Agriculture for food security and industrial sectors for 
production for domestic markets in the colonies were certainly not high on the list of priorities; all the 
same and like they did in other spheres, the new leadership adopted and perpetuated the system of such 
a dualistic model of development.  
 
In pursuit of such a model, the new leadership paid little attention to the development of the rural 
areas; the hub of agricultural productivity; the low levels of agricultural productivity and the related 
food insecurity that has characterized the continent for close to three decades is clearly linked to such 
an urban bias. Turok (1987: 15-16) notes that while agriculture was the only sector that would be the 
launching pad for economic development in Africa; it was dominated by the peasantry located in often 
remote and “forgotten” parts of the country. Remote as these parts of the country were, the new leaders 
made little if any effort to make the level of infrastructural investment necessary to facilitate increased 




same time as the industrial sector in many a newly independent African state was still poorly 
developed, economic development was but an illusion. This situation Turok (1987: 16) further notes; 
can be traced to the fact that an appropriate level of investment was not on the new leaders’ agenda for 
the insatiable drive for consumption overrun concern for production and while social services were 
provided, the provision of these was unbalanced; generally favouring the rich rather than the poor; the 
urban elite rather than the rural poor. Turok concludes that the capacity of the bourgeoisie-led post 
independence economies to generate growth as well as improve the living standards of the masses 
proved illusionary and records show that the policies pursued amounted to a massive betrayal of the 
interests of the people. Timberlake (1988: 1) shares these views and notes that the neglect of rural areas 
is evident in the fact that the importance of the agricultural sector was not reflected in development 
budgets worse still, the colonial policy of milking the economic surplus out of agriculture to meet 
needs of the towns and cities continued unabated.   
 
Bates (1981: 35) attributes the practice of milking the economic surplus out of agriculture to meet 
needs of the towns and cities to a persistent urban bias which can be traced to the importance African 
leaders attached to political survival by amongst other things, appeasing the enlightened urban elite. 
Timberlake (1988: 1) illustrates this by quoting a relief worker in the Sahel during the famine of the 
early eighties as saying, "...starve the city dwellers and you have a riot; starve the peasants and they 
die. If you were a politician, which would you choose…?” Decades into independence, the neglect of 
the rural areas continued unabated for the leaders failed to recognize the positive correlation between 
infrastructural improvements in the rural areas and increased productivity. This is evident in Tanzania 
where over four decades into independence, in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, 
then President Mkapa (2003) argued “...the productivity of our farmers is limited by lack of access to 
loans...” It is apparent that in attributing limited productivity by farmers to lack of access to loans, he 
was denying the link between poor policies and the performance of the agricultural sector and in the 
context of Tanzania, the ill conceived Ujamaa philosophy cited earlier. In any case, such loans are 
often facilitated by external aid as such, they are administered through local banks and/or finance 
houses designated by and on borrowing terms and conditions set by no less than the recipient 
governments themselves. Harsh (1997) observed that better access to credit was increasingly 
recognized as an effective tool for improving agricultural productivity amongst poor farmers; to this 
effect, small and short-term loans of as little as $100-200 could make a significant difference to their 
productivity and incomes. In Tanzania therefore, all it would have taken was for the government to 
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make the terms and conditions for borrowing favourable to farmers; after all, the size of the loans 
required as observed by Harsh was so small that as Head of State, Mukapa was probably getting that 
much as a daily “out-of-pocket” allowance!  
 
Urban biased policies and the consequent neglect of rural areas acted as constraints against increased 
agricultural productivity in many ways; this is one explanation for the perennial food security crises 
that has characterized the continent for close to three decades. In turn, such perennial food insecurity 
on the continent has prompted the international community to respond to the crises on humanitarian 
grounds; to avert deaths from starvation. Over the years, NGOs have become major players in 
emergency food security response operations as was the case in Kenya during the drought of 1999-
2001; 2004 and again in 2006.  
 
2.2.4 The failure of political institutions and the emergence of dictatorships  
According to the United Kingdom Government (2001: 6), even in those African countries where the 
transition to independence passed peacefully and the new leaders wasted no time in defining the role of 
the state in development and taking measures to harness national resources towards ensuring economic 
growth; it was by no means an easy process. The difficulties can be traced to the emergence of a 
typically African leadership style based on centralisation of power and patronage networks that 
allowed little popular involvement of the masses at national or local level. This observation is 
supported by Knife (1995: 101) who notes that faced with mounting pressure for meaningful political 
reforms, the new African leaders became as preoccupied with the problems of holding state together, 
political control and staying in power as much as they were with development policies. Babu (1981: 
38) shares these views adding that the consequent dictatorial tendencies resulted in a situation in which 
a trend that soon emerged was the concentration of power in the hands of a leading clique to begin with 
and in time, such arrangements degenerated into the concentration of power in the hands of a single 
individual, the Head of State. Babu (1981: 39) concludes that such one-man dictatorship emerged not 
by accident but instead, by design through the creation of a one party state whose justification was the 
argument that the masses were not yet ready for democracy!  
 
Some scholars argue that one party states were the creation of colonial powers who would not let go 
and amongst these scholars is Knife (1995:19) who cites the example of Niger of which he says on 
granting self-government to the former colony, France banned all political parties except the Nigerien 




thus became a one-party state from the very outset.  This view on France’s contribution to the 
emergence of a one party state in Niger is supported by Sharife (2010) who notes that France’s smooth 
handover of power in the former colony was realised through negotiated military and resource 
agreements that interlocked the interests of France with those of handpicked “native governors” in the 
run up to independence. The agreements saw France being granted preferential and priority access to 
strategic resources and in particular, uranium deposits as well the space to position and maintain 
French military bases in the former colony to sustain the rule of dictators who were expected to 
reciprocate by protecting French interests at the same time as keep the dictators in line. According to 
Knife (1995: 20), on assuming power and with France’s support, Diori became a respected figure 
worldwide for his role as a spokesman for African affairs. At home however, he became increasingly 
unpopular for what was perceived as his neglect of domestic affairs and his tendency to favour family 
members, close friends and fellow Djerma tribesmen in cabinet and other important appointments. 
Surrounded by an inner circle of staunch loyalists, corruption in his administration became the order of 
the day; this generated disgruntlement amongst the masses to the extent that barely four years into his 
rule in 1963, there was an attempted coup but which Diori successfully repressed with the support of 
French military troops.  
 
According to Knife (1995:19), such arrangements and support from the former colonial powers 
nurtured the environment for dictatorial rule which in time; reduced African politics to personal and/or 
factional power struggles. In such an environment, leaders ruled not through parliamentary systems 
and constitutions which they had inherited from the departing colonial authorities but instead, through 
manipulation; amending and rewriting constitutions to extend extraordinary power and discretion to a 
leader at the same time as restricting the power of the representative assemblies (parliaments).  In 
countries where constitutions were not so manipulated, their provisions were simply ignored and/or 
electoral systems were changed to ensure that the government of the day could never lose an election. 
Another dimension of colonial legacy in the political sphere according to Berman (1998) was the 
nature of political relationships in the colonial state which he argues, typically took on a patron/client 
form for colonial administrators sought to secure the loyalty of chiefs and headmen. To this effect, the 
former often provided these functionaries with “benefits” to supplement their meagre official salaries; 
such a practice nurtured the notion that the state was the principle source of benefits and a perception 
that a patron/client relationship was critical to maintaining power and access to the state resources. By 
the time the colonial states recoiled, African elites who later became leaders had internalised such 
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practices; the seeds of nepotism were sewn; nepotism flourished especially where a leader had the 
support of the former colonial power as is evident in Niger under Dirori.  
 
On nepotism, Ake (1996:4) notes that nepotistic tendencies by the new African leaders can be traced to 
the make-up of nationalist movements which he argues that while united by common grievances 
against colonial oppression, these groups were essentially a coalition of disparate groups as such, unity 
amongst these nationalist coalitions was artificial, fragile and never free from tension and conflict. At 
independence therefore; a combination of the high value tag placed on capturing and consolidating 
power; fear of losing the power to rival groups coupled with socialization under a colonial system in 
which one had to “buy” support and loyalty resulted in a situation in which they did exactly that to 
maintain their power. According to Kinfe (1995: 101), this is evident in the fact that civil services 
filled by loyalists and influential individuals deemed necessary for political survival grew at an 
alarming rate. He further notes that the impact of the growth of these institutions is such even up to the 
present, the state remains the biggest employer in many an African country with the civil service salary 
bill accounting for a grossly disproportionate part of national budgets. Meredith (1985: 53-4) shares the 
views by Kinfe (1995: 101) and argues that with loyalty the main criteria for appointment to political 
office and/or a senior public service position; civil servants acted not as catalysts of change but as 
instruments for the continued political control of those to who they owe their salaries, benefits and 
favours. An example of civil servants and government officials acting as instruments of their 
benefactors is in Zimbabwe where in the run up to the controversial 2002 Presidential elections, one 
Jonathan Moyo (2002) then Minister of Information was quoted as categorically stating that civil 
servants who belonged to and/or sympathized with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) had no place in the employment of the government adding that they should resign or risk being 
fired!  
 
Finally, another perspective to the emergence of dictatorship is given by Knife (1995: 98) who argues 
that this can be traced to the fact that during their struggles for independence, African nationalist 
leaders had been forced to operate underground and/or resort to guerilla warfare. As such, the only 
experience of leadership and governance they had ever had was leading liberation movements in a state 
of war and tension. In such an environment, there is no room for the application of democratic 
principles; be it in the choice of leadership and/or decision making and some leaders simply emerged 
by virtue of their prowess in guerrilla warfare. Unfortunately, come independence, some such leaders 




continued to be run using liberation politics methods. Amongst such methods was maintaining popular 
support amongst the masses by clinging onto broad anti-colonial rule slogans but with political 
manifestos void of any specific content with respect to political, economic and social advancement. 
Such a genesis and the consequent style of leadership displayed by some of the new leaders are 
illustrated by Kidane (2009) in his account of the rise to power of Isaias Aferweki, the President of the 
Republic of Eritrea. He says of Aferweki that within four years of joining Eritrean Liberation Front 
(ELF) guerrilla movement at the age of twenty, he was appointed the commander of the armed wing. 
In time, he defected from the ELF and joined a splinter group, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
(EPLF) where within a short period, the leadership qualities he displayed in guerrilla warfare made him 
popular and a hero of the Eritrean struggle for independence. In 1991, when Eritrea eventually gained 
independence from Ethiopia, he was the Eritrean peoples’ preferred choice of Head of State however 
ten years into his rule, it was apparent to many Eritreans that he had not changed from a guerrilla 
warfare leader to a Head of State. Many went into exile for fear of their lives and have since been 
describing their homeland as the “North Korea” of Africa and Afewerki as its “Kim Jong-11...a 
paranoid, irrational, eccentric and reclusive leader...” 
 
In the light of the such a political discourse and while Ake (2006: 3-4) acknowledges that political 
independence did bring about changes in the composition of the state managers however, the character 
of the state remained much as it had been during the colonial era; controlling every aspect of the 
economy tightly to maintain its power and domination. He concludes that political independence 
turned out to be not the heroic achievement it was meant to be but instead, mere accommodation of 
radical elements in nationalistic movements and/or racial integration. This in the main was because the 
tendency to reproduce the past was reinforced by the disposition of the dominant social forces in the 
post colonial era. As such and with a few exceptions, the gaining of independence was not so much a 
defeat of colonialism as it was acceptance by the colonial powers of the inevitable and hence the 
orchestrating of a handover of government to their chosen African successors who could be trusted to 
share their values and be attentive to their interests. 
 
2.2.5 Conflict, civil and cessation wars 
Conflict, civil and cessation wars which characterized the continent in the post independence period 
can be traced to disgruntlement of the masses with dictatorial tendencies of the new leaders and some 
scholars amongst them, Abbink (2002:3) attribute such tendencies to colonial legacy. Abbink argues 
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that the humiliation and/or destruction of African societies under colonialism and the continued 
subjection of African economies and state policies to dependency relations with the developed world 
inevitably rendered African leaders unable to construct a legitimate and inclusive national polity. 
Chiriyankandath (2008: 45) concurs adding that the new states faced the unprecedented challenge of 
fashioning a peculiarly modern form of statehood modelled not on basic forms of a state but on the 
elaborate modern Western state that had been developed over centuries. Furthermore, the argument 
continues, the new states were inhibited by the fact that the conditions in which power was transferred 
were often far from optimal. Thus, even in cases where independence was achieved relatively 
peacefully and was not preceded by violence and/or an armed struggle, it was marred by the hurried 
transfer of administrative responsibilities, belated and unsustainable political compromises, economic 
dependence and largely untested legislatures and governments. On unsustainable political 
compromises, untested legislatures and governments, Chiriyankandath (2008: 45) cites one 
Nolutshungu who observed that in Nigeria, the post-colonial political system was fatefully structured 
along regional and ethnic lines; in the process such an arrangement introduced elitist and paternalist 
notions of democracy. In turn, this sowed the seeds for authoritarian rule as the ruling group at any 
given point in time tried to cling onto power; unfortunately, such a style of leadership quickly and 
tragically gave way to successive military coups barely six years into independence not to mention a 
three-year civil war in Biafra that was to claim close to three million lives. 
 
On the destructive nature of colonialism on African societies, Schwab (2001:16) shares the views and 
argues that the arbitrary drawing of borders simply on the basis of the political and/or economic 
strategic importance of a stretch of territory or on the grounds that a physical landmark (river or 
mountain range) was convenient for such demarcation resulted in the social dislocation and/or division 
of groups of people hitherto identifying themselves as one (a clan or tribe) and assigning them new 
national identities. An example that comes to mind in the splitting of even families is the interesting 
profile of one Aggrey Awori (Government of Uganda: 2009), Minister of Information and 
Communications Technology in the Republic of Uganda at one point in time. The Awori family was 
traditionally characterised by polygamous marriages and typical of such families, they tended to be 
large with households spread across a relatively wide area. During the demarcation of the border 
between Kenya and Uganda, the family was split with some Aworis “becoming” Ugandans while the 
others became Kenyans. While still in the opposition, Aggrey was a presidential candidate in the 




President of the Republic of Kenya. Thus, had Aggrey won the election in Uganda, he would have 
been the President of the Republic of Ugandan at the same time as his elder half brother was the Vice 
President of the Republic of Kenya!  
 
With respect to the splitting of groups, Potholm (1988:215) cites the example of Somalia where he 
notes that unlike in most African countries; throughout the ages, the population of what until 1991 was 
the Republic of Somalia was virtually homogeneous; however, the strategic possibilities presented by 
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 generated interest amongst the European colonial powers. To 
this effect, by the turn of the century, the British had laid claim to what in the present day is the 
unilaterally declared state of “Somaliland” in the north west; the French laid claim to what is present 
day Djibouti in the north with the Italians laying claim to the central and southern part of what was 
formerly the Republic of Somalia until it disintegrated in 1991. Potholm (1988: 216) further notes that 
after colonization, the only period that Somalis experienced unity as a people was after the outbreak of 
World War II when Italy occupied British Somalia. During the occupation, Italy brought Somalia 
under a single government and Somalis were seen and treated as a unitary group however, the 
arrangement was short lived for the British regained their former territory in a counter offensive in 
1941. On reverting to British rule and while the colonial power did little in terms of developing the 
territory, it did however permit and even encourage political activity; to this effect, by 1947, the 
Somali Youth League hitherto the Somali Youth Club and the Hisbia Digil Mirifle hitherto the 
Patriotic Benefit Union were established political parties. However, notwithstanding the space and 
opportunity to participate in pluralistic politics, the political parties that emerged were characterized by 
clan and lineage loyalties for a number of reasons. Amongst such reasons is that in Somali culture and 
first of all, kinship was and continues to be an important factor in placing an individual in society and 
providing him with a point of reference. Secondly, there is also a strong achievement orientation in 
Somali culture which Schwab (2001:16) argues, can be traced to colonial administrative practice of 
selecting one sub-group to serve the colonial administration and thus elevating it into the “elite” 
relative to the rest who remained politically and economically marginalized.  
 
The social dynamics of affiliation and achievement which is the defining characteristic of Somali clan 
culture is evident in a study carried out by the World Bank (2005a: 16) in which it was found that 
members of a clan or sub-clan tend to provide unqualified support to their leaders as they see their 
upward mobility closely associated with the success of their clan or sub-clan. According to Dersso 
(2009:2-3), the Darood was the elite clan at independence understandably, they had been selected and 
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elevated above the rest through exposure to the British colonial administration as junior clerks and 
assistants amongst other positions. In addition, they had been exposed to political mobilisation through 
the establishment of the Somali Youth League as far back as the 1940’s with the rest of the clans 
marginalised and repeatedly subjected to violence and repression by the state during the period of 
colonization. Independence changed little for the marginalised clans for as Potholm (1988:219-20) notes, 
from the time Somalia became a Republic in 1960 through to 1969, three successive Prime Ministers, 
Sharmarke; Husseyn and Egal were all from the same clan, the Darood. Furthermore, the potential for 
conflict was fuelled by the behaviour of the ruling Darood who continued with the exploitative and 
extractive practice inherited from the colonial powers. The institutionalisation of the exploitation of the 
other clans set the stage for antagonism and rivalry as various groups vied for control of the state 
machinery for political dominance; the ensuing power struggles resulted in a brutal civil conflict and 
secessionist clan war that saw the former Republic of Somalia disintegrate in 1991. Two decades on, the 
conflict continues unabated and with no substantive government in place since then, what is left of 
Somalia is not recognised as a sovereign state and by United Nations definition, its citizens are 
“stateless”. Such a definition extends to those Somalis in the unilaterally and self declared state of 
“Somaliland” a breakaway republic governed by a secessionist administration but which remains 
unrecognized by any state or international organization even though regional states and Israel have 
expressed such a possibility in future. In the light of this, Potholm concludes that the introduction of 
political and social relations/structures alien to Somali religious and clan-based traditional political 
structures and social organisation effectively undermined and transformed such indigenous structures to 
the extent of alienating some clans in the process.  
 
In time, such a colonial legacy was taken to another level whereby competition and conflicts 
degenerated from the ethnic/clan to the individual level. In this respect, Tadjo (2004) cites the example 
of Côte d'Ivoire which under the leadership of Houphouet-Boigny from independence in 1960 through 
to 1993, a combination of sound foreign investment policies and a policy welcoming migrant labour 
from neighbouring countries saw the country become the most advanced economy in West Africa. 
Houphouet-Boigny was succeeded by Henri Bédié in what according to Lamin (2005: 11), was a fierce 
contest against one Allasane Ouattara, the prime minister since 1990; on assuming power, Bédié 
proceeded to exclude Ouattara and his followers from full participation in political processes. The 
justification for such exclusion according to Badmus (2009: 51); was a Bédié-conceived and state 




citizenship which by definition, such a status applied only to those for whom both parents were 
Ivorians. The ideology eventually became law and according to Tadjo (2004), the law was used to bar 
a substantial number of northerners from running for office and/or from voting on the grounds that they 
were not “real” Ivorians. Understandably, because of Houphouet-Boigny’s policy of welcoming 
migrant labour from neighbouring countries; many northerners were of mixed parentage; amongst this 
category was was Ouattara for who one of his parents was from Bukina Faso. The protests and civil 
strife that followed the barring of Outarra from running for office saw Bédié’s rule last only nine 
months (Nanga 2005); he was replaced by Robert Guei in December 1999 who likewise, also barred 
Ouattara and his supporters from participation in political processes. As if history was repeating itself 
(Tamakloe 2011), Guei was deposed in a coup and forced to flee the country after only ten months in 
office; he was replaced by Laurant Gbagbo who like his predecessors; also bared Ouattara and his 
supporters from participation in political processes. The catalogue of the chaos and violence witnessed 
in Côte d'Ivoire from 1999 through to 2011 and which can be traced to political power struggles is well 
documented and needs no elaboration. It suffices to mention that it took no less than political and 
military peacekeeping interventions by both the United Nations and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) to bring the chaos and violence to an end in April 2011.  
 
The catalogue of civil strife and conflicts in Africa is long but to name only a few; Abbink (2002:3) 
sums the catalogue by explaining that a remarkable domain of antagonism in contemporary Africa’s 
political discourse is obviously that of communal identity notions. He further argues that the notions in 
which regional, societal or ethnic characteristics have come to play an important role were conceived 
and nurtured in the framework of colonialism. Furthermore, since the emergence of the post-colonial 
state, such a colonial heritage has since been reinforced by the current phase of globalization. The 
result of undergoing such a process has been to bring out differences rather than similarities for in a 
political environment characterized by power struggles, the creation of “others” and the emergence of 
patterns of exclusion became necessary for any group’s political survival.  These views are supported 
by Kinfe (1995: 64) who expands the argument by pointing out that in the process of allocating 
themselves territory simply on the basis of economic interest, little attention was paid to existing ethnic 
boundaries and/or tribal power structures. The end result was a legacy of national identity crisis, border 
disputes and secessionist aspirations all of which have been pervasive all over Africa since then.  
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The consequences of the perennial civil strife and/or conflict (Colletta, Kostner &Wiederhofer 
1996:41), were first of all, the erosion of the potential for economic development understandably, 
conflict results in disinvestment, destruction of infrastructure and the deterioration of human and other 
forms of social capital. Secondly, given that armed conflict situations always involve two armies and 
inevitably, one or both are funded through the government budget; expenditure on defence becomes 
the priority. In turn, prioritising expenditure on defence means that a disproportionate percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used for the purpose to the detriment of economically productive 
sectors. Thirdly, in the post war period, restructuring of expenditure might not necessarily free up 
resources for social and economic development for a government must of necessity demobilise a 
substantial portion of its over-inflated but now redundant military force. Fourth, in an effort to be 
“better prepared and equipped” next time round, a common tendency is to use the savings so made to 
improve the quality of the military force through training and/or acquisition of better military hardware 
amongst other things.  
 
In concluding this section, the arguments of the proponents of the colonial legacy school of thought 
that the catalogue of civil strife and conflict in Africa can be traced to a colonial legacy is strong not 
least, because the seeds of such strife and conflict were sewn by amongst other things, the division of 
peoples and the pitching of selected and elevated groups against their fellow compatriots in the quest to 
keep the wheels of the then colonial administration oiled and in motion. At the same time, it can be 
argued that passing a law as happened in Ivory Coast; that barred an individual from holding office 
when in fact that same individual hitherto; had held the second highest office in the land with no 
questions asked (!) points to manipulation for political ends and this has nothing to do with 
colonialism. 
 
2.3 The Cold War era 
Scholars such as Hadenius (2002) argue that Africa was a “casualty” of the Cold War from two 
perspectives; politically and economically. With respect to the political perspective, Hadenius (2002:6) 
argues that in the main, this was a result of the fact that the United States, one of the principals of the 
Cold War and its allies notably Great Britain and France amongst others; were pushing for western 
ideology and corresponding democratic forms of government. Smillie (1995: 116) shares these views 
and notes that the importance the alliance attached to governance based on democratic principles was 
evident in Ethiopia during the well documented famine of the 1980’s. During the crisis and for a long 




perception then was that accounts of the gravity of the situation were exaggerations by a brutal and 
pro-Soviet regime; they hoped that the famine would deepen the political crisis and Mengistu would 
find himself in exile sooner rather than later. Then there was the Soviet Union, the other principal of 
the war; Babu (1981: 12) notes that disgruntled and distrusting the colonial model of political, social 
and economic organisation, African nationalists who had come into contact with communism 
welcomed Soviet counsel and readily accepted and internalised the political ideology. Thus, as the 
West and East extended the battlefield beyond Europe, African states were caught at an “ideological 
crossroads” and faced with such a dilemma; they treaded carefully, veering from one side to the other. 
Babu further notes that the dilemma faced by African leaders can be traced to the fact that 
notwithstanding the relationship with the Soviet Union, for a number of reasons, the newly 
independent states did not completely cut off the umbilical cord with their former colonial powers 
either.  
 
This view is supported in a report published by no less than a former colonial power and a strong ally 
of the United States during the Cold War (United Kingdom Government 2001: 6) in which it is 
acknowledged that the problems of governance in the newly independent African states were 
exacerbated by political and commercial rivalry between the principal Cold War belligerents and the 
reluctance of former colonial powers to cede influence even after formal independence. According to 
Young (2003:4) by “sitting on the fence” in the face of such a dilemma, African leaders hoped that a 
neutral position would give them a bargaining chip in so far as the antagonising super powers would be 
courting them for ideological influence and dominance. Furthermore, African leaders hoped that they 
would be protected in so far as the two super powers and their allies had generally legitimated some 
elements of global pluralism in the social systems of sovereign states. Besides; there was an agreed 
code of conduct between the principal Cold War belligerents restricting non-interference in the internal 
affairs of their allies outside Europe. This according to Meredith (1985: 156); was wishful thinking 
and/or an inaccurate appraisal of events on the world stage by African leaders for their adoption of a 
non committal position was to render Africa vulnerable to overt and covert foreign interventions 
second time round. This is the main, was a result of the fact while the legitimisation of  global 
pluralism in the social systems of sovereign states meant some restrictions on interventions in the 
internal affairs of these sovereign states, it however did not mark the end of foreign interventions in the 
independent African states. Thus, while the United States and its allies began to play down the 
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promotion of democratic and related principles in governance as a primary agenda for the War, it 
turned its focus on military and security policy considerations.  
 
With respect to military and security policy considerations, Lemanchard (1982: 116) cites the example 
of Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the then Belgian Congo and a continent-wide 
respected nationalist leader who did not last for consistency in his views on the evils of colonialism 
and steadfastness in his vision for a truly independent Congo. Lumumba had once been described by 
the United States government as a man not to be trusted, a person who was “...a Castro or worse...” and 
in the quest to ensure that Western military and security interests were not compromised by Lumumba, 
the CIA discovered Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, a newly appointed army Chief of Staff. Lemanchard 
further notes that perceiving Mobutu as an “impartial arbiter” in a conflict that developed between the 
then President, Joseph Kasabavu and the Prime Minister, it is alleged that the CIA played a direct role 
in influencing Kasabavu`s decision to use Mobutu to depose Lumumba. Lumumba was subsequently 
and violently removed from power and replaced by Mobutu; a man considered friendly to Western 
interests. However, despite the fact that for close to four decades, Congo’s people suffered under the 
dictatorship of Mobutu, the United Sates continued to support him. This view is shared by Young & 
Turner (1985: 389) who note that in 1977, when Shaba Province was invaded by the dissident group, 
Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), the United States played albeit, a belated and 
inconsequential role in support of Mobutu. However, during the second invasion in 1978, the super 
power played a much more active and decisive role by providing transportation and logistical support 
to French and Belgian paratroopers that were deployed to aid Mobutu against the rebels.  
 
In Angola, according to Leao and Rupiya (2005); even before independence, foreign interests were 
building up as a result of the failure of the three main Angolan liberation movements to reach an 
agreement on the model of power-sharing at independence. As independence approached, conflict 
among the liberation movements intensified, so did foreign interests; the warring superpowers were 
particularly eager to ensure that the faction that assumed power after independence was one which 
would be friendly; most sympathetic to their ideological cause and one which would guarantee the 
protection of their economic interests. On its part, the United States government authorised a grant of 
US$300,000 to the pro-Western National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in January 1975. 
The Soviet Union’s reaction to this development was increased arms deliveries to the Popular 




FNLA and for the first time, funded the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA); yet again, the Soviet Union reacted only this time round, indirectly through its ally, Cuba 
which had been aiding the MPLA since the mid-1960s. Cuba sent military instructors in late spring in 
1975 and by early October, more Cuban military personnel had arrived and this time round, it was not 
as instructors but as combat troops. According to Malaquias (2000), realising that Angola was 
becoming an “off-site” battle ground in the ideological warfare between East and West with the 
country caught in the crossfire; Agostinho Neto then President, seriously considered the adoption a of 
non-aligned foreign policy. Unfortunately, Neto did not live long enough to make the policy changes 
he was contemplating and on his death only four years into his rule in 1979; his successor José 
Eduardo dos Santos, a Soviet-trained petroleum engineer abandoned any pretence of a non-aligned 
position in favour of even closer ties with the former Soviet Union and Cuba.  
 
The Soviet Union welcomed this new foreign policy orientation in Angola and by 1986, (Franklin 
1997: 219) Angola was playing a central role in the Cold War; reciprocating, the Soviet Union, Cuba 
and other Eastern bloc nations increased their support for the MPLA government. To this effect, the 
Soviet Union gave an additional $1 billion to assist the Angolan government in its war against the 
other factions while Cuba sent in an additional 2,000 troops to the already 35,000-strong force serving 
in Angola. At the same time, Savimbi’s relations with influential American conservatives became 
stronger for he was seen a key ally of the U.S. effort to oppose and rollback Soviet-backed, non-
democratic governments around the world. According to Talbot (2002), Henry Kissinger, then US 
Secretary of State defended the United States involvement in Angola and in particular, support for the 
FNLA and UNITA in terms of limiting Soviet influence. The justification was bought across the 
political divide in both Senate and Congress and according to Malaquias (2000), the perception in the 
United States in the early 1980’s; that under dos Santos, Angola was the face of communism in the 
region saw the US government pursuing a clear and unambiguous policy to overthrow the MPLA 
regime and bring UNITA to power through the ballot box or bullets! 
 
With respect to the economic considerations, Gilpin (2001: 5) notes that during the Cold War, while 
political and ideological considerations were indeed critical and the United States and its major allies 
generally subordinated potential economic conflict to the need to maintain military and security 
cooperation however, they did not lose sight of the profit motive. These views are shared by Kinfe 
(1995: 63) who points out that protection of economic interests and the fear of losing western 
investments and commercial gains made in Africa led to a degree of protectionism that was yet again, 
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to translate into overt and covert foreign interventions. The importance attached to protecting western 
economic interests is evident in Niger where according to Knife (1995:20), notwithstanding the one 
party state dictatorship which characterised Diori’s rule, France continued to support him to the extent 
of providing him with military advisors and troops to assist him to crush an attempted coup in 1963. In 
1972 however, the relationship soured when Diori insisted that the former colonial power pays a 
realistic price for the country's uranium exports. The threat posed by Diori on the former colonial 
power’s economic interests was not taken lightly; he had to go and he did go when one Lieutenant 
Colonel Seyni Kountché  led a successful military coup ironically, with the support of French military 
advisors and troops, an arrangement which had saved Diori from a coup ten years earlier! 
 
The western alliance was not the only party in pursuit of the profit motive for according to Knife 
(1995:73), while Soviet Union assistance was supposed to assist the newly independent states to break 
their economic dependence on the imperialist West and to develop their economies independently, the 
focus of the assistance was on the development of the state sector and not the broader economy. These 
views are shared by Kanet (2006: 336) who observes that until the mid-1960s, Soviet support to the 
Third World was limited to providing weaponry and military training; economic and technical 
assistance was modicum.  In addition to military support, the super power also sponsored a growing 
numbers of students from the Third World to study in the Soviet Union and in other European 
communist countries however, this was not so much to equip them with the skills they needed to make 
a meaningful contribution to development in their home countries upon return but instead; to ensure 
the emergence of African elites who would propagate the communist ideology. Knife (1995:73) 
concurs adding that these arrangements were meant to ensure that the beneficiaries of the assistance 
would remain ideologically loyal and economically dependent on the super power. Besides and unlike 
the assistance from the West and notwithstanding the fact that Soviet assistance was for unproductive 
sectors, a vast portion of it was in the form of repayable credits. To this effect, between 1954 and 1977, 
of the US$ 1.8 billion assistance committed by the Soviet Union to Africa, only slightly more than US$ 
50 million or 2.7% was in the form of non repayable grants. Under such arrangements, Soviet 
assistance did not yield any economic benefits for Africa on the contrary; such arrangements resulted 
in indebtedness merely for consumption and not for investment purposes.   
 
In concluding this section, it is apparent that during the Cold War, regardless of the style of leadership, 
a dictator or otherwise, an African leader could count on the support of whichever side of the East-




positions to this or the other side of such a divide anyway. However, while such support was 
forthcoming from whichever side, it did not necessarily translate into social and economic 
development for in the main; it was limited to military support to ward off politically and ideologically 
“incorrect” opposition groups. As such, the support was not so much designed to benefit allies in 
Africa and elsewhere in the Third World but those providing it in terms of having the upper hand in the 
ideological warfare and/or protecting the latter’s economic interests. Furthermore and for Africa in 
particular, one outcome of getting caught up in the Cold War was the creation of a vicious cycle for in 
the quest to maintain their ideological dominance; the super powers went to the extent of creating 
and/or nurturing dictatorships; with no voice to express their objection to and/or opposition against 
such leadership styles, the masses often resorted to uprisings. Such uprisings often degenerated into 
full blown civil conflict meaning that there could be no meaningful development as resources and 
energy were diverted toward war efforts.  
 
In turn, oppressive administrative machineries and/or perceived continued failure by governments to 
provide for the masses were to trigger even more dissent to which the reaction of a government so 
threatened was often, an even higher degree of heavy handedness. Such a reaction by a sitting 
government would result in an even higher degree of dissent eventually leading to coup after coup and 
needless to say, further digression along the development continuum. For the African states, perennial 
civil strife if not all out war meant that there could be no meaningful development as the military 
imperative took precedence and resources were diverted towards war efforts. As such, despite the 
political rhetoric, assertions and cosmetic modifications designed to give the impression that the 
business of managing political and economic affairs was firmly in African hands, decisions on both 
continued to be heavily influenced by political and economic interests in the metropolitan capitals of 
both sides of the Cold War ideological divide.  
 
2.4 Africa’s dilemma in the new post Cold War economic order 
During the Cold War, even in those countries which were spared of the destabilising effects of foreign 
interventions and some degree of productivity was possible all the same, markets were limited since 
access to world markets was determined by ideological allegiances. According to Gilpin (2001: 13) the 
end of the Cold War ushered in an increasing acceptance of economic liberalism and the opening up of 
global markets; access which hitherto, was determined by ideological allegiances. The opening up of 
access to global markets in the post-Cold War era is evident in a report by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (2004) on Ethiopia in which the British government is said to have dispatched a high level 
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ministerial level delegation on a mission to Addis Ababa to “...strengthen economic ties...” with 
Ethiopia. During the Cold War, Ethiopia was considered a pariah and such a gesture would have been 
unthinkable then; by the end of the mission and given the new world order, no less than a ten year aid 
agreement covering a variety of development and economic sectors had been signed. The new world 
order would have been good news for the less developed countries only according to FAO (2003: 17-
18) and in Africa in particular, a broad range of factors including differentiated population dynamics; 
effects of climatic change; the level of technical development and domestic policies amongst others, 
resulted in a situation in which the playing field could not possibly be level. Such unfavourable 
conditions for comparative and competitive advantages resulted in a situation in which in Africa, 
expenditures on imports always exceeded that on exports understandably; the know-how and the pre-
requisite technology to producing finished products which meet global standards had to be imported. 
 
Streeten (2001: 368-9) gives another perspective to competitive advantage and argues that for the 
majority African states, attaining this status required structural adjustment, the very essence of 
development. In turn, such adjustment in the context of a globalised political economy required 
adapting from country to town; from agriculture to industry; from production for household 
consumption to production for markets and from largely domestic trade to a higher ration of foreign 
trade. Streeten however notes such adaptation often resulted in both favourable and unfavourable 
changes; favourable changes included unexpected improvements in the terms of trade, availability of 
additional foreign capital for investment and greater benefits from the international division of labour 
while unfavourable changes were manifest in high social costs because often, such changes were 
forced upon a country, “…too late…” According to Shah (1998), for many a Third World country and 
Africa in particular, change was indeed forced upon them “…too late…” for first of all, structural 
adjustment was forcing them into the global market place before they were economically and socially 
stable and ready to adjust. Secondly, they were being told to concentrate on cash crops and 
commodities produced elsewhere in the world in a situation in which they were lagging behind in 
know-how and technology. Thirdly, they were being told to export more in order to raise enough 
money to timely pay off their debts but in a situation in which their commodities could not meet global 
standards for lack of know-how and technology both of which were at a cost many an African state 
could not afford. Understandably, at that point in time, some African states were already heavily 




Fair (1985: 177) adds another perspective to the problem and argues that the structural adjustment 
programmes “recommended” to African governments in the wake of the post Cold War era involved 
broad packages characterised by cuts in government spending and in particular cuts on personnel costs 
in often over-inflated civil services. Other measures included doing away with food subsidies; 
inefficient parastatals and more reliance on the private sector; devaluing currencies and better 
accounting. Some African governments took heed of the recommendations and religiously 
implemented the measures however, amongst the social welfare "casualties" of spending cuts and in 
particular, in the civil service; were groups to who the majority of African ruling parties owed their 
status as the “government of the day”; some paid heavily for so “towing the line”. The Ivory Coast 
comes to mind as an example of a government that so paid heavily for according to Schwab (2001: 
143), the decision by the government in the 1990’s to restructure public enterprises led to layoffs and 
pay cuts; banks collapsed and loans were recalled. In the agricultural sector, the move to stabilise 
commodity prices on behalf of cocoa farmers at a time when the commodity’s price was steeply 
declining resulted in many a farmer going bankrupt. The ensuing economic crisis triggered strikes and 
protests of a level not witnessed hitherto. Schwab concludes that the political, ethnic and religious 
discord that confronted the Ivory Coast in the late 1990s into 2001 can be traced in part to the 
economic policies pursued by an unpopular government. A similar situation was witnessed in Sudan 
where according to Timberlake (1988: 179), enjoying a special client relationship with the United 
States, President Jaafar Nimeiri took advantage of the superpower's Economic Policy Initiative (EPI) 
which offered $500 million to those nations willing to undertake "more dynamic, growth oriented 
economic policies". His attempt to implement the “recommended" measures; devaluation of the 
currency and the slashing of subsidies on basic commodities were to be the trigger factor for the riots 
that ended his rule in 1985.  
 
African governments were clearly in an unenviable position for in order to be competitive, they had to 
implement structural adjustment programmes but then, the unfavourable changes associated with such 
adjustment generated dissent, civil strife and even conflict; a phenomenon whose impact on economic 
development amongst other causes had rendered them the “poor cousin” in global business 
competitiveness in the first place! This view by is supported by Abdul-Raheem (2000) who observes 
that over the years and time after time, African governments have succeeded in convincing the IMF, 
World Bank and other western controlled lending institutions that they are so poor that without the 
latter’s loans, there can be no improvements in the health and education sectors and/or in 
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infrastructure. In the process of benefiting from loans for such purposes however; when their hold on 
power is threatened, they can easily mobilise enough resources to arm and equip their armies and wage 
counter insurgency wars for years! This they are able to do because notwithstanding the fact that the 
Third World and African countries in particular, turned out to be bad debtors; the arms industry in 
Europe and North America readily sell landmines to the latter on credit terms without much 
persuasion. Abdul-Raheem laments that it is a tragedy that increasingly, many African governments 
have become totally dependent on food aid to avert deaths amongst the masses; at the same time 
however, the same African states are self sufficient in landmines when their positions are threatened! 
Abdul-Raheem’s views of business malpractice in the arms industry in Europe and North America 
were once echoed by former President Mahathir of Malaysia (2003) who in an interview with the 
British Broadcasting Corporation accused the West of creating and sponsoring wars in the Third World 
by using member countries as testing ground for new models of weapons. In order to maximise profit, 
the allegation continued, arms dealers in the West were selling weapons to one side in a conflict and 
should they prove superior to those used by the other side; they would persuade the latter to buy the 
same model or an improved version in order to match or have superior firepower over the adversary!  
 
In other sectors, Abbink (2002:3) argues that while the end of the Cold War and the new liberalized 
global economic order in which all members supposedly had equal status and access to markets was in 
itself good however, not so direct and/or covert foreign interventions designed to promote and ensure 
the continued protection of the economic interests of the economically powerful nations continued. 
This argument is supported by Knife (1995: 18) who argues that such protection of the economic 
interests of the economically powerful nations is evident in the fact that from independence through to 
the liberalised global economic order, the most critical decisions affecting the political economy in the 
Third World and in Africa in particular (access to investment opportunities and markets amongst 
others) continued and continue to be made in the metropolitan capitals. More seriously, such decisions 
were and continue to be made in forums marked by a conspicuous absence of African participants. 
This view by Knife is supported by Gilpin (2001: 18-19) who notes that notwithstanding the supposed 
subordinated role of the state in the new and liberalised global economic order, powerful governments 
continued to be the primary actors in both domestic and international economic affairs. In addition, 
they continued to set the rules within which other actors functioned and used their power to influence 





The views by Knife (1995: 18) and Gilpin (2001: 18-19) are evident from a conference convened in 
Washington by the United States government in June 2003 to discuss subsidies awarded to farmers. 
During the conference, one Nicholas Berg (2003), then a Senior Vice President of the World Bank and 
a key note speaker at the conference observed that other than stakeholder multilateral financial 
institutions (World Bank; IMF etc.) and United Nations agencies (Food and Agricultural Organisation 
etc.); the rest of the participants were from the economically powerful Europe and North America; 
representation from the Third World including Africa was conspicuously absent. He subsequently took 
it upon himself to assume the role of spokesman for those nations excluded and in an interview with 
British Broadcasting Corporation World Service’s World Business Report programme he asserted, 
"...stop subsidies to local farmers so poor nations can be able to feed their people..." According to 
Callebro, Calegar & Cappi (2000) subsidies paid to farmers by governments in industrialised countries 
are a form of protection from external competition in so far as in the event of over-production and 
excess supply and by implication, the lowering of commodity prices, farmers are paid the difference 
between the going market price for these commodities and a guaranteed or fixed target price should the 
latter be higher. In addition, in such situations, governments may also provide export marketing 
support through subsidizing transportation and storage costs; alternatively, they will buy the surplus 
from the farmers outright and dispose of it as food aid. Hassett and Shapiro (2003) concur adding that 
the European Union's policy of farming subsidies and tariffs have richly rewarded European farmers 
and swollen European food output while depressing world food prices and undercutting African 
exports. On undercutting African exports, the scholars argue that EU farm aid not only subsidizes 
inefficiency in so far as there is no disincentive for farmers to limit production to profitable volumes of 
produce; thus, unhindered production of surpluses has the effect of blocking the entry of many farm 
products from Africa thereby stifling economic growth in that continent.  
 
These arguments are not baseless for with generous subsidies from their governments, farmers in 
Europe or North America can never make a loss for in a good agricultural season, they make a profit 
and in a bad season, they are guaranteed of at least a break-even position thanks to the compensatory 
mechanisms in place to protect them from loss. Such subsidies and the buffers they represent against 
losses are non-existent for the African farmer and in a situation in which almost all agricultural 
produce in Africa is rain-fed; in the event of adverse climatic conditions; poor or erratic rainfall 
patterns in a given agricultural season; yields are poor and they make a loss. In the event of good rains 
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and a bumper harvest and by implication, excess supply; commodity prices fall, and the African farmer 
makes an unrecoverable loss.  
 
In concluding this section, it is apparent from the foregoing that the end of the Cold War and the 
liberalisation of global markets did not benefit Africa to the extent envisaged and Abdul-Raheem 
(2001) argues that far from delivering the promised gains; liberalisation, structural adjustment, 
privatisation and technocratic management have seen African countries sink deeper into debt and have 
resulted in ever increasing poverty. There is empirical evidence in support of these views by Abdul-
Raheem and not least, in the establishment by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1999 to assist countries for which there could be no 
development nothing short of debt relief. That Africa remains the “poor cousin” in the global political 
economy was inevitable and this can be traced to a combination of the factors cited above; the situation 
was compounded by the fact that first of all, Africa did not have the same starting point as the major 
European economic powers the continent was expected to compete with in the new order. Secondly, 
disruptive and destabilising foreign interventions during both the Cold War and in particular conflict; 
meant a reversal of whatever modest gains had been made during the first decade of independence.  In 
such a situation and with no comparative advantage, there was little scope for building a competitive 
edge against the powerful economies of Europe, North America or the Soviet Union. Thirdly, 
continuation of protectionist practices by the more powerful nations in the post Cold War era; overtly 
through amongst other things, subsidies paid to farmers or covertly through insisting on structural 
adjustment programmes, resulted in a situation in which African governments increasingly found it 
difficult to feed their people let alone produce a surplus for export and thus increase its export earnings.  
That being said and while admittedly, African governments have no control over protectionist practices 
by economically powerful governments and phenomenon like the increasingly pronounced impact of 
climatic change on agricultural productivity, the backbone of many an African economy; all the same, 
there are internal factors for which African governments have control. Amongst these factors are 
investment in rural areas, the hub of agricultural productivity and which for limitations in the pre-
requisite know-how and technology for the development of the industrial sector; is the only sector with 
the potential to take African economies into the future. The continued neglect of rural areas has 
resulted in many a farmer being disenchanted; and seeing no future for themselves in terms of making 
a living out of agriculture, the economically productive age groups are deserting the rural areas and 




situation in which the job market is shrunk and/or already saturated needs no elaboration; the poverty 
in the slums in many an African city tells the story only too well. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
It is apparent from the foregoing that a number of factors explain the discourse in Africa’s development 
path. However, the view by some scholars and African leaders alike, that the discourse is exclusively the 
result of a colonial legacy, the Cold War and the post Cold War global political economy has to be 
challenged. Indeed, these factors were significant contributory factors to the status of Africa as the “poor 
cousin”; disadvantaged of a comparative advantage from the very outset and later, the undermining of 
the potential to build up a competitive advantage. However, there are as many internal and equally 
significant contributory factors to such a state of affairs; this premise is based on the fact that Africa was 
not the only continent which at some point was under colonial rule; Latin America and Asia went 
through the same experience. Some countries in these regions successfully shook off the colonial 
hangover and have since become forces to be reckoned in the global political economy; the “Asian 
Tigers” are one example of such a phenomenon.  In any case, even if Africa was the only continent to 
have been under colonial rule, there is Ethiopia, a country that was never colonised but which 
notwithstanding the fact that it was spared of the alleged negative impact of colonialism on the 
development of its comparative advantage; if anything, it has witnessed as much political turmoil as in 
the former colonies and remains one of the poorest countries in Africa today.  
 
Regardless of the contributory factors, what is an indisputable fact is that increasingly; Africa is not able 
to adequately provide basic services, economic livelihoods and food security for the majority of its 
people. To this effect and whereas NGOs initially came in as short term gap fillers, three decades on, the 
services they provide have become indispensable to survival in many a community in Africa; in the 
provision  of education, health and social services and shelter; some even pay the salaries of some 
sectors of African public service sector. In being off-loaded of what clearly is their primary 
responsibility, host African governments should be grateful to NGOs not least, because the latter’s 
humanitarian gestures limit the degree of damage to a government’s public image for failure to fulfil its 
mandate. This however is not always the case; on the contrary and time after time, NGOs have come 
under fire by the same governments that are benefiting from the complementary services that NGOs 
provide; allegations ranging from “meddling in domestic affairs” to “agents of foreign powers” amongst 
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others are not uncommon. Such is the dilemma for NGOs which will be examined in depth in the 








































The United Nations (1961) General Assembly resolution 1710 (XVI) designated the 1960’s as the 
United Nations Development Decade. Explicit in the resolution was to accelerate progress towards 
self-sustaining economic growth and social advancement in individual nations so as to attain in each 
under developed country, a substantial increase in the rate of growth. In addition and according to 
Offiong (1980: 3), each country would set its own targets and have as the objective, a minimum growth 
rate of an aggregate national income of 5 percent by the end of the decade. However and 
notwithstanding the commitments made, between 1965 and 1968, Africa recorded the lowest growth 
rate with the average annual growth of GDP at only 3.3 percent; a rate representing per capita GDP of 
a negligible 0.5 percent. According to the United Nations (1987: 8), realising that the goal of declaring 
the 1960’s as the “United Nations Development Decade” had not been realised, the then Secretary 
General of the United Nations established the “Brundtland Commission” in 1983. The purpose of the 
Commission was to take to a higher level, the importance attached by member states to the “United 
Nations Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and beyond”. Amongst the terms of reference of 
the Commission was to examine and analyse environmental conservation measures that member states 
could embark on to promote and facilitate development.  At the conclusion of its work, the 
Commission defined sustainable development as "…development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."   
 
According to Ake (1996:8), commitment to development by the new leaders in independent Africa was 
already implicit in the ideology of the nationalist movements and without exception, they believed that 
one important lesson to be learnt from the humiliation of colonisation was the need to overcome 
weaknesses; not only in the political sphere but also in the military, economic and 
industrial/technological spheres. At the same time, in the face of a rising tide of nationalism and 
realising that colonialism could not survive, the colonial powers started promoting the idea of 
development. To this effect, they started exploring the concept “partnership in development” to 
maintain a presence and some leverage in the colonies after independence as well as to court what they 
hoped would be future allies in the fight against communism. 
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Notwithstanding the efforts made and the partnerships formed to promote development in Africa, the 
envisaged overcoming of weaknesses in the political, military, economic and industrial/technological 
spheres and the desired goal of “self reliance; plenty and happiness” for all has been difficult to realise 
since independence. This is evident as alluded to earlier, in the level of indebtedness, non-viable 
economies and in the context of this study; the fact that more than half a century into independence, the 
continent is increasingly finding it difficult to feed itself with the majority of countries depending on 
food aid year in year out.  
 
This chapter revisits some of the tenets of development theory and in the context of this study which is 
focusing on food security, modernisation and development theories are particularly relevant. This 
premise is based on the fact that with respect to modernisation; Jenkins & Scanlan (2001: 721) argue 
that international trade and investment stimulate economic development and spread technological and 
operational innovations across national borders; ultimately, this  increases social welfare and 
contributes to industrialization and growth in turn; a combination of these factors improve food 
consumption. This assertion by Jenkins and Scanlan is a contradiction in the context of African for 
despite the level of resources invested in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to promote 
development for close half a century; food consumption has not improved; on the contrary, the 
continent is increasingly dependent food aid. The level of resources invested towards development in 
Africa is illustrated by Mwilima (2003: 39) who notes that in the 1970s, Africa accounted for 25% of 
foreign direct investment to developing countries; two decades on in the 1990’s, FDI flows to 
developing countries surged and in Africa, it became the leading source of external financing. In 
addition to FDI and according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2011: 1); realising that debt 
was acting as a constraint to development in poor countries, the IMF and World Bank launched the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative to address the development needs of low-income 
countries. By the end of 2011, of the thirty six countries which benefited from the initiative, thirty were 
in Africa however; notwithstanding a combination of FDI and debt relief, economic development 
continues to lag behind other regions and the perennial food security crises continue unabated. 
 
With respect to the dependency school of thought, Wimberley & Bello (1992:899) argue that 
investment dependence has a harmful effect on food security in the Third World adding that MNC 
penetration reduces food security in the periphery countries. They explain their view by pointing out 




recycling of organic matter are replaced by the intensive use of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers; 
besides, MNCs’ use technology intensive production methods. The harmful effects of the intensive use 
of pesticides and synthetic fertilizers on the local environment compromises productivity especially in 
poor communities who produce simply to meet their own consumption. At the same time, the use 
technology intensive production methods means that “man is replaced by machine”; this generates 
unemployment which exacerbates household food insecurity especially in a situation in which the 
potential to produce food for one’s own consumption is already compromised.   
 
3.2 Development Theory  
 
Various schools of thought attempt to explain under development in Third World countries and 
according to Leys (1996:8), the first versions of development theory were the work of economists who 
believed that economic problems would ultimately bow down to the actions of modern benevolent 
states endowed with sufficient supplies of capital and good economic analytical skills. Based on such 
beliefs, they wrote development plans for newly independent states in Latin America, Asia and the yet 
to be independent colonies of Africa. Such a belief by modernisation theorists is supported by 
Cardosso and Faletto (1979: 11) who note that in almost all theories of modernisation, it is assumed 
that the political, social, and economic course which characterised Western Europe and the United 
States foretold the future for the underdeveloped countries. As such, for under-developed countries, the 
development process would involve replicating and completing the various stages that characterized 
the social transformation of the developed countries.  
 
By the 1950`s, such positivist orthodoxy according to Leys (1996:5); had not delivered any of the 
envisaged results adding that this was to be the trigger factor for debate on how the economies of the 
colonies of Britain, France and Portugal might be transformed and made more productive. Such debate 
was particularly important at the time; a period which coincided with the withdrawal of colonial 
powers and the emergence of new independent sovereign states in Africa and the transformation of the 
then still semi colonial states in Latin America. These views are shared by the World Socialist 
Movement (1997) who observed that the concerted effort by national governments and international 
agencies to “develop” the Third World was linked with de-colonisation as it was believed that this 
would help make political independence more "meaningful". However, for a number of reasons, this 
did not happen and according to Todaro &Smith (2003: 73), one of the reasons was the 
inappropriateness and/or irrelevance of many of the implicit assumptions of Western economic theory 
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on the conditions in Third World nations. Such inappropriateness and/or irrelevance Todaro and Smith 
argue, can be traced to the misconception that just as the Marshall Plan had worked in Europe, it would 
work in the Third World. In the process, the assumption overlooked the fact that the success of the 
Marshall Plan in Europe was facilitated by the existence of prerequisite conditions namely; well-
integrated commodity and money markets, highly developed transport facilities, a well-trained and 
educated work force, the motivation to succeed and an efficient government bureaucracy amongst 
others.  Such conditions did not exist in the Third World besides, the stages theory failed to take into 
account the fact that being part of a highly integrated and complex international system, even if Third 
World countries had developed the best and most intelligent development strategies; these could be  
nullified by external forces beyond their control. 
 
Rapley (2007: 3) notes that at the outset, the models appeared to have delivered; in the main, this was 
facilitated by the post-war world economy boom during which demand for third-world products rose; 
this provided Third World governments with the capital they needed to develop their industries and 
infrastructure. However, in time; problems with these strategies began to emerge and it became 
increasingly clear that the growth rate of many Third World economies could not sustain the 
improvements made in the standards of living of their people. This in the main; was due to the fact that 
the industrial development that took place consumed more resources than it generated and the wastage 
was exacerbated by the inefficiency of the state. As the post-war boom came to an end in the 1970s, 
the shortcomings of the state were exposed. According to Leys (1996:11-12), having failed to deliver, 
modernisation theory was challenged prompting the emergence of dependency theory. Proponents of 
dependency theory argued that under-development in the Third World was the result, not of internal 
factors but instead; of external interventions by powerful nations and in particular, interventions whose 
primary goal was profit maximisation.  The pursuit of such a goal was precisely what had kept the 
Third World in subordination since colonial times and in the process, the seeds of dependency were 
sewn. Thus, metropolitan policy was maleficent and self-serving and capitalist development offered 
nothing to the periphery. These two perspectives on development will now be examined.  
 
3.2.1 Modernisation Theory  
According to Rojas (1996) modernisation theory was the historical product of three main events during 
the post-World War 11era namely, the growth of a united worldwide communist movement led by 




communist movement and the imminent de-colonisation of Africa and Asia. The imminent de-
colonisation of Africa and Asia prompted the United Sates to encourage political and economic 
scholars to explore ways of promoting a capitalist orientation to economic development and political 
order in the new nation-states “in-formation” and thus avoid losing them to the Soviet socialist block. 
The scholars subsequently came up with a number of distinct but interrelated schools of thought viz. 
the Classical Evolutionary, the Structural Functionalism (also known as the Systems approach) and the 
Sociological and Economic perspectives.  
 
The main proponent of the Classical Evolutionary perspective according to Seyoum (2001:110) was 
Auguste Comte who believed that human evolution was predetermined, inevitable and unidirectional; 
all societies would move from a primitive to an advanced state adding that such evolution was good as 
it represented progress, humanity and civilization. To this effect, Comte identified five diametrically 
opposite characteristics which he argued, differentiated traditional (primitive) from modern (advanced) 
societies. The characteristics took the form of affectivity versus affective neutrality; collectivism 
versus individualism; ascription versus achievement (with respect to status in society), role diffusion 
versus role specificity and finally particularism versus universality in interpersonal relationships. 
Against this background, a modernising society was one in which the attributes that characterise 
traditional society were gradually being replaced by those that characterise the modern society. In the 
context of this study of which food security is at the centre, the movement towards modernity is 
captured by Smith (1973: 61) who points out that modernisation in predominantly agricultural societies 
is about replacing older agricultural practices with new ones. Such societies can be regarded as modern 
when they display specific characteristics; the extent to which these characteristics are exhibited gives 
an indication of the degree of modernity that has been reached.  
 
Agricultural productivity in traditional societies was influenced by and influenced the social 
organisation of these societies; it is for this reason that the attributes; affectivity, role diffusion and 
collectivism will be the focus of the analysis of modernisation theory. According to Seyoum 
(2001:111) affectivity is manifest in unquestionable trust; faith and loyalty to the values and beliefs of 
one’s kinship group as a whole. Role diffusion is manifest in an individual particularly in a position of 
leadership; playing a multiplicity of roles simultaneously; “executive”, “administrator” and “judge” 
amongst others; all rolled into one. Finally, collectivism manifests itself in collective social 
responsibility within a given community. The characteristics distinguishing traditional and modern 
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societies are interesting in the context of this study for according to UNDP (2006:7), the record of 
droughts in Kenya, go back to 1928. All the same and notwithstanding the fact that old agricultural 
practices had yet to be replaced with new ones and external food aid did not exist, communities did not 
altogether become extinct as a result of the impact of droughts.  
 
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that as the head of the clan, the chief made all the 
decisions on food security for his subjects (role diffusion); amongst such decisions would be drought 
mitigation and preparedness measures (executive) and how a “relief operation” would be managed 
(administrator) in the event of a drought. In addition, believing in the chief’s wisdom and trusting that 
the decisions he made were in the interest of the whole community, the decisions were religiously 
carried out with no questions asked (affectivity). During the drought of 1999-2001 in Kenya, amongst 
the categories targeted by UNICEF (2001) in the agency’s appeal for food aid were vulnerable children 
and in particular, orphaned child-headed households. The phenomenon “child-headed household” 
would have been the definition of “shame” in a typically traditional society for social safety nets for 
such children were readily available through collective social responsibility (collectivism). As such, a 
child was an orphan only in terms of not having biological parents otherwise a child had “parents” 
throughout his/her life. Thus, while social organisation in traditional societies was far from modern all 
the same, the defining characteristics of such societies; affectivity, the diffused role of the chief and 
collectivism, served them well. Against this background, it is argued that in Kenya, the move towards 
“modernity” did communities a de-service in so far as had they remained traditional, then perhaps 
these children would not have featured as a special category in UNICEF’s appeal.  
 
With respect to the structural/functionalist perspective, Talcott Parsons (Johnson 1993: 116) was the 
main proponent; concerned about the problem of social order, Parsons argued that if individuals were 
really separate entities pursuing their self interest, there could be no order. As such, the basis of social 
order was that while people act on the basis of their values; in practice, their actions are oriented and 
constrained by the values and norms of people around them. To elaborate on how order came about 
(Knapp1994: 191-192), Parsons drew an analogue between human society and a biological organism 
and just like a biological organism was made up of different organs, so was society; it was made up of 
different institutions that were its constituent parts. Each institution had a specific function to perform 
as a contribution to the optimal functioning and maintenance of the social fabric of the society and for 




and maintenance of society namely; adaptation to the environment, goal attainment, integration and 
latency. According to Seyoum 2001:110), Parson assigned the function of adaptation to the 
environment to the economy; to produce and distribute goods and services for people to survive. 
However, in Parson’ s view, it was not just any economic system but the capitalist form which he 
perceived as the only form capable of adapting to the environment. Goal attainment through the 
employment of resources was assigned to the political system but one which had to be based on 
European and/or North America models of democracy. In turn, goal attainment would be enhanced by 
integration through the administration of justice by legal and religious institutions but again, not just 
any religion but branches of Judeo-Christian religions. Finally, some family structure had to operate to 
facilitate procreation and as an institution for the transmission and maintenance of values from 
generation to generation through socialization; this function of the family is what Parsons referred to as 
latency. These components had to function in an interrelated and harmonious manner to facilitate a 
state of equilibrium which was a precondition for progress in any given society; malfunction in one 
component would destabilise the whole society. 
 
Of the main tenets of the structural functionalist perspective, adaptation to the environment; goal 
attainment and latency are relevant to the subject under study. There can be no argument against the 
assertion that the different institutions of any given society have a critical role to play and that a 
prerequisite for the well functioning of the whole society is that the constituent institutions work in a 
complimentary manner. With respect to the economy, modernisation theorists assert that adaptation to 
the environment is a characteristic peculiar to modern society; there is evidence to suggest that the 
assertion is based on limited understanding of patterns of daily living in traditional societies. Such 
evidence comes from an interview conducted with one Mutua (2011) whose age is estimated at 
somewhere between 90 and 100 years since he was already married and had two children at the onset 
of World War 11; a period during which in his Kamba tribe’s tradition, boys got married around the 
age 18-20. Mutua is a respected community opinion leader and is recognised as the institutional 
memory on pre-modernisation daily patterns of living his native Machakos District. In his account of 
how the Kamba people adapted to the environment, Mutua stated that when certain ecological signs 
pointing to a poor rainy season were observed; an unusual mild cold season or the appearance of 
certain foliage and/or insects; “...we did not waste time and energy planting crops which we knew 
would wither away anyway. Instead, we increased our trading activities (wooden sculptures and sisal 
baskets) with the Kikuyu’s ...” In the light of this, it can be said of the traditional Kamba communities 
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in Machakos District, that they had in place mechanisms which they effectively used to adapt their 
patterns of livelihoods to changes in their environment in order to shield themselves against anticipated 
food insecurity. Such defence and coping mechanisms are not peculiar to the Kambas for such 
adaptation was also evident amongst the Pedi; northern Sotho tribes of South Africa. According to 
Moninig (1988:147), with their economic life revolving around agriculture, the Pedi used phenomena 
observed in their natural environment to predict future weather patterns. Amongst such phenomena 
was the appearance of certain insects, the growth of certain shrubs and the timing of the budding of 
new foliage amongst other signs; such signs guided the Pedi in decisions on what crops to plant and 
when to plant them for maximum return on investment in terms of harvests.  
 
With respect to goal attainment through employment of resources, Dore (2001) notes that during 
colonial times, amongst nationalists expressions of disgruntlement with “modernising” colonial rule 
was repudiation of Western concepts of property rights. This, Dore’s argument continues, can be traced 
to a realisation by the nationalists that the pre-colonial customary land tenure system in which 
responsibility for land distribution rested with the chief ensured a “moral economy” rooted in a deep 
sense commitment to the interests and the good of society as a whole. Under the administration of 
chief, society was characterised by equity in communal existence supported by sound environmental 
management practices based on ecological knowledge and thus living in harmony with nature. 
According to Kievah and Nyaga (2009: 5), in Kenya, the colonial government viewed African 
customary land tenure as an impediment to greater agricultural production and proper land use 
practices, the traditional mode of land management was subsequently replaced by a hybrid system of 
English and African customary law.  
 
The system according to the Government of Kenya (2004: 9) was based on a system of Public Trust 
management in which Kenyan traditional rulers administered land in trust for the people under the 
supervision of colonial administrators. At independence in 1963, (Kieyah and Nyaga 2009: 5), a new 
law reclassified land into three categories namely government land, private land and trust land;  
responsibility for administering trust land was conferred on local government functionaries; this 
effectively marked the end of the role of traditional leaders in the distribution of land. Such a move 
was to disenfranchise communities to a level worse than during the colonial era; this in the main was 
the result of unscrupulous land grabbing and corruption within the local government functionary corps 




of enquiry established by the Kibaki government (Ndugu Commission) to investigate the scandals 
(Government of 2004b: 140) revealed that in County Councils in which trust land still existed, 
Councillors were either the main beneficiaries in land allocations or individuals and/or companies 
associated with them. More seriously, so much was the preoccupation of Councillors to secure a “share 
of the spoils” that minutes of Council meetings examined during the enquiry revealed that often, the 
only item on the agenda of meetings was allocation of land to Councillors! According to Mutua (2011), 
“... under the guidance of aimu (spirits)...the chief in Ukambani was a good mutongoi (chief/leader) 
and musili (judge) who made sure that some people did not have more than others...” Indeed, land 
distribution under traditional leaders in Kenya ensured a moral economy and it can be argued that the 
demise of the traditional authority structures is part of the reason why communities are increasingly 
food insecure. The premise for this argument is that even in the absence of climatic change and its 
impact on weather patterns and food production, the possibility that communities would  still have 
been food insecure cannot be ruled out not least; because of the systematic dispossession of their land 
by unscrupulous public functionaries. 
 
According to Seyoum (2001:103-104), the main proponents of the sociological economic perspective 
are Smelser and Rostow and in making a distinction between traditional and modern societies, Smelser 
(Seyoum (2001: 104) identified four processes namely; a shift from animal and human power to 
machine power; from simple to complex technology; from subsistence farming to cash crops and 
finally, from rural to urban settlements. Land would cease to be the only source of livelihood and 
wealth creation and industrialization would take root. Given that societies were characterised by 
different pre-modern starting points, the processes would not occur simultaneously furthermore, the 
momentum of change would also vary besides, the pattern and pace of development would be affected 
by other phenomenon notably wars and disasters. Against this background (Offiong 1980:40-41), 
Rostow identified five stages at which a society could be on the development continuum at any given 
point in time. At the first stage, the typically traditional society economy is dominated by subsistence 
activity of which agriculture is the most important and output is consumed by producers rather than 
traded. At stage two, a traditional society displays the pre-conditions for ‘take-off” into civilisation 
facilitated by new levels of education; entrepreneurship and institutions capable of mobilising capital 
while at stage three, industrialization increases and workers switch from the agricultural sector to the 
manufacturing sector. At stage four, there is a drive towards maturity and the economy diversifies and 
investment opportunities are created by amongst other things, increased external trade. At the fifth and 
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final stage, an economy according to Rostow (Seyoum 2001: 107-108) is characterised by mass 
production and the generation of a surplus which would provide a safety net for a society when 
threatened by the vagaries of competitive capitalist markets.  
 
In the context of this study, the second stage; the stage at which a traditional society displays the pre-
conditions for ‘take-off” into civilisation, is where Kenya could be placed in the present. According to 
UNDP (1999b: 4) following independence in 1963, economic growth in Kenya reached an all-time 
high of an annual average per capita GDP of 6.6 percent during the period 1964-1973. The rapid 
growth was fuelled amongst other things, by successful rural development policies and in particular, 
the expansion of land under cultivation and a switch to high-value crops that led to higher agricultural 
output. Growth was also spurred by import-substituting industrialisation which enjoyed access to the 
markets in the first life of the East African Community. This development in Kenya in the first decade 
of independence it can be argued; is attributable to new levels of education; entrepreneurship and 
institutions capable of mobilising capital”. On new levels of education, the argument has support from 
Kiringai and Manda (2002) who note that at independence in 1963, the government identified 
illiteracy, disease, ignorance and poverty as the main problems to be addressed in order to achieve 
sustainable national development. To this effect, the first three post independence decades saw some 
improvements in spheres such as educational amongst others.  
 
Rapley (2007: 2-3) notes that aware of the imperfections in the world economy and markets and 
confident that the state could overcome them, the thinking amongst development theorists was that 
assigning the state a leading role in the economy was the sure way towards development. The thinking 
was embraced by governments in Europe and North America;to this effect and as the colonial powers 
recoiled, this was the message they left with the new leaders in Africa and on their part; the new Africa 
leadership took heed of the message and eagerly adopted the models for they seemed to promise a 
rapid journey into the industrial age.  
 
During the first decade of independence; supported by the move from traditionalism to modernity as 
elaborated above and a booming post war economy, the strategy appeared to work for Kenya not least, 
because of an increase in the demand Third World goods. According to the UNDP (1999b: 4) however, 
the good performance of Kenya was not sustained and this is evident in an increasingly declining per 




period 1974-1979; down to 4.1 percent between1980-1985 sliding even further down to 2.5 percent 
between1990-1995. Given, there was a window period of recovery in 1995 when the recorded per 
capita GDP increased to 4.8 percent however, it was down to 2.3 percent in 1997; it was expected 
decrease further to 2.0 percent by the year 2000. Such a trend of an increasingly deteriorating 
economic performance is corroborated by Kiringai and Manda (2002) who note that during the 
previous decade (1992-2001), the educational attainment; health and poverty status of Kenyans had 
witnessed a declining trend to the extent that results from welfare monitoring surveys show that the 
rural poor constituted 46.3; 46.8 and 52.3 percent of Kenya’s population in 1992, 1994 and 1997 
respectively. In the light of the above, it can be said of Kenya that while the country got as far stage 
three; the process stalled at this stage; this is evident in the fact that three consecutive drought episodes 
in 199-2001; 2004 and 2006 were declared national disasters; in other words, they were beyond the 
country’s coping capacity; by implication, Kenya had not reached the stage of “mass consumption”. 
 
In the context of this study; there is evidence to suggest Kenya has yet to reach the stage of “mass 
consumption” not least, because a trend identified during the period under study (1999-2006) was one 
of increasing numbers of people requiring and receiving food aid due to poverty associated lack of 
and/or weak coping mechanisms during episodes of drought. This premise is based on the fact that in 
1996/7, the number of this category opf people stood at 1.8 million (FAO: 1996) increasing to 2.75 
million in 1999-2002 (Akilu &Wekesa 2002:1); given, there was a 16 percent decrease down to 2.3 
million during the drought of 2004 (World Agro-Forestry 2005: 18); however, in 2006, the number 
increased to 3.5 million (Kenya Food Security Steering Group 2005a: 4). Against this background, it is 
apparent that the stage of engaging the “cruise gear” which would see the production of surpluses for 
absorbing shocks presented by phenomenon such as drought never happened in Kenya. This is one 
explanation why perennial sorrowful appeals to the international community for food aid became the 
definition of “business as usual”! It has to be stated at this point that the focus on Kenya as an example 
is only because the study was carried out in communities in Kenya; the picture very much the same in 
other African countries.  
 
3.2.2 Conclusions on Modernisation Theory 
Modernisation theorists’ attempted to describe how social change and development; and the conditions 
for attaining the desired goal of “self reliance; plenty and happiness” for all came about. However, 
notwithstanding the arguments by classical evolutionists, the move from collectivism to individualism 
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for example, has not brought about the benefits that modernisation was supposed to deliver. On the 
contrary, such a move has taken communities backwards in terms of losing the benefits that 
collectivism once delivered. This is evident as pointed out earlier, in the fact that during the drought of 
1999-2001 in Kenya, the only safety net that orphan child-headed households had in order to survive 
the drought was provided by “strangers”, UNICEF and other humanitarian agencies because the social 
safety nets once provided through collective social responsibility no longer existed. A sense of 
collective social responsibility was a value inculcated into the individual from a very early age; 
nurtured by affective behaviour and monitored and supervised through an “integrated” approach to 
community “administration” in which the chief’s diffuse role meant that he was custodian of every 
aspect of the wellbeing of his subject; social welfare, security and justice amongst other considerations.  
 
Some scholars argue that such failure of modernisation to deliver can be traced to a number of factors 
and Zapf (2004:2) argues that one such factor is the fact that early modernisation theory was biased 
and ethnocentric in so far as the development categories, stages, and processes involved were all 
derived from the Western experience rather than from the developing countries. Gray (2002) shares 
these views and argues that the failure of modernisation processes to bring about the benefits envisaged 
by modernisation theorists lies in a number of mistakes. A fundamental and common error Gray’s 
argument continues, is the very idea that modernisation as articulated by its proponents represents a 
positive move when in fact it does not and cannot; for in and of itself, it does not carry any important 
human value and does not guarantee anything that could reasonably be thought of as human 
emancipation. Indeed a situation in which vulnerable children such as orphans have only “strangers” 
for a life-line when in fact they are living amongst their own people raises the question of the value of 
modernisation as a vehicle for human emancipation.  
 
The emphasis of the structural functionalist perspective on adaptation to the environment is interesting 
for in Kenya, colonial administrators dismissed traditional methods of land management including 
what were otherwise effective methods of adapting to the environment on the grounds that such 
methods were an impediment to greater agricultural production and proper land use. Given, while there 
was some room for traditional leaders to play a role in land distribution; however, the idea the colonial 
powers left behind was that the creation of room for such participation was simply a “public relations” 
exercise. In the absence of a need for such public relations exercises and bent as they were to see 




and replaced traditional arrangements for land distribution with “modern” ones. Notwithstanding the 
fact that in so doing, Kenya was making “progress” towards modernity, the “modern” methods of land 
management rendered communities worse off than they had been during colonial times.  
 
The premise for this position is that notwithstanding the adoption of approaches deemed to be modern 
and better with respect to adaptation to the environment and agricultural productivity; in the sphere of 
food security and as is evident in Kenya, over the past twelve years or so and except for the year 2004, 
the number of people depending on food aid for survival in Kenya has been increasing with each 
drought. It turns out that the established pattern of drought is such that the frequency, on average every 
two years; the severity and impact is increasing with each episode. At this rate and nothing short of 
food aid, communities in Kenya might well become extinct in the 21st century (!); this is a sharp 
contrast to their traditional and not so modern predecessors who survived them all without World Food 
Programme; German Agro Action; Catholic Relief Services; Action Against Hunger or the Red Cross 
amongst others. As for goal attainment through the employment of resources for the good of all, a 
function assigned to the political system; the new leadership in Kenya adopted the western model 
inherited from the colonial era. In practice, the inherited political system was not democratic by any 
standard for it was designed to serve and protect only the interests of the ruling class; colonial 
administrators and settlers. The new ruling class were unwaveringly loyal to the doctrine and did 
exactly that; they served themselves well just like colonial administrators and settlers had done during 
colonial days. The exploitation and dispossession particularly of poor voiceless rural peasants of the 
only asset they had namely, land; through corrupt land allocation and deals was to disenfranchise this 
category of people to the extent that the majority of this category in the semi arid regions of the 
country have become dependent on food aid, year in; year out. Finally, with respect to latency, the 
replacement of collectivism by individualism has seen many an orphan in Africa become a street child 
for lack of a family environment to grow up in and be socialised into the values of the community.  
 
With respect to latency, the irony of it all according to Porter (1992) is that in modernising Europe, the 
individualism that took root coupled with the “urban pull factor” prompted by the Industrial Revolution 
and the consequent escalating cost of living meant that often, both parents had to go out to work. The 
squalid conditions under which children grew up with little if any parental supervision saw many of 
these children growing up maladjusted. According to Hessen (1967: 112) this category were the lucky 
ones; the unlucky ones were deserted or orphaned pauper children who he notes; under the auspices of 
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“parish  apprentices”; were sent into virtual slavery by their “modern” government as represented by 
appointed “poor-law” officials; the latter often bound them into long unpaid apprenticeship in return 
for a bare subsistence. It will be argued here that had English Victorian society remained traditional, 
these children would have been cared for by the broader community and would not have had to be sent 
into virtual slavery. Notwithstanding such glaring evidence of the impact of modernisation on the 
welfare of people and in particular, children; modernisation theorists did not take into account its 
undesirable effects even in their own backyards!   
Seyoum (2001: 4) defines development as a complex set of change processes that encompasses the 
economy, society and the polity.  As a goal-oriented process of economic change, it embodies the 
quantitative expansion of an economy’s productive capacity and favourable changes in the quality of 
life manifest in improvements in people’s living standards. This definition by Seyoum suggests a 
society that has accomplished all five stages of development as expounded by proponents of the 
sociological economic perspective. In Africa however, it is apparent that many a country stalled 
somewhere along the continuum as the example on Kenya given earlier clearly demonstrates; such 
experience in many a developing country is precisely what discredited the theory amongst some 
scholars. Amongst these scholars are Cardoso and Faletto (1979:10) who argued that the failure of the 
theory to explain the development discourse in Third World countries can be traced to the fact that the 
emphasis on shifts in methods of production is narrow and ignores other equally important factors such 
as the relationships between the forces of production; patterns of income distribution and the structure 
of employment amongst others.  
In support of this assertion, Cardoso &Faletto (1979: 10) further argue that it may happen that a society 
modernizes its methods of production without corresponding advances in development that is, less 
dependency, self-sustained growth and improvements in the welfare of people. The argument appears 
valid for in Kenya for example, in 1990 (UNDP 1998:128), GDP stood at $1023; life expectancy at 
59.7 years and adult literacy at 69 percent. Fifteen years later in 2005 (UNDP 2008: 231) these 
indicators stood at $1250; 52.1 years and 73.6 percent respectively. Thus while GDP witnessed an 
increase of 22 percent, life expectancy actually decreased by 12 percent and while adult literacy 
increased by 6 percent, the increase was not commensurate with the increase in GDP. According to 
Jarso (2010: 35-36), in Kenya, such a skewed pattern of development in which there are improvements 
in economic performance but little if any improvements at all in the welfare of people; can be traced to 




continually witness the pilferage of public funds through shoddy deals between gluttonous public 
officials; in the process, an overwhelming proportion of Kenyans languish in abject deprivation and 
socioeconomic inequality. This account by Jarso points to income distribution disparities as a 
contributory factor to lack of meaningful development despite the increase an increase in GDP 
facilitated by expansion and diversification of the economy between the two periods. 
 
In concluding this section on modernisation theory, it will recalled that in 1983, the United Nations 
Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development "…development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."  It is apparent 
that modernisation processes did bring about benefits in terms of some improvements in people’s 
living standards in Africa. At the same time however and as is evident from the example on Kenya 
clearly demonstrates, the development that took place compromised the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs and in the context of this study, in the sphere of household food security. Thus, 
changes in the social organisation of communities and in particular, the replacement of traditional 
power structures and methods of land management by modern ones, disadvantaged communities who 
otherwise had their own albeit, not so modern, democratic and/or scientific methods of providing for 
and/or defending themselves against and/or coping with hazards and threats in their environment.  
  
3.3 Dependency Theory  
Dos Santos (1971: 226) defines dependency as a historical condition which shapes the structure of the 
world economy such that it favours some countries to the disadvantage of others and limits the 
development possibilities of the subordinate economies. In such a situation, the economies of the 
disadvantaged countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of the economies to which 
their own is subjected. In addition, he argued that the relations of interdependence between two or 
more economies and between these and world trade assumes a form of dependence when some 
countries (dominant ones) can expand and can be self sustaining while other countries (the dependent 
ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion.  Seyoum (2001: 97) shares these views and 
argues that the development of Europe and North America became dependent on exploitation of the 
Third World and a converse relationship between underdevelopment in the Third World and 
development in Western and North America developed.  
 
According to Cockcroft, Frank & Johnson (1972: 3), dependency theory first emerged in the 1950s and 
1960`s as a reaction to liberal free trade theories; the main advocate was one Raul Prebisch whose 
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research with the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) found that the wealth of poor 
nations tended to decrease when the wealth of rich nations increased. According to Rapley (2007: 26), 
Prebisch’s structuralist perspective was later adapted to a Marxist approach by the likes of Andre 
Gunder Frank, Paul Baran and Theotonio Dos Santos who argued that contemporary under- 
development had its roots in past and continuing economic relations between the less-developed 
countries of the periphery and the now developed metropolitan countries. Rapley (2007: 26) further 
notes that Baran in particular, argued that the First World actually hindered the emergence from 
poverty of the Third World adding that imperialism had not exported capitalism to the Third World 
rather, it had drained the colonies of the resources that would have been used for investment as such; 
imperialism had killed off local capitalism through competition. According to Seyoum (2001: 84) 
Frank later sharpened Baran’s analysis stressing that development and under-development were in fact 
two sides of the same coin; as such, by siphoning the surplus away from the Third World, the First 
World had enriched itself. In addition, by keeping the Third World underdeveloped; the ruling 
bourgeoisies of the First World ensured a ready market for their finished goods and a cheap supply of 
raw materials for their factories. Seyoum concurs with these views (2001: 84) by Baran and notes that 
periods of economic growth in Latin America coincided with periods of minimal intervention from the 
external world notably during the two World Wars while engendered stagnation and crisis coincided 
with a return to the world system in later years.  
 
Other scholars extended their argument to foreign aid and Rojas (1989) in particular, argued that for 
less developed countries, modernizing within the capitalist system meant that first of all, latecomers as 
they were to the modern world, Third World countries had to buy modern machinery, technology and 
know-how from abroad to meet the basic conditions to compete. Secondly and in order to finance the 
purchases, they had to export raw materials, cash crops, and human labour; but as with any free 
market, the international one will reach equilibrium prices in such a way that the prices of 
manufactured products will increase faster than the prices of raw materials. Under the circumstances, 
less developed economies faced a structural handicap in the balance of payments and had to constantly 
borrow from abroad; in the process, they found themselves trapped in the international financial system 
in three ways; in trade, in investment and in financing. Rojas further argued that there was a belief 
amongst Western European development theorists that less developed economies suffered from 
scarcity of capital and the way to industrialize them therefore, had to be through imports. Against such 




economies of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) would expand and the road to modernization would 
be easier. In addition, there was a belief that Transnational Corporations (TNCs) had an important role 
to play as engines of growth in less developed economies to this effect and at the time of Rojas’ 
writing, around 20-25 percent of all the capital invested abroad by TNCs was going to LDCs. In the 
LDCs, TNCs came to dominate the production of raw materials, energy, agricultural products for 
export and significant sectors of the domestic industries. Seyoum (2001: 84) shares the views by Rojas 
adding that the capitalist market and foreign investment is dominated by huge TNCs which he argues, 
have not only failed to empower the poor but have actually dispossessed them through legitimising 
inequalities. Such dispossession the argument continues; is evident in the fact that TNC activities 
generate far greater capital outflows than inflows into the underdeveloped world through amongst 
other mechanisms, interest payments, profit repatriation and transfer pricing. The solution to 
underdevelopment he concluded; was “de-linking” the periphery from the centre and pursuing 
autonomous and auto-centric national growth which meant more reliance on domestic resources. Such 
de-linking could only be achieved by introducing some form of socialism in order to neutralise the 
power base of the business elite who bent as they were on serving the interests of foreign capitalists, 
were an obstacle to such auto-centric development.  
 
3.3.1 Types of Dependency 
According to So (1990: 99-100), Dos Santos identified three forms of dependency; colonial, financial-
industrial and technological-industrial dependence. Colonial dependence can be traced back to 1884 
when after partitioning of Africa; the colonial powers immediately established export economies based 
on monopolies amongst other measures designed to protect their economic interests. Financial-
industrial dependence emerged towards the end of the 19th century when European colonial powers 
dominated the market and the colonies were treated simply as producers of raw materials and 
agricultural products for home industries and markets. Technological-industrial dependence emerged 
in the post World War II era during which underdeveloped countries depended on revenue from the 
export sector to import money and technology in order to industrialize. Dos Santos concluded that the 
economic backwardness of underdeveloped countries was not so much due to a lack of integration with 
capitalism instead; it was the monopolistic control of foreign capital, foreign finance and foreign 
technology at national and international levels that prevented underdeveloped countries from reaching 
an advantageous position. So (1990: 102) concurs, adding that such domination and monopolistic 
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control of foreign capital; finance and technology resulted in the reproduction of backwardness, misery 
and social marginalization of people in underdeveloped countries.  
 
Martinussen (1997:90) shares these views by So (1990: 99-100), and other scholars such as Seyoum 
(2001: 84) and argues that in the aftermath of the colonial era, the move from the metropolis-satellite to 
a centre-periphery orientation was characterised by a pattern in which an auto-centric reproduction 
structure was generally self-reliant in the developed countries. In the Third World however, there 
remained a typically peripheral economy characterized by an exploited export sector producing luxury 
consumer goods for the metropolis. Under the circumstances and while Third World countries 
generated a surplus and foreign currency; the initial capital outlay had been borrowed as such, the 
earnings went towards debt servicing amongst other competing priorities thereby leaving little for 
reinvestment. The end result was that instead of peasants producing for themselves and stimulating 
their local economies, they were reduced to mere agents for facilitating wealth accumulation in richer 
countries. Abdul-Raheem (2000) shares these views adding that the logic of global markets dictates 
that we (Africa) produce what we are best at, just as in the colonial times, this condemns us to 
commodity production for exports. Under the circumstances, we produce what we do not consume and 
consume what we do not produce and unfortunately, the West and the USA that dominate the global 
political economy dictate the price for both!  
 
3.3.2 Colonial dependence  
Rojas (1970) propounds that this form of dependence is export trade in nature and can be traced to the 
fact that commercial and financial capital in alliance with the colonialist state dominated the economic 
relations between the colonial powers and the colonies through the establishment of trade, land, mining 
and manpower monopolies (serf or slave) in the colonised countries. Examples of land monopolies are 
evident in Kenya where Knife (1995: 55) observes that a major root cause of the anti-colonial Mau-
Mau uprisings between 1952 and 1960 was grievances against the systematic eviction of local Kikuyu 
tribes from the central highlands to make way for coffee plantations for British settlers. The same 
practice is evident in the then Southern Rhodesia where according to the Africa Institute Bulletin 
(1977), the Land Apportionment Act of 1930  later amended in 1941allocated 50% of the land of the 
entire country to white settlers, 33% to blacks with the rest remaining designated for parks and nature 
reserves. In 1969, the Act was repealed and renamed the Land Tenure Act; it allocated an equal area of 




the repealing of the Act in 1969 changed little because the allocation was done in such a way that white 
settlers occupied the prime agricultural land while that allocated to blacks was of inferior quality.   
 
In the sphere of trade, the same situation prevailed for according to Willis (1985: 122), as far back as 
the early19th century, monopolies existed in various forms adding that such monopolies reached a new 
height during the late nineteenth century, a period which coincided with increasing dependence by 
competing colonial powers on the colonies for food commodities and raw materials for their fast 
growing populations and industrialising home economies. In this respect, Knife (1995: 10) observes 
that as new discoveries of the resource endowment of the colonised territories were made and 
competition intensified; Britain for example, started to view “state intervention” as an imperative. 
According to the Africa Institute Bulletin (1977), in the then Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) such a 
view resulted in the British talking Lobengula, the chief of the Ndebele tribe, into signing the Moffat 
Treaty in 1988. By signing the Treaty, Lobengula not only gave the British businessman Cecil John 
Rhodes mineral prospecting rights but also agreed not to enter into any correspondence or treaty with 
any other foreign power without the permission of the British High Commissioner for South Africa. 
Later in the same year, Lobengula yet again signed the Rudd Concession which gave Rhodes complete 
and exclusive charge over all metal and mineral rights and conferred on him; sweeping commercial 
and legal powers which he used to form the British South Africa Company (BSAC). In 1899, the 
BSAC subsequently obtained a charter from Queen Victoria which granted the company the exclusive 
right to operate in the whole of the British territory west of the Portuguese possessions; this effectively 
gave the company a mining monopoly in the then Southern Rhodesia, north of then Bechuanaland 
(Botswana) and the north and west of the then Transvaal region of South Africa.  
 
With respect to the exploitation of people as cheap labour, every former colonial power has own 
“skeletons in the cupboard” and according to Kimber (2003) the record of Belgium’s King Leopold 11 
in Congo is the worst of them all by any standard. Reports have it that forced labour practices by his 
agents on the rubber plantations were so brutal that to prove that they were doing their work; they 
would deliver baskets full of human hands severed from those who failed to deliver the stipulated daily 
quota of rubber harvest at the end of any given working day. Portugal was not much better either for 
Meredith (1985: 30-31) notes that despite claims to be engaged in a “great civilising mission”, the 
traditional role for Africans in Portuguese colonies was to provide labour and to pay taxes. In addition, 
the labour practices of the colonial power were so bad that unless one had evidence of being in gainful 
employment; for six months every year, African men would be conscripted to work for the government 
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or on privately owned plantations, roads and mines and often, hundreds of miles from their homes. In 
time, the outcry by other colonial powers in protest at such labour practices by the Portuguese was so 
strong that in 1937, a report run in London's Daily Express had it that it would be a blessing for the 
native population in Portugal’s territories if they were taken away and given to some other power!  
 
While criticising the Portuguese, Britain was not that much better off either for according to Alexander 
(2000: 10), while for some time, the colonial power managed to stave off criticism of its increased 
demands for Africans to give more and more of their labour in Kenya; in time, the colonial power’s 
exploitative labour practices were exposed through its record of such practices in South Africa. At the 
establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the labour legislation enacted by Britain was based 
and modelled on the Dutch “Masters and Servants” Cape legislation of 1856 which amongst other 
provisions prohibited strikes. According to Parsons (1984:113), even before the legislation; the late-
nineteenth-century mineral revolution dominated by British capital was known to have had to a 
profound effect on African society in Southern Africa and South Africa in particular. Such an effect 
was a result of the fact that the colonial power viewed and treated the pre-capitalist tributary societies 
of these colonies simply as reserves for a cheap supply of labour for the mining and later, the 
manufacturing sectors. In addition, Minter (1986: 24) notes that such conduct by Britain was inevitable 
for as early as 1894, Cecil John Rhodes had set the stage for the exploitation of Africans through the 
Glen Grey Act of 1984 in the Cape. The Act was designed to force a portion of Africans in Glen Grey 
District to work as migrant labourers by amongst other things, imposing taxes and replacing communal 
land tenure with individual title to land in native areas. The list of examples of how colonial powers 
maintained their economic dominance through exploitation of the natives is long but to mention a few.  
 
3.3.3 Financial-industrial dependence 
Financial-industrial dependence according to So (1990: 99), consolidated itself at the end of the 
nineteenth century and was characterized by the domination of big capital in Europe and North 
America. It was later extended to the Third World through investment for the production of raw 
materials and agricultural products for the fast growing industrial sector and for consumption back in 
the home capital cities. Martinussen (1997:86) notes that as a result of such a development, a 
productive structure devoted to and dependent on the export of these primary products emerged in the 
dependent countries; in turn, such a structure resulted in dual economies characterised by a large 




development of the industrial sector not least, because the latter requires substantial investment in 
technology and know-how both of which are facilitated by the availability of capital derived from 
export earnings. In the Third World and in Africa in particular, while the end of the Cold War ushered 
in the liberalisation of global markets, this did not bring any real benefits in terms of increased exports 
and corresponding export earnings for the terms of trade were not always conducive to maximum 
return on investment. Kinfe (1995:18) argues that this can be traced to the fact that the playing field 
was never level mainly because despite assertions that market forces would be the major determinants 
of the dynamics of the global political economy; overtly or covertly, powerful governments continued 
to play a significant role in order to protect their industries. Knife further notes that that such 
protectionist practices were to see the most critical decisions affecting the global political economy 
(investment; markets, high value tagged marketable commodities and related quality control standards 
amongst others) being made and continue to be made in metropolitan capitals as elaborated in the 
previous chapter. 
 
Gilpin (2001:18-19) argues that such exclusion was inevitable for contrary to assertions that the state 
would be playing a minimal role in the new and liberalised global economic order, powerful 
governments continued to be the primary actors in both domestic and international economic affairs. 
Furthermore, they continued to use their power to influence economic outcomes by setting the rules 
within which other actors had to function; the fixing of commodity prices, the determination of export 
quotas and tariffs amongst other strategies. Thus and at best, the playing field has never been level not 
least, because the Third World countries did not have the same starting point as those of Europe and 
North America. At worst, protectionism saw the goal post forever changing whenever the economic 
interests of the powerful nations are threatened; besides, the argument continues, there was an element 
of coercion. Such coercion is evident in the fact that when commodity prices, export quotas and tariffs 
are externally determined with no room for negotiation, the tendency by weaker nation states is to 
produce the commodities for which the price and quota are highest and the tariffs lowest in order to 
maximise return on investment. In addition to coercing governments in the Third World to focus on 
certain commodities through the quota system and price fixing, Hetch (1995: 404) notes that due the 
limited influence Third World countries have over both technology and investment decisions, powerful 
governments covertly dictate the quality standards that the commodities must meet; she refers to such a 
phenomenon as the "Issue of Externalities" and "Dependency Perspectives".  
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With respect to "Externalities", Hetch (1995: 405) cites the example of short-cycle crops like sugar and 
cotton of which the Third World is a major producer. But then, so is the United States and given its 
level of advancement in agricultural technology, the quality and thus competitiveness of these Third 
World agricultural products on the world markets is determined by the quality standards of United 
States commodities at any given point in time. With respect to "Dependency", the tendency by Third 
World governments is to seek and/or accept offers of “technical advice” from planners and/or agencies 
to ensure that their commodities meet the stipulated standards and are of the same quality as those from 
competing countries. According to Babu (1981:39), unfortunately for the Third World, there is little to 
show in terms of the impact of such “technical advice” understandably, his argument continues, in a 
situation in which the knowledge and experience of the “experts” is wholly metropolitan and/or their 
background entrepreneurial, the solutions offered to Africa is not from the reality of the situation but 
instead, from business manuals. In addition to little if any impact at all, Hetch (1995: 406) argues that 
the technical advice given often involves the application of technologies and/or yield enhancing 
chemicals that due to different ecological and/or cultural conditions are not suitable to the context. 
Mismatched with local ecological conditions as the technologies and/or chemicals are, the result is 
often environmental degradation and/or adverse influences on weather patterns amongst other 
undesirable side effects.  
 
The observations and arguments by Babu and Hetch with respect to the nature and form of “technical 
advice” offered to Third World governments are captured by a one-time spokesman of the UN Office 
for Emergency Operations who Timberlake (1988: 3) quotes as saying, “...Africa's biggest problem - is 
too many people going around the continent with solutions to problems they don't understand...” At 
about the same time, the same sentiments were echoed by a then Senior Vice President of the World 
Bank who admitted, “...We...have failed in Africa along with everybody else...We have not fully 
understood the problems. We have not identified the priorities. We have not always designed projects 
to fit...” In any case, Timberlake (1988: 3) notes that the cost to Africa was phenomenal adding that 
“...advising Africa has become a major industry with European and North American firms charging as 
much as $180,000 for a year of an expert's time...". Such a level of remuneration coupled with an 
estimated 80,000 or so such technical advisors working for public agencies under official aid 
programmes in Africa at the time, meant that more than half of the USD7 - 8 billion of aid spent 





According to Capps (2005) the majority of African countries were particularly vulnerable to downturns 
in the world economy because of the colonial legacy of heavy reliance on a narrow range of price-
sensitive primary commodity exports; cocoa, coffee and copper amongst others. The slump of the 
1970s saw the prices of most raw material collapse at a time when the cost of oil imports was 
witnessing dramatic increases; in response, the IMF began to offer short term loans to “stabilize” these 
countries’ balance of payments; this marked the beginning of Africa’ s foreign debt problem.  On 
foreign debt, Babu (1981: 39) argues that debt establishes a special kind of umbilical cord which ties a 
country's economy to that of the donor and in the process, distorts the local economy by integrating it 
externally. Bond (2006: 27) concurs adding that the conditions which are often attached to aid results 
in many other “phantom” aspects that prevents it from reaching its targets on the ground. In support of 
this assertion, he cites an example from an annual report of the NGO Action Aid which had that in 2003, 
payments in respect of transactional and administrative costs of administering aid accounted for some 14 
percent of the aid disbursed globally. In addition, technical assistance by Northern experts accounted for 
20 percent while some 4 percent was technically ‘tied’ to the purchase of inputs from the donor country. 
Such arrangements Babu (1981:45) argues are hardly surprising for there is no such thing as 
“disinterested aid” adding that all aid is designed to serve specific objectives beneficiary to the donor, 
directly or indirectly.   
 
This view by Babu is supported by Capps (2005) who cites the example of Western powers’ response to 
the world recession of 1974-75 in which they came up with a scheme which tried to boost demand for 
their home industries by underwriting the export of arms and machinery in the Third World. The 
“export credits” were in reality tied loans that could only be used for the purchase of specified imports 
and in the event that a Third World country could not repay the loan, the export contract would be 
honoured by the companies’ governments.  Such arrangements did not mean exoneration from 
repaying the loans; on the contrary, the obligation was presented in another form namely; an export 
credit which would be converted into a bilateral loan which would either be charged at market interest 
rates or at marginally lower concessional rates and recorded as Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA). Notwithstanding that the gamble failed in so far as the anticipated recovery of at least part of 
their money through these bilateral aid arrangements did not work, this however did not stop the 
industrialized countries from continuing to subsidize their arms and other export industries so they can 
continue do business in the Third World. The persistence of developed countries on continuing to lend 
money to the Third World is evident in the fact that between 1976 and 1980, the Third World’s total 
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debt grew at an annual average rate of 20 percent. Such bilateral debt has since been killing Africans 
twice - by underwriting the export of arms to fuel its many wars as well as by sucking out scarce 
resources to ensure that arms and other industries in the developed world stay in business.  
 
The same can be said of multilateral donors and Capps (2005) cites the example of the World Bank 
which increasingly lent money to fund “development projects” in the Global South from the 1950s 
onwards in arrangements in which a new arm of the bank, the International Development Agency was 
established to provide “soft” or “concessional” (cheap) loans to the least developed and poorest 
countries. Such arrangements were directly tied to the international financial institutions’ wider goal of 
establishing new avenues of accumulation of Western capital in all corners of the globe. Unfortunately, 
the bulk of the loans were for major infrastructural projects; however, in a situation in which the 
borrowing countries lacked the human capital and/or technological know-how, they relied on Western 
construction companies, consultants and technology as such, the projects generated a healthy profit 
“flow-back” to the firms of the states providing the funds and/or expertise. Babu (1981: 39) observes 
notwithstanding that African governments in particular, turned out to be bad debtors; readily available 
foreign loans became a substantial part of Africa's development strategy whereby the meaning of 
"protection of national interests" became synonymous with continued access to aid. He concludes that 
contrary what foreign aid was originally meant to do namely; to cover shortfalls in export earnings, it 
became indispensable to political survival whereby "progress" was and continued to be measured not 
on the basis of how much better the masses eat, dress and/or live but in terms of export performance 
and the balance of payments!  In the process (Babu 1981: 45), entrepreneurs became the first and final 
casualties of a vicious circle understandably, instead of enjoying protection from their governments 
through limiting their involvement in unfavourable world markets; they were exposed even more not 
least, by being coerced into producing not primarily for their own consumption needs but to satisfy the 
consumption and production needs of the donor country.  
 
3.3.4 Technological-industrial dependence  
Dos Santos (1971: 231) refers to this as a new dependence which he argues, was consolidated in the 
post war period and which can be traced to Multinational Corporations (MNCs) which began to invest 
in industries targeted at the internal markets of underdeveloped countries. The new dependence, the 
argument continues (Dos Santos 1971: 232-234), is characterised by the development of an industrial 
sector and an emphasis on industrial imports and exports instead of the traditional reliance on 




countries in so far as the development of an industrial sector is dependent on the development of the 
export sector which generates the necessary foreign currency earnings to maintain the industrial sector. 
However, in a situation in which traditional reliance on agriculture and raw materials, the only source 
of foreign earnings in the Third World was discouraged, it meant that countries in this group could 
never fairly compete in world markets for lack of a resource base with which to develop the industrial 
sector. Besides and of necessity, the development of the sector in the Third World and in Africa in 
particular, depends on technology from developing countries which countries have a monopoly over 
the supply of such technology anyway!  
 
On monopoly over the supply of technology, Rapley (2007:27) concurs adding that such a practice of  
“selective engagement” by foreign firms was designed to secure continued access to protected Third 
World markets; it is this practice amongst other reasons that the Third World did not derive maximum 
return on the investment made from the imported technology.  The other reasons are first of all, 
determined to maintain their competitive advantage in an environment in which through research and 
development, technology was ever evolving at a very fast pace, MNCs often used the Third World as a 
depository for technology which had become obsolete in their home countries. Thus, notwithstanding 
the drain on their meagre foreign earnings base, Third World industrial development was largely based 
on second generation production technology besides, while MNCs readily sold their obsolete 
machinery and equipment to the Third World , they were however reluctant to share and/or sell the 
know-how deriving from research and development. On selective engagement, the observation by 
Rapley is supported by Kema (2005: 6) who cites the example of a dispute between the Indian 
government and the Coca-Cola Corporation in which at one point in time, the government’s position 
was that if Coca-Cola wished to continue operating its subsidiary in India, it had to disclose details of 
the composition of the cola syrup formula used to make the beverage. Realizing that this would 
undermine its monopoly on the product and thus its profit motive, Coca-Cola declined to provide the 
details and instead, chose to close its operations rather find itself competing on a level playing field 
with a local company. Secondly, as the imported inputs were driving the Third World’s import bill 
upwards, MNCs were repatriating their profits back home further worsening the balance of payments 
situation in the host countries. Thirdly, in the relentless pursuit of the profit motive and while their 
activities created a few jobs and/or the odd linkage to other domestic productive sectors, a common 
strategy employed by MNCs was to ensure that capitalism did not spread too far beyond these firms.  
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Other protectionist strategies (Kema 2005: 6) took the form of a preference by MNC’s to transfer 
machines and equipment (albeit, obsolete by home standards) as capital investment rather than as 
commodities for sale. This way and desperate as Third World countries were to develop their 
industries, they would go out of their way to facilitate the entry of that form of foreign capital so that 
they could at least keep the wheels of their industries moving. To this effect, foreign firms enjoyed 
many advantages; from exemption from exchange controls for the importation of machinery; financing 
of sites for installation thereof not to mention loans from foreign and domestic banks which prefer such 
clients anyway. Gilpin (2001:291) shares these views adding that foreign direct investment 
characterised as it is by impersonal market forces and corporate strategies; is transforming the nature of 
international economic and political affairs in a manner that is exploitative, a manner which 
undermines the nation-state and integrates national economies. Thus, contrary to the belief in some 
quarters that integration was highly beneficial for mankind, MNCs were not only failing to empower 
the poor but actually dispossessing them through legitimising inequalities. On inequalities, Rojas 
(1989) argues that these are evident in the net balance between the “investments” by MNCs and 
outflow of payments on these investments; it is always negative. This in the main is because unlike 
domestic industries, part of the value added in the process of production goes out of the host country 
and is not recycled into the domestic circular flow of income. He concludes that foreign investments 
are not only "economically inefficient" but further fracture the host country's aggregate demand. 
Another dimension of MNCs contribution to under development and thus continued dependency in the 
Third World according to Nield (2002: 209); is their involvement in or abating corrupt practices in host 
countries, the justification of which is that this is necessary to circumvent the problem of bureaucratic 
inefficiency and bottlenecks to doing business in the Third World.  Thus, they buy their way into 
securing purchases of concessions to exploit natural deposits of oil, copper, gold and diamonds or 
simply to get their imported inputs cleared by the local revenue authorities on time. In some instances, 
MNCs pay outright bribes to rulers and officials to gain export contracts particularly in the oil and 
arms industries and will even justify it by suggesting that bribery is “customary” in those countries as 
such, they need to do it to in order to be competitive. With respect to bribes, Olori (2007) cites the 
example of Nigeria, of which he says that a political commentator once lamented that it was a paradox 
that the majority of Nigerians relied on wood for fuel at the same time as the country was so endowed 
with abundant oil and gas reserves that it was ranked the world's sixth largest oil producer. The 




report by FAO (2005a: 130) in which it is stated that during the decade 1990-2000, Nigeria lost 
398,000 hectares or an equivalent of 2.6% of its forests. The impact of such a degree of environmental 
degradation and corresponding effect on climatic patterns and by implication, agricultural productivity 
and long term food security needs no elaboration. 
MNC apologists amongst them, Ahiakpor (1992) argue that they create jobs; rent buildings and land, 
or sometimes outright buy them and when they buy; they generate capital which the owners can invest 
in other enterprises. Besides, the argument continues, MNCs are able to make profits because of the 
demand for their products; thus, had MNCs not been producing the products in the Third World, the 
Third World would have been importing the products from elsewhere anyway.  Kema (2005: 3) 
disagrees and argues that while MNC create jobs however, their operations do not necessarily promote 
sustainable economic development because they are self-serving entities and not the philanthropic 
institutions they portray themselves. To this effect and in the relentless pursuit of the profit motive, 
they turn from their homes where they assume some respectable form and image and turn to 
underdeveloped countries where they go uninhibited. Their uninhibited behaviour extends to engaging 
in activities that cause damage to the periphery by amongst other things, environmental degradation, 
introducing nutritional and health hazards and undermining the sovereignty of host countries.  
 
Kema’s views on environmental damage are shared by Timberlake (1988: 87) who quotes a one-time 
officer in the UN Office for Emergency Operations who at one point in time challenged a message in a 
commercial advertisement in the United States. The officer argued that the message "...our peanuts 
come fresh from the jungle..." was misleading in so far as "...you have to cut down trees to plant 
peanuts…then you get peanuts and desertification..."!  With respect to nutritional and health hazards, 
Kema (2005: 3) cites the MNC Néstle which through sophisticated advertising in the early 1980s, the 
corporate popularized the use of formula as the best and “modern” method for feeding babies in the 
Third World. A series of studies carried out over a period revealed widespread malnutrition amongst 
babies fed on formula. Understandably, the marketing strategy had not taken into account the fact that 
being of limited means the mothers would be tempted to over dilute the mixture to make the formula 
go that little further. In addition, the strategy had not taken into account the quality of the water 
especially in a situation in which babies fed on formula did not have the protection of the 
immunoglobulin properties found in mother`s milk. It took no less than a world-wide outcry by civil 
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society groups and UN agencies to contain the MNC’s determination to maximize profit regardless of 
the costs in terms of the health and welfare of babies.  
3.3.5 An analysis of Dependency Theory  
The arguments by Dependency theorists that colonial legacy was a major contributory factor to 
dependency in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World are supported by many scholars as illustrated 
earlier. Amongst such scholars is Knife (1995:98) who argues that the policies implemented by 
colonial powers for example, the dual model of development favouring the cities and the strategies and 
interventions applied, land and trade monopolies and forced labour amongst others; had an enormous 
destructive and destabilising effect on the organisation and management of the post independence 
African political economy. Such a view is supported by Offiong (1980: 119) who notes that European 
powers did not establish colonial states to carry out a programme of political and economic 
development or social change but instead, to establish efficient and effective administrative states for 
the purposes of economic exploitation.  Such exploitation continued after independence and 
continent’s role in the world economy continued to be limited simply to a source of raw materials for 
industries in Europe; as such, industrial development was limited to those sectors and locations which 
facilitated the exploitation and export of these resources. Since then according to Alemazung (2010: 
63), the political and economic relationship between post-colonial Africa and the West in the new 
global political order have the same underpinnings and meet the same objectives as those that prevailed 
during the colonial period; it is based on absolute control over Africa and its human and material 
resources and the nourishment of Western economies with Africa’s produce and markets. Under the 
circumstances; the exploitative and asymmetric character of the relationship continues unabated; what 
this means is that the continent continues to be condemned to perennial dependency not least, because 
powerful nations are not prepared to lose the competitive advantage deriving from their comparative 
advantage during colonial times; this they need to do in order to  maintain optimal conditions for 
nurturing their international business “comfort zone” in the new global political order.  
 
The arguments on the impact of a colonial dependency on development in Africa are strong however; 
Knife (1995: 98) concedes that the African state is not entirely exempt from many unpardonable acts of 
commission and omission. This view, he supports by pointing out that the pressure exerted by the 
legacy of colonial rule and/or neo-colonial interventions could not possibly have been immune and/or 




alluded to earlier, in Kenya, instead of changing legislation on land management such that it 
strengthened a system that had been proved to work and ensured a moral economy, the new leadership 
changed the system for the worse resulting in an unequal distribution of this important resource; a 
resource which for the rural poor, is the only capital asset they possess. Such poor legislation and 
policies are also evident in Ethiopia, one of the poorest countries in Africa but one that was never 
colonised and by implication; it was spared of the vices of colonialism. According to an article titled 
“Drought, death and taxes” posted in the Economist (2002; 45), Ethiopia’s long history of dependence 
on food aid can be traced to poor policies in turn, poor policies can be traced to the perpetuation of a 
feudal system dating back to the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie in which peasants could not own land 
instead, they leased it from the state. For the peasants, an annual land “tax” was payable in cash within 
a specified period after the harvest and the penalty for failure to meet this obligation was heavy. Under 
the circumstances, farmers would scramble for market share in the immediate post harvest period 
resulting in the flooding of the market with produce. In turn, flooding the market with produce would 
result in a fall in commodity prices meaning that farmers had to sell more of their produce to raise the 
necessary cash with which to meet their land tax obligations. The result was a vicious circle in so far as 
at the end of the day, the peasants had neither a reserve of food commodities for their own 
consumption nor cash with which to buy food until the next harvest hence the perennial dependence on 
food aid.  
 
The same can be said of Zimbabwe where according to Chitiyo (2002) a mechanism for addressing 
land inequalities was enshrined in the Lancaster House Agreement (1979) which ushered in an 
independent Zimbabwe. Implementation of the mechanism proved difficult for lack of financial 
resources all the same, in anticipation of an injection of funds from the former colonial power, Britain; 
the government (Republic of Zimbabwe: 2006b) developed and adopted the 1992 National Land 
Policy. According to Holman (2007), notwithstanding that the financial resources were availed, the 
policy failed to solve the problem in the main, because in the final analysis, the land acquired did not 
benefit landless peasants but instead, Mugabe loyalists in politics, the military and civil service, as a 
reward for their patronage. As if such an act of commission was not bad enough; according to 
O`Loughlin (2006), twenty years into independence in 2000, in an attempt to ride the storm arising 
from increasing disgruntlement and mounting political pressure for meaningful land reforms by the 
masses; under the guise of “land reform”, Mugabe pursued a policy of forced removal of white farmers 
from their land and unleashed a devastating cycle of often violent expropriation.  The impact of such 
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an ill conceived policy on agricultural productivity, the engine once driving the export sector is evident 
in a trend analysis conducted by Hanke (2009) which revealed that by mid-November 2008, the 
measurable rate of inflation in Zimbabwe was estimated at 79,600,000,000 percent or an equivalent of 
a daily increase of 98.0 percent with commodity prices doubling on average every twenty four hours. 
Under the circumstances, Zimbabwe could be expected to be dependent on foreign and food aid for a 
long time to come!  
 
In addition to such acts of commission, acts of omission are also evident on the part of African 
governments and in particular, their failure to reverse the colonial dual model of development which 
favours towns and cities to the neglect of rural areas. According to the World Bank (1981: 2) neglect of 
the rural areas is evident in the fact that basic infrastructure is almost nonexistent in some (rural) areas; 
ports, road and rail networks simply did not penetrate the hinterland and storage facilities and 
communications systems were poorly developed. The trend continued  prompting the World Bank 
(1994: 2) to remind African governments that the adequacy of infrastructure helps determine one 
country's success and another’s failure; in diversifying production, expanding trade, coping with 
population growth, reducing poverty and/or improving environmental conditions. The reminder 
changed little and five years later, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (2009: 17-18) reiterated 
that as a result of poorly developed infrastructure; road and rail networks; high fuel prices and an aged 
and inefficient fleet, transport costs in Africa remained the highest in the world and this was one 
explanation for the low levels of trade volumes on some routes.  
 
The consequences of poor infrastructure acting as a disincentive against increased production by 
farmers was not only limited to the erosion of the agricultural sector’s potential to generate much 
needed foreign earnings but more seriously, it undermined the ability of Africa to feed itself. 
Timberlake (1988: 32) argues that continued neglect of rural areas can also be traced to the fact that it 
often works out cheaper for governments to import food from abroad than from their own backyards 
characterised as they are by poorly developed road and rail networks and the logistical nightmare they 
present. However, it turned out that this option was not necessarily cheaper for according to Babu 
(1981: 42) , with the average import/export ratio at 1:1 at best and at worst, a negative value, this 
meant that of the little foreign earnings African governments generated through the feeble agricultural 
sector, a substantial portion of it would go towards food imports. More than half a century after 




Timberlake observed more than two decades ago continues unabated and this could not be more 
evident in the sphere of food security as is evident from the record in Kenya. 
 
According to Alemazung (2010: 71), financial-industrial dependency was inevitable in Africa for after 
independence; the former colonial masters introduced what they called development politics in the 
newly independent states; to make good the destruction that Europe had caused in the continent 
through colonialism. To this effect, development aid became the mechanism through which Europe 
would assist the new nations to develop; besides, the period coincided with the post war era during 
which the emphasis of the neo-liberal doctrine was on the development of the industrial sector.  
According to Dos Santos (1971: 235), this was to sow the seeds for financial-industrial dependency on 
the economically powerful countries for of necessity, the Third World had to resort to foreign 
borrowing in order to import the technology and know-how with which develop their industrial sectors. 
Timberlake (1988: 3) shares these views adding that for African states in particular, such a situation 
was tantamount to a “lose-lose” position on many fronts because first of all, the bulk of development 
“aid” was repatriated back to the donor country as income from purchases of technology and/or know-
how in the form remuneration of “consultants”.  Secondly, while the costly imported technology and 
know-how was meant to enhance production in the long term, the result was often the exact opposite in 
terms of its impact on the local ecology as pointed out earlier. Thirdly, the rate of evolution of 
technology and know-how in the more advanced countries was such that African states could not keep 
up the pace as such, they could never compete fairly in global markets characterised as they were by 
ever changing goal posts in terms of technological advancement and/or know-how. Such comparative 
and competitive disadvantages in industrial development saw African governments sink deeper into 
debt in order to fill income gaps in an attempt to enhance productive capacity. 
 
African states indeed had no choice but to resort to foreign borrowing and some ended up in a debt 
trap; borrowing to pay off previous debts; however, notwithstanding the fact that some states ended up 
in such a situation, there was little to show for the degree of indebtedness. In part, such a situation can 
be traced to mismatched priorities; during his first tenure of office (1977 -1989) Olusegun Obasanjo 
was once quoted as saying of mismatched priorities, “...Seemingly reckless pursuits of programmes of 
state expansion undermined the equilibrium between the consumption and the resource base which in 
some cases was further undermined by the lifestyles of the new leadership...” These views are shared 
by Black (1991:130) who notes that Third World debt servitude began to take shape in the 1950’s and 
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1960’s and was manifest in white elephants which characterise many an African capital. There is 
empirical evidence in support of this observation by Black when one considers the ultra modern 
airports, conference centres and stadia in some African capitals. Notwithstanding the phenomenal 
amounts of money sunk into such monuments; some such airports for example, only ever marshal in or 
out; a handful of domestic flights and one or two international flights a week. As for the stadia and 
conference centres, it is not uncommon for a whole year or more to lapse without hosting a single 
event which justifies such a level the expenditure; in many Africa countries, such infrastructure has 
since been reduced to venues for the ruling party’s events no matter how insignificant. The 
recklessness continued throughout the post-independence period and as late as 2003 and for no less 
than three months (Focus on Africa 2003), parliamentary debate in Swaziland was dominated by a 
proposal to spend a staggering $400 million from the national purse towards purchasing a private jet 
for the King! Ironically, at about the same time, the same leadership was complaining bitterly about the 
poor response by the international community to an appeal for food aid to mitigate the effects of a 
devastating drought!  
 
In concluding the analysis on financial-industrial dependence, it does appear that by dictating that 
economic development would focus on the industrial sector in a situation in which the Third World had 
neither the financial capacity, appropriate technology and/or know-how to develop the sector, the 
economically powerful nations created financial-industrial dependence in the Third World. However, 
as the above examples illustrate, African governments not only embraced such dependence but 
nurtured it as Babu, Knife, Timberlake and others illustrate. Besides, as they wasted resources on 
unproductive sectors, in the process; they facilitated capital flight back to the countries where it had 
been borrowed from in the first place for often, the contracts for such prestigious albeit, white 
elephants were awarded to firms from Europe or North America perceived as they were, as possessing 
the latest technology and know-how.  
 
With respect to technological-industrial dependence, the argument that through protectionism and 
selective engagement, MNCs created the environment for and exacerbated the conditions for such 
dependence appears valid as the example of Coca Cola given earlier clearly demonstrates. However, 
the “invasion” by these corporate entities was not peculiar to Africa; countries in Asia hitherto 
colonised, also went through the same experience. At the end of World War 11, Know (1994: 641) 
notes that East Asian states in particular, were at the bottom of the development ladder all the same; 




capitalists to kick-start the process (just like the situation in Africa); East Asian governments assumed 
the role of industrialist and took responsibility for the industrialisation of their economies. According 
to Brohman (1996: 118), that in time, the “Asian Tigers” as they came to be known; became an 
economic powerhouse in their own right can be attributed not to the pursuance of policies and/or 
structural adjustment programmes “recommended” by financial lending institutions (World Bank and 
IMF) but instead, to an inward as well as an outward orientation in which an activist state pursued 
policies of economic nationalism. Such policies involved the provision of subsidies to assist the 
neophyte industries to get off the ground; protecting them against market forces and competition and 
the active promotion of exports and investment decisions which were favourable to the growth and 
development of their domestic economies amongst other measures. In the light of this example, it can 
be argued that a sense of self determination like that demonstrated by the governments of East Asia is 
all that was needed by African states to turn their situation around. 
 
At various points in time, Africa experimented with both economic nationalism and structural 
adjustment but with disastrous results in both cases. Of the economic nationalism path, Ayittey (1990: 
5) notes that by 1980, almost every African economy was dominated by one large sector; the state 
sector characterized by a huge bureaucratic civil service and hopelessly inefficient state enterprises. 
With the main criteria for appointment into management positions in these institutions simply loyalty, 
their collective performance was nothing short of a scandal. He cites the example of the State Jute Bag 
Factory in Ghana; between1978-1980, the state enterprise was closed for 14 months due to a shortage 
of raw materials; all the same, the 1,000 workers received full pay for the entire period of the closure. 
The same situation prevailed in Niger where in 1982, the cumulative deficit of 23 loss-making state 
enterprises exceeded 4 percent of the country’s GDP while in Togo, the losses of just eight state 
enterprises reached 4 percent of GDP in 1980. Of the structural adjustment path, Ayodele, Cudjoe, 
Temba, Nolutshungu & Sunwabe (2005:1) argue that foreign aid given to support reforms in Africa 
had not been successful either; they cite the more than $500 billion in foreign aid which was pumped 
into Africa between 1960 and 1997 but which instead of increasing the rate of development, created 
dependence. They conclude that the record of Western aid to Africa is one of abysmal failure. These 
views by Ayodele et al. are supported in a report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTD) (2002) in which it was noted that the failure of structural adjustment 
programmes to overcome the major structural and institutional impediments to capital accumulation 
and sustained growth is partly due to slippages in policy design and implementation. This was evident 
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in the fact that of the 15 countries identified as core adjusters by the World Bank in 1993, only three 
were subsequently classified by IMF as strong performers however, this was not attributable to sound 
policies but instead, to some special circumstances that were of a one-off nature and unrelated to 
structural adjustment policies. The argument points to a situation in which unlike the East Asian NIC’s 
who decided to do things their own way, by blindly going along with “recommended” policies of 
financial lending institutions in a situation in which they were “clueless” on the appropriateness of the 
policies to their own situation, African governments found themselves in a worse situation that they 
had been hitherto. 
Indeed, that some MNCs are involved in and/or abate corruption is a fact even by their own admission 
as is evident from a number of well publicised litigation cases however, African governments are not 
exactly the “powerless victims” of the scourge; on the contrary, they have been party to it all the way. 
Ebeh (1994: 7) observes that in Nigeria for example; public office is seen as an opportunity to enrich 
self and kinsmen and a means to acquire personal aggrandizement. He laments the fact that despite the 
country’s endowment with natural resources, Nigeria remains one of the poorest nations in the world 
adding that the problem has to do with a primitive perception of power and authority by the leaders. 
This is evident in the record of Sani Abacha’s looted fortune of which according to the  New York 
Times (2004: A10) his successor President Obasanjo managed recover no less than US$709 million 
and another (GB) £144 million. However no sooner had the money been recovered, the Senate Public 
Accounts Committee found only US$6.8 million and GB £2.8 million of the recovered money in the 
Central Bank of Nigeria; the rest could not be accounted for; it had been re-looted! In Ghana, Ayittey 
(1990: 4) cites the example of Kwame Nkruma who while preaching socialism, his ministers were busy 
importing Mercedes Benz vehicles and gold beds at the same time as stashing millions into Swiss bank 
accounts; “socialist” ideology had degenerated into what he sarcastically refers to as "Swiss bank 
socialism."  
In Southern Africa, Angola was not spared of the “black gold curse” either for according to Butcher 
(2002), despite the country’s average £2 billion annual foreign earnings from enormous off-shore oil 
reserves; there is little to show for it in terms of economic and social development. Instead, in 1999, 
the government was accused of stealing up to a third of the annual income; the scandal was exposed in 
a footnote in the annual report of the MNC, Shell BP which stated that £75 million had been spent on a 
"signature fee" to win an offshore production contract. The payment never appeared in any of the 




publish details the recipients and those of similar signature fees paid for three other big contracts in 
Angola. In the arms industry and according to Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer (1996: x), it has been 
alleged that Europe and its allies continue to be party to economic underdevelopment in Africa through 
the destabilising effects of wars some of which as illustrated earlier, raged on for decades. Colleta et al 
further note that during the Cold War, the principals armed local factions or whole armies with the 
price tag on supplies, simply ideological allegiance. In the post Cold War era, warring factions 
maintained optimal levels of arms inventories through arms purchases facilitated by the control and 
sale of precious natural resources, forest woods, diamonds and oil; in the main, through shady deals 
supported by the arms industry. 
Indeed MNCs and in particular those in the arms industry exacerbated underdevelopment as the above 
accounts demonstrates however, Ayittey (1990: 7) argues that wars in Africa are generated not by the 
arms industry but instead, by dictatorships or weak authoritarian regimes that maintain their authority 
through personalised patron-client relations; such regimes are prone to sudden, erratic and often violent 
changes. This was the case in the well documented civil war in Sierra Leone where according to Pratt 
(1999), a one- time British government special envoy to the country; since independence in 1961, 
ethnic loyalty was and remained an important factor in government, the military, and business. In time, 
corruption within the ruling class and discrimination along ethnic lines in government appointments, 
contracts, military commissions and promotions became the order of the day. Such a style of leadership 
by leader after leader and the competition for the spoils of power was to sow the seeds for the turmoil 
and civil war from a mere seven years into independence in 1968 until 1998 or for three decades. 
According to Smillie, Gberie & Hazleton (2000: 9), the brutality of the 1991-1999 phase of the war 
was fuelled by diamond sales, resources which would have been better invested in development 
initiatives. Instead, the conflict robbed the potential beneficiaries and an entire generation of children 
of a future; the scholars lament that while the only impact of the enormous profits made at the Sierra 
Leonean end of the diamond chain was terror, murder, dismemberment and poverty; in the developed 
world, the same diamonds were purchased by the rich as emblems of wealth and/or as symbols of love 
and affection. 
A primitive perception of power and authority indeed, the leaders displayed; Babu (1981: 6) attributes 
this to the fact that being themselves of peasant origin coupled with lack of experience in the in the 
field of exploitation, Africa’s new ruling elite tended to be less refined in their approach. 
Notwithstanding the origin of such styles of leadership, it is apparent that wars in Africa and the 
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destabilising effects cannot be attributed to the profit motive of MNCs alone on the contrary, obsession 
with staying in power as manifest in tribal politics, and “divide and rule” political strategies that 
characterises many an African leadership are as much a contributory factor. In a situation in which 
channels for redress are either non-existent or thwarted, the disgruntlement of marginalised groups 
often finds expression in armed struggles and thus civil wars. Against this background, it can be argued 
that MNCs in the arms industry but only take advantage of readily available “market opportunities” 
created not by themselves but by the style of leadership of some governments.  
 
3.3.6 Conclusions on Dependency Theory  
 
In summary, critics of Dependency Theory argue that, that the Third World is lagging behind in 
development can be traced to the pursuit of economic dominance by powerful nations in the past and 
present. They further argue that in pursuit of the profit motive, powerful nations used and continue to 
use all sorts of strategies including manipulation, coercion and protectionism amongst other things, to 
realise their goal. In the light of the examples given in the foregoing, these arguments appear valid 
however, as illustrated in as many examples, indeed the African state is not entirely exempt from many 
unpardonable acts of commission and omission. To this effect, Babu (1981: 38) argues that to be 
workable, (government) institutions must be in harmony with the concrete situation to which they are 
designed to apply. This did not happened in post colonial Africa his argument continues; instead, the 
new leaders adopted wholesale, colonial systems of state management; in addition and unlike the 
NIC’s, they blindly followed IMF and World Bank-recommended systems for managing their 
economies that were not in harmony with their concrete situation. Against this background, Rapley 
(2007: 158) argues that while many external factors were significant in the dependency that 
characterises Africa’s development path, there are as many internal factors. Amongst such internal 
factors are first of all, the perpetuation of a policy of urban bias resulted in the decline of the 
agriculture, the only sector which had the potential to generate the resources to finance the 
development of the industrial sector. Secondly, the mismatching of priorities meant that African states 
borrowed heavily for consumption and not for investment and in so doing, they compromised their 
own development. Thirdly, dictatorships or one-party state regimes that emerged shortly after 
independence enjoyed so much power and latitude that nobody really knew when a politician or 
official was depositing money into a Swiss bank account. Finally, the situation was compounded by the 
fact that such dictatorial tendencies meant that the agents that act as watchdogs in the West; the media, 




by their governments. In the economic sphere and with such unlimited power, the vision for economic 
progress was the prerogative of a dominant individual or a small ruling click; such latitude saw 
malpractices and mismanagement thrive unfettered. Such mismanagement and dictatorial tendencies 
has generated untold misery and suffering in Africa and given their strong hold on power, the only way 
to remove a leader was by force and hence the catalogue civil wars that have characterised the 
continent for the greater part of the post-independence era right through to the present.  
 
In concluding this section on Dependency theory, the arguments that external factors are responsible 
for constraining sustainable development and perpetuating dependency in the Third World in general 
and in Africa in particular, are strong. However, Knife (1995: 109) notes that in  turning democracy 
into mockery and broad day light plundering of their nation states, the behaviour of leaders and the 
ruling class is a major contributory factor to the state of under development in many an African 
country today.  
 
3.3.7 General Conclusions on Development Theory 
 
It would appear that neither modernisation nor dependency theory provide a satisfactory explanation 
for the state of under development in the Third World in general and in Africa in particular. The 
modernist school of thought’s evolutionist perspective is self contradicting in so far as it presents the 
process as a progressive unidirectional process at the same time as proponents of the theory 
acknowledge that the process would be subject to the influence of other factors including wars. By the 
same token, perhaps even the definition of development should be defined in context based on the 
perceptions of any given society on what the concept “progress” means to that particular society. A 
study carried out by Narayan, Chambers, Shah & Petesch (2000:22-23) revealed that perceptions of 
“progress” indeed differ from society to society. In poor communities studied in Malawi, there was a 
strong psychological orientation in which for example, “…couples being respectful of each other, 
having peace of mind and having well-behaved children who are not selfish, …” were regarded as 
progress; in Ghana, this included “...being protected by God, having children for security in old age, 
not holding a grudge against someone and having a peaceful mind...” The progress and satisfaction 
once deriving for example; from having children (biological or otherwise) for security in old age has 
been eroded by a shift from collectivism to individualism as such, such a move would not represent 
progress in the communities studied in Ghana. The same can be said of the functionalist perspective in 
so far as the undermining of traditional authority structures which once served societies well by 
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maintaining social cohesion, order and collective social responsibility has resulted in chaos and 
suffering of the masses as the example on Kenya clearly demonstrates. Besides, not holding a grudge 
against an individual or institution that is the cause of the chaos and suffering can be a challenge for 
many a disadvantaged individual or group as the happened in Sierra Leone with disastrous 
humanitarian consequences. Finally, proponents of the sociological-economic perspective argue that 
modernisation of the means of production; diversification of the economy; improvements in 
infrastructure and thus household income symbolise development. However, such advancement in the 
material condition of societies does not necessarily translate into happy homes for in pursuit of careers 
to improve household income, parents may neglect their parental obligations and this may well result 
in maladjusted children as did happen in Europe during the Industrial Revolution.  
 
With respect to dependency theory, in the economic sphere, Rojas (1989) adds his voice to the 
argument of the likes of Cardosso and Faletto adding that economic growth and development do not 
necessarily go hand in hand. To this effect, he argues that a society can experience economic growth 
without any significant social development; it can achieve social development with little economic 
growth or can achieve economic growth and social development at the same time. There is evidence in 
support of this position by Rojas for example, Swaziland is an example of economic growth without 
social development for according to the UNDP (2000: 159); in 1998, per capita GDP was $3,816; life 
expectancy stood at 60.7 years and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolment was 
72 percent of the school going population. In 2004 (UNDP 2006: 285), the figures stood at $5,368, 
31.3 years and 58 percent respectively. Thus, during the six year period; while GDP increased by some 
40 percent, life expectancy and school enrolment decreased by 48 and 19 percent respectively. 
Seychelles comes to mind as an example of achievement of social development with little economic 
growth for in 2001 (UNDP 2003: 237), the country’s GDP was $17,030; life expectancy stood at 72.7 
years and adult literacy rate was 91.0 percent. In 2005 (UNDP 2008: 229), the figures were $16,106, 
72.7 and 91.8 percent respectively. Thus, while Seychelles’s GDP decreased by 5.4 percent; life 
expectancy was maintained at 72.7 years and there was an increase albeit small, of 0.8 percent in adult 
literacy. Zambia is an example of economic growth commensurate with social development for 2001 
(UNDP 2003: 240) the country’s GDP was $780; life expectancy stood at 33.4 years, and the combined 
school was 45 percent of the school going population. In 2005 (UNDP 2008: 232), the figures were 
$1,023, 40.5 years and 60.5 percent respectively. The increase in GDP by some 31 percent was 




percent respectively as such, Zambia can be said to have achieved both economic growth and social 
development. 
 
The emphasis of dependency theory on external factors and the playing down of equally important 
internal factors is also misleading furthermore, it poses the danger of exacerbating the “lame duck” 
syndrome for while the East Asian experience is evidence that a history can be undone, African states 
it appears, have put little effort towards turning their situation around. Instead, they absolve themselves 
from responsibility for the underdeveloped state of their nations and appear comfortable in 
apportioning the blame to their colonial history and events during the Cold War era. Such self pity is 
evident in the fact that increasingly, foreign aid is perceived as a right hence when it is not 
forthcoming, they complained bitterly as was cited in the example of Swaziland. Such an attitude of 
resignation and/or unreasonable expectations has seen African governments entrenched deeper into a 
state of dependency especially in the sphere of food security. Given that the donor community is 
increasingly using the third sector to deliver aid; humanitarian agencies have become indispensable to 
the filling of gaps in the provision of basic services and the delivery of food aid amongst other 
humanitarian interventions. Behind the scenes though, humanitarian agencies have their own 
challenges; such challenges determine the degree to which they can fulfil their primary mandate of 
alleviating human suffering whenever and wherever it occurs as well as engage communities in long 
















AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOs, DONORS,  





NGOs have indeed become indispensable to filling the gaps in the provision of basic services; health, 
education, social services and economic livelihoods amongst others; this is not to mention their 
indispensability in emergency and disaster relief. According to Salamon; Sokolowski &List (2003: 2), 
this can be traced to increasing disappointment with both the state and the market as mechanisms for 
solving interrelated social, economic and environmental crises. To this effect, the aid recipient states 
were perceived as stifling initiative, creating unresponsive bureaucracies and generally absorbing an 
escalating share of national income; at the same time, the market was perceived as ignoring human 
needs and producing untenable social inequalities. These views are shared by Conway; de Haan & 
Norton (2000: 11) who say of the state in particular; that the poorest households in poor countries 
rarely ever benefit from direct state support; under the circumstances and of necessity, they have come 
to rely heavily on non-state actors. In order to cope with public problems created by a combination of 
these factor, there was increasingly, a frantic search for a “middle way” between sole reliance on the 
state on the one hand and the market on the other hand; development ceased to be the sole 
responsibility of any one entity but instead one of partnership between various stakeholder groups; 
states; their extensions; the market and civil society.  
Freeman (1984: 52) defines stakeholders as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of an organisation’s purpose; such a definition could not better reflect the relationship 
between the various stakeholder groups in the work NGOs do. Amongst these stakeholders are first of 
all, the donor stakeholder group which provides the resources that facilitate the work of NGOs; 
secondly, there is the host government stakeholder group on whose territory NGOs work, filling gaps 
in the provision of services that the said governments cannot adequately provide for their people for 
lack of resources. Thirdly, at the centre of this tripartite relationship are the poor communities, the 
target of the services provided by NGOs which constitute the fourth stakeholder. In the relationship 
between the four categories of stakeholders; each party has a clearly defined role to play; donors 
provide the resources which facilitate the work of NGOs; host governments provide the space for 
NGOs to translate the resources provided by donors into services. The contribution of communities is 




and expertise and their commitment to the humanitarian cause. This appears a straight forward division 
of labour based on each party’s comparative advantage however, in practice it is not so straight 
forward as will become evident at a later stage. 
4.2 Donors  
The International Development and Research Centre (IDRC 2000: 2-3) identifies a number of 
categories of donors that support international development namely, donor governments; multilateral 
donor agencies, corporate donors; foundations and private donors. The focus of the analysis of the 
relationship between NGOs and donors will be on government, multilateral and corporate donors since 
the motivation of foundations and individual donors is usually less susceptible to the influence of other 
vested interests than that of the other categories of donors. For government donors, such influences can 
be traced to the fact that they have their own “back donors” namely the tax payers from whom they 
mobilise the resources and to whom they are accountable in terms what they do with the said tax 
payers’ money.  The “back donors” of multilateral donors are the “shareholder” member governments 
of these institutions as such, the former is accountable to the latter with respect to what they do with 
the resources where, when and often, even how. For corporations, they are accountable to their 
shareholders for who the primary motive for investing in the company in the first place, is a good 
return on investment; in turn, a good return on investment for the shareholder is a function of the 
profitability of the company’s operations. 
  
4.2.1 Donor Governments  
In the main, western governments, Japan, and member states of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries group (OPEC) constitute the major donor governments; these governments 
normally channel their development assistance directly to recipient government (bilateral aid) through 
agencies created for the purpose. Amongst such agencies for example, the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID); United States’ Agency for International 
Development (USAID); Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA); Sweden’s International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) etc. Development assistance can also be channelled 
indirectly through non-state actors for example, NGOs or multilaterally through regional or 
international institutions created for the purpose and in which they are member states; for example, the 
European Commission Humanitarian and Civil Protection Office (ECHO), the World Bank, IMF or the 
United Nations. The rationale for providing humanitarian and development assistance by these 
governments as implied in their policy statements is a sense global social responsibility.  In Canada for 
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example (Government of Canada: 2005), such a sense of global social responsibility is articulated in an 
international policy statement adopted and published by the government in 2005. The policy statement 
amongst other things, urged governments to think beyond their own national borders and take 
responsibility for one another; to this effect, it covered a wide range of humanitarian and development 
assistance to developing countries both bilaterally and multilaterally.  In Europe, (European Union 
1997), as early as its establishment in 1958, the then European Economic Community, the European 
Union (EU) as of 1993; global social responsibility was enshrined in the Rome Treaty which 
established Community. In the Treaty, Article 177 as amended in 1997 states that in the sphere of 
development cooperation, the Community’s policy and the policies pursued by the Member States shall 
foster the sustainable economic and social development of developing countries, particularly the most 
disadvantaged among them. With respect to humanitarian assistance, as far back as 1990, the European 
Union (2002: 3) reaffirmed both its political duty to coordinate humanitarian interventions in countries 
outside the Union and its moral duty to show solidarity with their civilian populations who were 
increasingly becoming the deliberate victims of chronic and ferocious conflicts. It was this double 
imperative which in 1992, resulted in the establishment of ECHO, an institution charged with 
administering humanitarian aid.   
According to Manji & O`Coill (2002: 9-10), the general belief in the 1970s was that the failure of 
Africa to develop and the poverty and misery of its inhabitants were rooted in poor policies; the 
thinking then was that integrating developing countries into the world economy would get these 
countries firmly on the path to sustainable economic and social development. As a result of this belief 
and thinking, “neo-liberalism” emerged as the dominant political-economic ideology in the West and 
central to the ideology, was minimising the role of the state. According to Shivji (2006: 8), the period 
coincided with the oil crisis of the mid 1970s and the petrol-dollars accumulated by international banks 
were off-loaded in the form of cheap loans to developing countries. Such loans according to Rojas 
(1997), would be accessed through the IMF and World Bank however, eligibility was on condition that 
the recipient countries implement a number of measures amongst which was reductions in public 
expenditure and minimising the role of the state in the economic affairs of the country. Manji and 
O`Coill (2002: 10) argue that notwithstanding the level of resources availed to developing countries in 
the form of such loans; the benefits of such international credit were short-lived. This in the main was a 
result of the fact that the reductions in public expenditure imposed on the borrowing countries as a 




sectors;  resulted in increasing poverty and inequality of a level not witnessed in Africa and Latin 
America for over two decades. Realising the negative impact that the neo-liberal policies were having 
on the poor, member state shareholders availed funds to the lending institutions for various welfare 
initiatives to minimise the impact thereof. However, believing in the “minimalist state” as the member 
state shareholders of these institutions did, the palliative interventions would be implemented not by 
the recipient states, which after all had long been forced to coil back from the provision of social 
services but instead, by the ever-willing NGO sector.   
 
In addition to their willingness, Edwards & Hulme (1995: 3) observe that NGOs were perceived as 
being more efficient providers of services compared to governments which were perceived as 
inefficient and even corrupt. Against this background, NGOs became the new “favoured child” of 
official development agencies and were proclaimed as the “magic bullet” to target and fix the problems 
that had befallen the development process. These views by Edwards and Hulme have support from 
many quarters and the Overseas Development Institute (1995: 3) cites three factors which influenced 
donors to increasingly utilise the skills and services of NGOs as an alternative vehicle through which to 
deliver development assistance. The scholars explain the first factor in terms of an evolutionary 
process in which having been engaging NGOs in emergency relief activities for some time, donors 
perceived their engagement in development work as a natural progression. Secondly, the record of poor 
performance of official donor programmes in reaching the poor and the apparent lack of impact of rural 
development projects financed in the late 1960s and 1970s was a cause for concern in the donor 
community. Thirdly, such failure of official donor programmes; the perceived success of NGOs 
interventions in education and health coupled with NGO claims that they had the capacity to reach and 
improve the lives of the poor in areas which due to limited resources, poor infrastructure and/or lack of 
will, governments could not reach, increasingly endeared NGOs to donors. Fourth, NGOs were 
perceived as a means of getting around obstacles to the impact of aid caused by inefficient and corrupt 
governments.  
 
The perceived success of NGOs is supported by Jennings (1995: 13) who observed that as official 
donors increasingly became frustrated with state inefficiency in programme management manifest 
often; in misallocation of resources and an urban bias, the role of NGOs moved from the periphery to 
centre stage on the development agenda in the 1990s. Besides, NGOs were perceived as better able to 
work more effectively than governments at the community level especially as they used a participatory 
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approach, a process that was considered essential to democratisation and the development of civil 
society. Such perceived strengths and advantages of NGOs are echoed by Chege (1999: 2) who notes 
that first of all, NGOs’ greatest strength lies in advocacy and participatory models that focus on human 
development. Secondly, they are very effective in demonstrating that poverty, no matter how endemic, 
can be tackled by involving the beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of development 
projects thus increasing the chances of their sustainability. Thirdly, a source of their distinct 
comparative advantage lies in their ability to reach important constituencies; their independence in the 
assessment of issues and problems; dissemination of information and awareness-raising; advocacy and 
local accountability. He concludes that NGOs often tackle issues that governments are unable or 
unwilling to take up; they provide efficient, innovative and cost-effective approaches to difficult social 
and economic problems; they provide leadership in advocating for and producing changes in public 
policy and operate in spheres where government officials are constrained by bureaucratic or political 
considerations.  
 
Robinson (1991: 171-2) shares these views adding that in their more traditional emergency relief and 
welfare activities;  NGOs were valued for their capacity to respond rapidly, flexibly and efficiently 
while in development activities, they were valued for the particular development approaches they 
employed in their activities. These sentiments are echoed by Fowler (1988: 8-9) who notes that the 
perceived cost effectiveness of the approaches used by NGOs coupled with the fact that for political 
reasons, UN agencies were not always able to access victims in situations of civil conflict and only a 
handful of NGOs could secure the permission to work on the ground; further endeared NGOs to 
official donors. The end result of such perceptions according to Fowler (1988: 9); was that member 
states of the European Union increasingly engaged civil society partners for the delivery of their 
humanitarian and development assistance. Such increasing engagement is evident in the fact that 
according to the European Union (2002: 13); in the two year period 1998–2000, around two thirds of 
the EU’s funds allocated for humanitarian aid were channelled through NGOs. Furthermore and in 
order to create an enabling environment for non-state actors, in time, the rules of engagement in the 
partnerships witnessed positive developments; this is evident in Article 94 of the European Consensus 
on Humanitarian Aid (European Union 2007a: 31) in which within the framework of the applicable 
rules, the EU undertook to continue efforts to streamline and simplify its procedures for humanitarian 
aid in order to reduce the administrative burden on implementing organisations. In addition and at 




2) positively responded resulting in greater support to civil society actors in the field and the 
strengthening of dialogue with broader civil society by amongst other things, institutionalizing the 
space for Civil Society Organisations policy dialogue in all relevant areas of cooperation.  
4.2.2 Multilateral donors  
In addition to providing humanitarian and development assistance as individual states and/or, 
collectively as members of a regional economic block, donors also often provide such assistance 
through institutions they jointly create for the purpose.  In such arrangements, the institutions are 
referred to as multilateral donors; the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), ECHO, and 
United Nations (UN) agencies are examples of such multilateral donors. Wallace, Bornstein & 
Chapman (2006: 19) note that multilateral donor institutions have been engaging NGOs in 
development partnerships for over three decades with the rate of such engagement increasing 
dramatically in the nineties. This development according to the three scholars; can be traced to the neo-
liberalism orientation prevailing at the time and of which an important tenet was that economic growth 
was best achieved when the role of the state in development is minimised. These institutions were 
convinced that the engagement of non-state actors; the private sector and civil society alike was one 
sure way of increasing the prospects for economic growth and development. According to Malena 
(1995: 13); as far back as the 1970s, operational collaboration with NGOs had become an increasingly 
important feature of activities financed by the World Bank. On its part, the Bank attributed the 
increasing collaboration with NGOs first of all, to their expanding role and influence and an increasing 
recognition of the specific benefits which NGO involvement could bring to Bank-financed operations. 
Secondly, the experience of donor institutions which hitherto, had been collaborating with civil society 
organisations had clearly demonstrated the benefits that civil society could bring to development 
initiatives. Against this background, collaboration (World Bank 1998: 4) began to grow significantly in 
the 1980s especially in the social and rural sectors; by 1990, NGOs were involved in about 12 percent 
of Bank-financed projects; the figure increased to 38 percent in 1997. 
 
Of the United Nations, Chege (1999: 2) notes that the growing importance of NGOs to the 
intergovernmental body is reflected in the number of NGOs granted consultative status by the UN 
Economic and Social Council, a forum for discussing and formulating policy recommendations on 
social and economic issues; in 1948, the number stood at only 41 and by 1992, it had increased to 
1,350.  At that point in time and increasingly, virtually every UN agency was working with NGOs in 
various contexts and situations; for example, in 1997 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
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disbursed some $272 million of its $1.4 billion budget or some 19.3 percent through 443 NGOs 
working in 131countries. Krut, Howard, Eric, Harris &Pattison (1997: 17) attribute this development to 
the fact that in its form during the period, the UN was unable to execute its mandate especially in the 
face of an unstable world in which poverty, civil war, displacement and the breakdown of the family to 
name a few, had become endemic in many parts of the world. In addition, relative to finance and trade 
institutions, the authority of the UN had declined dramatically; this, coupled with a financial crisis at 
the time, the UN needed allies to perform its operational tasks and to increase its legitimacy and status 
in the new global power-play; NGOs became an important category of such allies.  
An important category of allies for multilateral donors indeed NGOs became for in its 1996 annual 
report on cooperation with NGOs, the World Bank (1997: 7) stated that there was evidence to suggest a 
strong correlation between project performance and NGO involvement in those sectors in which NGOs 
had historically been more involved. Furthermore, projects in which NGOs were involved were less 
likely to have unsatisfactory ratings in meeting development objectives and/or were less likely to carry 
risks. Such positive perceptions of NGOs were taken to a higher level following the adoption of the 
Millennium Development Goals; the World Bank in particular, (2005b: xi) saw civic engagement as an 
important means for integrating poor people’s voices and citizen participation in public policy issues; 
improving service delivery schemes and accelerating progress toward the MDGs. To this effect, the 
Bank increased its efforts to promote civic engagement in the belief that this would assist member 
governments to exercise their leadership role in promoting sustainable development and achieving the 
MDGs in a cost-effective, participatory, equitable and accountable manner.  
 
4.2.3 Corporate donors 
In the main, these are multinational corporations (MNCs) also referred to as Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) which are companies which operate in more than one country, directly or through 
off-shore subsidiaries. According to Kinfe (1995:9), the history of MNCs dates back to the 16th 
century when England developed a commercial sea fleet for trading with the Far East; the prevailing 
business model then was one of a partnership between individuals who pooled their resources and 
acted in the interests of their own communities. In time according to Makwana (2006), the majority of 
corporations became charitable institutions licensed by the crown and forbidden to engage in profitable 
commercial activities; however, a few corporations perceived to be acting directly in the nation's 
interest through their engagement in large-scale, high-risk commercial activities were allowed to make 




by King Charles I in 1638 to colonize the new world; in time, this and similar companies such as the 
Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company became a crucial part of the mercantile 
economic policies practiced by the colonial powers. They effectively run state monopolies in the 
colonies and were able to accumulate great financial and economic power through publicly trading 
shares in their companies.  
In the post Cold War era, Krut et al (1997: 6-7) note that the new global economic order was integrated 
by a massive increase in international economic activity and the concentration of world capital among 
MNCs. Such a development resulted in the emergence of a world economic government dominated by 
giant corporations on a completely new level. In addition and following its establishment, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) saw its power increase while the authority of the United Nations as an 
agent of global governance diminished. In time and with such power in its hands, the WTO expanded 
the economic and political space for multinational corporations with the result that national systems of 
production, distribution, trade and consumption were trans-nationalised. The impact of this 
development was the dismantling of the power of nation states to manage and intervene in their 
economies and in Third World countries in particular, this restricted and/or dampened the competitive 
capacity of enterprises and productive apparatus; a globalized economy that would serve the interest of 
the northern transnational corporations emerged. These observations by Krut et al. are shared in a 
report by the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (2001: 4-5) in which it is acknowledged 
that multinational corporations have unprecedented influence on national governments; international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF as well as various UN agencies. Such 
growing power coupled with increased trade liberalization and investment resulted in a diminishing 
role for Third World governments in the protection of their local industries, public goods and services. 
The end result was that the nation state became less self-sufficient and more vulnerable to the vagaries 
of global supply and demand systems; furthermore and in the Third World in particular, the new order 
undermined national governments’ ability to provide social “safety nets” for their people. In order to 
counter the impact thereof especially on the welfare of people, some NGOs started working towards 
changing the rules of the game by pressuring corporations directly; advocating for regulatory changes 
and/or by lobbying for fair trade and investment policies. According to Murphy and Bendell (1999: 1), 
it is precisely this course of action adopted by NGOs that at the outset, most relationships between the 




4.2.4 Foundations and Private donors   
According to Fleishman (2007: 59) a foundation is a legal categorization of non-profit organization 
established to donate funds; to support other organizations or provide the source of funding for its own 
charitable purposes in accordance with the mission designated by its founder. Foundations can be 
either private or public and according to the Foundation Centre (2012), the difference is in how they 
are funded. Thus whereas a private foundation has a principal fund or endowment, a public foundation 
has numerous sources and must continue to seek money from diverse sources in order to sustain its 
work.  
 
Foundations and private donors share the same vision and goals as NGOs namely, that of alleviating 
human suffering and save in situations where one party fails to meet its obligations in a contractual 
agreement, relations are normally smooth. In the light of this, focus on the nature of relationships 
between donors and NGOs will be limited to government, multilateral and corporate donors; categories 
for which relationships with NGOs are often influenced by a variety of factors outside the 
relationships. 
 
4.3 Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs)  
According to Malena (1995: 13-14), the World Bank defines NGOs as private organizations that 
pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment and 
provide basic social services and/or undertake community development. As such, NGOs can be said to 
be value-based organizations however, in wider usage, the term NGO can be applied to any non-profit 
organization which is independent from government and which depends in whole or in part, on 
charitable donations and voluntary service. Furthermore, there are many different types of NGOs and 
in the field of development and relief; they include large Northern-based charities such as Oxfam, Save 
the Children, Plan International, CARE and World Vision etc. to Southern-based Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs). Of these, Oxfam, Save the Children and Plan International according to Manji 
and O`Coill, (2002: 572); were primarily established as “war charities” to deal with the consequences 
of conflict in Europe; since then, the nature and scope of NGO work has expanded to include 
development and advocacy amongst others. 
  
According to Shivji (2006: 8), during the first one-and-half decades of independence, facilitated mainly 




to other continents. However, what this meant was that Africa’s export market was based on a few 
primary commodities traded on a hostile and adverse international market. At the same time, for lack 
of technology, the neophyte manufacturing sector was heavily biased towards import substitution 
which was heavily dependent on imported intermediary inputs. As a result of such a degree of fragility 
of African economies, the economic shocks of the late 1970s saw them plunge into a deep crisis. The 
crisis according to Manji & O`Coill (2002: 567-8), saw the continent’s  per capita GDP increasingly 
decrease and a reversal of the gains made in areas like food consumption, health and education during 
the period of relative growth. Under the circumstances and as African governments found it 
increasingly difficult to provide an optimal level of basic services for their people, there was an 
explosion in the growth and the presence of Western NGOs in Africa.  NGO presence in Africa indeed 
grew and while at the outset they came in as short term "gap fillers", in a situation in which 
socioeconomic and political conditions were increasingly deteriorating, the expansion of the nature, 
scope and reach of their activities witnessed a steady growth; more than half a century on, they are still 
“in business” in Africa. In addition to their growing numbers, Malena (1995: 14) observes while the 
principles of altruism and voluntarism remain key defining characteristics, the sector became 
increasingly professionalised.  
 
NGOs have been classified according to the type of work they do and Smillie (1995:27) makes 
reference to a typology developed by Korten in 1990 in which the scholar identified four categories 
based on an evolutionary process in the development and growth of NGOs. The primary focus of “first 
generation” NGOs is on relief and the provision of welfare services while the focus of the “second 
generation” is on self reliant local development through small scale community empowerment projects. 
“Third generation” NGOs focus on sustainable development and seek to influence the broader policy 
framework; finally, for “fourth generation” NGOs, the concept of organisation does not really exist 
instead, they are made up of loosely connected social or people`s development movements which are 
driven not so much by budgets or organisational structures but instead, by ideas and a vision for a 
better world.  While such categorisation is useful for understanding NGO’s and how they work, it is 
not unusual for an NGO to be somewhere in between the categories for example, an NGO might 
combine some agricultural project in a food insecure community at the same time as it is lobbying for 
improvements in productivity-enabling policy frameworks and/or infrastructure to facilitate higher 
productivity by that farmers. Regardless of which category they fall into, NGOs are committed to their 
noble cause however, Cernea (1988: 17) points out that like any other entity, NGOs have their own 
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strengths and weaknesses; of the strengths, the scholar argues that it is their capacity to reach the poor, 
urban and rural areas alike however, it is in reaching the rural poor where they score the highest. 
Understandably, many a rural poor community are located in remote areas that public authorities have 
difficulties in accessing for lack of infrastructure as such; such communities often cannot access basic 
services; health and education amongst others.  
 
The capacity of NGOs to reach the poor is facilitated amongst other things, by their flexibility; such 
flexibility is acknowledged in a United Nations Human Development Report (UNDP 1993: 93) in 
which it is stated that in the early 1980s, a rough estimate suggested that NGO activities "touched" 100 
million people in developing countries. At the time of the report, it was estimated that the actual figure 
was nearer 250 million and was expected to rise considerably in the years ahead.  Dejong (1991:7) 
attributes NGO capacity to reach such a large number of people to the fact that they are typically 
community based with their personnel residing and working in close proximity to the populations they 
serve. As such, NGO personnel are much more likely than remote city-based bureaucrats to understand 
the issues of the communities they serve and to empathise with their perceived needs. Proximity to the 
communities served also serves to neutralise conflicting lifestyle values which characterise city based 
government bureaucrats socialised as they are, in a milieu foreign to that of the beneficiaries of the 
programmes they design. This renders NGO personnel better equipped to adapt their programmes to 
local circumstances; such flexibility is a major facilitating factor to their success in service delivery. 
Ball and Dunn (1991: 8) share these views adding that a comparative advantage NGOs have is that 
they are motivated by a desire for caring and developing society as such; their programmes are 
designed and implemented in a manner that addresses people’s felt needs. In turn, such success in 
addressing people’ s felt needs can be traced to their ability to accurately identify the needs of the poor; 
their ability to explore locally available resources (knowledge, indigenous technology and materials 
amongst others) and/or adapting technologies developed elsewhere to local conditions. Hyden (1983: 
186) concurs adding that the advantage that NGOs have is that they can help to “warm” up funds, thus 
giving them a final “temperature” that is likely to ensure greater success than if passed through cold 
governmental channels. In any case, McNeill (1981: 94) argues, NGOs offer the opportunity of 
alleviating the problem of absorptive capacity which is most serious with governments in poor 
countries characterised as they are by over-inflated and inefficient bureaucracies. 
 
Of the weaknesses, Werker and Faisal (2008: 6-7) observe that the voluntary nature of NGO work 




measuring such impact. The cost of shirking on the quality of goods and services is high for a 
commercial entity for consumers can choose not to buy a commercial product if they are not satisfied 
that it is value for money. Likewise, an electorate disillusioned by unfulfilled election promises can 
vote out an incumbent from office at the next elections however for NGOs, the “consumers” of their 
voluntarily provided services do not yield such “market power” to penalise and/or reward the service 
provider for the quality of the services. Chege (1996: 3) argues lack of “market power” by the 
consumers of the services provided by NGOs coupled with excessive dependence on external financing 
has seen an increasing tendency by NGOs is to prioritise upward accountability rather than downwards 
towards the beneficiaries. According to Rauh (2010: 34-35) another downside of heavy dependency on 
external funding is that it further compromises NGOs in so far as donors often impose their own 
norms; values and priorities. On priorities, Rauh notes that these often fluctuate depending on what is 
popular at any given point in time and/or what is likely to be “successful” rather than addressing the 
root of the problem which usually involves complex long-term processes. On the norms and values, he 
notes that donors were increasingly insisting on professionalism and “best practices” and in particular, 
the use of log-frames; tools which require NGOs to spend disproportionate amounts of time developing 
elaborate and minutely detailed project proposals . In the process, quality time for their core business 
was being diverted towards these lengthy processes as such; NGOs were exposing themselves to the 
risk of compromising their own performance. Bush (1992: 391) concurs with Rauh’s views on donors’ 
insistence on “best practices” adding that in response to such demands, nonprofits were increasingly 
adopting private sector orientations and techniques. He cautioned that one of the biggest challenges 
facing organizations in the sector was how to retain their “non-profit spirit in a for profit world” adding 
that by focusing on private sector orientations and techniques, they were undermining the virtues 
which makes them distinct from the sector. 
 
In concluding this section, it is evident that in the provision of services, the strengths of NGOs translate 
into a distinct comparative advantage over state machineries for the reasons elaborated earlier. At the 
same time however, their weaknesses and in particular, dependency on and the tendency to appease 
donors to the neglect of the objects of their raison d’etre compromises their performance. For this act 
of commission, NGOs have come under fire with allegations that they are not always as neutral on 
issues of policy formation as they purport to be and that they often play the dual role of providing 
information and acting as an agent of political pressure on host government leading to potential 
conflicts of interest in the host countries. According to Wlliamson (2005), there is increasing 
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awareness in the NGO community that they will need to do more to prove that such allegations are 
unfounded; to do some soul searching and to take a position that is consistent with their raison d’etre. 
It is only through taking such a position that they will regain the level of trust and credibility they have 
enjoyed hitherto.  
 
4.4 Host Governments  
In situations in which humanitarian and development assistance is channelled directly to governments, 
a government receiving such assistance is normally referred to as the “recipient” government however, 
in situations in which the assistance is channelled through NGOs; by virtue of the fact that such a 
government is hosting the NGO, it is normally referred to as “host” government. According to Manji et 
al. (2002: 575) political independence in Africa was achieved through the ability of the nationalist 
movement leaders to capture the imagination of popular formations, uniting them in the promise that 
only through self-determination and independence, could all their aspirations be achieved. After 
independence, the struggle changed from one of emancipation and/or the denial of basic rights to one 
of fighting poverty and providing basic needs for the masses; to this effect, the state became the “sole 
developer” and “sole unifier” of society with development as its main preoccupation. However, barely 
ten years into independence and for a number of reasons, it became apparent that for the majority of 
the new African nation states, “development” as envisaged by the new leaders was increasingly 
becoming an illusion. This as mentioned earlier, can be traced a number of factors including the 
backwardness of the states they inherited from the colonial powers, political instability which in some 
countries was evident in the first decade of independence as well the oil crisis of the 1970’s. According 
to Cannon (1995: 109), faced with such a dilemma, the state withdrew from the core responsibility of 
providing for its people and NGOs increasingly stepped in to fill in the gap left by the withdrawal of 
the state in such sectors as social welfare, education, or health; sectors which are primarily the 
responsibility of governments. 
 
The withdrawal of the state from its core responsibilities according to Manji et al. (2002: 577); was to 
transform the “development” arena such that space for the proliferation of NGOs in the region opened 
up and rekindled their missionary zeal. According to Slim (2007: 1), the opening up of space coupled 
with a perception that NGOs were better placed to accurately identify and address the felt needs of 
poor communities saw NGOs welcomed by many an African government. They were indeed 
welcomed for their programmes could give some measure of legitimacy and respectability to bad 




themselves working. Thus, with well resourced NGOs filling in the gaps in the provision of basic 
services, negligent governments and guerrilla groups were able to present themselves to their people as 
socially responsible. Smillie (1995: 75) observes that the shift in donor attitudes in the 1970s, from 
state centred development models towards more participatory, ’bottom-up’ approaches; coupled with 
the increasing competence of NGOs deriving from the experience effect, host governments 
increasingly expected them to do more. Such expectations saw governments even creating an “enabling 
environment” through collaboration; consultation and support in the coordination of activities and even 
positively publicising their activities through the media. The variety of incentives was wide and a study 
carried out in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya and Uganda revealed that such incentives extended to 
exemption from paying income tax and duty on imports at the same time as individuals and companies 
making a donation to charity enjoyed tax concessions. Such attitudes by host governments are hardly 
surprising after all, NGOs were “subsidising” them in the provision of basic services thereby 
offloading a substantial portion of what is primarily a responsibility of the state.  
 
The appreciation of NGOs by host governments expressed through creating of an enabling 
environment as elaborated above suggests a healthy and mutually beneficial partnership between 
NGOs and host governments. According to Clark (1995), such an assumption is wrong for a healthy 
relationship is only possible when both parties share common objectives thus, if a government's 
commitment to poverty reduction is not sincere, NGOs will face many frustrations and the relationship 
will be strained. In such situations, the tendency by NGOs is to chart their own course and in the 
process, sideline instruments of the state; this sows the seeds for antagonism and in particular, where 
the government is repressive. According to Campbell (1996: 2), such a tendency coupled with the 
praises often showered on NGOs for the role they play in development and their focus on 
empowerment and people’s participation at the same time as criticism of African governments as being 
anti-market and anti-people was on the increase; created the perfect ground for the antagonism to 
degenerate into suspicion and even hostility.  
 
In concluding this section, notwithstanding the fact that the services delivered by NGOs are in general 
welcomed by host governments not least, because they protect these governments from exposure of 
their failures; all the same, the relationship between these two stakeholders has not always been smooth 





According to Edwards and Hulme (1998: 11-13), functioning within the larger society of which it is a 
part, is a grassroots and localised unit of social organisation known as a community and by implication, 
such a unit shares a common habitat, concerns and a common culture that gives the locality a distinct 
form and character. Members in a given community particularly in rural settings; will generally 
cooperate with one another to provide the means for meeting the common needs of daily living. 
However, notwithstanding the seemingly homogeneity, shared values and collective action, the sense 
of belonging is not uniform across a community at both the individual or sub-group level; it is likely 
that some of them will even feel alienated. The qualification on the homogeneity of the community is 
supported by other scholars amongst them Burkey (1996:41)  who argues that that rural communities 
are composed of individuals and groups with different and often opposing interests and even conflict of 
interests; as such, communities are characterised by dependence and dominance relationships and 
competition for resources exist amongst other discourses. Other scholars extend the argument further 
and de Berry (1999: 11) points out that the perception that communities are homogenous entities 
ignores the social dynamics, power, hierarchy and authority structures as well as value and belief 
systems which define patterns of living amongst people even though they may be living in the same 
locality; all of these dimensions can militate against joint and communal undertakings.  
 
The perceptions about what a community is; have implications for NGOs not least, because the 
majority of humanitarian interventions are rarely targeted at individuals or households but instead at 
whole communities.  In the light of this, the argument by NGOs and their supporters that they are 
better placed to understand the social processes within their constituent communities and to empathise 
with their perceived needs becomes the subject of question. This in the main; is because if de Berry’s  
argument that the concept “community homogeneity”  is a fallacy, then by implication, NGO 
interventions may only be “scratching the surface” in meeting felt needs at the individual and 
household level and by implication, not addressing  “community” needs. Some of the implications of 
this challenge will become apparent in the section which examines the relationship between NGOs and 
communities and in Chapter 6 in which the research findings are summarised.  
4.6 Factors which influence donor behaviour 
Factors which influence the behaviour of donors are worth examining for such factors influence their 




given point in time; finally, availability of resources determine what the latter can do in any given 
situation and at any given point in time. Thus, even in situations where a host government is 
unreservedly welcoming to NGOs and the communities served are committed; at the end of the day 
what NGOs can or cannot do is determined by availability of resources. According to Shah (2005), 
neo-liberalism was an ideology promoted as the mechanism for global trade and investment 
supposedly, for all nations to prosper and develop fairly; the proponents of the ideology believed that a 
precondition for this to be realized amongst other things; was minimizing the role of the state, 
including in the provision of basic services. Lewis &Wallace (2000: 77-78) note that minimizing the 
role of the state was based on a number of key assumptions about what civil society could deliver. The 
first such assumption was that civil society was a force and an ingredient for democratization and a 
natural component of a market economy. Secondly, civil society was perceived as having the potential 
to serve as the moral pulse of society and thus hold the state in check and in the process, democratic 
values would be reinforced.  Thirdly, there was a perception that civil society and the market 
constituted an organic symbiotic whole characterized by unity rather than disjuncture and by 
cooperation rather than conflict. Finally, the triadic unity of state, market and civil society was 
assumed to be characterized by neat boundaries between the three elements each with its own discreet 
functions, actors and an organic harmony and balance. These assumptions according to Shah (2005); 
would have been valid only as charitable organizations, NGOs operate as a non-profit group as such; 
they do not own the means of production. Under the circumstances, while they are meant to be 
politically independent, in reality it is a difficult task because they must rely on funding from their 
governments, other funding institutions, businesses (market) and/or from private sources. As such, and 
depending of their vested interests, all or some of these institutions can have direct or indirect political 
weight on decisions and actions that NGOs make; such interests will now be examined and an analysis 
carried on how these impact the relationship and the work that NGOs do in communities.   
4.6.1 Factors influencing donor government behaviour 
Randel, German and Ewing (20004:4) note that during the 2000 UN General Assembly, member states 
committed themselves to unreservedly pursue  the Millennium Development Goals at the centre of 
which was to halve the number of people living in poverty by the year 2015. To this effect, donor focus 
was on increased efforts to improve aid effectiveness and strengthen North/South partnerships in 
pursuit of the goals. However, just three years later in October 2003, the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD released a controversial policy statement linking development 
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cooperation to the prevention of terrorism. In the policy statement, member states in the main, those of 
Europe and North America asserted that development cooperation had an important role to play in 
helping to deprive terrorists of popular support and addressing the conditions that terrorist leaders 
exploit and feed on. The scholars conclude that in the face of profound crises of poverty, growing 
inequality and conflict in the developing world, the lens through which donors would be assessing their 
priorities would be their own security interests and the “war on terrorism”; and not necessarily on the 
needs on the ground. Such political considerations according to Atmar (2001: 5); increasingly became 
an influential factor in donor government funding decisions in both bilateral and multilateral aid 
arrangements. He cites the example of Afghanistan where donors withheld development assistance 
during the period that the Taliban was in control with the result that there was a shift in the focus from 
support for capacity building of state welfare functions to community structures and from long-term 
development to short-term palliative assistance. Needless to say, the arrangements had little impact 
especially given the length of the conflict, the progressive destruction of human capital, physical 
infrastructure and deteriorating institutional crisis; under the circumstances, humanitarian needs simply 
could not be adequately met by short-term, localised, project-specific and relief-focussed interventions.  
 
In support of this observation on political interests which influence donor behaviour, Macrae (2002:39-
40) notes that modern US humanitarian assistance began with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. A 
provision contained in the Act was that through the Marshall Plan, the United States would be engaged 
in the reconstruction of Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War and in order to achieve this, 
the Economic Cooperation Agency, the predecessor of present day USAID was established. At the 
time, Washington was unapologetic about its use of aid for political purposes hitherto; however, in 
time, a line was drawn between long-term development assistance and life-saving emergency relief; 
relief activities subsequently took on a mantle of neutrality. Later in the 1990`s this position changed 
and the US began to explore the direct use of humanitarian assistance to achieve political ends; to this 
effect and in North Korea for example, policy-makers saw the famine in 1995 as a potential leverage 
point and attempted to extract political concessions in exchange for food aid. Likewise, in Serbia, the 
US and European governments hoped to shore up pockets of opposition by giving aid to certain 
municipalities and withholding it from others. Such use of aid for achieving political goals met with 
fierce opposition from civil society and the dispute reached its climax over an amendment to the 
Foreign Operations Bill signed into law by then President Clinton in November 1999; the Bill 




Southern Sudan. The policy was pursued in the post-Clinton era and Lasensky (2003) observes that in 
2003, the then Bush administration not only announced the largest increase in American foreign aid in 
two decades but also, the criteria for eligibility for recipient governments. Amongst such criteria was 
fighting corruption, investing in education and health care, meeting strict standards on human rights as 
well as good governance; of itself, the criteria was sound not least, to ensure accountability on the part 
of recipient governments but then, it turned out that such criteria were not consistently applied.  
 
This assertion is supported by Zunes (2008) who cites the example of Equatorial Guinea where it is 
said of the Head of state, Teodoro Obiang; that he is amongst the worst of African tyrannies; at the 
time however, the country continued to receive U.S. government funding and military training through 
the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). In addition, a private U.S. security 
firm founded by former senior Pentagon officials was playing a key role in the country’s internal 
security apparatus in reciprocity for the regime’s “friendliness to U.S’ strategic and economic 
interests”. The same can be said Israel, a wealthy democracy of which Lasensky (2003) says that at the 
time, it was the largest recipient of American foreign aid; on average, over $2 billion a year in military 
aid and about $600,000 in economic assistance. At the same time and despite Egypt’s history of Arab 
nationalism, its strategic positioning as a neighbour of Israel and its ownership of the Suez Canal saw 
Egypt receiving over US$50 billion of US aid over a period going back to 1975. The irony was that 
Israel, a state which did not exactly need foreign aid was receiving it anyway and had Egypt not been 
considered of strategic political and security importance, its history of Arab nationalism would have 
seen it “blacklisted” from receiving aid. Such donor government behaviour was however, not peculiar 
to the US government for Mavrotas and Villanger (2006: 6) note that during the period 1970-1994, a 
study on aid carried by OECD-DAC at 5-year intervals revealed that of the twelve donor governments 
studied (including the Nordic countries as a group), political and strategic considerations and not 
institutional considerations were increasingly becoming important determinants of the aid allocation 
decisions. The study also found that the Nordic countries allocated aid to the poorest countries and 
rewarded recipient countries for sound policies and institutions; this was in sharp contrast to the US 
whose preference was UN friends and Middle East allies. On the other hand, the aid allocation pattern 
of France and Japan were linked to former colonial ties and UN voting behaviour respectively, rather 
than income levels and policies in recipient countries.  
 
In addition to the factors cited above, another factor influencing government donor behaviour is what 
has been described as donor mentality or a self perception of the “big brother” in which donor 
 138 
governments use their financial clout to set the rules of engagement in transactions with recipient 
governments and non state actors alike, including NGOs. ActionAid International (2004: 4) argues that 
such conditions attached to aid money were failing the recipient countries for a number of reasons for 
first of all; conditionality perpetuated a relationship between donors and aid recipient countries that is 
already stacked in favour of the former. Secondly, many of the poorest countries depend on external 
finance for over half of their national budgets; this gives donors strong leverage over these countries’ 
policy choices. Thirdly, threatening to withhold essential loans and debt relief unless the recipient 
country implements the recommended measures is abuse of power; in any case; with respect to the 
privatisation of public utilities for example, many of the benefits of such privatisation often accrue to 
private sector companies from the donor countries themselves raising concerns about conflicts of 
interest.  
 
With respect to non-state actors and according to Randel et al. (2004:174); in 2002, the European 
Commission (EC) published a communication on the participation of non-state actors in EC 
development policy. This was immediately followed by the publication of corresponding guidelines on 
principles of good practices for the participation of non-state actors; in dialogue and in consultation on 
development matters. In themselves, the guidelines were sound as they sought to promote the principle 
of “local ownership” by recipient countries through enhancing the participation of non-state actors 
amongst other things. This was a positive development however, notwithstanding the soundness of the 
policy, guidelines and the good intentions; the documents were developed with little official 
consultation or input from civil society organisations in Europe or in the developing world. Since then, 
non state actors have been complaining that any consultation they have enjoyed up to date has been ad 
hoc adding that the Commission only ever consults when it wants to legitimise its own perspective 
rather than to genuinely listen and/or to consider alternative viewpoints. Randel et al. conclude that 
even if the Commission did consult with NGOs consistently, there would still be a problem in that the 
Commission assumes that NGOs are representative of civil society as a whole as such, that policies are 
made in a participatory manner is a misconception!   
 
In concluding this section, the factors that influence donor decisions on aid to governments are the 
same in the funding of NGOs for their humanitarian work. This premise is based on the fact that if 
donor government funding decisions are influenced by political, security and economic interests; by 
extension and save in emergency and/or disaster situations; no matter how desperate the situation of 




funding that NGOs can access in support of such countries will be limited. Likewise, if a humanitarian 
situation has little value added in terms of publicity or some other profile considerations (“forgotten 
disasters”); the level funding NGOs can access and by implication, the extent to which they can fulfil 
their humanitarian mandate will be limited. Besides, should NGOs fail to meet “professional” and 
“best practice” demands increasingly made by donors but which standards diverts their primary 
accountability from their “market” in favour of donors; the same donors will be the first to criticise; 
worse still, they risk losing much needed funding; “caught at crossroads” indeed NGOs are! 
4.6.2.     Factors influencing multilateral donor behaviour 
In 2002, a forum on development and poverty reduction whose theme was “Financing for 
Development” was convened in Monterrey (Mexico); it resulted in what came to be known as the 
Monterrey Consensus (OECD-DAC 2005:7). During the forum, the global community affirmed the 
importance of development to the world’s well-being and called on developing countries to strengthen 
their commitment to policies and institutions that can stimulate growth, reduce poverty and achieve the 
MDGs. In addition, the global community called on developed countries to provide more and better aid 
as well as improved trade and debt policies. As a follow-up to Monterrey, (European Commission 
2009: 9) another high level forum on harmonisation of aid whose theme was “Results Oriented 
Monitoring” was convened in Rome in 2003. During the meeting and amongst other things, donors 
made an undertaking to ensure that harmonization efforts are adapted to the receiving countries’ 
context and to align development assistance with the recipient countries’ development priorities. 
Sequel to the Rome meeting, yet another forum whose theme was “Financing for Development” 
(OECD-DAC 2005:7) was convened in Marrakech in 2004; to discuss the challenges of managing 
results for development. During the meeting, heads of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) and 
the Chairman of the OECD-DAC affirmed their commitment to foster a global partnership for 
managing for results and endorsed a set of core principles on how best to support partner countries’ 
efforts to do likewise. The objectives of these international forums and many others were noble; meant 
as they were, to define key goals, objectives and interventions that were needed for the aid 
effectiveness agenda; in some quarters however, the affirmations were dismissed as typical rhetoric 
which characterised such forum. Amongst the critics were the international NGO, ActionAid 
International (2004: 2) that argued that, two decades after the introduction of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment programmes across Africa, Asia and 
Latin America; donor agencies continued to use their financial and technical muscle to pressure the 
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world’s poorest countries into adopting risky and unproven economic reforms. In addition, new loans 
and debt relief were still contingent on governments accepting highly specific economic reforms that 
were conceived, designed and approved in Washington by IMF and World Bank staff and their boards 
and not in the countries in which they would be implemented. If countries failed to comply with these 
stipulations, both multilateral and bilateral donors would withhold funds.  
 
These sentiments are shared by other critics of the World Bank andVillanger (2004: 3)  argues that the 
Bank is an instrument of developed countries’ foreign policy in general and the US in particular adding 
that at any given point in time, changes in the  Bank’s policies  are a mirror image of changing interests 
in developed countries. He further argues that Third World governments are misled in so far as 
counting their own governments as members, developing country officials generally perceive the 
World Bank as a neutral multilateral financial institution that provides objective advice. Aware of this 
perception in the Third World and confident that the advice given by the institution was more likely to 
be acted upon particularly in cases where proposed changes were costly and politically difficult; donor 
countries and their private sectors used the Bank to advise  the Third World. Gavin (2002) concurs 
with these views adding that both the World Bank and the IMF have often been tools for U.S. foreign 
policy and foreign economic goals; this can be traced to the nature of power relationships between the 
stakeholders. Such relationships Gavin’s argument continues, is such that unlike the United Nations 
where each state has an equal vote; representation within the Bretton Woods institutions is established 
by the size of the financial contribution.The United States is by far the largest contributor as such, it 
has the principal voice in determining the policies and procedures of both institutions. Furthermore and 
by virtue of the size of its financial contribution, the United States is able to pressure other large 
contributors; Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait amongst ohers, into following their policy 
preferences. 
   
The scepticism on the neutrality of multilateral financial institutions is shared by Burnell (2004: 13) 
who cites the example of certain European governments which in 2002 considered the idea of delaying 
World Bank funding to Pakistan not so much to apply pressure for political liberalization and/or 
democratization but to press for greater efforts to control cross-border terrorism vis-à-vis India.  On 
their part, Burnell, Eade &Ligteringen (2001:105) cite an example from the 70`s, an era during which 
the focus was on commercial agriculture and industrialisation as the route to “modernising” developing 
countries. To this effect and led by the USA, private commercial lenders who wished to dispose of 




the disbursement of loans to developing countries. While availing much needed loans to developing 
countries, the strategy benefited manufacturers in the developed countries more than the developing 
countries in so far as it created market opportunities for the export of intermediate goods especially as 
recession in home country reduced demand for such goods. Burnell et. al (2001: 107) conclude that 
even though it does not always bow to every demand of the US government, the World Bank forms 
part of the external infrastructure of the US adding that in general, the influence of powerful 
governments comes partly through the Bank`s dependence on world financial capital and in particular, 
that availed by the US.  
 
Boas & McNiel (2003: 23) concur adding that as the largest shareholder, the US government is 
simultaneously the most influential member state; to this effect, US support for, pressure on and 
criticism of the Bank has been central to its growth and the evolution of its policies and practices. 
Mavrotas & Villanger (2004: 4) share these views adding that the influence of powerful governments 
such as the US government on the World Bank is evident in the fact that donors often channel funds 
through the World Bank and regional development banks alike when in fact both the World Bank and 
these regional banks give concessional loans to the same countries. The same situation prevails with 
donor governments who give bilateral loans to the same countries, for the same purpose that 
international institutions such as the World Bank are giving. This means a donor can end up dispersing 
the loans through three channels: bilaterally, through a regional bank as well as through the World 
Bank. Mavrotas et al (2004: 5) conclude that a possible explanation for such arrangements is political 
and economic considerations in the donor country including the achievement of foreign policy goals 
through the World Bank, an institution which aid recipient governments perceive as neutral and which 
enjoys their trust.  Notwithstanding the fact that the some of the criticism is substantiated, members of 
the US Congress argue that the US has little influence on what the Bank does and are on record as 
intimating that they would like to see the US have even more influence on the Bank!  
 
In concluding this section, the perception that multilateral donor institutions are agents of economically 
powerful governments’ vested political and economic interests is evident from the various arguments 
of the various scholars cited above. Understandably, the said powerful governments are the very 
shareholders of the Bank as such and of necessity, the funding decisions of the World Bank will be 
influenced by the said shareholder governments’ priorities. In a situation in which multilateral donor 
institutions’ funding decisions are influenced by shareholder governments’ priorities at the same time 
as NGOs are increasingly courted as partners and their resource base has expanded to include these 
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multilateral donor institutions, this creates a dilemma for NGOs. A dilemma was inevitable for if 
multilateral donor decisions are not so much their own but those of their “back donors”; the 
shareholder governments for which as elaborated earlier, priorities are not always based on the degree 
of need but instead, on many other considerations including even “the fight against terrorism”; then 
there will be occasions in which there will be differences of opinion between NGOs and multilateral 
institutions on the priorities.  Such an order of things means that there will be times when the 
relationship between multilateral donors and NGOs will be strained due to differences in opinion or 
donor interests and priorities by proxy.  
4.6.3 Factors influencing corporate donor behaviour  
According to Schiller (2005: 7), at the outset, companies had only three sets of stakeholders; 
governments which issued them with the licences to operate and monitored compliance with the 
provisions thereof; shareholders whose capital companies owed their existence and employees whose 
productivity kept them in business. In time, the stakeholder group expanded to include the media and 
NGOs who increasingly, were scrutinising and putting pressure on business to account for the impact 
of their activities on the environment and society. At the same time, there was also a growing 
realisation by business that the impact of phenomena such as global warming and HIV/AIDS on 
productivity had reached a stage where it was beyond the capacity of governments alone to 
successfully intervene. Such a realisation coupled with pressure from the media and NGOs saw 
business expand its stakeholder base to include communities; customers, suppliers and future 
generations. Sayer (2005: 260) has a different view and argues that business involvement in poverty 
reduction, development and other human welfare enhancing activities in communities was not so much 
a reflection of a growing sense of social responsibility, instead; it can be traced to pursuit of the profit 
motive. He defends his argument by pointing out that for business, stable and well-governed robust 
societies produce healthy, educated workers and consumers or the perfect market for maximising profit 
whereas societies characterised by a decayed environment, high levels of disease, vulnerability to 
climate change and poor security carry market and financial risks.  
 
The observations on risks are supported by Bendell (2003: 1) who notes that in order to minimise such 
risks, business is increasingly concerned about workplace and general community health and welfare 
issues and especially the fight against the HIV/AIDS scourge for there are strong economic and social 
reasons for doing so. In Africa in particular, the impact of the HIV/Aids scourge is significant and 




AngloGold and now Anglo Ashanti Gold. The study revealed that in 2003, nearly a quarter of its 
90,000 gold and diamond mining workers were infected with the HIV virus and the company estimated 
that AIDS was costing the company up to $6 for every ounce of gold produced. Shaken by this 
development, in its report to society in 2007, Anglo Ashanti Gold (2007: 132) started courting civil 
society into partnerships to make practical and meaningful contributions to the welfare of communities 
in which it operated. In addition, in order reduce the impact HIV/Aids on its operations (Bendell 2003: 
3), Anglo Ashanti Gold became the first corporate in South African; to provide its staff with free anti-
AIDS drugs.  
 
In time and in relation to the HIV/Aids scourge, other MNCs followed the example of Anglo Ashanti 
Gold; amongst these was Nestlé (2003) which in a report in 2002 titled “HIV/Aids Prevention: Nestlé 
in Community”; the corporate announced that it had signed a partnership agreement with the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in which the company would 
sponsor workplace and wider community HIV/Aids interventions in Nigeria and Kenya over a three 
year period. During the period, the Nigeria and Kenya Red Cross Societies between them reached 1.2 
million young people with life-preserving information through youth peer education programmes and 
provided home-based care to thousands of people at the terminal stage of AIDS. In Southern Africa, 
the corporate entered into partnerships with civil society in a number of countries implementing a 
variety of community welfare projects. In South Africa, the corporate engaged civil society partners in 
an entrepreneur development initiative (“Ice Cream on Wheels”) in Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal 
Provinces while in the poverty-stricken areas of the Cape Peninsula, the corporate and partners served 
14,000 low-cost, nutritionally-balanced meals daily through “WARMTH”; a project involving 
community kitchen feeding centres. In education, the corporate has since been involved in bursary 
schemes for academically gifted children from under-privileged homes. Following suit, in its 
“Sustainability Report” of 2007, the oil giant British Petroleum (2007: 32) announced that it would be 
increasing its CSR budget from $106.7 million in 2006 to $135.8 million and that it anticipated 
increasing the level to $500 million over a period of five years from 2008 onwards. Amongst the 
interventions would be investment in education; from school-based projects to university research; in 
business, the development of local supplier sector while in the realm of energy, the corporate would 
continue to explore ways of meeting the energy needs of low-income customers.  
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According to Sayer (2005: 263), believing in a “division of labour” based on comparative advantage, 
some MNCs’ philanthropy took not the form of millions of dollars towards community welfare- 
enhancing initiatives instead; it found expression in “donations-in-kind”. To this effect, some Telecom 
and Information Technology companies would avail their technical staff and equipment to facilitate 
and enhance the work of relief agencies while pharmaceutical companies would earmark a portion of 
their manufactured inventories for donations to facilitate improvements in contingency planning by 
relief agencies. Borrowing a leaf from the “donations-in kind” approach, banks and other financial 
companies have since been exploring the possibilities and/or implementing CSR programmes 
involving the provision of pro-poor financial services, microcredit and corruption-reducing transfers 
systems. 
 
With respect to the environment, a report by the United Nations Environment Programme (2002: 8-9) 
noted that although globalisation facilitated the transfer of environmentally sound technology, it did 
not stop the transfer or ‘dumping’ of polluting technologies or products in the Third World which  had 
been banned in other countries. Furthermore, the report noted; in most industrial sectors, only a small 
number of companies were actively striving for sustainability and the gap between the efforts made 
and the worsening global environmental situation was widening. This portrays MNCs as selfish, 
manipulating and greedy entities that ruthlessly pursue the profit motive with little or no consideration 
of the negative impact of their activities on the environment. This is not the case with all MNCs and 
there is evidence (UNRISD, 1998: 1) suggesting that a new corporate ethic demonstrating a 
commitment towards minimizing the negative impacts of their operations on the environment was in 
the making. To this effect (UNRISD, 1998: 3), during the 1990s, there were a number of initiatives by 
business to improve its environmental record and in a number of countries; some of the most 
progressive environmental policies were developed when influential business interests added their 
weight to the conservation lobby. Furthermore, as corporate social responsibility for environmental 
protection increased, state agencies in a number of countries increasingly ceded control of certain areas 
of resource management and environmental protection to the private sector thus reducing the level of 
public-sector regulation in favour of voluntary agreements and/or self-regulation by business.  
 
Another development in this respect according to Sayer (2005: 263) was that whereas hitherto, the 
approach to CSR by business was more often than not, a response to an imminent and/or actual 




changed to engaging in “preventive” environmental conservation activities. Such a change in approach 
saw some car manufacturers and electricity-generating companies introducing programmes for 
offsetting the carbon emissions of their activities and products through for example, providing funding 
for reforestation projects amongst other initiatives. Notwithstanding these positive developments in the 
conduct of business, Duma (2006) argues that the profit motive remains the priority for business; in 
pursuit of this agenda and as business has become more multinational and electronic means of 
communication have advanced, there has been a reduction in the power of the nation-state to curtail the 
ever increasing power of the business community. Kema (2005) shares these views and dismisses as 
fallacy, the assertions by defenders of MNCs that they are the engine of development in so far as they 
create jobs, transfer technology, reduce inflation and make war unthinkable. On the contrary his 
argument continues; there is evidence to suggest that MNCs, whose primary goal is maximizing profit; 
are not philanthropic institutions for they serve the interest of no one but themselves. In the process, 
they not only undermine public authorities in their home countries but also cause injury to the 
periphery in so far as their unbridled operations in the underdeveloped countries cause environmental 
degradation, create health and nutritional hazards and undermine the sovereignty of host countries. 
Against this background, Kema (2005) cautions that while NGOs and civil society groups are warming 
up to business, they must not be complacent instead, they must continue to play the role of “corporate 
watchdog”; to monitor business malpractices wherever they operate adding that it is only because 
business is aware that it is being watched that it is becoming more conscious about the impact of their 
activities on the welfare of communities.  
 
With respect to shareholders, Clark and Hebb (2002) note that the rise of public corporations that 
dominated the 20th century meant a dispersal of ownership rights across large segments of the 
population. While the spreading of the benefits of capitalism to a wider constituency was a positive 
development however, it meant that the owners surrendered control of company decision-making to 
professional managers who administrated the company on their behalf. In time however, this changed 
and today's institutional investors are re-aggregating previously dispersed shareholder power and 
playing a more active role in decision-making. This development according to O’Rourke (2002: 3) can 
be traced to the fact that contrary to the assumption that shareholders are only interested in healthy 
returns on their investment, both private shareholders and institutional investors are increasingly 
insisting on standards of company behavior. Furthermore, they have since been collaborating with 
NGO’s and the broader civil society in playing the role of watchdog against business malpractices; 
 146 
such collaboration was inevitable after all, social activists, private shareholders and corporate investors 
are often the same people.  
 
The question that needs to be asked is why shareholders are turning watchdog on their own companies 
and/or are content with foregoing good returns on their investment by voting for a budgetary allocation 
for CSR which effectively means a reduction in the disposable profit margin and corresponding 
reductions in dividend pay-out to the investor. The answer lies in a study carried out by Godfrey, 
Merrill & Hansen (2009) which revealed that in the longer term; CSR, particularly investment aimed at 
secondary stakeholders - consumers or potential consumer markets (communities) represents longer 
term insurance-like protection for shareholders through increasing the potential for value creation. 
Such a view has support from a European Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR (European Union 2004: 9) 
which established that first of all, businesses that  are conscious of and take measures to protect the 
environment were more likely to generate higher profits and thus higher dividends for their 
shareholders in the longer term. Secondly, businesses which observed and conformed to local 
legislation were more likely to succeed not least, by positioning themselves such that they retain the 
license to operate; thirdly, with investors increasingly becoming as much concerned about moral issues 
as they were about their returns on investment, the trend was one of seeking to invest in line with their 
own values. Finally, taking cues from developments at the business/market interface in which 
increasingly, business was coming under scrutiny, the thinking in the investor community was that 
companies with a proven record of behaving responsibly presented a lesser investment risk. 
 
The above discussion focused on factors internal to business; external factors also played a significant 
role in influencing business practices and according to Zadek (2001: 7), it is a fallacy to assume that 
the growing importance of CSR to business has its roots in an evolution in human consciousness. On 
the contrary, the argument continues, it is an outcrop of the new economic order in which the ability to 
build up and nurture brands based on values shared with key groups in society has become essential to 
long-term competitiveness and profitability in business. Zadek’s views are shared by the European 
Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR (European Union 2004: 9) which concluded that increased public 
scrutiny of corporate conduct, greater campaigning and more effective media coverage of critical 
NGOs and trade unions presented reputational risk for companies. This was particularly so for 
companies associated with making profits and hiring cheap labour in countries in which parents cannot 




or food amongst other problems of the poor. Image considerations are important and extend to how a 
company implements its CSR activities; Damlamian (2006: 5) notes that there is an increasing 
awareness in business that behaving in a socially responsible manner in the environment in which they 
operate is an important pre-requisite for profit maximisation. In addition, there is also increasing 
awareness in business that while they have the financial and material resources to directly engage 
communities in CSR activities, they do not have the management capacity and/or know-how on how to 
effectively do so. Besides, there are business risks associated with venturing into territory for which 
they have limited experience; this renders them vulnerable to the risk of reputational damage in the 
event of failure to deliver. 
 
The risks associated with business directly implementing CSR programmes are illustrated by Heap 
(2000: 7) who cites the example of the corporate, Shell in Nigeria which between 1992 and 1996;  in 
response to community uprisings in protest against its operations in the Niger Delta, the company 
increased its spending on CSR initiatives by some 250 percent. The initiatives involved infrastructural 
development (construction of schools, clinics etc) however, little if any meaningful development took 
place in the region. In the main, this was due to the fact that the projects  were implemented without 
due or adequate consultation of all stakeholders; the result was idle white elephants appearing across 
the Delta for associated manpower needs (teachers and medical personnel etc) had not been taken into 
account in the planning of the projects. According to Groves (2009: 11), this was not the end of Shell’s 
problems for perceiving the corporate as a collaborator in the court ruling that resulted in the hanging 
of the Ogoni people activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa; the uprisings intensified and no amount of distancing 
itself from this course of action by state could appease the communities. Faced with such a dilemma 
(Heap 2000: 7); Shell entered into partnerships with local civil society and international NGOs alike; 
such a move by the corporate paid dividends on two fronts according to Groves (2009: 12); first of all, 
it facilitated the re-engagement of communities which hitherto had “blacklisted” Shell. Secondly, the 
re-engagement opened new opportunities for dialogue with the communities thereby providing Shell 
with a mechanism for securing the social licence to continue to operate in the Niger Delta. Damlamian 
(2006: 7) explains the gains made by Shell in terms of the fact that on environmental issues, NGOs 
enjoy a higher degree of trust by the public than MNCs; in turn, MNCs consider such NGOs as a great 
asset. Indeed, such NGOs are valuable assets for MNCs not least, because association with the former 
has the potential to “open doors” to business contacts and relationships with the leadership in the 
country and other influential institutions. Besides, NGOs with a well established presence in the county 
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of operation will no doubt have equally well established management capacity as such, a corporation 
entering into partnership with such an NGO is spared of the paperwork and grants management tasks 
involved in managing both the partnership and the CSR programmes.  
 
In concluding this section, it is apparent from the foregoing that whereas at one point in time the only 
pre-occupation of business was maximising profit; due to a number of both internal and external 
factors, going beyond the profit motive is no longer a matter of choice. Understandably, in addition to 
exposing businesses which pay little or no attention to the impact of their operations on the 
environment and on society as a whole, civil society was going as far organising consumers and others 
in the supply chain to boycott the products of such businesses; not only locally but even globally. 
Furthermore, in the quest to strike a balance between short and long term financial benefits in the form 
of healthy dividend payouts, shareholders were insisting that management take measures to ensure that 
the future profitability of the business’s operating environment is guaranteed by amongst other things, 
being conscious of the impact of company operations on the environment and welfare of the host 
communities. Finally and as the examples given earlier on the initiatives undertaken by Anglo Ashanti 
Gold, British Petroleum and Nestlé demonstrate; there was increasing awareness in business that in the 
longer term, success will be better realised through making a contribution to the host communities’ 
welfare or the market. Regardless of business’ motivation to engage NGOs in CSR, Schiller (2005:6) 
argues that such engagement is desirable because it makes for a perfect mutually beneficial 
relationship; he supports his argument by pointing out that international NGOs in particular, often 
work in a multiple of countries at the same time; however; generally they do not have adequate 
resources to carry out their projects efficiently and sustainably.  Likewise, MNCs operate in a number 
of countries at the same time and have an abundance of resources but not necessarily the desire, 
management capacity and /or the know-how to carry out CSR programmes themselves. In partnership 
therefore, NGOs would have access to increased resources for their work while MNCs would be spared 
of administrative tasks associated with delivering humanitarian aid and more importantly, the risks 
inherent in doing it themselves; it is a win-win situation for both partners.  
4.7 The relationship between NGOs and other stakeholders in partnership for development 
For the reasons given earlier, NGOs indeed became the channel of choice for delivering humanitarian 
assistance by both government and multilateral institutions for according to Chege (1999: 2) they were 




project beneficiaries in the planning and  implementation of projects. According to Clark (1991: 47), in 
1989, such a perception of the capacity and success of NGOs saw government and multilateral donors 
disbursing $6.4 billion to the South through northern NGOs; an amount representing 12 percent of the 
entire OECD-DAC’s aid allocation for that year. According to Manji et.al (2002: 580), an analysis by 
country revealed that in 1992, DFID allocated around 8% of its aid budget to NGOs and in the United 
States, the level was close to 40%. Such trends Faroohar (2005) notes; resulted in a situation in which 
between 1977 and 1999, non-profit expenditures grew 77 percent faster than the American economy as 
a whole. Furthermore, while the U.S. economy fell into a "jobless recovery," with total employment 
falling between 2001 and 2004, employment in the non-profit sector actually grew from 2 to 4 percent 
during the period. In the U.K. employment in the voluntary sector increased by 17.7 percent between 
1995 and 2000 compared with an 8.5 percent increase in the for-profit sector. At the centre of such 
development partnerships in which donors contribute resources and NGOs contribute their skills and 
labour to achieve a common goal, are the poor the communities served; then there are the host 
governments who are the guardians of the communities’ welfare. In a situation in which the 
communities served are the common denominator in terms of shared goodwill and/or generosity by all 
the stakeholders, it can be assumed that all would be well in relationships between NGOs and these 
other stakeholders. Unfortunately it is not always the case as the following accounts of the 
relationships reveal.  
 
4.7.1 Relationship with donor governments 
In 2005, the OECD (2005: 9-10) established the “Principles for Good International Engagement in 
Fragile States” which were binding to all member states; they covered a wide range of the “rules of 
engagement” including aligning aid with local priorities and systems; mixing and sequencing aid 
instruments to fit the context; doing no harm and staying engaged long enough to give success a 
chance. Sequel to the establishment of the principles, at a meeting of the Council of the European 
Union and the representatives of Member States in 2007, (European Union, 2007a: 6), conclusions on 
the process towards an EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid were adopted. The Consensus covered a 
number of areas including common principles and good practice in humanitarian aid; some of the 
principles have many things in common with the NGO Code of Conduct for example, a requirement on 
donor countries to observe the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. In the 
light of this, it would appear that both donor governments and NGOs are guided by same principles in 
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the delivery of humanitarian aid; as such, it can be assumed that the relationship between them will be 
free of controversy and/or contradictions.   
 
Hoffman & Minnear (2002: 2) point out that such an assumption is wrong for notwithstanding the good 
intentions and assertions by the OECD and EU which suggest a serious commitment to understanding 
the issues of the poor so they can give wisely and effectively, the scholars identified four trends in 
donor behaviour that undermined “the quality of money”.  The first trend they cited was that 
perceiving weaknesses in some UN agencies and their programmes; donor governments started to 
channel more funds to NGOs and less to the UN system. Hoffman & Minear note that such a trend 
would have been good news; only such an arrangement carried liabilities for NGOs in so far as in 
general, funds were more readily available for relief interventions than for development. Such 
liabilities according to Giovanna, Giovanna &Haldorsson (2001: 5) pertained to the fact that even 
when implementing a short emergency relief operation for which resources are more readily available; 
NGOs generally tend to employ a medium to long-term perspective. To this effect, NGO interventions 
are usually planned such that they go beyond the “fire fighting” phase to include recovery through to 
development in the post crisis period. Understandably, with sustainable development as their ultimate 
goal, NGOs are aware that by themselves, relief interventions are not enough to reduce vulnerability in 
the longer term and worse still, they might actually induce dependence. According to Harvey & Lind 
(2005: 5), prolonged relief assistance can undermine local economies and large amounts of food aid 
can damage local agricultural production. This in turn leads to a continuing need for relief assistance 
creating a vicious cycle and trapping people into chronic dependency. In a situation in which funds are 
often more readily available for relief operations but less so for long term development, not only do 
NGOs risk not having any impact at all in terms of attainment of the goal of sustainable development, 
but even worse, the interventions might render communities even more vulnerable as a result of relief-
induced dependency.  
 
The second trend according to Hoffman & Minear (2002: 2); was the changing balance between grants 
and contracts; donors are awarding fewer grants and signing more contracts understandably, this gives 
them greater control in how their funds are spent by NGOs; NGOs are uncomfortable with the 
implications of being treated primarily as service delivery machinery rather than agents of institution-
building and empowerment. In addition, while there may be a degree of reciprocity in contracting 




contractual terms of engagement are developed by the sponsor (donor governments). The observation 
on the asymmetric nature of the relationships between NGOs and donor governments is shared by 
Rauh (2010: 34) who argues that providing funding as donors do, they are in a position of power which 
allows them to set the agenda and conditions that must be met in order to receive a grant. Such power 
has often resulted in donors designing programme objectives in contexts very different to that in which 
they will be implemented and given that these objectives are heavily influenced by their own norms 
and values, they are often not suitable to the cultures in which they will be implemented.   
 
Of donor power, Jennings (1995: 18) shares the views by Rauh adding that most development aid 
programmes claim to be based on partnership but the reality is usually very different not least, because 
donors have the financial power which they use to insist that the partner fulfil certain conditions. On 
conditionality Smillie & Minear (2003; 11) observe that some donors insist on the use of their nationals 
in humanitarian programmes or will be more generous if their nationals are placed in key positions. 
Others tie humanitarian funding for UN agencies to the use of their own home NGOs, consultants, and 
companies because of the visibility their work commands on the home front. Bendell (2006:68) shares 
these views adding that much governmental aid is often explicitly tied to the awarding of contracts to 
companies based in the donor country adding that the same is true with NGOs; donor governments 
often channel their aid through their own NGOs rather than directly to Southern organizations. For 
NGOs, being the “favoured child” of their own governments would be good news but then, there are 
instances in which a humanitarian crisis that NGOs are trying to address is the result of a conflict in 
which their home government is party to; overtly or covertly.  The same government subsequently 
provides generous funding for home NGOs for the necessary humanitarian interventions; double 
standards it could be argued. With respect to such double standards, Stevenson and Macrae (2002) note 
that governments have often used the term “humanitarian” to describe and justify political and military 
interventions with humanitarian assistance portrayed as an integrated effort to “manage” or “resolve” 
conflicts and/or to facilitate “peace building”. 
 
Bendell (2006:67) gives another perspective on such behaviour by donor governments and argues that 
even in a situation in which a donor government providing funding for relief interventions, conflict 
resolution and/or peace building; is not party to the conflict; such an “innocent” donor government will 
be cautious about the degree of engagement and may well earmark the funding. Such earmarking of 
funding may extend to specified activities; beneficiary groups and/or geographical regions all of which 
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may not make for a “goodness-of-fit” between competencies and sensitivities of international NGOs 
relative to local CBOs. In addition, it may not take into consideration the needs and/or the priorities on 
the ground either; this presents a dilemma for NGOs. Eade (1999: 12) shares these views adding that 
such a dilemma was inevitable given that NGOs are primarily involved in transferring resources from 
societies which have plenty to those who have little as such, their success more often than not, depends 
on their ability to mobilise resources primarily from their home constituencies and in particular, their 
governments. She concludes that it is this more than any other single factor which makes NGOs 
susceptible to following or at least, accommodating the agendas and fashions set by their funders.  
 
Scholars writing in Mango (2005. 6) add their voice to this argument adding that despite the rhetoric 
about “good donor-ship”, little has changed for either recipient governments or non state actors 
including NGOs; this can be traced to the fact that donors use their financial power to dictate what 
funding is available, when, where, for what and how it will be used. In such a situation, the priorities of 
the donor country will always be uppermost in funding arrangements and these may not necessarily 
match the needs or priorities on the ground that NGOs would like to address. There are many examples 
of such manipulation of NGO development agendas by donors and Edwards & Hulme (1995: 109) cite 
an example of Bangladesh given by one Ramesh where in the mid nineties and as a result of the 
successful experience of the Grameen Bank, the emphasis on credit based poverty alleviation was 
driven by the ease of availability of donor funding. With large amounts of funding on offer, NGOs 
were unstoppable in their efforts to replicate the approach; at the same time however, the significant 
drop in adult literacy programmes was traced to lack of donor interest in such programmes. Thus 
whereas the urgent need at the time was improving literacy levels, NGOs were found wanting in 
addressing this dimension of development as they chased the dollars availed for credit based poverty 
alleviation interventions.   
 
The third trend (Hoffman & Minnear 2002: 3) is the perceived economies of scale which have seen 
donors scramble to go into partnership with large well established NGOs. It was estimated at the time 
that the eight largest NGOs in the world between them were raking in approximately $5-$6 billion of 
their governments’ money annually; in addition, the twenty largest NGOs were the partner of choice 
for the United Nations and between them, representing 75% of funds allocated to NGOs by the agency. 
However, such a level of funding Hoffman & Minnear argue; did not always result in aid going where 




known and not so well funded smaller NGOs and local CBOs which were working on the most 
neglected problems, reducing vulnerabilities within communities and addressing long term 
development albeit, on a small scale for limitations in funding. According to Cosgrave (2007:31-32), 
visibility and high media profile and in particular in emergency or disaster situations is a motivational 
factor for donors to court the large well known NGOs that have a well established presence and 
capacity on the ground.  Thus, media exposure rather than humanitarian need determine funding 
particularly in well publicised disasters; Cosgrave observes that the “CNN effect” is evident in the 
level of funding availed by donor governments during the Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster in 2004.  
 
In addition to publicity, public pressure also is also an important factor in large well publicised 
disasters thus, the public sympathy generated by the Tsunami in turn, generated public pressure on 
politicians to “do something about it”. In such situations, Dmitracova (2009) notes that governments 
often prefer to channel aid through their own large well established NGOs for this category usually 
receive the bulk of media attention understandably, endowed with the bulk of donor funding, they 
seemingly do more. However, Dmitracova argues that it has been established by experts that in reality, 
it is actually the people living in the damaged areas (local civil society) who save the most lives and 
help survivors long after foreign aid workers leave. Understandably, equipped with such large amounts 
of funding during the crisis and “exciting” phase of a disaster, the big ones take centre stage while their 
smaller home country and/or local counterparts are pushed to the periphery. However, once the 
exciting phase is over; it is the smaller home country and/or local, not so well known or funded NGOs 
that usually remain behind “picking up the pieces” in the communities; a time that the real and long 
term impact of the disaster is beginning to unfold. At the same time, it is also a time that the “big 
brothers” who benefited the most from the huge amounts of funding and publicity have long taken off 
to the next “big and exciting one”.  
 
Binder & Witte (2007:3) note that the competitive nature of the donor community and the pursuit of a 
high media profile often resulted in a situation in which increasingly, this became the main 
preoccupation with donors rather than what the funds accomplished on the ground. Such 
competitiveness and pursuit of high media profile had two outcomes; first of all, a trend that soon 
emerged in the USA and UK was one of increasing direct contracting of commercial service providers 
particularly in post disaster reconstruction and development work to plan and implement humanitarian 
projects. The scholars further note that supporters of such arrangements argue that the trend is good for 
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the introduction of competition into the humanitarian marketplace reduces inefficiencies and increases 
value for money in humanitarian relief by amongst other things, bringing expertise, new technology 
and in some cases much-needed funds. At the same time however, Binder & Witte note that critics of 
such arrangements caution that the trend could result in a shift of donor funding to the sector since 
donors might well prefer partnerships with the private sector because companies are less inclined to 
defend their independence than NGOs. In partnership with the private sector, donors would be able to 
solidify their control in the implementation of relief activities and particularly in countries where they 
have vested political interests. These views are supported by Hoffman & Minnear (2002: 2) who 
caution that while donors were increasingly dependent on NGOs for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance; they may be quite willing to dispense with NGOs in favour of the private sector in certain 
situations. Such a development would be a disaster in itself Hoffman & Minnear’s argument continues; 
for the private sector perceives humanitarian relief simply as about logistics. As such, the 
preoccupation of the private sector in a relief operation is delivering the goods and/or services to the 
right consignee; in the right quantities, at the right time and intact; so they can submit their invoices 
and get paid on time. The issue or whether or not the ultimate “consignee” (beneficiary communities) 
derives any utility from the goods and/or services is not their concern; the scholars conclude that the 
“truck and chuck” attitude that has been witnessed in many a relief and/or post-relief operation 
implemented by the private sector is evidence of such a perception. More significantly (Binder & Witte 
2007:3), critics fear that the increasing engagement of the private sector will serve to weaken the 
application of humanitarian principles for as profit maximising entities, companies are less concerned 
about humanitarian principles than NGOs and might out-crowd NGOs altogether, further weakening 
the application of humanitarian principles.   
 
Finally, a fourth trend identified (Hoffman & Minnear 2002: 3) was enforced coordination and there 
are two viewpoints on this;  the first is that donors want the choices that a more competitive 
marketplace provides at the same time however, they also want at least a measure of coordination. In 
order to promote coordination among NGOs, the tendency became one of structuring and earmarking 
funds to force them to coordinate their activities with other agencies; a practice designed to erode their 
flexibility. The other viewpoint is that donor demands for coordination are legitimate and even overdue 
for interagency collaboration provides an effective counterweight to the increased competition that is 
increasingly witnessed in the NGO marketplace. Interagency collaboration indeed increases efficiency 




from parties for who the primary motivation is not necessarily the “humanitarian imperative”, NGOs 
may well find themselves being party to hidden donor goals rather than their own. Commins (1999: 70-
71) shares these views and argues that  while in the past, NGO self perception was one of having a 
significant impact in shaping donor policies and humanitarian responses; in time, such a self-
perception proved a fallacy. In the main, this was a result of the fact that in pursuit of shaping the 
world economy, the globalisation agenda pursued by powerful governments; transnational 
corporations, capital and currency markets saw NGOs pushed into roles that were to minimise their 
impact in the long-term. The scholar concludes that NGOs are in danger of becoming increasingly 
marginalised in terms of the importance of their work; of being reduced to mere “ladles” in a global 
soup kitchen, handing out meagre comfort or acting as useful fig-leaves to cover governments’ inaction 
or indifference to human suffering. Edwards and Hulme (1998:8) go further and caution that while the 
trend of increasing official funding of NGOs allows them to become providers of social and economic 
services on a much broader scale, it however compromises their performance in other areas of 
development activity such as institutional development and advocacy. Furthermore, it weakens their 
legitimacy as independent actors in society and distorts the accountability of NGOs away from 
grassroots and internal constituencies to overemphasis on short-term, quantitative outputs as demanded 
by donors. 
 
The demands for upward accountability can indeed compromises NGO performance and a study 
carried out by Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman & O’Dwyer (2009: 20-21) revealed that although 
donors expressly indicated that they were keen to see their funding used to further broad long-term 
NGO charitable development objectives, they would “apply the handbrake” if the specific activities did 
not suit the donor’s agenda. The end result was that NGOs often found themselves working on a 
narrow range of specific issues and projects that the donors were prepared to fund. In addition, such 
manipulation of NGO agendas extended to specification of the geographical areas where activities 
would be undertaken; specified target groups as well as particular technology to be used. With respect 
to specification on what technology is to be used, rigidity in the upward-accountability requirements of 
the donor did not allow NGOs to report on problems and difficulties consequently, the latter played 
down these difficulties and problems so that they can report “good performance” and thus continue to 
access funding. A related challenge NGOs faced in their partnerships with donor governments was the 
ever increasing demand for information in the form of detailed reports. According to Davies (1997) 
this can be traced to the fact that disbursing large volumes of aid money to NGOs as donor government 
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were, they became increasingly concerned about the capacity of the recipient NGOs to manage such 
large volumes of aid effectively. In particular, donor governments were worried about the rate of 
implementation of activities as agreed; but not so much about whether or not the activities were 
achieving what they were designed to achieve in the communities served.  Worse still, Davies notes 
that at a forum convened to discuss the ever increasing demands for information by donors, NGO 
pointed out that in order to meet the demands; they often, had to hire staff whose sole function was 
writing the detailed reports required by the donor. Such arrangements were increasing their 
administration costs and when they reported higher administration costs, at best they were criticised 
and at worst, they were threatened with withdrawal of funding for operating “inefficiently”.  In the 
event NGOs did not recruit more staff and used the resources at hand for the purpose of maintaining 
administrative costs at a level acceptable to the donor at best, the reports could not be timely submitted 
and at worst, by diverting man hours from implementing activities, targets could not be met. In turn, 
when reports could not be submitted on time and targets could be met, it was criticism at best and 
threats of withdrawal of funds at worst! As is evident, access to large amounts of donor funding in a 
situation of unequal power relations turned out to be a real dilemma for NGOs. 
 
In concluding this section, indeed the relationship between donor governments and NGOs is unequal; 
this is illustrated by Lister (1999: 10-11) in a study conducted on an international development arm of 
a US Christian membership organisation. The study revealed that while the donor was covertly 
benefiting from operational and structural influence over the NGO, there were no effective 
mechanisms by which the NGO could exert either structural or operational influence over the donor. 
Moreover, the demands of the donor with respect to the extent and types of reporting required; the 
timelines for the reports and the complex procedures which had to be followed; were having a 
structural influence in so far as the NGO had to adapt its own procedures, processes and timelines to 
correspond to those of the donor. The final outcome of these demands was that the NGO found itself 
changing the focus of its activities over the years so that they fit more closely with the donor’s priority 
activities. Such a inequality in the power relationships between donor governments and NGOs is 
eloquently captured by Smillie (1995: 173-4) who says of the United States that the seemingly ideal 
“marriage” between government and non profit organisations turned into a confused and expensive 
mess that satisfied only those with vested interests. The manipulation of NGO agendas by donor 
governments not only creates dilemmas for NGOs but more seriously, liabilities; such liabilities are 




Code of Conduct for NGOs which seeks to maintain high standards of independence, effectiveness and 
impact; values which even those which have not signed, subscribe to it anyway. “Caught at crossroads” 
NGOs are indeed.  
 
4.7.2 Relationship with multilateral donors  
According to Boas and McNiel (2003: 3), it was environmental issues that first offered NGOs and 
other civil society groups the possibility to influence decision making processes and to access funding 
from multilateral institutions. Cernea (1998:29-30) concurs; adding that such access and influence can 
be traced to the perception by multilateral institutions that NGOs offered a significant and under-
utilised potential to involve people in development and in particular, the lowest strata in society. Paul 
(1996: 1) makes the same observations and argues that the impetus for increasing efforts by the World 
Bank to engage NGOs in its operations is based on the fact that their presence on the ground and their 
first hand knowledge of the needs and interests of the poor was seen as a clear comparative advantage 
of the sector. In addition and according to Malena (1995:24) the Bank strongly believed that NGO 
involvement could contribute to the sustainability and effectiveness of Bank-financed projects by 
introducing innovative approaches and promoting community participation. Furthermore, NGOs were 
perceived to have what it takes including capacity; to increase project uptake and reach and could 
facilitate greater awareness of diverse stakeholder views. In time, such a comparative advantage was 
recognised at the highest level in the UN to the extent that in his report to the 53rd Session of the 
General Assembly in 1998, (United Nations 1998: 8) the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
stated that practical cooperation in operational matters between the United Nations and NGOs had 
undergone vast qualitative and quantitative changes in recent years. Hitherto and for a long time, with 
the notable exception of relief work, there was little functional interaction between the United Nations 
system and NGOs in the field. However, as the comparative strengths of NGOs and the potential for 
complementing the work of the United Nations grew more evident; they became indispensable 
partners, not only in development and relief operations, but also in public information and advocacy. 
At about the same time and according to a report by CIVICUS (1998: 1), the same sentiments were 
expressed by then World Bank President James Wolfensohn who is on record as saying that he 
believed that civil society participation was an essential element of its projects without which, such 
projects would not be as successful. For NGOs, this was good news coming from these multilateral 
donor institutions which as vehicles for transferring resources from those who have to those who do 
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not have; the nature of the work of civil society organisations and in particular development NGOs 
made for a perfect match of agendas.  
 
According to Cernea (1998: 46), in the quest to promote stronger collaboration and partnership, the 
World Bank subsequently developed a number of programs and policies which included provisions for 
sharing information to facilitate NGO dealings with governments; and an enabling environment for 
NGOs to take the lead in decisions pertaining to how they will work together or with one another. To 
this effect, in its progress report titled “World Bank-Civil Society Collaboration” (World Bank 2001: 
11); the Bank made an undertaking to make a special effort to improve the policy dialogue 
environment between all stakeholders (donor and recipient governments alike, other multilateral 
donors and civil society) in Africa. In time, the Bank went further and elaborated its vision on options 
for improving engagement with civil society organisations (World Bank. 2005b: 10) which amongst 
other things, included encouraging and promoting partnerships by assuming a facilitation role in 
building the capacity of governments and civil society organisations to engage each other more 
effectively. The capacity building initiatives involved training;  sharing knowledge and best practices; 
convening and/or supporting multi-stakeholder discussions; encouraging and sometimes brokering  
negotiations on terms of engagement and providing guidance, technical or financial assistance to client 
governments to engage with CSOs in Bank-supported activities.  
 
With respect to multi-stakeholder discussions, two important policy dialogue forums were created 
(World Bank 2005b: 13); one addressing Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) and the other, a special 
regional consultation forum to address HIV/AIDS concerns. With respect to the latter, such dialogue 
resulted in the establishment of the Multi-Country AIDS Program for Africa (MAP), an initiative 
involving a partnership between UNAIDS, the International Partnership against AIDS in Africa, 
bilateral donors and NGOs. The benefits flowing to NGOs from these partnership arrangements were 
significant for during the fiscal years 2005 and 2006 (World Bank 2006: 43); the MAP initiative saw 
$300 million or more than or 48 percent of the total budget of $625 million disbursed through CSOs to 
carry out AIDS education, prevention, surveillance, care, and treatment activities. Notwithstanding the 
benefits of a seemingly mutually beneficial relation between the World Bank and civil society 
organisations, according to the report by CIVICUS (1998: 4), many observers questioned the economic 
and social impact multilateral donors were having on countries of the South. Besides, despite many 




eradication efforts as well as the institution's underlying economic philosophy. To this effect 
(CIVICUS (1998: 2), the World Bank's strongest critics (NGOs) mobilised and staged the “50 Years is 
Enough Campaign” in 1994; the focus of which was the Bank's fundamental development paradigm 
and economic growth policies which were perceived as exacerbating rather than reducing income gaps 
between rich and poor. Furthermore, the Bank and other multilateral lending institutions were 
perceived as agents of rich governments and multinational corporations both of which they perceived 
as benefiting the most from globalization and trade liberalization.  Some protesters even argued that 
there was an inevitable conflict between the lending institution and the goal of poverty reduction; they 
went as far as appealing to governments to cease funding the Bank and reallocate the money to more 
socially and environmentally responsible development agencies!  
 
Since then, NGOs have not eased the pressure on multilateral donors to behave more responsibly and 
while the World Bank (2005b: 23) acknowledged that globalisation had been harmful to poor countries 
and their people; recalling the campaign ten years earlier, the Bank took a position.  The position was 
that the Bank would not be engaging individuals or groups that espoused violence adding that there 
was little basis to expect that constructive relations are possible or desirable with obstructionist-minded 
groups unless their aims and tactics changed significantly. The antagonistic nature of relationship 
between NGOs and the World Bank has a long history however; as far back as 1998 there was no 
consensus even within the Bank itself that such a relationship could be attributed exclusively to 
attitudes and behaviour in the NGO community. On the contrary and in the report by CIVICUS (1998: 
4-5), some Bank staff were quoted as admitting that NGOs had had to resort to building and maintain 
political pressure from outside to force the Bank to create the space for dialogue adding that even then, 
dialogue was not the best way to describe it, because real dialogue rarely occurred. They defended their 
view by arguing that the dialogue that occurred around these processes tended to be constructed by the 
Bank as such, engagement of civil society was often on the Bank’s terms and the potential for co-
optation was great hence many NGOs did not want to legitimize a process they felt was illegitimate.  
 
Notwithstanding the history of the antagonism which often characterised the relationship between 
Bank and NGOs, the former was determined to make the partnership work and in 2005 (World Bank 
2006: xiii), the outgoing President Jim Wolfensohn stressed the importance of Bank-civil society 
engagement in development policy and operations. In turn, his successor Paul Wolfowitz demonstrated 
in his first year in office of his intent to expand this legacy; to this effect, the Bank (World Bank 2006:  
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2) established new global mechanisms for Bank-civil society engagement to promote mutual 
understanding and cooperation. Amongst such mechanisms were a Bank-wide institutional framework, 
the establishment of a focal point for consultations and introducing and piloting a new monitoring and 
evaluation system for civic engagement. Furthermore, it conducted a review of Bank funds available 
for civil society engagement in operations and policy dialogue and explored possible realignment or 
restructuring. The restructuring of funds available for civil society involvement in Bank-funded 
projects (World Bank 2006: 23) resulted in the doubling of such engagement from 50 projects or 32 
percent in 1990 to 217 projects or 72 percent in 2006.  
 
According to CIVICUS (1998: 4), on the one hand, multilateral donors represent powerful forces that 
can make a difference in efforts to fight poverty; improve the quality of life; build democracy; ensure 
human rights; foster sustainable development and protect the environment.  On the other hand and as is 
evident from the foregoing, NGO collaboration with and participation in multilateral institution 
financed development projects is not without problems. Malena (1995; 13) shares these views and 
notes that while the World Bank had policies and procedures to facilitate effective partnerships with 
borrowing governments and the private sector alike however, having their own distinct characteristics 
and culture, NGOs were different; as such, standard Bank operational guidelines were not always well-
suited to effective NGO collaboration.  Thus; while for NGOs, complaining or staging protests was an 
acceptable way of expressing disgruntlement with a donor, in a situation in which the Bank perceived 
such behaviour as obstructionist of which the consequences could well be the severing of cooperation 
and partnerships, there were two options for NGOs. The first option and for the sake of securing 
continued funding, was to remain silent and painfully get co-opted by an institution which may well be 
party to the origin of the problems of the poor in the first place; the very problems that that NGOs 
sought to address! The other option was for NGOs to be strictly loyal to their mandate and their 
constituents, the poor who are their “raison d’etre” and openly and actively play the poor’s advocate 
but then, risk being disengaged and more seriously, lose a substantial portion of their resource base.  
 
An unenviable position for NGOs it is indeed and for many an NGO, caught as they are at such a 
“crossroads”, the tendency was to prioritise institutional survival resulting in a situation in which 
mobilising resources took precedence over accountability to the poor that they serve. This tendency 
was not so much a case of “if you can’t beat them, join them” but more; a belief that in the interests of 




change over time. However, while such “towing the line” creates the space for NGOs to be “doing 
something” about the situation of the poor in the here and now, in the longer term, this compromises 
their performance and it may well be the same multilateral funding institutions who will make the 
loudest noise about lack of impact of NGO interventions; it is as it were, a “lose-lose” situation for 
NGOs. 
 
4.7.3 Relationship with corporate donors 
According to Business Social Responsibility (BSR) (2001: 6), from the business perspective, the rise in 
the number and importance of NGOs resulted in an increasing recognition of the competencies and 
social stature that many of them possessed and the powerful synergies that were possible when 
companies, NGOs and governments work together. In addition, there was recognition that the long 
term viability of any business was a function of interactions with all stakeholders through dialogue and 
cooperation.  On stakeholder engagement, a study conducted by Greenall & Rovere (1999: 2) revealed 
that taking into account the increasing role of private sector investment in developing economies and 
the changing role of the state from goods and services provider to market facilitator; Canadian 
businesses considered enhanced business-stakeholder engagement as advantageous. One distinct 
advantage deriving from such enhanced stakeholder engagement was the strengthening of national 
environmental regulatory frameworks thus creating a level playing field for all players; NGOs were 
perceived as important in influencing environmental policy and regulatory frameworks. In addition, in 
an era in which advanced information technology facilitated rapid dissemination of information from 
local stakeholders to a mass audience, there would be no place to hide for those companies bent on 
flouting the rules. For Canadian businesses therefore, expanding the stakeholder base was not only 
desirable but a sort of insurance for a sustainable operating environment and in time, optimal 
productivity and profitability.   
 
In the light of this development, it would appear that business and stakeholder groups were moving in 
the same direction however, the NGO stakeholder group did not become complacent besides, the 
increasing ease with which information could be gathered and rapidly disseminated meant that in the 
event of business malpractice, through their strong networks; such information could reach all corners 
of the world in a relatively short time. According to Kennedy (2008), it is precisely this “corporate 
watch-dog” role that generated conflict between business and NGOs for the former resented the 
pressures exerted on it by outside agencies and especially, environmentally oriented NGOs. As a result, 
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Kennedy notes, for most of the previous century, an atmosphere of distrust and mutual suspicion 
existed in both camps and this often stood in the way of much progress by either group. This was 
particularly so  as global environmental issues rose to prominence and the (negative) effects of climate 
change increasingly compromised the agendas of both business (productivity/profitability) and NGO 
(the welfare of the poor). Communication and cooperation between the business and NGOs was no 
longer a matter of choice and according to Greenall et al (1999: 7), partnering with NGOs not only 
opened the doors for access to the broader local stakeholder group but also, the possibility for 
companies operating in developing countries to tap into the skills and expertise that NGOs brought to 
the table. Such skills and expertise were viewed as viable options for positive spin-offs in terms of an 
operating environment conducive to profit maximisation. The views are supported by Gartzke (2004: 
4) who notes that first of all, companies hoped to strengthen their corporate and brand image through 
association with NGOs which were respected and trusted by communities. Secondly, there was a 
realisation in business that due to their numerous contacts and networks; coupled with the fact that they 
work in and live with communities, NGOs were well placed to generate business intelligence. Thirdly, 
NGOs had the ability to influence communities (market); in turn, the thinking in the market was a 
critical factor in decisions on the direction product lines should take for maximum profitability. Thus, 
firms which had a deep insight into NGO activities within communities and formed partnerships with 
them would have an advantage over their competitors.  
 
On strengthening corporate and brand image, den Hond, de Bakker & Wilts (2008) share these views 
adding that firms often use their relations with NGOs to portray themselves as subscribing to the same 
values of concern for disadvantaged communities. Besides, a relationship with NGOs can help a firm 
to deal with and manage complex and interrelated sets of social expectations; government regulations 
and to contain activist pressures both of which affect the latter’s performance and thus profitability. On 
access to business intelligence information, Schiller (2005: 11) notes that such information enables 
firms to identify commercial partners and networks through working closely with NGOs. In turn and 
equipped with such information, firms are able to develop product sale environments, supporting 
infrastructure and/or new types of ethically-sensitive products for specific market conditions. Ethically-
sensitive products perceived as not exacerbating the situation of poor improves a company’s 
reputation, public image and result in positive media coverage resulting in branding paying for itself; 
positive media coverage may even positively affect the share price of a company. Partnerships with 




(2004:1) cautions that there are also dangers for even within a meaningful relationship, companies risk 
wasting time and money and possibly divulging sensitive information which could be misused. Schiller 
(2005: 11) shares the view on the dangers for business adding that in opening up their operations to 
“outsiders”, companies risk information leaks. Thus, while a company can safeguard itself from such a 
risk through the inclusion of a clause prohibiting the leaking of information in the terms of 
engagement, all the same, such a possibility can never be ruled out.  
 
Information leaks indeed can never be ruled out for as the Canadian Council for International Co-
operation (2001: 11) noted, while benefiting from funding provided by the private sector, some NGOs 
still felt that in order to tackle poverty at its roots, it was necessary to maintain the pressure on both the 
companies themselves and those who govern the framework within which they operate.  The rationale 
behind this NGOs’ position was the awareness that there was a gulf in values between themselves and 
the private sector; such a gulf rendered their motives and methods irreconcilable to those of business. 
Under the circumstances, the only way to successfully affect corporate behaviour was to speak in a 
language that corporations understand namely, confrontation. Besides, in a situation in which 
governments which have the mandate to grant corporations a license to operate often turned a blind eye 
to corporate malpractices and conventional methods had failed, NGOs strongly felt that there was a 
need to remind both governments and business of their duty through “any other” means. According to 
Duma (2006), such contradictions in the relationship between the private sector and NGOs were 
inevitable; he illustrates his point by drawing an analogue in which he likens the relationship between 
the two travellers for who both the point of departure and final destination are not the same but by 
some chance, they meet in a transit lounge. In order to “kill time” and of necessity, they start a 
conversation and keep each other company until one has to his/her own way. As such, it a short lived 
relationship of convenience in which when each gets to his/her own destination, he/she resumes his/her 
own established lifestyle; for business, such lifestyle is represented by the pursuit of the profit motive 
while for NGOs, it is continuing to play the role of corporate watchdog. Notwithstanding the 
contradictions in the partnership between business and NGOs, Cowe (2004:1) argues that business 
considers the risk worth it for the credibility and reputational gains deriving from association with a 
reputable and trusted NGO outweigh the risks.   
 
From the NGO perspective, den Hond et al. (2008) observe that  the withdrawal of the state from the 
provision of basic services for their people; the growing focus on self-regulation and soft law for 
 164 
business; the growing attention paid to CSR issues and the increasing international character of many 
social and environmental issues, saw NGOs courting business as important stakeholders. In the face of 
such a trend, NGOs spared no effort in gaining access to companies’ management to gain leverage 
over how they conducted their business; this was particularly so given that for fear of driving away 
investors, Third World governments were reluctant to regulate them. Through such an approach which 
the scholars refer to as the three “I’s” namely, instrumentality, identity and ideology; NGOs hoped to 
be instrumental in influencing policy on issues of concern to them; to strengthen their common identity 
and to act in order to fulfill their humanitarian ideological mandate. With respect to instrumentality, 
Sethi (2006: 2) observes that while NGOs have been at the forefront of campaigns for exposing 
companies that are perceived as exploiting the poor, partnerships between the private sector and NGOs 
had witnessed enormous growth in the previous decade. He attributes such growth to the fact that a 
number of societal issues of concern to NGOs invariably involve private sector organizations and 
multinational corporations in particular, are important players. Multinational corporations are indeed 
important players because over the years, it is often direct externalities and/or un-intended 
consequences of business activities that have created problems for and compromised the welfare of 
communities; the very problems that NGOs seek to address.  
 
Of direct externalities Bartimole (1982) cites the activities of the Swiss-based corporation, Nestlé; the 
world's largest manufacturer of infant formula which the corporate aggressively marketed and 
promoted as good as breast milk. According to Kema (2005), the marketing strategy completely 
ignored and/or down-played the issue of the quality of the water which in Africa, was often 
undrinkable without purification besides; being of limited means, the tendency by mothers was to put 
less formula into each recommended measure of water to make the supply last a little longer. A number 
of studies revealed that a combination of these factors exposed babies to nutritional and health hazards 
with UNICEF estimating that in the late 1970’s’, one million formula-fed babies were dying every year 
from these health hazards. In 1977 and in response to this revelation, NGOs led a world-wide boycott 
not only of formula but all Nestlé products at a phenomenal cost to the corporate. Of un-intended 
consequences, Mokhiber (1987) cites the example of pharmaceutical companies which during the 
1950s and early 1960s produced and marketed the drug thalidomide; as a non-toxic tranquilizer that 
had none of the poisonous potential of the barbiturates then flooding the world drug market. 
Unfortunately, babies born to mothers who had been taking the drug during pregnancy had one thing in 




from their shoulders to name a few. Like in the case of Nestlé, there was world-wide outcry with 
NGOs in the lead. 
 
According to Sethi (2006: 2), another factor which led to changes in attitudes in the NGO community 
from suspicion and hostility to collaborating with business was the realisation that while private sector 
organizations were often the source and/or part of the problems of the poor, the sector could be 
successfully engaged in the search for solutions to problems that were its creation in the first place. 
This is evident in the example given earlier on Shell in Nigeria where according to Schiller (2005: 6), 
reflecting on the damage that the MNC’s operations were inflicting on the environment and the half 
hearted measures the company was taking to reverse the damage, NGOs of which Greenpeace was at 
the forefront; moved from the position of “outsiders” challenging the system to being “insiders” 
working with the corporate to reverse the damage. Likewise and according to Business Social 
Responsibility (2001: 21); in the USA in 1991, CARE welcomed Starbucks’ commitment to have an 
impact on the lives of its workers and their families in coffee producing countries. At the time BSR 
published the guide in 2001, Starbucks was the largest North American contributor to CARE; donating 
and helping to raise $1.2 million to support programmes in Africa; Latin America and South-East Asia. 
Bendell (2010) explains such a shift in patterns of business-NGO collaboration in terms of the fact that 
business no longer considers corporate social responsibility as consisting merely of the “nice” things a 
company might do with its profits. Instead and increasingly, business is going beyond image 
considerations to serious introspection on the moral question of how companies make their profits in 
the first place. Consequently, the trend has since been one of business forming strategic partnerships 
that are designed to tackle both internal operational issues including profitability on the one hand; and 
on the other hand, systematically examining the negative impact of their operations on the environment 
and communities; and ways of minimising them.  
 
The benefits for NGOs engaging business in partnerships for development are many as is apparent 
from the foregoing and Sethi (2006: 2) notes that the forging of relationships between NGOs and the 
private sector was welcomed and strongly encouraged by both governments and multilateral donor 
institutions which perceived the development as healthy and long overdue. Another significant benefit 
according to Damlamiam (2006: 7); was the fact that faced with difficulties in finding and maintaining 
new sources of funding from governments, multilateral institutions and private donors; NGOs 
increasingly turned to the private sector for resources. This assertion is supported by Business Social 
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Responsibility (2001: 18) in which it is noted that as support from governmental sources shrank, NGOs 
sought alternative sources of funding and partnerships with business to enable them continue to deliver 
with a shrinking resource base. On its part, business was only too happy to fill the gap in NGOs’ 
resource base in return for being on record as being socially responsible and for some companies, 
without having to do the work which most of them have limited capacity and/or interest to do the work 
themselves; it was a perfect and mutually beneficial arrangement. On increased funding opportunities, 
Hoffman and Minnear (2002: 3) however cautions that readily available corporate funding can lead to 
a lack of cost-efficiency and over-ambitious programmes. More seriously, readily available funding 
can lead to lack of attention to options for cost recovery including charging beneficiaries modest fees 
for services which would make the programmes sustainable and more beneficial to the target groups in 
the longer term.  
 
In addition to the financial benefits which derive from NGO-business partnership; Murphy &  
Griss (2007: 7) note that business brings in expertise in management and marketing issues as 
well as increased understanding of the drivers of business. This is supported by Business Social 
Responsibility (2001: 18) which notes that in partnering with business, NGOs gain access to 
operational expertise, skill enhancement and other resources they lack but which are critical to 
increased efficiency and effectiveness in their work.  Besides (Damlamiam 2006: 7), working 
from inside also gave NGOs greater insight into how companies really operate and this acted as 
a spring board for dialogue and lobbying for changes in business practices from an informed 
position; in time and in some instances, such changes rippled through to an entire industry to 
the benefit of society as a whole. Murphy & Griss (2007: 7) concur, adding that this increased 
NGOs’ understanding of the drivers of business and presented opportunities for new solutions 
especially in an era in which many NGOs were disenchanted with the rhetoric and inaction of 
governments. Inaction is illustrated by Smillie & Minear (2003: 14) who note that NGOs had 
funding pushed at them by governments and multilateral donors alike following the highly 
photogenic Goma volcano; at the same time however, they could not get adequate funding for 
the much larger on-going emergency in the Democratic Republic of Congo despite reports of as 
many as 2.5 million deaths in 32 months. 
 
In the long term, the courting of NGOs by business even if the primary motive is “image-cleansing” as 
the example of Shell in Nigeria illustrates and/or the NGOs courting business to ensure that business is 




for all.  Schiller (2005: 10-11) however cautions that while NGO-private sector partnerships present 
many advantages and opportunities for both parties, there are also risks inherent in such partnerships. 
Of the risks, he argues that NGO-private sector partnerships can result in co-option and weaken NGOs’ 
stance on certain issues and when this happens, NGOs may find themselves compromising their 
principles. This can lead to splits and disagreements between groups and/or activists working on the 
same issue further weakening their position as the defenders of the defenceless. NGOs may also find 
themselves reduced to fulfilling the role of appeasers; being used to do community work on behalf of 
companies particularly in the developing world; in the process, they may well lose their credibility 
among peers, the public and most crucially, other categories of their donors. Besides, partnering with 
the private sector could bring about changes in organisational culture for example, increased 
bureaucracy, formality and the loss of one of the greatest comparative advantage NGOs have - 
flexibility. These views are shared by Sethi (2006: 5) who argues that while NGO-business 
partnerships have been hailed as a positive development long overdue, they are far from perfect; 
adding that most of the business-NGO strategic alliances or partnerships are a form of forced marriage 
or a marriage of convenience in which the partners hope that eventually, they will fall in love and live 
happily ever after! He defends this view by arguing that the private sector has had considerable 
experience with all types of strategic alliances and partnerships; if therefore partnerships with NGOs 
were considered important and a good idea, corporations would have pushed for them as their preferred 
solution to resolving business-society conflicts a long time ago.  
 
The argument by Sethi that if business thought that partnerships with NGOs was a good idea, they 
would have been pursuing them a long time ago suggests that business enter into partnership with 
NGOs not voluntarily but instead, under duress; to achieve a specific goal. Cowe (2004 1-2) shares 
similar views and argues that true partnerships do not really exists instead, what exists are  just loose 
relationships or traditional sponsorships. As such, to refer to “partnership” under the circumstances is 
glorifying such a relationship for while it not exactly a “...one-night stand...” it is not marriage either or 
if it is; it is a “marriage of convenience”. Sethi (2006: 5) shares the views by Cowe adding that with 
few exceptions, these so called “partnerships” or strategic alliances have failed to deliver on their 
promises. However, Sethi’s argument continues, such failure to deliver is not so much due to lack of 
commitment or good faith on the part of the parties involved instead; it can be traced to conflicting 
interests and goals which render the partnerships a complicated affair.  
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Tennyson and Harrison (2008: 16) concur and note that amongst some of the reasons for the failure of 
partnerships to deliver is that first of all, how the partnerships evolves is often different from what the 
parties anticipated on engagement. This can be traced to the fact that contrary to the belief by the 
partnering organisations that they are drawn together by a common goal; the reality is that they are 
drawn together by what each partner perceives the other as bringing to the table. Secondly, contrary to 
the belief that the partnerships are shaped round a common vision; the reality is that the partners expect 
the partnership activities to primarily deliver their individual organisational aims with the other’s aims 
taking second place. Such contradictions (Sethi 2006: 5) became even more complicated for eager as 
each party was to proclaim success, they promised more than could deliver; they glossed over the real 
difficulties of managing conflicting goals and downplayed differences of opinion on the means for 
achieving the goals and even on acceptable levels of performance. Under the circumstances, the 
tendency was to assiduously try to avoid describing their respective constituencies in specific terms for 
fear of antagonizing the other; consequently, they were often not able to manage heightened 
expectations in their respective constituencies and when they failed to manage these expectations, the 
blame game started thereby further straining the relationships. 
 
Another risk in business-NGO partnerships according to Sayer (2005: 262) lies in the fact that while 
corporate social responsibility remains a useful reminder for corporations to pay heed to environmental 
and social issues; it may well be used as window-dressing to cover up acts of corporate misconduct. 
Thus, in partnering with such businesses, NGOs risk reputational damage particularly in situations 
where the acts of corporate misconduct are exposed and they are perceived as having been party to it 
by association. Schiller (2005: 11) concurs adding that partnerships involve risks and may be a drain 
on resources that could be more effectively used for traditional campaigning; this is particularly so 
because the work culture of business is very different from that of NGOs. Such differences might also 
result in the partners spending disproportionate amounts of time negotiating the terms of engagement 
amongst other things; time which could be more effectively used for traditional campaigning. At the 
same time however, Schiller notes that while at outset, covering up acts of misconduct might have been 
a primary motive for business to engage NGOs in general however, business was increasingly 
becoming more conscious about the impact of their activities on the welfare of communities as 
illustrated in various examples cited earlier. Tennyson, Harrison & Wisheart (2008:19) concur adding 
that in time and as partnerships became more commonplace and those involved became more 




also less tolerance of poor partnering behaviour and growing confidence in challenging poor practices. 
In this respect, the scholars cite the example of partners involved in a number of bio-diversity 
partnerships for several years during  which they were able to articulate what constituted grounds for 
suspending and/or terminating a partnership altogether.  
 
Murphy & Bendell (1999: 2) share the views that relationships are indeed improving and note that 
while at the outset, the dominant pattern of business-NGO relations was characterised by antagonism 
since then, some businesses and NGOs have since been quietly working together to overcome their 
differences for the common good. However, notwithstanding these positive changes in business’ 
attitudes and practices, voluntary or otherwise and while this may have moved business and NGOs 
closer in terms of common goals, all the same, “housekeeping” problems lingered on. In this respect, 
Duma (2006) notes that some of these problems have to do with the fact that first of all, in trying to 
establish what types of initiatives the corporate is interested in sponsoring, NGOs often face a hurdle as 
in many corporations, there is little documented information on CSR or if information was available, it 
is often outdated and not in tune with the reality of the situation on the ground. Secondly, the focal 
point for contact is often at an inappropriate level of corporate management ranks meaning that the 
individual is not in a position to make decisions on suggested changes or modifications to the CSR 
plans in the event that they did not fit the reality on the ground and the matter has to be deferred until 
the next “senior management retreat”! Thirdly, in the event that one gets an audience at the right level 
of corporate management and the process of engagement takes off; often, there are no clear guidelines 
and/or timely feedback on project proposals submitted for funding. Instead, corporations are often 
quick to criticise the lack of professionalism within the NGO community in so far their proposals are 
considered of poor quality understandably, the proposals are judged according to corporate standards!   
 
In the light of the foregoing, it does appear that for NGOs, partnerships with the corporate sector were 
mutually beneficial and desirable because first of all, such partnerships brought in much needed 
financial resources and in an environment in which the NGO resource base was increasingly shrinking, 
NGOs embraced business as a viable alternative for resource mobilisation. Secondly, according to the 
Canadian Council for International Co-operation (2001: 11), at the outset, NGO perceptions of 
business were very negative and the mood then was confrontational. A common strategy used to 
confront business was naming, shaming and taking other measures aimed at driving companies that 
engaged in malpractices out of business; amongst these measures was advocating for world-wide 
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boycotts of their products. In time however, there was a realisation in the NGO community that by 
placing themselves in a confrontational mode, they were foregoing opportunities to work 
constructively with business which had the resources and sometimes the will to create meaningful 
livelihoods for people and thus make a contribution to poverty reduction. In addition, there was a 
realisation that continuing to pursue the confrontation agenda may be hurting those on whose behalf 
they claimed to work. Besides, such a strategy often provoked only short-term palliative changes in 
corporate behaviour; for meaningful and lasting change, it was necessary to relate to business on more 
positive terms for in the longer term, more could be achieved through dialogue and cooperation.  
 
The change in strategy from confrontation to collaboration, cooperation and inclusion saw NGOs 
benefiting from two fronts; access to corporate funding at the same time as it placed them in a position 
in which they could positively influence corporate behaviour and practices. Schiller (2005: 10) 
however notes that such a position was not without its own challenges for whereas hitherto, it was 
enough for NGOs to follow charity-sector rules; in partnership with business, they were increasingly 
expected to follow best practices in transparency, accountability and governance. For corporations in 
particular, such demands have since extended to accountability to the communities served; it is as it 
were; the tables had turned on NGOs whereby corporations were hitting back and demanding that 
NGOs “practise what they preach”. Such a backlash was taken to a new height when according to Lee 
(2004: 4); a report published by One World Trust in 2003 revealed that some NGOs including the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), CARE International and Oxfam ranked lower on organizational 
accountability than the often criticized companies such as Rio Tinto and GlaxoSmithKline amongst 
others. According to Schiller (2005: 10) some NGOs are uncomfortable with such a level of demands 
for accountability by business and especially those that are increasingly or entirely dependent on 
corporate funding. Such discomfort derives from the fact that NGOs fear that these demands by 
corporate partners and by implication, spending disproportionate amounts of time writing reports, may 
be taken to a level where “upward” accountability takes precedence over “downward” accountability; 
accountability to the communities served. In the light of this,  NGOs are faced with the challenge of 
maintaining a healthy balance between “upward” and “downward” accountability and many feel that 
while getting closer to business, it is important that they maintain a degree of “social distance” from 





In concluding this section, it appears that through courting NGOs and providing resources that it knows 
they are desperate for, business has earned itself some breathing space however; that the former 
continue to be corporate watchdogs is a fact as is illustrated earlier. Damlamiam (2006: 6) however 
points out that while campaigns against corporate malpractices have indeed been successful in the past, 
with increasing power and reach facilitated by amongst other things, supply chains which often span 
several continents; MNCs have become much more difficult to regulate at the national level. The 
“watchdog” task of NGOs is made even more difficult because it appears that no supra-national 
organization is prepared to readily take on this task. NGOs are aware of this reality hence their 
reservations about the kind of partnerships in which they run the risk of being totally co-opted; the 
reservations appear quite legitimate and as long as they prevail, the relationship between business and 
NGOs will always be ambiguous.  
4.7.4 Relationship with host governments  
According to Slim (2007: 1), most NGOs want a strong efficient state for the authority and capacity a 
state commands is crucial to delivering the things most NGOs care about: efficient delivery of basic 
services to its people; enlightened policies; pre-planned and well coordinated disaster relief 
interventions; the rule of law and the protection of rights amongst other things. According to Jennings 
(1995), such strong and efficient states were few and far between especially during the economic crisis 
of the 70’s which rendered states unable to provide basic services to their people. The crisis coupled 
with pressure from international financial institutions for reductions in public sector spending under 
structural adjustment programmes resulted in many a government withdrawing from the provision of 
certain public services.  Such withdrawal is evident in a study carried out in Uganda by Cannon (1995) 
it which it was established that the proportion of health services provided by NGOs ranged from 30 to 
50 percent; in time and under the circumstances, the common perception amongst the majority of 
Ugandans was that the primary responsibility of government was to provide peace and security with 
the provision of basic services assigned exclusively to NGOs!  
 
Slim (2007: 1) cautions that arrangements in which NGOs substitute governments in the provision of 
basic services can result in neo-colonial forms of service delivery which are dependent not on citizens' 
political demands and action but instead, on what “outsiders” perceive as good and beneficial to the 
masses. This can undermine the establishment of genuinely binding political contracts between a 
people and its rightful government. Clark (1992:153) identifies three categories of regimes which offer 
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distinct environments in which NGOs operate; the liberal democracy, the single-party state and the 
military or other forms of dictatorship. The liberal democracy environment is characterised by freedom 
of association as such, NGOs are welcomed as an integral part of civil society working in close 
cooperation with public authorities to improve the welfare of citizens; in such environments, their work 
provokes little if any hostility from the host government. In a single-party state environment, a 
government will tolerate NGOs as long as they are perceived as strictly confining themselves to their 
humanitarian mandate while in a dictatorship environment and depending on political interests 
prevailing at the time, their activities may be severely restricted.  
 
Farrington and Bebbington (1993: 177) share the views on both the type of political environment as a 
determinant of the relationship between NGOs and host governments and the views on the operating 
environment adding that in a dictatorship environment, the relationship is often one of “reluctant 
partners” characterised by mutual suspicion and mistrust. In restricted environments, Cambell (1996) 
notes that the severity of restrictions is determined by the degree to which a government perceives 
itself as politically vulnerable. In turn, a sense of vulnerability can be traced to the fact that the donor 
community has always been critical of the typical one-party monolithic state and the lack of legitimacy 
such a state is associated with. In a situation in which NGOs are the preferred partner and are funded 
by the same donor community which is critical of a government, suspicion and mistrust is inevitable. 
Suspicion and mistrust can also be traced to the fact that the organisational structure and 
developmental objectives of NGOs and governments often differ; in this respect, Salmen (1990: 29) 
notes that states tend to take the form of large, hierarchical bureaucracies with centralised and 
paternalistic notions of development. In contrast, NGOs are characterised by flexibility; non-
hierarchical structures and values of participation and empowerment are ranked high. NGOs are thus 
likely to use a “bottom-up” approach while the state is more likely to adopt a “top-down” approach. 
Such differences in approach have the potential for generating conflict between the two parties since 
the NGO approach is more popular with the masses and is likely to move people further along the 
development continuum thereby exposing the weaknesses inherent in the rigid and bureaucratic 
approach of governments. 
 
Abdul-Raheem (2001) holds a different view and argues that in most of their activities, NGOs operate 
in a manner that is more akin to the state, for endowed with abundant resources and backed directly or 




and local NGOs in the host countries.  Abdul Raheem defends his argument by making reference to 
their lifestyles of which he says that like the ruling elite in Africa, they go around in the latest models 
of four wheel drive vehicles fully equipped with state of the art high technology, communication and 
navigation equipment. At the same time and ironically, while they drive around in expensive vehicles, 
children, a category for which they purport to be advocate, have to walk anything up to ten kilometres 
to get to school every morning and most likely, on a half empty stomach. These views are supported in 
a study of the relations between NGOs and the government in Afghanistan where according to Jelinek 
(2009), Provincial government respondents accused NGOs of wasting funds and using donor money to 
pay for extravagant, luxurious lifestyles. Abdul-Raheem (2001) further argues that another dimension 
of NGO-state relations resulting in suspicion and mistrust is their perceived dominance and control 
over civil society in Africa. Such dominance is a mirror image of the crisis of the post-colonial African 
state which was characterized by neo-colonialism; only today, the political economy of Africa is 
characterized by re-colonization through the IMF, World Bank and Western NGOs. These new 
catechists the argument continues; joined the right-wing chorus about the inefficient state and declared 
their newly discovered civil society (NGOS) to be the new angels. He dismisses as fallacy; the myth 
that because these organizations are based “among the people” they are best placed to deliver services 
to the people adding that benefiting from generous grants from their home governments, NGOs 
became the civil arm of their governments' policies and the ideological cousins of the IMF and World 
Bank. He concludes that it is a case of one hand slapping one in the face and the other offering a 
handkerchief to wipe the tears!  
 
With such perceptions abound, host government-NGO relationships were bound to be strained to 
varying degrees at various points in time, even in environments characterised by relative freedom of 
association. Global Policy Forum (2002) gives an example of such strained relationships in Zimbabwe, 
a de facto one party state until 2002 when for the first time since independence; the ruling party was 
challenged by a viable opposition party in a general election. The opposition did well; gaining a 
substantial number of parliamentary seats but not enough to dislodge the government; while the 
government survived, all the same, it was shaken by the outcome of the elections. At a subsequent 
annual congress, the government blamed NGOs on the outcome of the elections alleging that they had 
been the conduits through which external aid was channelled to finance the opposition’s campaign. 
NGOs were warned that they would be scrutinised; the policy and laws governing their operations 
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would be reviewed and for those found guilty, the law that restricts foreign funding of NGOs would be 
invoked.  
 
Such behaviour on the part of host governments is not peculiar to Zimbabwe for according to Mutasah 
(2007), similar behaviour was witnessed in Zambia in mid 2007 where the Justice Minister introduced 
a Parliamentary Bill that extended government control over the civil society sector on the grounds that 
this was necessary to make the sector more accountable. Ironically and not so long after the bill was 
introduced, addressing a workshop on aid effectiveness in Livingstone, the late President Mwanawasa 
praised the role of NGOs in the implementation of the country's fifth national development plan adding 
that jointly with government and sometimes on their own initiative, they had built schools and 
hospitals and ladled porridge on plates to hungry children! While so appreciating the contributions of 
NGOs to the welfare of the poor, Edwards & Hulme (1995: 135-136) note that governments remained 
suspicious of any independent NGO initiative which attempted to mobilise and provide services to 
disadvantaged communities without the direct involvement of the state.  Understandably, states view 
NGOs as an extension of state policy and they are expected to implement government policy and not 
chart their own independent agenda. Edwards & Hulme further note that in general, NGOs were not 
opposed to implementing government policy however most of them were opposed to the deliberate 
frustration by state functionaries and to increasing state monitoring, control and direction. NGOs 
perceived such behaviour on the part of the state as undermining their social base and their efforts to 
pursue an alternative development path for the poor and marginalised sections of society. When NGOs 
openly express their frustration with this sort of interference by host governments, this sews the seeds 
for hostility and such hostility is most pronounced in the case of NGOs whose mission is addressing 
human rights issues. Adiin-Yaansah & Harrell-Bond (1995: 2) trace such hostility and in particular, 
against NGOs involved in human rights issues to the fact that governments tend to be threatened by 
activities which expose their failures to uphold these rights especially those which are enshrined in 
international human rights conventions to which a government is a state party.   
 
Host governments are also threatened by activities that expose their failure to fulfil obligations to the 
masses in general and this was evident in Zimbabwe from the year 2000 onwards. According to 
Mbofana (2004), as voices of dissent amongst the masses increased over bad state management and the 
consequent impact of an increasingly shrinking and deteriorating economy and in particular, the 




communities. Amongst such a contribution was the provision of community-based health services, 
education and livelihoods for the marginalised groups in society for whom the situation would 
otherwise have been unbearable. Besides, NGOs made a notable contribution in the economy by 
amongst other things, creating jobs, contributing to the ailing banking sector through foreign currency 
inflows and to the survival of the hotel industry (60% of the business) at a time that the tourist industry 
had virtually collapsed. Such a contribution by NGOs was perceived as exposing the failures of the 
state especially in the economic sphere; to this effect, the threat “…review the policy and laws that 
govern their operations…” was finally carried out in 2004 through the passing of an NGO Bill which 
severely restricted the scope of NGO activities and imposed conditions which made it near impossible 
for them to execute their mandate. According to Edwards & Hulme (1995: 136) such hostility is taken 
to even greater heights when NGOs reports on human rights and failures in general are taken up by 
local groups and used in campaigns to unseat the government of the day. Perceiving its power to be 
threatened by such NGOs, rather than introducing the much needed reforms, such governments are 
more likely to look for legal or illegal means to suppress them as the example on Zimbabwe illustrates.  
 
Another source of mistrust between NGOs and host governments according to Bendell (2006: 10) is 
that the latter are particularly worried about lack of control of the work of organizations which are 
headquartered in their home country and which are almost entirely funded by foreigners including their 
home governments.  The worries appear legitimate and in particular, the perceived influence foreign 
funded groups might have on domestic culture, economics and politics; this is particularly so in a 
situation in which the concept of development and how to attain it is so hotly contested.  Other scholars 
amongst them Farrington & Bebbington (1993: 333) cite resentment which they argue is rooted in the 
question of the sustainability of large-scale service provision by NGOs especially in a situation in 
which virtually all service-delivery operations are totally dependent on large subsidies from external 
donors; resources which increasingly, are denied to governments. The scholars argue that were 
ministries of health and education allowed access to resources on this scale, then over time these 
ministries too, would be able to provide services as cost-effectively. They conclude that the widening 
gap between government and NGO resources makes state inefficiency a "self-perpetuating reality" and 
this sews the seeds of resentment.  The frustration of host governments denied of resources by donors 
in favour of NGOs coupled with exposure of state failures be it in the economic or political spheres 
often results in drastic action being taken against the former; the imposition of severe restrictions, 
deregistration or even expulsion. Such drastic action by a host government is evident in Sudan where 
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according to the United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) (2009), as late as 
March 2009 the government ordered the expulsion of ten international NGOs and the deregistration of 
two local NGOs. The expulsions and deregistration were on the grounds of allegations ranging from 
spies to thieves and cooperating with the International Criminal Court which earlier, had issued an 
international warrant of arrest for the state president, Al Bashir. It was stated in the report that most of 
the expelled NGOs would be conforming to the order so as to ensure the safety of their staff for the 
possibility of detention and/or physical attack by members of the public could not be ruled out – it was 
that serious. 
 
In concluding this section, it is apparent that the environment in which NGOs work is not always 
conducive to the effective execution of their mandate; this is particularly so in cases where the 
government is a military or other form of dictatorship as suggested earlier by Clark. In such 
environments, Mariam (2010) argues that the conditions which generate dictatorships, (civil and cross-
border wars; ethnic and religious strife) simultaneously create the conditions which render 
communities vulnerable (economic regression, high unemployment rates and poverty; insufficient food 
production, malnutrition and disease). Thus, perceiving such governments as the source of some of the 
problems and like they do with corporate business, NGOs may attempt to engage them in the search for 
solutions and when they do, they are perceived as “meddling in domestic politics” which perception 
might well see them on the next flight back home. This was the case in Zambia where according to the 
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) (2007), the introduction of the Parliamentary Bill in 
Zambia in 2007 mentioned earlier was an attempt by the government to reverse a court decision to 
reinstate the Southern African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), a regional 
human rights and good governance watchdog deregistered hitherto. SACCORD had a history of being 
a thorn in the flesh for three successive administrations in Zambia; it led the anti-one party state 
movement which forced Kaunda to introduce multiparty politics in 1991; it was instrumental in 
blocking Chiluba's bid for a third term of office in 2001 and maintained the pressure on Mwanawasa 
resulting in the adoption of a new constitution in 2009. Thus, when NGOs “tow-the-line” and restrict 
themselves to their humanitarian mandate; they will be tolerated by a host government and thus have 
the space to execute their mandate. However, perceived by the poor as they are as the “redeemer” and 
likewise, perceived as they are by donors as the “magic bullet” for turning around the situation of the 
poor, if they tow the line and turn a blind eye to the conduct of a government, they risk losing their 




out their principles and values, this might lead to loss of the space in which to fulfil their mandate; a 
very delicate balancing act NGOs must play if they are to fulfil their mandate at the same time as 
ensure that they have the space in which to do so. 
 
4.7.5 Relationship with beneficiary communities 
 
More than a decade ago, Chambers (1997:1) pointed out that the visions of the 50s and 60s for a better 
world with full employment, decent incomes, universal primary education; health for all and safe water 
supply amongst other things, had not happened. As a result (Chambers (1997: 7), hundreds of millions 
of people had become more vulnerable , more exposed to risks, shocks and stresses with loss of 
physical assets and fewer and weaker social support systems and the means to cope. Such a situation of 
the poor is corroborated in the United Nations annual report on Human Development of the same year 
(UNDP 1997: 24) in which it is stated that poverty had degraded human lives for centuries adding that 
one of the greatest achievements of the 20th century was its dramatic reduction. At the same time 
however, UNDP qualified the “dramatic reduction” adding that first of all, far from continuous, the 
progress had been marked by ascents and descents and secondly, progress had not been equally 
distributed with some regions lagging behind others. Indeed progress had not been equally distributed 
for a report published by the United Nations on progress on the MDGs (United Nations 2005: 7) 
revealed that between 1996 and 2001, the number of people living on less than $1 a day in developing 
regions (in millions) was 78 and 74 respectively or a reduction of approximately five percent; for Asia, 
the figures were 748 and 703 million respectively or a reduction of six percent. In contrast, the picture 
was very different in Sub Sahara Africa, where the figures stood at 271 and 313 million respectively or 
an increase of fifteen percent.  
The definition of community development has been the subject of debate for years however, for the 
purpose of this discussion, that articulated by the United Nations in the sixties will be used. According 
to Coetzee (1989: 257-8), the United Nations defined community development as the process by which 
the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of government authorities to improve the 
economic, social and cultural conditions of communities and in the process, communities are 
integrated into the life of the nation thereby enabling them to contribute fully to national progress. The 
United Nations further elaborated that the process was made up of two essential elements namely, the 
participation of the people themselves and the provision of technical support and other services in ways 
which encouraged initiative, self help and mutual help. The United Nations definition of development 
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above, points to governments as the primary drivers of development processes within their sovereign 
states; however; Abdul-Raheem (2001) argues that in Africa, structural adjustment programmes 
recommended by the Bretton Institutions as the only way of heading towards development removed the 
state from all areas of the economy and disempowered them. In particular, the argument continues, the 
insistence by these institutions on cuts in public expenditure; on education, health and social welfare 
services resulted in new social contradictions which made the condition of the poor worse. Under the 
circumstances, liberal and social democratic forces in the West, the architects of the very philosophy, 
began to question their own wisdom in the face of evidence on the social effects of structural 
adjustment;  their liberal consciences sought a palliative to relieve the pain but without necessarily 
curing the disease. Such a solution was to find expression in increased funding for NGOs which due to 
the myth that because these organizations were based among the people, they were best placed to meet 
service delivery gaps which governments could not meet. This is how NGOs became part of the 
community development landscape in Africa and other parts of the Third World. On their part, African 
governments were only too happy to co-operate by handing over responsibility for the provision 
education, health and social services amongst others, to NGOs. This is evident as elaborated earlier, in 
the praises showered on NGOs by the then President Mwanawasa of Zambia for their role in building 
schools and hospitals to complement government efforts in implementing the country's fifth national 
development plan. 
Over the years and notwithstanding the level of technical, material and financial resources NGOs have 
employed in their attempt to improve the lot of the poor, some scholars question the impact such a 
level of resources has had. Amongst these scholars are Swanepoel (1997: 15) who argues that such 
interventions failed to show significant outcomes; instead and unfortunately, “…the outcome of many 
so-called community development projects is disappointment, frustration and an even deeper 
apathy…” The outcomes have indeed have been disappointing for implied in any development 
intervention is empowerment of the beneficiaries of the interventions. With respect to the poor, the 
World Bank (2002: 15-17) defines empowerment as the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor 
people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold accountable institutions that affect 
their lives. An empowering approach to development thus puts poor people at the centre of 
development and views them as the most important resource rather than as the problem. Other 
scholars, amongst them Narayan; Chambers; Shah & Petesch (2000: 2) argue that a significant 




power relationships between benefactors and beneficiaries. They further argue that such an imbalance 
is a result of the fact that there are 2.8 billion poverty experts, the poor themselves yet the development 
discourse about poverty has been dominated by the perspectives and expertise of those who are not 
poor;   professionals, politicians and donor agency officials.   
In support of this view, Chambers (1983: 104) argues that “outsiders” views of the poor are distorted in 
many ways adding that lack of contact or communication permits them to form such views without the 
inconvenience of knowledge and/or personal exposure. Shivji (2006: 11) adds his voice to this school 
of thought and says of Africa in particular, that the people who were supposed to be the authors and 
drivers of development and the liberators of their nations were reduced to “the chronically poor”.  In 
addition, they became the subject matter of strategy papers on poverty reduction authored by 
consultants and discussed at stakeholder workshops in which the “poor” were represented by NGOs. 
Consequent to such attitudes, the poor, the diseased, the AIDS-infected, the ignorant and the 
marginalised were excluded from being part of the development equation; instead, they merely became 
the recipients of humanitarian aid provided by “true friends” and dispensed by non-partisan and non-
political Non-Governmental Organisations. The views on exclusion of the poor are shared by Narayan 
et al. (2000: 265) who observe that poor people have limited spheres of influence and their 
powerlessness is evident in their inability to get a fair deal; their inability to take a stand against abuse, 
being lied to and cheated and their inability to access market opportunities. Furthermore, to stand up 
against those on whom one and his family depends is risky and can even be a matter of life and death.  
Burkey (1996: xvi) notes that programmes and projects aimed at improving the socio-economic and 
health conditions of the poor tended to be initiated, designed and implemented from “top-down” by 
agencies and institutions without systematic consultations and involvement of the beneficiaries. The 
basic idea behind such an approach was that the introduction of modern technology and science would 
automatically lead to a decent standard of living for all and that the availability of modern health 
services would defeat illness and disability. Burkey (1996: 48-49) further points out  that while these 
so called integrated development programmes are still popular with development agencies however in 
reality, they are more multi-sector than integrated. As such, each sector is usually planned by sector 
specialists who are primarily interested in ensuring that people are organised to implement the 
activities they have planned and designed. These views are supported by Swanepoel (1997: 45) who 
points out that the situation is one of an organisation deciding what the people`s needs are and how 
they should be met. In addition, many organisations view planning as a technocratic exercise taking 
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place in regional or central offices as such, planning and planners are removed from grassroots action. 
Under the circumstances, at best, a community`s inputs are channelled to the planning office where at 
best, they are heeded or ignored and at worst, the people and community are confronted with a ready-
made plan that they must accept and implement.   
 
Such an approach alienates the people and this is evident in an example from Sri Lanka given by 
Burkey (1996: xi) in which a large European NGO engaged a community of resettled people in a 
project involving growing mulberries and selling them for income. On a visit to the project, a woman 
came out of her hut and in a pleading voice asked the NGO officer for permission to root out the 
mulberry bushes and plant chillies instead! The officer pointed out to the woman that they were her 
mulberry bushes and she could do what she liked with them. In Afghanistan, a study carried out 
(Jelinek 2009), revealed that a recurrent complaint by communities was that NGOs implemented 
projects regardless of what villagers had asked of them; a community elder was quoted saying; “...An 
organisation came to our village to ask us for our views on what type of assistance we needed, but then 
they did what they wanted...” That the woman in the above example on Sri Lanka was not even aware 
that the mulberry bushes belonged to her and that an NGO can engage a community in discussion on 
what should be done but then goes on to do what it thinks is good for the people anyway; speaks 
volumes about perceptions on concepts like community “participation”, “ownership” and 
“empowerment”; words which are appear in almost every NGO project proposal document regardless 
of the activities involved.  
 
Another dimension of the problem is articulated in a review of the humanitarian system carried out by 
the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN 2010) in which it was established that while some 
agencies are more likely to seek beneficiary feedback; they however do not necessarily act on it. On 
the contrary, the emphasis on programme evaluation is still more on the strengths and weakness of the 
aid given rather than on to what degree needs were met. Notwithstanding these observations, for 
NGOs, the concepts “participation”, “ownership” and “empowerment” are not just a matter of words 
that make for a project proposal that is attractive to donors. On the contrary, in a study carried out by 
the British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) on approaches to quality used by NGOs both in 
the UK and internationally (BOND 2006:20);  the importance of beneficiary voices, perspectives and 
involvement as key elements in defining quality and the lasting impact of interventions was echoed by 




the key beneficiaries in programme design; decision making and strategies were key characteristics of 
programme quality. This suggests that “participation” was considered critical to the quality of 
interventions; quality in the context of community development implies that the interventions address 
the felt needs of the communities served and are implemented such that the communities can continue 
with the activities at a cost they can afford after external assistance has ceased. So what does 
“participation” involve, one is inclined to ask? Swanepoel (1997: 5) puts forward two viewpoints on 
the concept; the first is the liberal view whose main tenet is that it is through participation that a solid 
local knowledge base is built; such knowledge is a pre-requisite for successful development initiatives. 
In addition, the view has it that it has been established that people who do not participate in their own 
development have no affinity for development efforts or their outcomes. The second is the radical view 
in which participation is seen first of all, as a way of ensuring equity for often, the poor do not get their 
fair share of the fruits of development and secondly, participation is seen as a democratic right. On 
participation as a prerequisite for successful development initiatives, Swanepoel goes on to make a 
distinction between active participation and a mere presence adding that failure to make a distinction 
between the two is perhaps where NGOs have compromised their own performance and where their 
claim that they are more participatory in their approach to addressing the problems of the poor has 
been challenged.  
 
Such a challenge is not exactly baseless for in an evaluation conducted on USAID-funded NGOs, 
Tendler (1982) identified three main types of decision-making processes; genuinely representative; 
“top-down sensitive” in which while seemingly, the beneficiaries fully participated in the processes 
however; in reality, it was the NGOs that made the decisions in a relatively top-down manner. The 
third process involved “local elite decision-making” in which NGOs took the decisions made by local 
elites as representative of all the views of the poor. She concluded that often, what American NGOs 
regarded as participatory decision-making, was in fact not participatory at all. Indeed, perhaps this is 
where NGOs have been failing themselves for as pointed out earlier, the common practice is one in 
which needs identification and planning stages of many a development project are carried out in offices 
hundreds if not thousands of miles away. In a situation in which “community participation” is reduced 
to a mere presence at the often great and well planned “consultative” meeting but which turns out to be 
a forum to simply get the community to endorse decisions which have already been taken on their 
behalf; then it is no wonder that they “…have no affinity for development efforts or their outcomes…”  
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de Berry (1999: 12) articulates another perspective on the failure of community development and 
argues that in addition lack of meaningful participation; through the misconception that communities 
are homogenous entities and that the “community approach” will automatically translate into 
development interventions that work at the grass roots, NGOs ignore the fact that communities evolve 
over time. Such evolution which is in response to broader contextual events can act as a constraint 
against a joint and communal undertaking besides; many NGOs often find themselves drawn to one 
segment of the population. A study carried out by the scholar in rural Uganda revealed that those who 
were “consulted” tended to be a minority and in particular, those who had had some education and had 
a good command of English with the rest left feeling disenfranchised from influence. In such a 
situation, the disenfranchised may not be enthusiastic about the initiatives or their outcomes and since 
the interventions are designed to address issues affecting the whole community, if the felt needs in any 
part of the community are not addressed, then the interventions cannot be said to have been successful. 
 
In a situation in which “community participation” is reduced to a mere presence at the great and well 
planned “consultative” meeting but which turns out to be a forum to simply get the community to 
endorse decisions which have already been taken on their behalf; the disenfranchised may not be 
enthusiastic about the initiatives or their outcomes. Besides and as mentioned above, if interventions 
that are designed to address the issues of a whole community do not meet the felt needs of any part of 
the community, then the interventions cannot be said to have been successful. For a long time in the 
past, NGOs have got away with “thinking” and “deciding” for communities however, they are sitting 
on a “time bomb” for in defending the Sudanese government’s decision to expel thirteen NGOs, a 
community opinion leader was quoted (IRIN 2010) as asking; “...When the 13 NGOs were expelled in 
Darfur, nobody asked why they were still there; why after three, four, five years, there was no local 
capacity... what were the NGOs doing all those years...?” In the light of this, perhaps communities or 





NGOs share the cherished goal of and are sincere about turning around the situation of the poor 
relative to other stakeholders in the “partnership-for development”, they understand the situation of the 
poor better than donor governments, multilateral donor institutions, corporate donors and host 




the NGO community that small, often time bound and isolated projects will not have a significant 
impact if they are not undertaken within larger political and economic policies and structures that 
facilitate sustainable development within communities. Such awareness is evident in the fact since the 
early 1990s many of the large international anti-poverty NGOs have broadened the scope of their 
activities beyond simply providing relief and/or development aid to include high-profile advocacy 
campaigns. Such campaigns have ranged from protests against government policies, both north and 
south; multilateral donors and MNCs whose business practices are perceived to be exacerbating the 
situation of the poor. However, given that the resource base of most NGOs and in particular, for the 
work they do “off-shore” is dependent on funding from their governments and/or home corporations; 
that these “back donors” often have vested interests, both political and/or economic and that such 
interests may be in conflict with or work against the goal of sustainable development within the 
communities served presents a dilemma for NGOs.  
 
Playing the role of advocate of the poor has not been without problems for NGOs for increasingly, the 
strategy has become the subject of criticism from academics, political theorists and analysts alike. This 
is evident in an article titled “Angry and Effective” published in the Economist (2000) on NGO 
protests; the editor argued that NGOs are increasingly and to varying degrees, extorting admissions of 
fault from law-abiding companies and multilateral donors; and insisting on changes in policy from 
democratically elected governments. In so doing, NGOs claim to be acting in the interests of the people 
but then, so do the objects of their criticism, governments; multilateral donors and the corporate sector 
they despise. In the West, governments and their agencies are in the end accountable to the voters who 
elect them; “…who elected Oxfam…who holds the activists accountable…?” he asks.  He concludes 
that NGO advocacy is a paradigmatic example of a type of “non-electoral” representation adding that 
there would be no objection to the influence of NGOs and their protests if the concessions they win in 
the process genuinely advanced the cause of the world’s poor whose interests they claim to defend; 
unfortunately such advancement of the cause is very much in doubt! 
 
With respect to multilateral institutional donors, their back donors are the same governments which are 
also the back donors of NGOs as such; the situation of these institutions is not much better than that of 
NGOs in so far as “the fiddler names the tune”. Then there are host governments which will tolerate 
NGOs as long as they observe the unwritten rule that whether or not they accept the manner in which a 
state exercises its power; it is outside their mandate to comment on such matters. Finally, there are the 
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poor themselves who due to their status as the “poor cousin” in development partnership power 
relationships, they will generally go along with suggestions of this or the other project as dictated by 
donors through NGOs but knowing very well it can never meet their felt needs. Under the 
circumstances, the sense of ownership and commitment prerequisite to the success of a development 
intervention is simply not there and consequently, the investment so made yields little in terms of 
moving the beneficiary communities along the development continuum in a sustainable manner. And 
when this happens, both donors, host governments and the communities themselves (albeit not as 
loudly as the other parties) express disappointment in the lack of impact of NGO development 
interventions.  
 
Central to this study is the question why communities in Machakos District in Kenya were even more 
vulnerable to drought in 2006 than they had been in 2001; this suggests a lack of impact of post 
drought recovery through to development interventions implemented by NGOs between the two 
drought episodes. The reason could well have been a lack of sense of ownership within the beneficiary 
communities which is rooted in “...lack of affinity for the outcomes...” and which in turn, can be traced 
to lack of involvement (participation) in decisions on what interventions would best meet the felt needs 
of the beneficiaries at that moment in time; Swanepoel would argue. Non-involvement of the 
beneficiaries in the making of such critical decisions is certainly not always by design on the part of 
NGOs as illustrated earlier. Instead, it is often due to constraints beyond the control of NGOs and in 
particular, availability of resources which of necessity determines what they do, where, when and how 
they will deliver. Indeed, NGOs are not always at liberty to decide what they do, where, when and how 
they will deliver for this ultimately, this is a function of what resources are available for who; for what, 
where and when. With respect to advocacy activities, when they act they are damned and when they do 
not, they are damned; it is as it were a “loose-loose” situation! NGOs are indeed caught at crossroads 
for they are bound by clearly defined principles and values and some are actually signatories to 
protocols to this effect. NGOs know the right choice of exit is out of what is a complex crossroads 
however, they often find themselves in a dilemma in which in the quest to at least be “doing 
something” about a given situation of the poor in the here and now; they find themselves 
compromising these principles and values. It is more important now than ever before; that they come 
up with durable solutions to these challenges if they are to fulfil their primary mandate of alleviating 
human suffering and empowering communities to take charge of their own future destinies in other 






RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the profile of the study area; Machakos District in Kenya; the 
rationale for the choice of the District; and describes the methods used in conducting the study from 
the organisation of the study, sampling of the subjects, data collection and analysis. In Chapter 1, it 
was stated that the purpose of the study was first of all, to identify and analyse the factors that 
contributed to a situation in which despite post drought NGO interventions whose objective was to 
increase community resilience against such phenomenon, vulnerability to drought in communities in 
Machakos District in Kenya actually increased in 2006 relative to an earlier drought in 1999-2001. 
Secondly, based on the findings; to draw important lessons from the experience and translate the 
lessons into recommendations which hopefully, will stimulate further debate on what NGOs can and 
should do for more effective interventions.  
5.2   The profile of Machakos District 
Until 2010 when a new constitution abolished the Provinces and Districts system of Local Government 
administration and replaced it with a system of Counties, Eastern Province was one of eight Provinces 
which made up the Republic of Kenya. Stretching from the border with Ethiopia in the north and as far 
south as approximately only two hundred kilometres from the Kenya-Tanzania border; Eastern 
Province was the second largest after the Rift Valley Province. 
 
Map 5.1: Location of Eastern Province in Kenya 
 
Source: Government of Kenya 2006 
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Machakos, one of thirteen Districts making up the Eastern Province was located in the southern part of 
the Province with Machakos Town, the District capital, located sixty five kilometres south east of the 
state capital, Nairobi as illustrated in the maps below.  
















Source: Government of Kenya 2006                Source: Government of Kenya 2006  
                                                                                                     
 
The District (Government of Kenya 2005b: 3), was made up twelve administrative Divisions of 
differing geographical size and population as illustrated in Map 5.4. 
 
Map 5.4: Administrative structures and population density pattern 
 





The Divisions were made up of a combined total sixty-two Locations; in turn, the Locations were made 
up of a combined total of two hundred and twenty Sub-Locations.  Between 2001 and 2006, the 
distribution of Locations in the Divisions was as follows:  
 
Table 5.1: Administrative structure of Machakos District 2001-2006 
Division Locations Total 
Athi River  Katani; Lukenya; Settled Area. 3 
Kalama Kalama; Kola; Lubwa 3 
Kangundo Kakuyuni; Kangundo; Kanzalu; Kawathei; Kivaani. 5 
Katangi Katangi; Kawathei; Lubwa; Kathiani Iveti. 4 
Kathiani Iveti; Kaewa; Kathiani; Mitaboni 4 
Machakos 
Central 
Kathekakai; Kiima Kimwe; Kimutwa; Masaku; Mua Hills; Mumbuni; 
Muputi; Mutituni; Ngelani. 
9 
Masinga Ekalakala; Ikaatini; Kangonde; Kithyioko; Kivaa; Masinga. 6 
Matungulu Kalandini; Koma Rock; Kyanzavi; Kyeleni; Matungulu; Nguluni; Tala. 7 
Mwala Masii; Mbiuni; Mwala; Vyulya. 4 
Ndithini Mananja; Muthesya; Ndithini. 3 
Yathui Ikalaasa; Kibauni; Miu; Muthetheni; Wamunyu; Yathui. 6 
Yatta Ikombe; Katangi; Kinyaata; Kithimani; Kyua; Matuu; Mavoloni; Ndalani.  8 
  62 
Source: Government of Kenya. 2006. 
 
In 1999, the District’s population was 906,644 (1999 census); 924,712 in 2001 (Machakos District 
Survey: 2001); and 996,650 in 2006 (Machakos District Survey: 2006).  
 
Table 5.2: Population of Machakos: 1999; 2001; 2006 
Division Population 
1999 2001 2006 
Athi River (Mavoko) 48,936 50,404 55,444 
Kalama 41,000 42,148 44,255 
Kangundo 91,238 92,789 97,892 
Katangi* - 36,565 41,575 
Kathiani 95,096 96,903 104,170 
Machakos Central 143,274 147,572 157,164 
Masinga 74,478 75,893 83,446 
Matungulu 99,731 102,224 108,213 
Mwala 89,211 91,174 95,276 
Ndithini 32,358 33,136 39,872 
Yathui 65,567 66,714 73,018 
Yatta** 125,755 89,190 96,325 
Total 906,644 924,712 996,650 
Source: Government of Kenya. 2006. 
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As will be noted from the table, Katangi Division did not exist in 1999; it was carved out of Yatta 
Division in 2000. This is the explanation of the decrease in the population of Yatta from 125,755 in 
1999 to 89,190 in 2001. 
 
The District covered a total surface area of 6,281.4 square kilometres and according to English, Tiffen 
& Mortimore (1994: 3), by agro-ecological classification, the District was semi-arid or marginal with 
only 1,574square kilometres or 26 percent of the total surface area considered as having medium to 
high potential for the cultivation of crops. In addition, the only variety of crops that had the potential to 
grow, were rain fed crops and in the drier parts, crops which do not require high levels of rainfall; in 
the main, sorghum and cotton. A study carries out by the KFSSG (Government of Kenya, 2008: 1) 
established that during the period 2003-2008, the District had displayed a fairly constant pattern with 
respect to livelihoods zones as illustrated in the Table 5.3 and Map 4 below: 
  
Table 5.3: Machakos District: Livelihood Zones (2003-2008)         Map 5.5:  Machakos District Livelihood Zones 
 
Livelihood Zone % Population 
Mixed Farming: irrigated horticulture. 
 
0.8 








Formal/ informal employment - 
ranching 
- 




Scource: Governement of Kenya 2008 
 
5.3 The choice of Machakos District 
The rationale for the choice of Machakos District was that relative to the arid northern parts of Kenya 
where food production is severely hampered by dry climatic conditions and community livelihoods are 
limited to pastoral farming; the District has the potential to feed itself not least; because as illustrated in 
Table 5.3 above, over 60 percent of the population was engaged food production during the period 
under review. Furthermore, in the event of adverse climatic conditions as was experienced in 1999-
2001, 2004 and 2006; there existed the potential to produce drought resistant cash crops (cotton and 
sorghum) which communities could convert into cash with which to buy food. In the event that 




communities would have to rely on food aid; it was reasonably expected that such reliance on food aid 
would only be a temporary measure and that with minimum support; communities would be food 
secure within a relatively short period.  
 
Following the drought of 199-2001, this appeared to have happened for during a subsequent drought in 
2004; seven of the thirteen Districts making up the Eastern Province were affected and needed food 
aid, Machakos was not amongst these. However, another drought in 2006 not only saw Machakos 
District back to reliance of food aid but more seriously, there was evidence to suggest that  the degree 
of vulnerability to drought within communities had increased  relative to the 1999-2001 drought. This 
premise is based on the fact that according to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC 2004: 1), during the drought of 1999-2001; 260,497 people or approximately 
29 percent of Machakos District’s estimated population of 906,644 (1999 census) were affected and 
required food aid. According to the Government of Kenya (2007: 3) during yet another drought in 
2006; Machakos District’s population then stood at 996,650 and of this population, 289,029 or 29 
percent required food aid.  In relative terms, the proportion of people requiring food aid remained 
constant however in real terms and relative to the 1999-2001 drought; the number of people actually 
increased by 28,532; against this background, it can be argued that in 2006, communities in Machakos 
District were more vulnerable to drought than they had been in 1999-2001. 
 
5.4 Research methodology 
 
5.4.1 The sampling frame and the sample 
The study is focusing only on Machakos District as such, communities in the District form the primary 
sampling frame; other categories of the sampling frame included the NGOs, the donor community in 
Kenya and government ministries with functions relevant to the subject of study. 
 
Local Government administrative arrangements during the period under review (Government of 
Kenya 2005b: 3) were such that Districts were made up of a number of administrative structures and 
in ascending order, Sub-Location; Location and finally, Divisions which made up Districts. 
Machakos District was made of twelve Divisions, the Divisions  were made up of a combined total of 
sixty-two Locations; in turn, the sixty-two Locations were made up of a combined total of two 
hundred and twenty five Sub- Locations. With twelve Divisions, Machakos was one of the largest 
Districts in Eastern Province and in order to make the study manageable, a sample of Divisions, 
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Locations and Sub-Locations was drawn for the study. A second category of the sample was NGOs 
involved in drought relief and post-drought recovery through to development interventions between 
the periods 2001 and 2006 while the third category was the donor community as represented by donor 
governments; multilateral donor agencies and corporate donors. Finally, the forth category was 
government ministries. 
 
5.4.2 The sampling procedure 
For the sample at the communities level in Machakos District, a sample of four Divisions or 30 percent 
of the District was considered as adequately representing the sample population and was subsequently 
drawn using the sequential sampling method. The selection criterion used was the impact of the 
drought in terms of the percentage population which received food aid in 1999 and 2006 with those in 
which the impact was greatest selected. To this effect, the Divisions were ranked in descending order 
(1 to 12) according to the severity of the impact of the drought for both periods. The next step was 
“cross matching” the position of each Division in 1999 and 2006 with a view to selecting the top four 
perfectly matching Divisions at position one, two, three and four respectively. In the event that four 
perfect position matches could not be reached; Divisions appearing in the top four positions were 
selected regardless of the position in the respective years. The results of the sampling process at the 
Division level are illustrated in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Results of sampling at Division level. 
Division Population 
1999 2006 
Total Food aid 
recipients 





48,936 3,194 6% 11 54,444 2,722 5% 12 
Kalama 41,000 18,450 45% 3 44,255 20,800 47% 4 
Kangundo 91,238 26,459 29% 6 97,892 30,262 31% 6 
Katangi - - - - 41,575 8,618 20% 9 
Kathiani 95,096 12,500 13% 9 104,170 15,626 15% 10 
Machakos Central 143,274 11,462 8% 10 157,164 14,145 9% 11 
Masinga* 74,478 37,984 51% 1 83,446 42,557 51% 1 
Matungulu 99,731 22,933 23% 7 108,213 27,053 25% 7 
Mwala 89,211 31,224 35% 5 95,276 34,299 36% 5 
Ndithini 32,358 6,472 20% 8 39,872 8,772 22% 8 
Yathui* 65,567 28,199 43% 4 73,018 35,049 48% 3 
Yatta* 125,755 61,620 49% 2 96,325 49,126 51% 1 
Total 906,644 260,497 29%  996,650 289,029 29%  




As is evident from the table above, for both periods; four Divisions namely, Masinga, Yatta, Kalama 
and Yathui appeared in the top four positions in terms of the severity of the drought; they were 
subsequently selected as the sample at this level. In many ways, this came as no surprise for Masinga, 
Yatta and Yathui share a border with Kitui, the driest District in Eastern Province while Kalama shares 
a border with Kajiado, the driest District in the southern part of Rift Valley Province. 
 
Following the selection the four sample Divisions, the process moved to the Location level and like at 
the Division level, a sample size of 30 percent of all the Locations making up the twelve Divisions in 
the District or twenty Locations (62 x 0.33) was considered fairly representative of the population 
under study. Had the distribution of Locations been uniform across the Divisions, this would have 
worked out at a figure of five Locations per Division (62/12) however, it turned out that first of all, the 
distribution was not even; secondly, between the four selected Divisions, the total number of Locations 
was twenty three. Against this background, a system of proportional representation was used to 
allocate the number of Locations for study in each selected Division as illustrated in Table 5.5 below.  
 
  Table 5.5: Allocation of Locations for selection (Total no. /23 x 20) 
Division Total no. of Locations No. selected 
Kalama 3 3 
Masinga 6 5 
Yathui 6 5 
Yatta 8 7 
Total 23 20 
Source: Field work 2011 
 
Having allocated each Division the number of Locations for study, a list of all the Locations in each 
Division was drawn and the same sequential sampling method and criterion used at the Division level 
was used to select the sample Locations. However, it turned out that Kalama Division had only three 
Locations, a number below the average number of Locations in the four Divisions; against this 









Table 5.6: Results of sampling at Location level. 
Division Location % pop. food aid 
recipients 
Position Comments 
1999 2006 1999 2006 
Kalama Kalama 42% 47% 3 2 All three were selected by virtue of the 
small number of Locations relative to 
other  
Divisions. 
Kola 48% 49% 1 1 
Lubwa 45% 45% 2 3 
Total 45% 47%    
Masinga Ekalakala 45% 46% 6 6 Ekalakala Location was eliminated for it 
the least affected during the two periods. Ikaatini 53% 53% 3 2 
Kangonde 51% 52% 4 3 
Kithyioko 54% 52% 1 3 
Kivaa 49% 49% 5 5 
Masinga 54% 54% 1 1 
Total 51% 51%   
Yathui Ikalaasa 51% 55% 1 1 Muthetheni Location was eliminated for 
while it moved one position up in 2006, 
the average for the two periods (38.5%) 
was lower than that of Wamunyu at 39%.  
Kibauni 45% 53% 3 2 
Miu 46% 49% 2 3 
Muthetheni 35% 42% 6 5 
Wamunyu 38% 40% 5 6 
Yathui 43% 49% 4 3 
Total 43% 48%  
Yatta Ikombe 52% 53% 3 4 *Mavoloni Location was eliminated for 
while it moved one position up in 2006, 
the average for the two periods (44.5%) 
was lower than that of Ndalani at 45.5%. 
Katangi 54% 55% 1 1 
Kinyaata 51% 54% 4 3 
Kithimani 48% 49% 5 5 
Kyua 53% 55% 2 1 
Matuu 47% 49% 6 5 
Mavoloni* 42% 47% 8 7 
Ndalani 45% 46% 7 8 
Total 49% 51%  
Source: Field work 2011. 
  
  
Following the selection of the twenty sample Locations, the process moved to the Sub-Location level;      
had the distribution of Sub-Location been uniform across all the Locations, this would have worked out 
at four Sub-Locations per Location (225/62) or a total of eighty (20x4) in the twenty selected Locations. 
Eighty was considered too large a sample and a decision was made that a sample of 50 percent of this 
figure or forty Sub- Locations was fairly representative of the population under study. As is evident 
from Table 5.7; the distribution of Sub-Locations in the selected Locations was not even; against this 
background, a system of proportional representation was used to allocate the number of Sub-Locations 










Table 5.7: Allocation of Sub-Locations for selection (Total no. /63 x 40) 
Division Location Sub-Locations Total Allocation 
Kalama  Kalama Kiitini; Nziuni. 2  
Kola Katanga, Iiuni. 2  
Lumbwa Muumandu. 1  
Sub-total 5 3 
Masinga  Ikaatini Ikaatini; Itunduimuni; 2  
Kangonde Kikumini; Mikuyuni; Musingini; Kangonde. 4  
Kithyioko Kithyoko; Eendei; Thatha; Miangeni. 4  
Kivaa Kivaa; Kaewa; Iiani; Kyondoni. 4  
Masinga Masinga; Mukusu; Katulye; Musumaa. 4  
Sub-total 18 11 
Yathui  Ikalaasa Kamuthwa; Matulani; Ndithini; Ngungi. 4  
Kibauni Kilala; Kiunduani; Ngomano. 3  
Miu Kalamba; Kikulumi; Kyawikyo; Ngamba; 
Utithini. 
5  
Wamunyu Kaitha; Kambiti; Kilembwa; Kyawango, Nyaani 5  
Yathui Kwa-kala, Kyamatula, Kyangulumi 3  
Sub-total 20 13 
Yatta  Ikombe Ikombe, Kitheuni, Kyasioni, 3  
 Katangi Katangi, Mekilingi 2  
 Kinyaata Kinyaata, Makutano, Mathing’au. 3  
 Kithimani Kambi ya Ndeke; Kithendu; Kithimani, 3  
 Kyua Kyua, Syokisinga 2  
 Matuu Kakumini; Kaluluini; Katulani; Matuu.  4  
 Ndalani Kivingoni; Mamba; Ndalani. 3  
Sub-total 20 13 
 63 40 
Source: Machakos District Office 2011 
 
The number of Sub-Locations around the Locations was relatively small as is evident from the above 
table; against this background, a modified systematic sampling method was used; it involved selecting 
every 2nd Sub-Location in each Location in a first round. In the event that the full quota of Sub-
Locations in a Location could not be reached in the first round, those not selected would be regrouped 
in the order in which they appeared in the first round and depending on the deficit in reaching the 
quota, a convenient frequency interval was adopted and used to systematically select the outstanding 
number of Sub-Locations to make for a full quota for the Location. In Kalama Division, the allocated 
quota was reached in the first round as such; there was no need for a second round. The results of the 








Table 5.8: Sub-Locations selected 
Division Location Sub-Location selected Sub-Total Total 
  Round 1: Interval: 2 Round 2: RI R2  
Kalama Kalama Kiitini; Nziuni. -  -  
Kola Katanga; Iiuni. -  -  
Lumbwa Muumandu. -  -  
Sub-total 3 - 3 




Frequency Interval - 5 
Itunduimuni;  
   
Kangonde Kikumini;  Musingini.  Mikuyuni; Kangonde;     
Kithyioko Kithyoko; Thatha.  Eendei; Miangeni;     
Kivaa Kivaa; Iiani. Kaewa; Kyondoni.     
Masinga Masinga; Katulye. Mukusu; Musumaa.    
Sub-total 9 2 11 
Yathui   
Ikalaasa 
 
Kamuthwa; Ndithini.  
Frequency Interval - 4 
Matulani; Ngungi. 
   
Kibauni Kilala; Ngomano. Kiunduani;     
Miu Kikulumi; Ngamba.  Kalamba; Kyawikyo; 
Utithini. 
   
Wamunyu Kaitha; Kilembwa. 
Nyaani 
Kambiti; Kyawango,    
Yathui Kyamatula.  Kwa-kala, Kyangulumi    
Sub-total 10 3 13 




Frequency Interval – 4 
Kitheuni;  
   
 Katangi Mekilingi. Katangi;     
 Kinyaata Makutano.  Kinyaata; Mathing’au;      
 Kithimani Kambi ya Ndeke; 
Kithimani 
Kithendu;     
 Kyua Syokisinga. Kyua;     
 Matuu Kaluluini; Matuu.  Kakumini; Katulani;     
 Ndalani Mamba.  Kivingoni; Ndalani.    
Sub-total 10 3 13 
Total 40 
Source: Field work 2011 
Explanatory note: In round 2; the Sub-Locations in italics were eliminated. 
 
Following selection of the Sub-Locations for study; whereas it had originally planned that the average 
of five households per Sub-Location would be the working figure at this level; it turned out that public 
authorities kept immaculate records of the distribution of households around the Sub-Locations. The 
margin in the distribution of households in Sub-Locations was wide (from 287 to 3,557); against this 
background, simply allocating the average five households per Sub-Location would have meant over or 
under representation in some Sub-Locations. To this effect, a decision was taken to use a system of 
proportional representation to allocate each Sub-Location the number of households for selection. 






Table 5.9: Distribution of households in selected Sub-Locations and quotas allocated  
(Total no. in Sub-Location/43,663 x 200)  
Division Location Sub-Location Households Allocation 
By Location By Sub-Location 
Kalama  
 
Kalama Kiitini 1,419  6 
Kola Katanga 1,643  8 
Lumbwa Muumandu 2,820  13 





































Sub-total 10,798 49 49 







































Sub-total 6,582 30 30 









 Katangi Mekilingi 1,047  5 
 Kinyaata Makutano 1,067  5 









 Kyua Syokisinga 930  4 












Sub-total 20,400 94 94 
Total 40 43,662 200 200 
Source: Machakos District Office 2011 
 
Having allocated each Sub-Location its quota of households, the purposive sampling method was used 
to select the households for participation and as had been planned, the selection criterion was first of 
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all;  households in which members and in particular, the respondent had continuously lived in the 
village from 1999 through to 2006. Secondly, households rated by the community and opinion leaders 
as most vulnerable in terms of limitations in the means for livelihood relative to the rest of the 
community.  It turned out the households identified around the Sub-Locations were those in which the 
breadwinner was deceased (households headed by widows; minors or grandparents) and/or households 
with disabled members who required considerable care which meant less time for the carers to pursue 
livelihood activities.  
 
With respect to other categories of subjects, the purposive method of sampling was used and only those 
who were involved during and after the 1999-2001 drought; were selected. It was established that four 
NGOs that had been involved in drought relief operations stayed behind working with communities in 
the implementation post-drought recovery through to development activities to increase the latter’s 
resilience against the impact of future droughts. Another two NGOs had been involved in livestock 
interventions during and after the drought making a total of six NGOs in this category of sample; for 
confidentiality purposes their names are not revealed in the text; all the same, they are available on 
request. For the donor community, four donor governments that had funded their home NGOs were 
identified and purposively selected while amongst the multilateral donors, only UNICEF was selected 
by virtue of the fact that the agency had directly funded interventions during both the relief and 
recovery phases whereas the other donor in this category had funded only the relief phase operations 
and not the post-drought interventions. For the corporate donor category, it turned out that no corporate 
donor had funded interventions during the relief or recovery phases; all the same, a well established 
MNC in Kenya with a long history of partnerships with NGO through both international and country 
level agreements was selected simply for the purpose of comparing how this category of donors 
manage their relationships with NGOs relative to government donors. Finally, with respect to the host 
government; with a decentralised system of local government in which every government ministry at 
the central level was represented at the District level under the leadership of the District 
Commissioner; it was felt unnecessary to include government ministries at the central level in the 
sample besides; it was felt that the information sought would be better gathered from the said 
ministries in loco; at the District level. The forth category of sample was thus made up of government 
ministry representatives at the District level. At a later stage after the interviews had taken place, the 
offices of these functionaries were to prove very useful in the cross-validating of their records with 




the government, UN agencies and NGOs are members; the primary records were readily available in 
the District Office archives. 
 
5.4.3 The instrument 
The study sought to go “beyond mere fact and surface appearances” especially given that in 2004, the 
facts and surface appearances suggested that the post drought recovery through to development 
interventions implemented by NGOs between the years 2001 and 2004 had enhanced community 
resilience against drought in six out of thirteen Districts in the Eastern Province including Machakos. 
As is evident from Chapter 1however, such a phenomenon was but only a surface appearance. 
According to Kvale (1996:189-190); through an interview the researcher can gather information on the 
experiences of the subjects as articulated from their own reality. It is for this reason that the structured 
interview was selected as the instrument of choice with all categories of subject; to “dig” for 
information beyond the surface, on what had contributed to the regression in the resilience of 
communities against drought. To this effect, a questionnaire was developed to guide the researcher to 
elicit the information she required and to capture it real time as the respondents articulated their views 
on the various dimensions of the enquiry.  
 
At the community level, in addition to interviews at the household level, focus group discussions were 
also used. According to Krueger (1988: 18), a focus group discussion is a carefully planned discussion 
designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening 
environment. On a non-threatening environment, Kumar (1987: 7) shares these views adding that an 
advantage of focus group discussions is that participants discuss ideas, issues, insights, and experiences 
among themselves in an atmosphere in which each participant is free to comment, criticize and/or 
elaborate on the views expressed by previous speakers. The size of the group varies however; 
according to Kahan (2001: 130) the number of people typically used in focus group discussions is 
usually small; from six to fifteen people with the discussion lasting about one and a half to two hours.  
The convening of group discussions was to prove most useful and in particular, in terms of cross-
validating information whereby participants either corrected accounts of and/or elaborated on the views 
expressed by previous speakers thereby enriching the quality of the information provided.  
 
On the advice of the Assistant Chiefs, every household that had participated in the study had to be 
included in the focus group discussions and the explanation given was that; that was how the 
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community affairs were run in the Sub-Locations adding that community members were more 
comfortable with such arrangements. They further informed the researcher that there was a system in 
place where Assistant Chiefs routinely convened a monthly baraza (consultative or information 
dissemination meeting) in their respective Sub-Locations. In addition, an Assistant Chief could 
convene an extra-ordinary baraza whenever there was an issue necessitating such a meeting and 
depending on the nature and/or scope of the issue (affecting the whole Sub-Location or only specific 
groups), such extra-ordinary barazas could involve the whole Sub-Location or participation could be 
limited to the affected group(s). In the context of the study, Assistant Chiefs used the monthly baraza 
to sensitise communities of the pending study as soon as authority to conduct the study was granted. 
During the meetings, they explained the purpose of the study and the rationale behind the fact that 
some households would be participating while others would not. The dissemination of information on 
the study, Assistant Chiefs explained; was important especially given the nature of the study and the 
possibility of raising expectations of assistance. Nearer the time of the start of the study, Assistant 
Chiefs convened extra-ordinary barazas of the households which would be participating to explain 
what would be involved in the study and to discuss and agree on the scheduling of interviews with 
individual households.  
 
With respect to focus group discussions, Assistant Chiefs explained that it would be a recipe for 
divisions within the communities if some members from households that had participated in the 
interviews were selected and not others; besides, those attending might not express their views freely 
for “lack of a mandate” to speak on behalf of those excluded. The advice was heeded however, given 
that the distribution of households was uneven; in some Sub-Locations, households spontaneously 
became a group while in others, groups were constituted by clustering households across Sub-Location 












 Table 5.10: Focus groups constituted 
Division Location Sub-Location Households Participants Group 
Kalama  
 
Kalama Kiitini 6 14 1 
Kola Katanga 8 
Lumbwa Muumandu 13 13 2 






































    


















































 Katangi Mekilingi 5  
14 
 
9  Kinyaata Makutano 5 
 Kyua Syokisinga 4 
















 Matuu Kaluluini 6 
Matuu 16 16 12 





Total 200 13 
Source: Field work 2011 
 
Focus group discussions had also been planned for the NGO subject group however; it was not 
possible to convene them for the simple reason that none of them were willing to participate in such 
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discussions. The researcher concluded that this was one manifestation of the alleged competition that 
characterises the NGO market pace in the 21st century!   
At the host government level and given that vested political interests and/or perceptions of possible 
positive outcomes in terms of an increase in the level of development aid, exaggerated accounts of the 
plight of the people was considered a possibility. Against this background, in addition to structured 
interviews, cross validation assumed a quantitative dimension involving desk research on documented 
evidence of food security stress and related indicators as captured in updates issued during the period 
under review, by the KFSSG in which the government, UN agencies and NGOs are members. To this 
effect, harvest levels relative to seasons during which the rainfall pattern was normal; fluctuations in 
commodity prices, local market trends and the performance of the local small enterprise sector were 
examined. In the sphere of health, records pertaining to food stress related indicators; malnutrition 
levels and the prevalence of anaemia in expectant mothers; incidence of “light-for-dates new born 
babies and prevalence of the protein deficiency syndrome (quashiokor) in children under the age of 
five (“under-fives”) were examined. Given that school enrolment and attendance rates are a secondary 
indicator of food insecurity, records maintained in the office of the District Education Officer were also 
examined. Finally, economic trends and in particular the medium of exchange and general price levels 
of commodities were also examined. 
 
5.4.4 Pre-testing the instrument 
Having identified the main sample for the study, the next step was to identify the sample for pre-testing 
the instrument; a sample of ten households or 5 percent of the sample size for the study (two hundred 
households) was considered adequate for the purpose. In this respect, a combination of sampling 
methods were used; the systematic sampling method was used to select the Sub-Locations from which 
to draw the sample by selecting every nth Sub-Location at regular intervals calculated to arrive at a 
total of ten Sub-Locations. This was followed by use of the purposive sampling method to identify the 
sampling frame in each selected Sub Location; the sampling frame at this level was made up of those 
households in the category “most vulnerable” as classified by the community leadership and opinion 
leaders but not selected for the study. Sequel to identifying the sampling frame, the random sampling 





5.5 Organisation of field work and access to subjects  
The researcher coordinated the field work throughout the study and the first step was to recruit three 
research assistants; the second step was to seek the permission of the District authorities to carry out 
the study. This involved a meeting with the District Commissioner followed by a formal request in 
writing supported by letter from the researcher’s employer; proof of registration with UNISA and a 
supporting letter from the Kenya Red Cross. Permission was duly granted; in addition, the researcher 
sought and secured permission to have an audience with the District Management Group (DMG) at the 
end of one of their regular monthly meetings; the group is chaired by the District Commissioner with 
government line ministry representatives; District Development Officers (Division Administrators), 
Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs as members. During the meeting, the researcher introduced herself to the 
group and briefed the members on the study and how she planned to conduct it; following the meeting 
with the DMG, the researcher developed a work plan; it was the tool (Table 5.11) that guided the field 
work. 
 
Table 5.11: Work-plan for field work 
Date Activity Responsible 
Nov. 2010 Research assistants recruited Team Leader 
Nov. 2010 Introduction to District Commissioner’s Office and submission of 
request to conduct study. 
 
Permission to conduct study secured; 




Dec. 2010 Meeting with DMG 
 
1st Planning meeting with research assistants; draft of work-plan 
developed and; 
 
 Shared with the DMG. 
District Commissioner 
 




Jan. 2011 Feedback on draft work-plan by DMG; work-plan approved.   
 
Pre-field work meeting with research assistance: division of labour 
agreed. 
Research team 
Feb-Apr. 2011 Field work Research team 
April 2011 Post-field work meeting: review of  general impressions on the 
exercise; 
Identification of possible problems with questionnaires to flag to the 
data capture consultant. 
 
Research team 
May/June 2011 Data capture  Consultant 
Aug.-Sept 2011 Data analysis and report writing  Researcher 
Oct.-Nov 2011 Revisiting and editing complete text Researcher 
Source: Researcher 
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5.6 Data collection techniques and procedures 
Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources; primary data was collected through 
structured interviews from four sources namely, communities, NGOs, the donor community and the 
Government of Kenya (Office of the District Commissioner, Machakos District). According to Dillon, 
Madden & Firtle (1994: 125), a standardised guideline in which specific questions are asked in a set 
order and manner ensures that  no variation occurs between interviews besides, the researcher gains a 
great deal of information from a relatively small number of interviews. In a situation in which the 40 
Sub-Locations selected for the study represented a combined total of over forty thousand households 
between them and one could get “a great deal” of information from relatively small number of 
interviews; it was for this reason the structured interview was used on the sample of two hundred 
households at the community level. The questionnaire was the tool used as a guide during the 
interviews for the purpose of gathering information with all categories of respondents; at the 
community level, the tool had been pre-tested on a smaller sample as elaborated earlier; it had been 
found to be appropriate and adequate for use on the main sample.  
 
The questionnaire used in conducting interviews at the household level was divided into four sections 
namely; the profile of the respondents; their experience during the 1999/2001 drought; their experience 
of the assistance provided by the government and NGOs between the period 2001and 2006 and their 
experience during the 2006 drought. For the NGOs, the questionnaire was divided into five sections 
namely, the profile of the NGO; organisation of work at the field level; the relationship between the 
NGO and the host government; communities and donors. Altogether, six NGOs purposively selected 
participated in the study by virtue of the fact that they worked with communities in Machakos District 
during the drought in 1999-2001 and stayed on to implement post drought interventions for varying 
periods after the drought. The persons designated to meet with the researcher were all at an appropriate 
level; Programme Coordinator or equivalent. For the host government, the questionnaire was divided 
into three sections namely, the criteria for licensing an NGO to operate in the District; working 
relationship with NGOs and return on investment considerations. Finally, the questionnaire for the 
donors was divided into four sections namely, internal administration profile of the donor; partnerships 
considerations; working relationships with NGOs and return on investment considerations. 
 
At the community level, a schedule on interviews in each Sub-Location had been discussed and agreed 




order not to inconvenience respondents; the interviews took place within the confines of the subjects’ 
homesteads.  Such an arrangement was also designed to exploit the “principle of familiarity” to create 
a comfortable and non-threatening environment thereby rendering respondents better able to recall 
events. The principle was also exploited in the division of labour whereby research assistants whose 
primary role was to mobilise and prepare the sample households for the interviews and focus group 
discussions were allocated the Division which they were most familiar with. The smallest Division 
(Kalama) was allocated to the team leader and the rationale for this arrangement was that first of all, 
she would be conducting the interviews with all the categories of primary sources of data. Secondly 
and from an administration perspective, the researcher would be playing the dual role of researcher and 
coordinator of the field work simultaneously. In order to be able to play this dual role effectively; the 
field work was organised such that there was a gap of one week between Divisions so that the 
researcher would be available to supervise the preparatory work of the research assistants were doing 
in the next target Division.  
 
With respect to focus group discussions, a prerequisite for success in focus group discussions amongst 
other considerations according to Wiersma (2000:251) is that members of the group must exhibit a 
high degree of homogeneity with respect to either background; behaviour or both; members of the 
group must also have a deep knowledge of the topic under discussion. It will be recalled from Chapter 
1 that Sub-Locations were often characterised by close proximity with only a dirt road; stream or some 
other insignificant landmarks for borders; notwithstanding the fact that some focus groups were formed 
by clustering Sub-Locations; their close proximity guaranteed a fair degree of homogeneity. 
Furthermore, with seven of the groups having more than the maximum of fifteen people recommended 
by Kahan &  Krueger (1994: 17) and endorsing of the use in some instances, of “mini-focus groups” of 
three or four participants; the approach used with groups with more than fifteen participants was 
modified. Such a modification involved starting with a plenary for on average half an hour during 
which common themes were identified and clustered into three to four major categories. The group 
would then be divided into mini-groups of three or four people with special interest, knowledge and/or 
experience in the particular theme; such “group work” was allocated forty five minutes for discussion 




The mini-group concept turned out to be very interesting because in four of the seven groups in which 
it was applied, while individuals were at liberty to choose to participate in a mini group of their choice, 
some did not get the chance to make such a choice for they were unanimously “volunteered” to 
participate in certain thematic mini groups. The researcher later learnt that the individuals so 
“volunteered” were known to be passionate and were perceived to be more knowledgeable and/or more 
experienced in the subject for discussion. This confirmed the sentiments expressed by a respondent in 
Kalama during the interviews where when asked why five elderly people had been chosen as 
supervisors in a government-supported project; his response was that the advice given by the mzee’s 
(old men) on terracing the hills was more useful than that given by “...those little boys and girls from 
the DC’s office...”! In addition; based on their perceived leadership qualities, others were nominated to 
chair the mini-groups. Finally and in order to exploit the principle of familiarity yet again; in cases 
where the group was made up of households representing one Sub-Location, the discussions were 
convened at the site at which the monthly barazas normally take place. In cases where the group 
consisted of households clustered across Sub-Locations, discussions took place at the site at which 
Location events normally took place while for groups clustered across Locations, the participants were 
asked to identify the venue of the discussions; their wishes were respected.  
 
5.7 Data capture and analysis 
According to Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 26) researchers need to be able to organize, manage, and 
retrieve the most meaningful bits of data; in capturing data from interviews conducted at the household 
level and in an effort to “organize” and “manage” the data, the raw data from the questionnaires was 
uploaded into SPSS to facilitate the segmenting and coding of the data into meaningful information. 
Thus for example, for closed questions, a “Yes” was coded as 1; a “No” as 2 and “Not applicable” as 3; 
however, in the event that some questions were not answered because they were either inapplicable or 
the respondent did not have an opinion, use was made of both absolute and relative frequencies on 
closed questions in order not to distort the information. With respect to open ended questions; taking 
cognizance of individuals’ differences in perception as well as the possibility of the existence of 
"multiple realities"; responses were aggregated into preliminary categories of which the criteria for 
establishing a category was simply the frequency with which the same view and/or opinion appeared in 
the responses. The responses were subsequently grouped under four themes namely, the food security 




2001-2006 and the food security situation in 2006. The grouping of responses into these four themes 
was designed to prove or disprove the hypothesis. 
 
With respect to focus group discussions, the “constant comparison analysis” method was used. This 
method according to Goetz and Le Compte (1981:58) combines inductive category coding which 
involves coding by frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in raw data and simultaneous 
comparison of all social incidents observed. According to Dey (1993:96), internally, categories must be 
meaningful in relation to the data as understood in context and externally, in relation to the data as 
understood through comparison.  In a situation in which there were no less than thirteen groups which 
were spread across four Divisions, the constant comparison analysis method was considered the most 
ideal not least, because of necessity; data would be collected internally in context at the same time as it 
had to be collated with data gathered from sources “external” to each group in order to draw general 
conclusions on the views and opinions of the subjects. With respect to questionnaires administered to 
NGOs; donors and the government of Kenya, the method for data analysis was the same as that used to 
analyse data from questionnaires administered to households; in the main, coding of closed questions. 
For open ended questions, yet again, responses were aggregated into preliminary categories of 
recurring responses following which they were grouped under themes applicable to each category of 
respondents. 
 
According to  Cooper & Weekes (1983: 50) univariate analysis is the simplest form of quantitative 
statistical analysis which describes a single variable and its attributes of the applicable unit of analysis; 
thus for example, if school attrition rates during a given period are the unit of analysis, the researcher 
captures and analyses the captured data with a view to establishing what proportion of the school 
population dropped out of school during the period. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that it was 
argued that the seeming reduction in the vulnerability of communities against drought in Machakos in 
2004 was not sustainable for while in relative terms, the percentage of the District’s population 
vulnerable to drought in 1999-2001 was the same as in 2006; in real terms however, an even higher 
number of people were vulnerable to drought in 2006. Given that the argument was based on numbers, 
some quantitative statistical analysis was necessary to support the argument; to this effect, univariate 
analysis was used to establish the frequency distribution (relative and absolute) of the variables 
representing the impact of the drought (level of food insecurity, impact on school attendance etc) 
during the periods under study.  
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According to Harré & Madden (1975: 5) through regression analysis, the relationships between the 
various factors that govern real-life phenomena can be identified; the non-sustainability of the 
interventions suggests a cause-effect phenomenon. The second objective of the study was to examine 
and establish why in terms of community resilience to drought; the gains made between 2001 and 2004 
were reversed in 2006; to the extent that the degree of vulnerability to drought in communities reverted 
to the same level as it had been before the interventions of 2001-2004. It is for this reason that 
regression analysis was used; to examine the relationships between the various factors that might have 
resulted in the reversal of the gains in community resilience made between 2001 and 2004.  
 
5.8 Shortcomings and error 
Part of the questionnaire was designed according to the Likert scale or single response items; this 
presented problems in so far as first of all, that respondents would avoid being seen as exaggerating 
either way (yes or no) and thus would try to portray themselves in a more favourable light by taking 
the “middle ground”; could not be ruled out. When this happens, the results can be distorted in so far 
they will have both a central tendency and/or social desirability bias. This was the very rational for 




























DATA PRESENTATION AND FINDINGS 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The methods used to collect, capture and analyse the data were described in the previous chapter; this 
chapter presents the findings from the structured interviews and focus group discussion conducted in 
the course of the study.  
 
6.2 Profile of respondents at the community level 
6.2.1 Age considerations 
This was important to establish for being a historical study; recall on events was likely to be influenced 
by temporal considerations since the period under review was some twelve and five years back 
respectively. Besides, age considerations would influence the degree of recall on certain aspects of the 
experience thus for example, respondents who at the time were in school would recall the impact of the 
drought on schooling and school attendance better than that of respondents who were past the school 
going age. Similarly, recall of the impact of the drought on household food security by respondents 
who were adults by then, was likely to be better since at that point in time; it is likely that men in this 
category were already heading households while women were responsible for managing food security 
issues in the home. The age profile of the respondents is illustrated in Table 6.1 below: 
Table 6.1: Distribution of respondents by age group 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 





























 Source: Field research 2011 
 
As is evident from the above table, the majority of the respondents were over the age of 55 years; as 
such, during the periods under review, they were at the age which confers on an individual; 
responsibilities for the welfare of the family including food security. 
6.2.2 Gender considerations 
The division of labour in Kamba tradition in food security matters is such that if a man is the head of 
the household, his role is simply to provide while the role of the woman is to manage such matters. 
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This is the reason why gender considerations were regarded as important. The distribution of the 
subjects by gender is given in Table 6.2 below:  
Table 6.2: Distribution of respondents by gender 




















Source: Field research 2011 
 
The results supports the division of labour amongst the Kamba’s; the majority of respondents were 
women at 62%; this is further supported by the fact that even in households where both husband and 
wife were present during the interviews, the man insisted that the woman was the right person to talk 
to! 
 
6.3 Participation in community affairs 
The degree of influence one has in community affairs is a function of his/her status; status was thus 
important to establish since in such a position, an individual is regularly interacting with the 
community as such; he/she is better placed to make an informed appraisal of conditions within the 
community as a whole and at any given point in time. On the level of participation in community 
affairs and the capacity in which respondents participated; the results are presented in Table 6.3: 
 
Table 6.3: Participation in community affairs. 

















Source: Field research 2011 
  
As is evident from the above table, the majority of respondents actively participated in the affairs of 
their communities in various capacities. 
 
It was also important to establish in what capacity and to what extent a respondent participated in and 
made a contribution to the common good of the community. The rationale for seeking this information 
was to establish whether or not, the community spirit that once characterised African communities still 
existed or had been taken over by a move towards modernisation. In the event that such a spirit still 




interventions would be examined at a later stage. The capacity in which respondents participated in 
community affairs is illustrated in Table 6.4: 
 
Table 6.4: Distribution by position and contribution to community welfare 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Village Head 































Source: Field research 2011 
 
While only 4.0% of respondents held positions of authority, 73% were active in the affairs of their 
respective communities in more practical ways and in the main, serving as members of the 
communities’ own (volunteer) resource persons (CORPS). Amongst such ways were contributing to 
community welfare in kind mainly with their labour in community projects; digging wells; fencing off 
community gardens and cutting grass in the rainy season to prevent the breeding of mosquitoes 
amongst other contributions.  
 
6.4 Experience during the 1999-2001 drought  
The majority of respondents stated that the situation was grave with all social support systems 
paralysed and most of their animals dying or dead; children not going to school for lack of fees or 
because they were too weak to walk to school; food aid was not a matter of choice. 
 
6.4.1 Impact of the drought on household food security 
  The impact of the drought on household food security is illustrated in Table 6.5: 
 
Table 6.5: Food security situation at the household level 1999-2001 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Enough for at least one meal a day 
 






















Source: Field research 2011 
 
As is evident from the table above, the majority of the respondents indicated that they did not have 
enough food to make at least one meal a day. Those who indicated that they had enough food for at 
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least one meal a day were asked how they had managed to achieve such a status of food security in the 
face of a devastating drought. Table 6.6 illustrates the responses to the question 
 
Table 6.6: Stated reasons for not so severe food insecurity relative to other households  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Stocks from previous harvest 
 































Source: Field research 2011 
 
Those who indicated that they had money with which to buy food were supported through the family 
network; children and/or grandchildren in gainful employment in towns and/or cities. An interesting 
finding was that the 10 respondents who managed with stocks from the previous harvest were all in the 
over 55 years age bracket; they explained that in the past, the practice of keeping a reserve of food 
stocks was how people used to survive when crops failed. On responding to the question what this 
involved; of the two options presented, modern methods (e.g. freezing) or traditional, the response 
from all the subjects was that they used traditional methods which in the case of pulses involved 
drying; for vegetables, it involved part-boiling (blanching) and then drying while for dairy products 
(meat and fish) it involved salting and then drying. With respect to meat products, they continued with 
the traditional practice of slaughtering their animals when they were in poor health especially when it 
was apparent that they were going to succumb to the illness; they would subsequently preserve the 
meat using the methods described above. An interesting observation in this respect was that the 
distinguishing feature of homesteads of the elderly was the “infrastructure” in place for the purpose; 
elevated mud and pole drying racks and/or storage huts elevated on rocks which was explained in 
terms of preventing the stored food from getting damp from moisture from the ground and/or invasion 
by rodents. 
 
Finally under this section, respondents were asked how they had survived the drought. The response 
from all of them was that they had been assisted with food by NGOs. Fifteen respondents from 
households in which the head of the household was either a very old person or a very young minor 
stated that before the drought, they had been receiving food from the government. However, the food 




Government rations had stopped altogether when NGOs started distributing food and they had been 
informed that from then on, they would be on the NGO programme of assistance. For the NGO 
drought relief operations, the system in place at the District Office was that public authorities would 
allocate NGOs the areas in which they would operate. To this effect, four NGOs were allocated a 
Division each for food relief operations while two NGOs specializing in livestock were allocated 
Divisions in which animal health was said to be in urgent need of interventions. Thus, two of the 
Divisions had the benefit of the services of two NGOs; one for food assistance and the other for 
veterinary services.  
 
6.4.2  The impact of the drought on schooling in1999-2001 
In order to establish the impact of the drought on schooling, data collection was limited to the twenty 
respondents in the age bracket 20-30 years as they were at school going age in 1999-2001. On whether 
or not they were actually in school during the period, the results were as follows: 
 
Table 6.7: Distribution of school going respondents in 1999-2001 



















Source: Field research 2011 
 
The fourteen respondents who were in school during the period had however dropped out of school at 
various points in time during the period. This came as no surprise for selection for participation in the 
study was based on the degree of poverty and vulnerability of a household in any given Sub-Location. 
Table 6.8 illustrates the reasons given for dropping out of school.  
  
 Table 6.8: Reasons for dropping out of school 
Reason Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
School fees used to buy food 
 
To go for “food-for-work”  
 
Failed exams due to poor attendance; could 
































Source: Field research 2011 
 
The six who were not in school at the time had long dropped out for lack of school fees; all the same, 
they were also affected by the drought; three of them were engaged in the rearing of livestock as a 
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means of income. Under the harsh weather conditions; the animals either died or realising it would be a 
matter of time before they succumbed to the impact of the drought, they were forced to sell them at 
very low prices. This exacerbated their food insecurity situation in so far as on the one hand, they were 
forced to cheaply dispose of the only source of assets they had by converting them into cash with 
which to sustain themselves on the other hand; the returns were not enough to meet household food 
requirements until the next agricultural season. The other three respondents were engaged in informal 
trading as a means of income; their accounts were the same; “business” ground to a halt as the priority 
for many households was securing food; it was no time for non-necessities.  
 
6.5 The situation during the period 2001-2006    
This section of the questionnaire sought to establish the scope and nature of post-drought recovery 
through to development interventions and services implemented and/or provided by NGOs and the 
government in communities in the four selected Divisions in Machakos District and establish the extent 
to which these increased the resilience of communities against drought. It will be recalled that one of 
the criteria for selection into the sample was that one had to have lived in their village from 1999 
through to 2006. This was designed to facilitate a linear appraisal of the situation of communities 
during the period under review. 
 
6.5.1 Government support 2001-2006    
On the services provided by the government, the respondents (27 households) who stated that they 
were provided with services were all from the same Division, Kalama; this it turned out, was because 
due to limitations in resources, government support was provided under a system in which a cluster of 
Divisions would be provided with such support for a designated period on a rotational basis. Kalama 
Division happened to be in the cluster that was receiving government support at that moment in time. It 
was learnt that hitherto, the system was one of government trying to do everything and everywhere in 
the District; in a situation in which resources were limited, the result was that the services provided 
were spread thinly across the whole District and achieved little in terms of the impact of the support. It 
was for this reason that government had come up with a system of targeting a cluster of Divisions for a 
comprehensive programme of support in rotation while elsewhere, routine support would continue on a 
smaller scale.  The services provided by the government are listed below. 
•  Water infrastructural improvement. 
•  Agricultural extension services 




•  Livestock interventions 
On the question of who decided what activities would be implemented, how, where and when; the 
responses were as follows: 
 
 
Table 6.9: Decisions on activities  
 Government Community Joint decision 
Who decided what the activities would be?   √ - - 
Who decided how the activities would be implemented?  - - √ 
Who decided where the activities would be implemented? √ - - 
Who decided on when the activities would be implemented?  √ - - 
Who decided who would participate in the activities? √ - - 
 
Source: Field research 2011 
 
The respondent however explained that with respect to how the activities would be implemented, their 
participation in decision making was only in terms of their contribution; what manpower there was in 
the community and how they would organise themselves with respect to who would do what; 
otherwise decisions on the organisation of the actual work were made at the District Office. On how 
they had contributed to the government initiatives; the responses were as follows: 
 
Table 6.10: Contribution of the community to the government initiatives 























Source: Field research 2011 
 
As is evident from the above table, the majority of respondents in Kalama Division contributed to the 
assistance offered by the government with their labour; of the four respondents who indicated that they 
contributed with ideas; three were retired agricultural extension officers while one had from time to 
time, been employed as casual labourer in the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. Of those who 
contributed with their labour, five elderly respondents; one in each Sub-Location, were said to have 
been designated “supervisors” in environmental conservation by their respective communities. This 
was an interesting finding for when asked why these elderly people had been so designated; a 
respondent in one Sub-Location stated on conditions of anonymity; that the advice given by the mzee’s 
(old men) on terracing the hills was more useful than that given by “...those little boys and girls from 
the DC’s office...” In other Divisions and with respect to ongoing government interventions, the 
sentiments were not so overtly expressed but instead, “in brackets understood”! Communities clearly 
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had more faith in their own traditional methods than the modern ones espoused by agricultural 
extension officers. Below is an image of traditional land terracing in Machakos District. 
                      
 
     Figure 6.1: Land terracing in Machakos District 
 
Source: World Resources Institute 
 
On how long the services lasted, the response was that the services continued for nine months after the 
drought ended; it turned out the timing of the end of government assistance was by no accident, on the 
contrary, it was by design for this was the period which the comprehensive government programme of 
services targeting cluster of Divisions including Kalama Division; was scheduled to end anyway. This 
was the reason given by the government for terminating the services; however, as the government 
withdrew, it handed over the activities to NGOs which were implementing post drought interventions 
in Division. On whether or not the government activities had benefitted the community; respondents 
stated that they were happy that the government handed over the activities to NGOs for progress in the 
government programme had been very slow. Improvement of water infrastructure featured highly 
amongst the list of examples in which government was perceived as having failed to deliver in Kalama 
Division. In elaborating their views on how government had failed to deliver, they stated that in the 
twelve months the Division was on the government programme; only two out of a planned five 
boreholes; one each in the five Sub-Locations had been sunk but one had yet to be equipped with a 
pump. With respect to the digging of wells, out of a planned five, three had been dug however; yet 
again, one had yet to be fitted with the manual pump.  In a situation in which the government had 
handed over the activities to an NGO only nine months into the period under review, it was felt that 
there was no need to ask questions pertaining to whether the duration was considered enough and/or 




6.5.2    NGO support 2001-2006    
This part of the questionnaire sought to establish the post drought recovery through to development 
assistance provided by NGOs to increase community resilience during the period 2001- 2006 and thus 
enable them to better cope in the event of another drought in the future. To this effect, the study sought 
to establish the nature of the activities implemented by the NGOs and the modalities of 
implementation. Tables 6.11; 6.12 and 6.13 illustrate the responses to questions asked in this respect.  
 
Table 6.11: Activities implemented by NGOs by Division 
 Kalama Masinga Yathui Yatta 
NGOs 
Water infrastructural improvements 3 2 1 4 
Agricultural extension services Ongoing low key routine government interventions 
Environmental conservation education 3 2 1 4 
Livestock services 5 - 6 - 
Food preservation education 3 2 1 4 
Health and nutrition education 3 2 1 4 
Source: Field research 2011 
 
On the question of who decided what activities would be implemented, how, where and when; the 
responses were as follows: 
 
Table 6.12: Decisions on activities  
Division Kalama Masinga Yathui Yatta 
Who decided what the activities would be?   N N N N 
Who decided how the activities would be implemented?  N J N J 
Who decided where the activities would be implemented? N J N J 
Who decided on when the activities would be implemented? N N N N 
Who decided who would participate in the activities? N C N C 
 
Source: Field research 2011                Key: N – NGO; C – Community; J – Joint NGO/Community decision. 
 
 
As is evident from the above table, in all four Divisions, it was the NGOs which decided what 
activities would be implemented and when. On how and where the activities would be implemented, in 
Masinga and Yatta; these were joint NGO-community decisions while in Kalama and Yathui, the 
decisions were made by the NGOs. Finally with respect to who would participate in the activities, in 
Masinga and Yatta, the decision was made by the communities themselves while in Kalama and Yathui 
yet again, the decision was made by the NGOs. The differences in approach will be elaborated in the 




Table 6.13: Contribution communities to the NGO initiatives 
 Kalama Masinga Yathui Yatta 
Money  - √ - √ 
Materials  √ √ √ √ 
Labour √ √ √ √ 
Ideas - √ - √ 
Source: Field research 2011 
 
Yet again there were differences between Masinga and Yatta on the one hand and Kalama and Yathui on 
the other hand. Yet again, the explanations for these differences will become apparent under the section 
on NGOs.  
 
The duration of the activities by NGO in years according to the accounts of the respondents was as 
follows: 
 
















Source: Field research 2011 
 
On the adequacy of the duration of the interventions, all respondents indicated that the duration of 
water infrastructural improvements was adequate since the activities were completed ahead of schedule 
in all four Divisions; in Masinga and Yatta Divisions, the rest of the period was spent training water 
point attendants. Training on food preservation was completed on time in all four Divisions; in Kalama 
and Yathui however, this marked the end of the food preservation training programme. In Kalama and 
Yathui Divisions, the same situation prevailed with respect to health and nutrition activities; they 
ended when the NGOs left while for environmental conservation activities, the Divisions were back to 
the often unreliable government services. The situation was different in Masinga and Yatta Divisions 





Water infrastructure; Environmental conservation; Food preservation and 







Masinga 2 Water infrastructure; Environmental conservation; and Health and 
nutrition education. 
 









Water infrastructure; Environmental conservation; Food preservation and 







Yatta 4 Water infrastructure; Environmental conservation; and Health and 
nutrition education. 
 








where with respect to food preservation for example; as early as the beginning of the interventions, the 
NGOs left much of the activities to their local affiliates. With respect to health and nutrition education; 
one year into the activities; the two NGOs started “Training of Trainers” activities for volunteers of 
their local affiliates who in turn, went around training members of the CORPS as Community Health 
Workers (CHW). In addition, the NGOs supported  the formation of Community Health and Homecraft 
Clubs; a forum at which CHWs disseminated information on health, nutrition, home hygiene, running  
“Community Well Baby Clinics” (weighing  under fives and monitoring conformity to immunisation 
schedules) as well as engage the communities in other family welfare enhancing activities. Under these 
arrangements, interventions continued as ongoing community initiatives after formal interventions by 
the NGOs ended. With respect to environmental conservation, given that routine low key agricultural 
extension services would continue to be provided by the government, before they left, the NGOs 
sponsored volunteers of their local affiliates for training as Community Environmental Conservation 
Monitors (CECMs) by the government; in turn, CECMs trained CORPS members as Community 
Environmental Scouts (CES) and thereafter, the former supervised the work of the latter. Under these 
arrangements, the activities that the NGOs had been implementing continued as ongoing routine 






























Table 6.15: Adequacy of duration of interventions 
 Frequency % Valid % Cumulative % 


































































































































Source: Field research 2011 
 
In the two Divisions which benefitted from livestock interventions, the period was considered 
inadequate besides, the timing was considered inappropriate since many households had lost their 
livestock as such; the training on animal care ended up being mostly theoretical with no opportunity for 
hands-on experience. 
 
With respect to the benefits of the activities, communities in Masinga and Yatta stated that there were 
many benefits from bringing water closer to households so that women did not have to walk long 
distances to fetch water to being more knowledgeable about the causes and effects of disease as well as 
the effects of cutting down trees. In addition, they were very proud of the fact that whereas hitherto, 
CORPS were only involved in work of a manual nature (repairing roads; bridges; assisting the elderly 
in digging cropping and harvesting etc) after the interventions they were involved in many other things 
for example, as CHWs, CECMs and CES. In the two Divisions in which communities felt that the 
duration of the activities was not long enough (Kalama and Yathui), the respondents stated that the 




however, the benefits were short-lived as they stopped as soon as the NGOs left. On what would have 
been a reasonable period for the implementation of the activities; the responses in Kalama and Yathui 
pointed out that it was not so much in terms of temporary considerations but instead, in terms of being 
there long enough to ensure that communities would be able to continue with the activities on their 
own after the NGOs left. In emphasising this point, they went further to state that even if what it took 
to achieve such a level of self reliance was a mere three months, then it would have been adequate in 
their views. In Kalama and Yathui, livestock interventions were cited by the majority of the 57 
respondents as having had the least benefit; asked at what point during the implementation that they 
had realised that this activity was not having little benefit, the responses were as follows: 
 
Table 6.16: The point at which communities realised activities would not be beneficial 
 Frequency Percentage 
From the very beginning of the activities 
Half way through the activities 













Source: Field research 2011 
 
The respondents who indicated that they sensed this at outset were senior community opinion leaders 
and when asked what they did about it, the response was that they did nothing for they felt that if the 
views to this effect came from the community as a whole, they would carry more weight. For those 
who only realised this half way through the activities; they felt that it was too late to do anything about 
it and since the activities would be ending soon anyway; it was in the interests of the community to be 
“polite” and part with the NGO on good terms. The researcher made note of these sentiments and made 
a decision be probe that matter further during focus group discussions. On what could have been done 
differently in order to increase the benefits of activities in Kalama and Yathui; recurring responses are 
illustrated in Table 6.17: 
 
Table 6.17: What could have been done better to increase the benefits of activities 
 Frequency % 
To discuss the priorities in the light of the short duration of the activities.  
 
To give advice that was possible for communities to implement  
 


















Source: Field research 2011 
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The respondents who indicated that it would have been better to discuss the priorities in the light of 
the short duration of the activities were the same senior community opinion leaders who had earlier 
indicated that they could tell from the beginning that “...nothing would come of it...” It turned out that 
those who indicated that the advice had to be such that it that was possible for communities to 
implement came from households of lesser means relative to the others while the majority of those 
who cited greater involvement of the community in the implementation of the activities were in the 
age bracket 31-45 years.   
 
In a situation in which regardless of the duration of the activities, there were some benefits in all the 
respondent communities in the four Divisions, respondents were asked if the benefits had rendered 
them in a better position to cope with the drought of 2006; the responses were as follows: 
 
Table 6.18: Benefits of activities enabled us to cope with drought in 2006 
 Frequency Percentage 
Yes 
 



















Source: Field research 2011 
 
Respondents who indicated “to some extend” were all above the age of 55years; they explained their 
situation in terms of the fact that the availability of water meant that they no longer had to walk long 
distances to the nearest water point. The reason given by respondents who indicated that the activities 
did not benefit them fully was that in 2006, the situation of the majority of them was worse than in 
1999-2001 as illustrated in Table 6.19: 
 
Table 6.19: Household food security in 2006 
 Frequency % 
Better than in 1999-2001 
 
The same as in 199-2001 
 
























The majority of respondents who indicated that their situation was the same in 2006 as it had been in 
1999-2001 were in Masinga Division where the percentage increase in the number of people requiring 
food aid between the two periods remained the same at 51.0%.  
 
In response to the question in what way the situation had been worse; all the respondents who indicated 
that it had been worse cited harsh weather conditions which resulted in total crop failure at the same 
time as there was considerable loss of livestock; the only alternative means of livelihood they had.  
Finally, on being asked for any other comments, 55 respondents or 27.5% made comments in which 
they lamented the fact that government always waited for another drought to do something instead of 
doing in between droughts. 
 
6.6 Focus group discussions  
The focus group discussions were conducted using a questionnaire as a guide. The questionnaire was 
divided into five sections namely, the profile of the group; perceptions on the experience during the 
drought of 1999-2001; the nature, scope and impact of recovery through to development support 
provided the government and NGOs during the period 2001-2006 and on experience during the 
drought in 2006. As a point of departure, a quick scan of the gender balance of the composition of the 
groups was carried out; on average, the women to men ratio was 2:1; this  roughly matched the 
distribution of the sexes in the main sample. Many issues emerged from the group discussions however 
constant comparison analysis revealed eight recurring themes as illustrated in the Table 6.20 
 
Table 6.20: Recurring issues 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 




Poverty  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Food security   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Food aid √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Participation √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Empowerment √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Culture and traditions   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Education   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Infrastructure   √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Source: Field research 2011 
 




•   Poverty, education, infrastructure and food aid 
• Culture, tradition and food security  
•   Participation, empowerment and food security 
Reducing the themes to three worked out quite convenient for it will be recalled from the previous 
chapter that seven of the groups had more than the maximum of fifteen people recommended; in 
conducting discussions with such groups, the “mini-focus groups” constituted were assigned one of the 
four themes to discuss. 
 
6.6.1 Poverty, education, infrastructure, and food aid  
As is evident from the table above, infrastructure and education emerged as issues in Masinga; Yathui 
and Yatta Divisions understandably, these Divisions are relatively remote and typical of such remote 
areas; schools are few and far between meaning that children have to walk long distances to school. 
The groups were very vocal in their criticism of government for the lack of infrastructure and in 
particular schools and roads arguing that their poverty and increasing food insecurity can be traced to 
neglect by the government in these areas. The groups in these Divisions understood the problem the 
same way; lack of road networks meant that even in a good agricultural season, they had difficulties 
taking their produce to the market; as such, they did not make enough money from their labour to meet 
their daily needs including school fees. For lack of school fees, many children dropped out of school 
and with little education, their chances of getting jobs in the future were poor; the majority of these 
children joined the ranks of the jobless later in life. With no jobs, their only means of livelihood was 
tilling the land but then; with limited access to markets due to poor road networks, they made little 
money; with little or no money, they could afford not send their own children to school and the cycle 
of poverty continues. In the event of a drought, the situation was even worse for with little food to eat, 
the issue of school fees did not even arise, besides even if school was for free, on empty stomachs, the 
children could not walk the long distances to school; many failed the exams due to absenteeism. Many 
families could not afford keeping their children in school longer than necessary as such, when a child 
failed exams due to hunger-induced absenteeism and had to repeat a grade; that marked the end of 
schooling for most of the children thereby setting the stage for poverty in the next generation.  
 
In Yathui Division in which livestock interventions had been implemented by an NGO but in a 
situation in which most of the animals had either died or had been sold off; the communities lamented 




being aware that it was the government that decided what NGOs would do and where; there were 
sentiments of disappointment that government did not insist on NGOs coming with projects that would 
“...really make a difference...”. With respect to projects that would have a real difference, they cited the 
long promised construction of a grain depot from where Grain Marketing Board would collect their 
produce for the market as one that could have taken communities “...somewhere...”.  
 
6.6.2 Culture, tradition and food security  
The view that the food security situation in 199-2001 was so bad that receiving food aid was not a 
matter of choice was shared by many groups. It was acknowledged that some degree of food insecurity 
could be expected during drought episodes however, food aid was not the first line of defence for 
survival on charity is considered as humiliating amongst the Kambas. Participants were vocal in 
criticising government for inaction in preventive and mitigation measures and only intervening when 
“...people are on the knees...” adding that by the time government reacts, children have stopped going 
to school because they are too hungry to do so or for lack of school fees; animals are dying or dead 
and/or people are surviving on tree roots. In addition and in Kalama and Yathui in particular, 
government was criticised for being party to NGO interventions that did little to change the situation of 
the poor in so far as they alleged that by allowing NGOs to come in with ideas that were alien to 
communities, people were worse off than they were before the NGO came in. This they attributed to 
the fact that when NGOs came in with their own ideas on what was to be done and how; this they 
blamed the government which they alleged is always telling visiting foreign NGOs that we are 
“...poor...” One community opinion leader in a group in Kalama got a “standing ovation” when he 
angrily asserted, “...even poor as we are, we could still be spared of the humiliation of food aid... we 
are only poor in our pockets and not in our heads...if only these...”  
 
In this respect, sentiments pointing to disappointment with the fact that the methods advocated 
particularly in environmental conservation and food preservation were not workable were strong. The 
argument was that if anything, the methods were likely to make people poorer in so far as they would 
need to spend a disproportionate amount of their meagre earnings on the methods. The best approach 
in their view; would have been to listen to accounts of how communities coped in the past and identify 
where improvements on these cultural and traditional methods could be made so they can match the 
challenges of the day. This did not happen instead, NGOs brought “...pieces of paper...” which they 
said had come from the donor stating what was to be done and how; in Kalama Division, a community 
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leader attested to being privy to a “piece of paper ” from the donor on what the NGO had to do and 
how. A Village Head in one of the groups in Yathui attributed the increase in the number of people 
requiring food aid in 2006 to a combination of factors; the discouraging of traditional methods that 
worked and were affordable to communities and the fact that the activities did not go long enough for 
people to grasp the new methods. Similar sentiments were expressed in Kalama where an elderly 
female participant lamented that the NGO operating in the Division had discouraged traditional 
methods of food preservation as old fashioned and ineffective and instead, promoted modern methods 
involving the use of “...medicines...” which after the NGO left, she knew not of a single family which 
could afford them.  
 
In Masinga and Yatta, while communities were not better off in 2006 than they had been in 1999; they 
were not worse off either despite the fact that the rate of crop failure in their view was worse than in 
1999. This they attributed to the fact that the NGOs that had served them well in so far as they had not 
interfered with their traditional styles of living; this had been facilitated amongst other things by the 
fact that they worked in partnership with “...our people...”(local affiliates) who knew and understood 
what worked for communities or otherwise. With respect to food preservation for example, the NGOs 
had left this to their local affiliates to implement the activities using methods that communities had 
used for generations and which had been proved to work. They had done the same in respect of 
environmental conservation for in facilitating the training of volunteers of the local affiliates in modern 
methods, it was not so much a case of introducing new ways of doing things but instead; using the 
knowledge to enhance the effectiveness of traditional methods. Realising improvements in the 
effectiveness of traditional methods as enhanced by the training of the volunteers; communities had 
unleashed their zeal in engagement and commitment to the extent that they made modest financial 
contributions for transport and meal allowances for the volunteers.  
 
6.6.3 Participation, empowerment and food security 
On participation and empowerment, in Masinga and Yatta Divisions; NGOs were hailed for the 
manner in which with limited resources, they had engaged the communities in manner that would 
ensure activities would continue after they left. A shared view was that in some activities for example, 
food preservation; they had left it to their local affiliates to engage communities with their role limited 
to training trainers amongst the volunteers of the affiliates. The volunteer trainers happened to be the 




CORPS to a higher level of skills and knowledge. In addition, they had encouraged and supported the 
formation of Community Health and Homecraft Clubs coordinated by the trainers to ensure that 
activities would continue in a coordinated manner. Furthermore, the work the NGOs were doing was 
appreciated by public authorities to the extent that Assistant Chiefs put a system into place whereby 
time was allocated at the end of the monthly baraza for people to participate in their chosen clubs of 
which in Health clubs, Maternal and Child Health (MCH) and Environmental Conservation were most 
popular.  In the Health clubs, home hygiene and nutrition were the main focus of activities while in 
Homecraft clubs; the focus was on food preservation. In Environmental Conservation clubs, land and 
water management were main activities. Even more appreciated was the fact that to the best extent 
possible, the NGOs had encouraged and promoted the use of locally available resources (knowledge, 
indigenous technology, materials etc.) In Masinga in particular, a shared view was that; that, people 
needed food aid in 2006 was the result of the severity of the drought for they gave many examples of 
an increase in the capacity of communities to cope with threats and hazards in their environment. In 
particular, they cited a decrease in malnutrition amongst children and the elderly and an increase in the 
number of children whose immunisation regimen was up to date. This they attributed to the fact that 
equipped with a higher level of knowledge and skills, their CORPS were doing a good job in 
monitoring the health of under-fives. These assertions were later confirmed during desk research of 
records kept in the office of the District Medical Officer and cross validated against country reports 
produced by UNICEF during the period. 
 
Groups in Kalama and Yathui attributed the poor outcomes of NGO interventions to lack of 
meaningful participation in decision making on the nature, scope and organisation of activities. Such 
lack of meaningful participation was implied in the views on culture and traditions in so far as the view 
that NGOS came with “ready-made” projects was strong. To this effect and first of all, they cited the 
livestock interventions which they argued; by the time the NGOs came in towards the end of 1999 
advising communities to sell off some of their livestock, the herds had already been depleted as a result 
of the drought anyway.  At the same time; the few animals left were in such a state of poor health that 
they did not generate enough income to see them through to the next agricultural season; they cited the 
market prices of livestock in 2000; for a cow, a decrease in price from (Kenya Shilling) KES 1,200 to 
KES750; a goat from KES600 to KES350 and a chicken from KES 450 to KES275 on average. A 
vocal opinion leader in Kalama had the group in tears with laughter when he emotionally asserted that 
“...talk about destocking when the animals are either dying; dead or have been sold off at give away 
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prices is like Tololwa (Kenya’s popular Mathare United Football Club striker) shooting one of his 
magical goals from an off-side position...”!  In addition, views that with the size of the herd so depleted 
after the drought in 2001; livestock interventions were not a priority were strong; groups in Yathui 
lamented that the level of resources spent on the activities had not been used to address more pressing 
needs. Of such needs, the long promised government Grain Marketing Board collection warehouses at 
Location level were cited yet again.  
 
Secondly and in other interventions, activities had been implemented in a disjointed manner and in 
Kalama for example, participants cited a situation in which the health education team completed its 
work before the water team came in. As such, the lessons on home hygiene were given in the “...air...” 
in so far as talking about hand washing but without the water with which to practice proper hand 
washing was to no avail. They dismissed as excuses, the reason given by the NGO that it had received 
the money for health education before the funding for other interventions and had to observe the 
timeline set by the donor as such, it could not wait until the money for sinking boreholes and digging 
wells was received. Finally, expressions of disappointment were strong against arrangements in which 
the NGOs “...brought their own people...” to implement the activities. They argued that; that the health 
education workshops took place before the water interventions would have not mattered had the NGO 
used human resources available within the communities for the CORPS would have continued with the 
work after the boreholes were sunk and/or the wells were dug. It turned out that by the time the water 
projects were completed; having completed their work, the health education teams had all left. They 
attributed the fact that even more people needed food aid in 2006 to the poor outcomes of the recovery 
through to development interventions and citing in particular, lack of participation and poor 
prioritisation.  
 
6.7   Interviews with NGOs 
6.7.1 Profile of NGOs 
With respect to the duration of their presence in Kenya, four NGOs started operating in Kenya in 
response to the drought of 1999-2001 while respectively, two had had a presence of eight and five 
years  prior to the drought. With respect to their mission statements, the following common themes 
were explicitly stated or implied: poverty reduction; capacity building; and sustainable development. 
Their activities covered the whole range of activities which characterise humanitarian organisations 




6.7.2 Decision making on field activities 
For all six NGOs; some decisions on what field activities, when and where they will be implemented 
were made centrally at the headquarters while others were made at the field level. On the criterion on 
the level at which decisions were made; the response from all of them was that decisions on activities 
funded by institutional donors were all taken at the central headquarters for the simple reason that this 
was the level at which  partnership agreements were negotiated and signed. In turn, the reason why 
partnerships were negotiated and signed centrally was because donors were increasingly providing 
funding under restricted projects arrangements which involve the donor sending out a call for bids for 
specified activities in a specified country or countries and NGOs compete for the funds. The 
implications of such arrangements is that NGOs submitting a bid against such a call are therefore 
effectively committing themselves to restrict the activities and location to what the donor has already 
decided as specified in the call for proposals. Under the circumstances, field offices have no say in the 
matter except to implement the activities in accordance with the project specifications. In addition to 
restrictions on what activities and where they will be implemented, it was not uncommon for 
institutional donors to specify the timeline of project cycles (when it starts and finishes); staffing 
and/or procurement modalities.  
 
Funds can also be availed through an appeal in which case, NGOs indicate what they want to do, where 
and when and it is up to the donor to decide whether to fund the activities or not. Appeals offer NGOs 
more flexibility but then, this mode of funding is increasingly becoming less attractive to donors. 
Finally, field offices occasionally made the decision on activities but normally, only in situations in 
which the activities are funded through the NGO’s own resources  mobilised from private donors; 
foundations, individuals and/or the organisation’s own public fundraising events. 
 
6.7.3 Organisation of work at the field level 
This section sought to establish how the NGOs organised the implementation of their activities and in 
response to staffing issues; the responses are illustrated in Table 6.21 below: 
 
Table 6.21: Staffing 
NGO 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Directly implement activities with salaried staff     √ √ 
Community contributes in kind (labour) √ √ √ √   
Sometimes the community does all the work and NGO only supervises  √  √   
  Source: Field research 2011 
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The two NGOs that indicated that they used salaried staff in all their activities were those specialising 
in livestock; the explanation given was that this was highly technical work which required people with 
specialised training. The four which indicated that communities made contributions in kind explained 
that involvement and contributions by the communities was enshrined in their “Rules of Engagement” 
with communities in the field. The two which indicated that sometimes the community does all the 
work and they only supervise were involved in low technology and low cost community social 
mobilisation interventions.  
 
On staff costs in relation the average annual budget over the past ten years; the responses were as 
follows: 
Table 6.22: Personnel costs as a proportion of the budget 
NGO ˂10%  11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 
1   √   
2  √    
3   √   
4  √    
5    √  
6    √  
Source: Field research 2011 
NGOs 2 and 4 had the lowest personnel costs; they attributed this to their approach in which to the best 
extent possible, maximum use was made of locally available resources; people, materials, knowledge 
and indigenous technology. NGO 5 and 6 had the highest personnel costs, a factor attributed to the fact 
that their work was highly specialised and required skill sets which were not readily available in poor 
communities. NGOs 1 and 3 attributed their level of their personnel costs to the fact that they used 
local people hired under temporary contract arrangements in which one had to have a stipulated 
minimum level of education and/or professional qualifications.   
The study also sought to establish who decided the permissible percentage of personnel costs relative 
to the budget in any given programme/project. The response was the same across all six NGOs; in 
restricted projects, donors stated the threshold for personnel costs as a percentage of the budget 
(usually not more than 30%); in unrestricted projects, this was negotiated with the donor. On whether a 
threshold of a maximum of 30% was a reasonable level, NGOs 5 and 6 indicated that it was not 
reasonable explaining that sometimes, specialised expertise had to be sourced from outside the country 
of operation; from the region or even abroad; this made personnel costs a significant cost centre in the 




that such thresholds are necessary in some cases; he declined to elaborate all the same, the researcher 
guessed that this was to do with criticism by the likes of Abdul-Raheem (2000) as alluded to earlier, of 
NGOs as self serving. NGOs 1 and 3 had no position save to make comments which the researcher 
interpreted to mean that it was the donor’ s prerogative to dictate what will be done with the funds. 
 
On post drought interventions implemented in 2001-2006, accounts of interventions and their duration 
given by the six NGOs in their respective allocated Divisions matched the accounts given at the 
community level as illustrated earlier in Table 6.14.  
  
Table 6.23: Adequacy of duration of interventions 
NGO 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Water infrastructural improvements Yes Yes Yes Yes n/a n/a 
Environmental conservation education No Yes No Yes n/a n/a 
Food preservation education Yes Yes No Yes n/a n/a 
Health and nutrition education No Yes No Yes n/a n/a 
Livestock interventions n/a n/a n/a n/a No No 
Source: Field research 2011 
 
As is evident from the above table; the time allocated to improvements in water infrastructure was 
considered adequate by all four NGOs involved in this sector. With respect to environmental 
conservation, two NGOs indicated that the duration was not adequate; the explanation given on why 
they had not continued with activities for a longer period, they both cited the fact that the duration had 
been stipulated in the agreement with donors adding that the level of funds availed was such that the 
activities could only cover the stipulated period. The same explanation was given for food preservation 
activities by one NGO; in Kalama however, the view of the NGO that the duration was adequate 
differed from that of the communities. In the main, this was due to the fact that the NGO saw the 
duration of the activities only in terms of completion of the planned number of training workshops 
whereas the communities saw it in terms of a period long enough for them to grasp the new methods 
that the NGO was promoting. On health and nutrition education, two NGOs stated that the duration 
was not adequate; the same sentiments were expressed by the two NGOs involved in livestock 
interventions; they both stated that the duration of the interventions was inadequate. For all of them, it 
was the same situation; the duration of the activities was a function of the period for which funding 
was availed and not necessarily the needs on the ground. 
 
For the two NGOs that indicated that the duration of all the intervention was adequate, the explanation 
given was that first of all they were working in partnership with their local affiliates and the volunteers 
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of the local affiliates were members of the same communities being assisted; as such, continuation of 
the interventions was guaranteed. Secondly, realising that donor funding was not guaranteed forever, 
they had designed the projects such that to the best extent possible, maximum use was made of 
resources available within the communities themselves; people, local knowledge, materials, indigenous 
technology and sometimes money. With respect to money and as communities began to recover from 
the drought, each household was asked to make a modest monetary contribution of between 
KES100.00– 150.00 (or then an equivalent $1.30-2.00) a month depending on their means. The money 
was pooled and used to pay modest stipends for water point attendants and/or transport allowances for 
CORPS; CHWs; CECMs and CESs to attend quarterly District coordination meetings in Machakos 
Town; this kept the cadres abreast of the latest developments in their respective areas of involvement 
as well as enhance their knowledge and skills. 
 
Finally, those NGOs that were forced to prematurely close the projects were asked what the 
government’s reaction was to this development; the response was the same; government expressed 
regret that they had to leave before the communities were at a stage that they could look after 
themselves all the same, their assistance during and after the drought was appreciated. 
  
6.7.4   NGO relationships with host government 
 
On at what point in time the NGO started working in the District relative to the 1999-2001 drought, the 
responses were as follows:   
  
Table 6.24: NGO presence 
NGO Presence prior to 1999 Presence established during  drought 
1  √ 
2 √  
3  √ 
4 √  
5  √ 
6  √ 
Source: Field research 2011 
 
NGOs 2 and 4 had had a presence in the District before the drought while the rest had established a 
presence in response to the drought. On whose decisions it was where they would work in the District; 
the office of the District Commissioner stated that for the four relatively new NGOs; it was their 
decision. Understandably, the system in place was that the registration of NGOs was decentralised to 
the District level with central government only keeping records of who is involved where; such 




whether or not the NGOs were comfortable with their allocated Divisions, the two livestock NGOs 
stated that at the outset they were however when they learnt through the monthly DSG meetings at a 
later stage that overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster, District authorities had simply used an 
allocation system based on the principle, “equitable geographical distribution” to allocate Divisions to 
NGOs; they were not very happy. The system involved simply making sure that all Divisions had a 
comparable number of agencies providing assistance and did not necessarily take into account the 
nature or the degree of the needs. They cited three Divisions in which the livestock situation was more 
desperate that in their allocated Divisions however, the three Divisions already had an “adequate” 
number of NGOs hence they ended up in Kalama and Yathui where the livestock situation was not as 
desperate as in the other three. Asked what they did about it; the response was that they accepted the 
situation for first of all; by the time they made the discovery, they had already established themselves 
in the allocated Divisions, it was too late to negotiate. Secondly, for fear of upsetting the very authority 
that had granted them the space to do something about the situation of the victims of the drought and 
on the advice of their headquarters abroad; they decided to accept the situation. 
 
The other two relatively new NGOs addressing human needs stated that with the situation so bad 
across the whole District, it mattered little to them, where they made their own contribution while the 
two NGOs that had been working in the District prior to the drought stated that being membership 
organisations, they had always had a presence across the entire District through their local affiliates. To 
this effect, when they announced that they would be implementing drought relief interventions, District 
authorities had given them the option of deciding in which of the Divisions they would make their 
contribution. As such, these two NGOs “allocated” themselves the Divisions in which they 
implemented their relief operations and by extension, post drought interventions. The decision on their 
selected Divisions they explained; was based on information gathered through DSG meetings on the 
severity of the drought. A secondary consideration was the strength of their local Branches on the 
ground for enshrined in their respective organisational philosophy was a belief that it is better to 
intervene in settings where interventions can have the greatest impact rather than spread oneself thin on 
the ground.  
 
On whether or not the process of getting the NGO registered was made easy by the host government; 
those NGOs that established a presence in the District in response to the drought stated that the 
registration process was easy; a factor they attributed to the fact that the situation was so desperate that 
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public authorities welcomed any assistance offered by NGOs. Public authorities had gone further to 
facilitate the entry of the NGOs by writing supporting letters to expedite processes relating to the 
issuing of work permits for expatriate staff by the Department of Immigration as well as to get 
imported equipment and materials for use in the relief operations cleared by Kenya Revenue Authority 
(Customs Department) amongst other facilitating interventions. At the time that the two NGOs that had 
a presence prior to the drought started working with their national affiliates in Machakos District, they 
did not have to go through the formal registration process. The explanation given for this was that as 
the affiliating bodies of their national affiliates which were already registered; all they were required to 
do was to submit the credentials of the affiliating organisation and append their signatures to an 
addendum in the terms of engagement originally signed between District authorities and their national 
affiliates.  
 
On the coordination of activities with public authorities, the DSG served as the forum for the purpose; 
the District Commissioner regularly convened and chaired monthly meetings of the group; the 
membership consisted of all government ministries represented at the District Office and relief and 
development partners operating in the District. At these meetings, government ministry representatives 
would give status reports on their respective sectors while NGOs would brief government on what they 
were doing within communities. The forum was considered very useful by all respondents in so far as 
it provided them with an insight into the situation in the whole District and presented an opportunity to 
share experiences; identify common challenges and share ideas on how to address the challenges. In 
addition, the forum also presented NGOs with an opportunity to get an insight into who was doing 
what and where in the District. The information was useful in so far as to the best extent possible, it 
facilitated the economic and effective use of available resources by amongst other things, the sharing 
of resources and in particular, those pertaining to logistics; communication facilities (radio base 
stations) and transport etc. for those working in adjacent Divisions. However, this was not always 
possible because first of all, some donors even specify how the logistics will be handled and as 
mentioned earlier, it is not uncommon for them to insist that procurement will be done from their home 
companies or the companies’ subsidiaries in the country of operation. Secondly and in such situations, 
making a financial contribution to services provided by a supplier in arrangements in which another 
NGO is the primary client but which the supplier is not one that is specified in the terms of engagement 






It is apparent that in DSG meetings, information and reports were voluntarily shared between the 
government and NGOs with instant feedback given to the latter. In addition, all six NGOs indicated 
that there was no requirement by the government for them to declare their sources of funding; the level 
thereof and/or how they used the funds. All the same, in their reports to the DSG; the NGOs 
voluntarily included summaries of income and expenditures. Sharing of financial information also 
served the purpose of making the government aware of the stage of the projects; as such and at any 
given point in time, the authorities had an indication on when activities would end. 
 
On visits to the project sites by the government, all six NGOs stated that the question of a “visit” did 
not arise as they worked with the government (as represented by the Assistant Chiefs) on a daily basis. 
All the same, whenever the Chief, District Development Officer or the District Commissioner was in 
the area; often, they would stop by a project site but more as a public relations exercise and for 
encouragement and moral support rather than to inspect the projects.  
 
On whether they had ever differed with the host government in opinions on the use of funds, the 
response from all respondents was that, that question did not arise for on community entry or the start 
of a new project, NGOs always shared the plans and budgets for the interventions and it was on the 
basis of such information that permission to engage communities and/or start a new project was 
granted. The two NGOs that had had a long presence in the District further stated that whenever they 
had unrestricted funds; the needs were already known as such, it was matter of informing public 
authorities that they are now in a position to address the needs.  
 
Finally, in general; NGOs enjoyed a mutually supportive and collaborative relationship with public 
authorities from the Sub-Location through to the District level; this made their work easy and fostered 
cooperation from the communities. 
 
6.7.5 NGO relationships with communities 
 
The accounts given by the four NGOs involved in people welfare on decision making with respect to 
the activities in the aftermath of the 1999-2001 drought matched the responses given at the household 
level as illustrated in Table 6.12; they all stated that they had made the decisions on what activities 
would be implemented and when explaining that this was because the funds mobilised were earmarked 
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for the specific activities with the timelines of the project cycles clearly stated. With respect to how and 
who would be involved in the implementation of activities in Kalama and Yathui, the reasons given for 
making the decisions was that this was enshrined in the partnership agreement with the donor. In 
Kalama, the development NGO explained that the implementation methods involved some “technical” 
dimensions necessitating a minimum level of basic education. To this effect and in health and nutrition 
education for example; the NGO stated that completion of secondary school was the minimum 
requirement with biology taken as subject of study considered “an added advantage”. On decisions on 
where the activities would be implemented; in Kalama and Yathui where decisions were made by the 
development NGOs, a number of reasons ranging from access to the communities and proximity to a 
health centre etc; the researcher concluded that the basis of the decisions was more for the NGOs’ 
convenience rather than needs considerations. This section did not involve the two NGOs involved in 
livestock for they had stated earlier that they were working though the entire Divisions allocated to 
them. Finally, when asked what the reaction of the communities was on the decisions taken by the 
NGOs on their behalf, the response was that the communities accepted the decisions. 
 
The accounts given by the NGOs on the contribution of communities mainly in the labour matched that 
given by the communities themselves as illustrated in Table 6.13 with communities in Masinga and 
Yatta going further to willingly make a modest contribution in money for the purpose of facilitating the 
work of their CORPS. On achievements, they all cited the availability of safe drinking water and the 
reduction in the distance women had to walk to fetch water thus creating time for them to carry out 
other household chores. In Masinga and Yatta where clubs were established, women in particular had 
benefitted from increased knowledge and skills in the management of health, nutrition and hygiene in 
the home while in Kalama and Yathui, immunisation rates children and vaccination of domestic 
animals were cited as major achievements.  
 
On the facilitating factors, they all cited the instant relief that the relief interventions brought to the 
communities as such and at the outset; there was a lot of excitement and enthusiasm about the projects; 
in Kalama and Yathui however, the NGOs had noticed a decline in the enthusiasm half way through 
the post drought interventions. Such a development they had attributed to the fact that communities 
were behaving this way because they were over the worst. In Masinga and Yatta as elaborated earlier, 
the enthusiasm was taken to even greater heights as the communities’ sense of security was taken to a 




skills. With respect to the constraints, the four NGOs who had worked in Kalama and Yathui cited the 
limited duration of the interventions which prevented them engaging communities long enough to 
make a difference.  
 
In Masinga and Yatta, communication with communities continued along the same lines as it had 
always done whereby the NGOs took advantage of monthly Sub-Location barazas to engage 
communities in formative evaluation of the activities and address any issues of concern to the 
respective parties. Borrowing a leaf from the NGOs working in Masinga and Yatta through 
information sharing at DSG meetings, the two NGOs which had been implementing livestock 
interventions in Kalama and Yathui also started attending monthly barazas in their respective 
Divisions. Their explanation for following suit was that implementing highly technical projects as they 
did, they realised that they would never have the opportunity to get to know the communities if they 
did not take advantage of these community gatherings to interact with the communities. In addition, 
this presented the opportunity to jointly evaluate progress; listen to, raise and discuss issues of mutual 
concern and jointly work out solutions. The two NGOs working through project teams in Kalama and 
Yathui stated that in their view, it was not necessary to meet with whole communities since the 
community leadership and project teams participated in the monthly project review meetings which 
they convened; as such, they were of the view that communities were adequately represented by these 
two categories.  
 
On the impact of the drought in 2006, the four NGOs involved in people welfare stated that the 2006 
drought had been worse in so far as there was an increase in the number of people requiring food aid 
relative to 1999-2001. However, the two NGOs that had been operating in Masinga and Yatta qualified 
their statements by pointing out that relative to the rate of crop failure; the percentage increase in the 
number of people requiring food aid at zero and 2 percent respectively pointed to an increase in 
community resilience against drought. Such an increase in resilience they attributed to the fact that the 
communities had assumed responsibility for continuing with mitigation activities after formal 
interventions ended albeit; on a small scale. The four NGOs that had been operating in Kalama and 
Yathui attributed the situation in these two Divisions to the fact that as a result of limitations in donor 




6.7.6   NGO relationships with donors 
The NGOs were asked to provide information on their regular donors over the past ten years or more 
and indicate what categories of activities they funded. The results are illustrated in Table 6.25. 
 
Table 6.25: Categories of donors and activities funded 
NGO Donor Activities Funded 
























Source: Field research 2011 
 
As is evident from the above table, with the exception of one for which one of the regular donors was 
the private sector, in the main, the major donors  for the other NGOs were governments; their own or 
through the European Commission. 
  
With respect to relief interventions, donor governments were said to be more flexible in so far as in its 
appeal, an NGO would state what it intended to do however, a common trend was one of donors 
selecting what they would fund from the presented “menu” of interventions. They also stated that it 
was often difficult to secure funding for post disaster recovery through to development interventions 
and if funding for this category of activities was availed, it was often for a maximum of two years. In 
the event that funding was availed for more than two years; it was rarely for the same projects but 
instead, a completely new cycle of funding for different activities.  
 
On the attributes of funding for development in terms of restrictions or flexibility in the use thereof; all 
six NGOs stated that in the past ten years, it had become increasingly difficult to secure funding 
through an appeal for development interventions designed, developed and for implementation in 
countries identified by NGOs. Instead, the trend was one of calls for proposals for funding for 
restricted projects in the donor’s priority countries and it was up to the NGO to decide whether the 
country and/or activities fitted with their own priority countries and/or activities.  Furthermore, it was 
not uncommon for a donor to provide funding for a relief operation in a country which is not amongst 




country; what this meant was that the NGO would have to close its operations at the end of the relief 
phase.  
 
The same situation prevailed with the European Commission whereby in honouring the contributing 
member states’ instructions with respect to the disbursement of development assistance through non-
state actors; the Commission would state what the funds were for and where they could be spent. For 
the NGO which had a substantial portion of its income coming from the private sector; it stated that the 
system of priority countries was also practiced; the criterion was often countries in which the company 
had operations or countries in which it had in interest in establishing a presence.  
 
On the position of the organisation with respect to the earmarking of funding, they all stated that in 
principle they were opposed to the practice adding that if funding was availed for countries which in 
their view, needs were not the greatest, they would decline the invitation to submit a proposal. At the 
same time however, they all stated in the past ten years, they had accepted earmarked funding for 
activities that were not exactly the burning priority in a particular country at that particular point in 
time. They defended decisions to go against their own position in terms of “getting a foot in” and then 
using the country presence as a launching pad for advocating for more pressing needs; they cited 
situations in which the strategy had worked.  On whether there had been an occasion in which turning 
down the offer of earmarked funding had compromised the chances of securing funding in the future; 
the NGO for which the private sector was a major donor stated that this had happened on a number of 
occasions adding that such a position by the NGO had resulted in it being “...blacklisted...” At a later 
stage however, relations with the corporate resumed; this was interesting because the resumption of 
relations according to the respondent was prompted by an imminent image crisis for the company! 
 
On the level at which decisions are made on the various dimensions of project management, the results 








Table 6.26: Decision making in project management issues 
NGO 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dimension Locus of decisions       
Project design Donor decides       
NGO decides √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Joint decision       
Implementation 
method 
Donor decides √   √ √ √ 
NGO decides   √    
Joint decision  √  √   
Frequency of 
reporting 
Quarterly   √    
Half yearly √ √  √ √ √ 
Yearly       
Format of reporting Donor’s format √    √ √ 
NGO’s format   √    
Agreed with donor  √  √   
Other dimensions        
        
Source: Field research 2011 
 
As is evident from the above table, all the NGOs stated that they made the decisions on project design; 
in restricted projects however, they stated that the design was often influenced by cues from the donor 
adding that if a proposal against a call is going to appeal to the donor, one of necessity must design it 
along what the donor has in mind. On how the projects would be implemented; three NGOs that stated 
that it was the donor however, this was never explicitly stated; instead, it was implied in the budget 
lines of the various cost centres. One NGO gave an example in which under the cost centre 
“procurement”, a budget line made reference to a “...provision for the pre-shipment inspection of the 
goods by the xxx...” (the donor government’s own export pre-shipment inspection agency); “in brackets 
understood”, the goods were to be sourced from the donor government’s country. Another NGO gave a 
similar example in respect of personnel in which a provision for “...housing for three expatriate Project 
Manager, Accountant and Coordinator...” appeared in the budget and by implication, the NGO had to 
fill in these three position with expatriate staff regardless of whether or not, such skills were readily 
available locally. For two NGOs; how the activities would be implemented was a decision jointly taken 
with the donor; it was only the NGO which is funded by the private sector that stated that it made the 
decisions itself.   
 
On the frequency of reporting, it appears that government and related institutional donors were 
satisfied with two reports a year however, the NGO whose main sources of funding was the private 
sector indicated that it had to submit reports on a quarterly basis; this the respondent explained, was 
because the donor wanted the reports to be aligned to its business reporting calendar. On the reporting 




while two stated that they had negotiated for a reporting format agreeable to both themselves and the 
donor. The differences were interesting for first of all, an examination of the NGOs revealed that the 
two NGOs which successfully negotiated for a format agreeable to both had been in existence for much 
longer; they were larger in terms of geographical coverage around the globe and their activities 
covered a wide range of sectors. In contrast, those which went along with reporting formats of the 
donor had not been in existence as long as the two cited above; they were smaller in terms of 
geographical coverage and the scope of their work was narrower. 
 
On whether or not they were comfortable with the arrangements on decision-making; they all stated 
that in general, they had no problems with the arrangements. However, with respect to how the 
activities would be implemented and in particular staffing  and procurement arrangements, the four 
NGOs that stated that the donors make the decisions lamented that such arrangements often 
compromised their efficiency in so far as in some instances, they could have easily recruited people 
with the same if not a higher level of skills and experience and sourced project materials locally or 
regionally at a much lower cost and by implication, more resources into the target communities. With 
respect to reporting requirements, the four NGOs which strictly adhered to donor requirements had no 
opinion and the researcher concluded that for fear of severing their own “umbilical cord” they went 
along with such decisions anyway, but under duress. 
 
On communication with donors in terms of a forum in which to discuss progress and/or differences of 
opinion on the management of projects; four NGOs stated that such a forum existed, however, it was 
their headquarters staff which attended the meetings and they would be briefed on the outcomes of the 
discussions. However, in the views of the respondents, since little had changed in the general terms of 
engagement, it was assumed that donors ignored many of the concerns which from time to time are 
raised during such forums by the NGOs’ headquarters. The situation of the other two NGOs was 
different for they had put into place a system in which depending on the issues, field personnel were 
from time to time invited to form part of the NGO delegation at such forums. In addition, involvement 
of field staff was not restricted to operations in which there were cooperation problems; often field 
staff from operations in which the partnership was working well, were invited to showcase success 
stories and explore ways of strengthening the partnership for even better results in terms of the impact 
of interventions. Furthermore, and in order to get donors to get an insight into project management 
issues directly from field practitioners themselves, during internal annual programme review meetings 
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convened by their respective headquarters; donors were invited to have the opportunity to interact with 
field staff on the day designated for “Views from the Field”. They attributed the relatively incident-free 
nature of their relationship with donors to such a system of communication with their donors. 
 
On donors visiting projects, they all stated that his happened occasionally at the invitation of either 
party; it was common practice for example, to invite the Ambassador or his representative to 
commission a newly constructed water point, opening a health centre etc. funded by his government; 
during the ceremony the donor government representative would be briefed on and be taken on a tour 
of the project and any others in the area. The same situation prevailed with multilateral institutions like 
the European Commission in which the resident representative was often invited to commission a 
project; in addition, if an executive from the donor institution was visiting the country, the resident 
representative would request a site visit; these arrangements suited all six NGOs. For the private sector; 
given that the funds were usually disbursed through local subsidiaries; it was easy and the NGO often 
to got local representatives to visit project sites from time to time.  
 
On whether there were clearly identifiable behavioural patterns that distinguished government, 
multilateral and corporate donors the NGOs had engaged with over the years; the response was a 
strong “yes” from all six NGOs. With respect to the approach to funding agreements; scheduling of 
activities and the modalities of implementation and reporting schedules, the five NGOs whose main 
donors were governments or their multilateral institutions rated the latter as less rigid compared to 
government. The one NGO funded mainly by the private sector enjoyed the greatest latitude and was 
of the view that their funders were interested only in results and not “control” adding that, that was the 
very reason why in fundraising, it targeted the private sector and foundations for it did not want to be 
treated like a “...government department...and all those controls...”! 
 
6.8   Interviews with host Government 
Interviews with the host government were held at the District level for first of all, because government 
ministries relevant to the subject of study were represented at this level; secondly, it turned out while 
there was a central policy on the registration and management of NGOs, the implementation of the 
policy was decentralised to the District level. The respondent was the Senior District Development 
Officer or the de facto Deputy District Commissioner with ministry representatives in attendance to 




6.8.1    Background to NGO presence in Machakos District 
  
The respondent first gave an overview of central government policy on the registration and 
management of NGOs; the policy had provisions pertaining to the conditions for registration; the 
conditions that must be met for an NGO to be admitted into a District and the framework for 
engagement with communities at the District level. The process for the registration of foreign NGOs at 
the central level involved clearance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; verification of the NGOs 
credentials by the “parent” Ministry for example, health NGOs by the Ministry of Health; agro-forestry 
NGOs by the Ministry of Agriculture etc. then finally, to the Ministry of Local Government, Planning 
and Development from where they would be referred to the District of their choice or a District is 
recommended to them. Having completed these stages, the NGO would head for the District where the 
District authorities would register the NGO and issue the licence to operate.  
 
On whether the District authorities had ever turned down an application for registration by an NGO 
which had successfully undergone the clearance at the central level, the response was “yes”. This he 
explained; was in the case of a faith-based NGO whose profile on the surface was one of the ideal 
typical humanitarian organisation committed to improving the conditions of the poor. However, during 
the interview with the District Management Committee, by its own admission, the NGO had clearly 
stated that a secondary motive was recruiting members into its religious doctrine. Such a revelation 
sealed the fate of the NGO for memories of an experience in neighbouring Kitui District two years 
earlier were still fresh. The faith-based NGO had been registered by the Kitui District authorities on the 
understanding that its agenda was solely development assistance to the communities however; it had 
been discovered barely six months into its operations that it was using conversion into its religious 
doctrine as a pre-condition for receiving development assistance. 
 
The account given by the District authorities on how the six NGOs had established a presence in the 
District; their motivations for establishing a presence; the Divisions in which they worked during and 
after the drought of 1999-2001 and the interventions they were involved in matched the information 
provided by both communities and NGOs. On whether or not they had lived up to their stated 
motivation for wanting to work with communities in Machakos District; he stated that they had done a 
sterling job during the relief phase. However, he pointed out that in post-drought phase, interventions 
in Kalama and Yathui had not had the expected outcomes adding that this can be traced to the fact that 
they did not engage communities long enough to have any impact. 
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6.8.2 Working relationships between public authorities and NGOs 
 
On who decided in what Divisions of the District individual NGOs will be involved, the response was 
that such decisions were made by the District Management Committee; he explained that the rationale 
for this arrangement was that as custodian of the welfare of the people, government knew best what the 
needs were and where unfilled gaps existed. Furthermore and in response to whether or not NGOs 
readily accept the decisions; he emphasised that the matter was not for debate adding that NGOs were 
at liberty to accept or reject the Division allocated to them. In the event that they did not accept the 
allocated Division, they were equally at liberty to consider a District elsewhere to offer and provide 
their assistance. With respect to preferred operations/programmes, the respondent stated that 
development interventions which empowered and imparted skills to communities were preferred for 
the simple reason that “...prevention was better than cure...” He lamented the level of resources spent 
on the drought relief operation in the District during the period 1999-2001 adding that a small 
percentage of that amount invested in development would have yielded higher returns in terms of 
longer term food self sufficiency.  
 
With respect to the appropriateness of activities implemented in the post drought phase relative to 
needs within communities at the time; the response was that they were all appropriate only some of 
them only “...scratched the surface...” as such, they did not result in empowering communities to a 
level where they could take full charge of their future. In this respect, he cited the example of the 
livestock interventions in which all the project staff were brought in from outside and lamented the fact 
that first of all the activities did not continue for long enough secondly, even if they had, given that the 
communities were not involved at all in the implementation; there was no-one in the communities to 
carry on with the work after the NGOs left. He qualified the view “not long enough” by stating that it 
was not so much about timelines in terms months or years instead; it was about implementing the 
activities long enough to empower communities  to a level where they could continue to implement the 
activities with minimum external interventions. Finally, on what the government’s reaction was when 
the NGOs announced that they would be winding up their operations, the response was that there was 
nothing the government could do especially in a situation in which the duration of the activities was a 
function of the provisions in the partnership agreements the NGOs had signed with the donors.  
 
Accounts given by NGOs on coordination mechanism in the form of monthly DSG meetings at which 




host government respondent. He further pointed out that in the event that an NGO could not attend a 
coordination meeting due to the exigencies of service; they had the benefit of minutes of the meetings 
which were circulated to all partners. This according to the respondent; was important to ensure that all 
partners had the same information at any given point in time.  
 
The reason given for government not requiring NGOs to declare their sources of funding; how much 
they had available and/or how they used the funds was that NGOs voluntarily shared such information 
in their reports to the DSG as such there was no need to demand any more information in this respect.  
Closely related to this dimension; there was no system in place for scheduled and formal visits to 
project sites by the government as the government as represented by the Assistant Chiefs was on site 
all the time. However, whenever on a field trip to a Division, the District Commissioner always tried to 
make the time to stop by the site to encourage and motivate NGOs and not so much to inspect the 
projects. 
 
On whether District authorities ever received complaints from communities about NGO conduct, the 
response was that at some point during the post drought interventions, District authorities had received 
such complaints. The complaints were in respect of the fact that the NGO had been “head hunting” and 
recruiting members of project committees without consulting them on who they preferred to be 
included in such committees. The same situation prevailed with respect to staff; the NGO was 
recruiting project staff from outside the communities and even the Division; the communities were not 
happy about such arrangements and would have preferred the project staff from within the 
communities. The authorities took up the matter with the NGO but then the NGO argued that enshrined 
in the project document was the minimum qualifications for the various positions and if such 
incumbents could not be identified within the communities and/or Division, it looked elsewhere. The 
NGO further argued that the District authorities had a copy of the project document in which the 
modalities of implementation were elaborated! The respondent lamented the oversight on this 
important dimension of the modalities of implementation adding that they had to explain to the 
communities that that is how the NGO’s donor wanted to see the project implemented. Finally, 
notwithstanding what the respondent referred to as “...little hiccups every now and then...” in general, 
the working relationship between the District authorities and NGOs was good and mutually supportive. 
To this effect, NGOs religiously honoured their commitments and conformed to the operational rules 
of engagement while public authorities did their best to facilitate their work as they were valued as 
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partners in the development of the District. The authorities had never had a case in which they had to 
ask an NGO to leave the District for misconduct. 
 
6.8.3  “Return on Investment” 
 
On “return on investment”, the researcher sought to establish public authorities’ views on the benefits 
deriving from NGO interventions during the period 2001-2006. Improvements in the water sector 
featured high; altogether sixteen boreholes were sunk and twenty four wells were dug in the four 
Divisions. In addition, the respondent stated that there was also increasing awareness on how 
communities could contribute to environmental conservation and at the initiative of the communities 
themselves; in Masinga and Yatta Divisions, it became an offence punishable with a “heavy fine” to 
cut down a tree without authorisation from the Assistant Chief. Food preservation interventions 
implemented had resulted in improvements in household food security in some communities especially 
in Masinga and Yatta Divisions.  
 
Improvements in food security were evident in so far as relative to 1999-201; in Masinga, the 
percentage increase in the number of people requiring food aid remained constant at 51%; in Yatta, the 
increase was 2% and he attributed this to the fact that when Katangi Division was carved out of Yatta 
Division in 2000; people were given the option of voluntary relocation. It turned out those who chose 
to relocate were relatively young families while for a variety of reasons ranging from lack of the 
energy to make the move; heritage of the land spanning many generations and/or sentimental/cultural 
considerations (late spouse and/or children’s graves on the property), the majority of those who chose 
to stay on were elderly people. Thus, the population in what was left of Yatta Division after the 
creation of Katangi Division was generally of less means relative to the economically productive age 
groups which opted for the voluntary relocation; by implication; they were amongst the most 
vulnerable to environmental and related socio-economic shocks. In Kalama and Yathui, he attributed 
the increase in the number of people requiring food aid to the fact that post drought interventions had 
not been successful due to restrictions on the duration of the interventions. All the same, with respect 
to animal health, there had been notable improvements in so far as the two Divisions attained a 75% 
vaccination rate for domestic animals. However, since the NGOs left after only one year, the services 
had discontinued and unless a household could afford the vaccines in which case government 






On whether the benefits had rendered communities better able to cope with the drought of 2006, the 
respondent stated that they had; especially in Masinga and Yatta where increasing awareness by 
communities about the importance on environmental conservation was evident in the fact that at the 
communities own initiative; it became a punishable offence to cut down a tree without authorisation 
from the Assistant Chief. He was of the view that the reason why the benefits were not so evident in 
Kalama and Yathui was a result of the fact that the manner in which the NGOs implemented their 
interventions was simply not sustainable. He explained the non-sustainability of the interventions in 
Kalama and Yathui in terms of the approaches used by the NGOs which in his view, did not build on 
existing knowledge or the use of locally available resources adding that communities can never sustain 
activities in which the implementation methods are alien. Besides; he continued, there is the question 
of affordability; “...how can you possibly expect the communities to continue with the activities that 
they cannot afford after you are gone...” he asked in a frustrated tone.  
 
On District authorities’ expectations of the outcomes of the assistance delivered by NGOs, he quipped, 
“...half a dose of medicine is more dangerous than no dose at all...” adding that if interventions are not 
sustainable, communities may be much better without the assistance in the first place. Finally, the 
respondent was asked what action the District authorities take when it is apparent that the approach that 
an NGO is using in the implementation of activities is not sustainable. The response was that back then 
in 2001, District authorities were still in a state of shock from the impact of the drought and accepted 
any form of assistance that was on offer. Following the lessons learnt from the experience of the 2006 
drought, District authorities had since developed a District Development “Charter” spelling out how 
community development will be conducted. The charter was shared with partners old and new alike 
and for new ones, subscribing to the charter is a pre-condition for licensing. In the event that an NGO 
is uncomfortable with the provisions of the charter, they were asked to go and renegotiate the terms of 
engagement with their donors. On one or two occasions, an NGO had invited District authorities to be 
part of the delegation to the negotiation table with the local representative of the donor and after 
authorities explained the rationale behind the charter, the donor made some concessions and relaxed 
some of the provisions in the partnership agreement with the NGO. In the event that either the NGO or 





6.9   Interviews with donor representatives 
Based on the information given by the NGOs, three categories of donors were identified; government; 
institutional and the private sector. For the private sector, it was not possible to identify a 
representative of the NGO’s donors in Kenya however one multinational corporation with a well 
established presence in Kenya and which is a well known NGO “donor” at the international as well and 
the local level accepted to give an interview. The findings of necessity would be treated with caution 
since the particular corporate donor did not fund any activities during the period under review all the 
same, it was felt that an interview with the corporate would give the researcher some insight into how 
this sector works with NGOs especially given that it had years of experience in funding NGOs at both 
the international and local level.  
 
6.9.1   Internal administration profile of the donor 
For four of the NGOs, their governments had been their regular donors in the past ten years; these 
governments had foreign missions in Kenya and they agreed to give interviews; they were 
subsequently assigned a number corresponding to the numbers assigned to their home NGOs for ease 
of reference as follows; G1; G2; G5 and G6. In all cases, the respondent was a representative of the 
government’s development cooperation agency or a member of the mission so designated; as such, 
they were well versed in the position of their government on development partnerships with NGOs. 
The institutional donor had a well established office in Kenya with a desk specifically designated for 
partnerships with NGOs. The same situation prevailed with the private sector concern whereby within 
the CSR Department, there was a well established NGO Liaison desk. 
 
First and foremost, the researcher sought to establish whether the donors had preferences in the 
categories of programmes/operations they funded; the results are illustrated in Table 6.27 
 
Table 6.27: Donor preference in funding programmes/operations 
Category G1 G2 G5 G6 I C 
Development      √ 
Relief       
Both √  √ √ √  
Advocacy √ √ √ √ √  
Other 
       





Government and the institutional donors indicated that their funding preference was for both relief and 
development programmes; this they explained in terms of the fact nation states had a global social 
responsibility to respond to disasters at the same time, development interventions were one way of 
reducing the vulnerability of people to the impact of disasters. They also all stated that they supported 
advocacy activities because in some recipient countries, poverty was the result of poor policies and/or 
neglect of sections of society. For the corporate donor, the preference was exclusively development 
programmes; the respondent explained that company CSR policy was such that emergency and disaster 
situations are best left to those with the comparative advantage of knowledge, skills and experience. As 
for advocacy, the response was that this was outside their mandate.   
 
On how funding was availed to NGOs, the responses are elaborated in Table 6.28 
Table 6.28: Modalities of availing development funding 
 G1 G4 G5 G6 I C 
Unsolicited offers √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Respond to appeals √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Calls for proposals √ √ √ √ √  
Source: Field research 2011 
 
Both government and the institutional donors’ explanation for unsolicited offers was that governments 
always factored into their annual budgets, a provision for engaging non state actors in development 
work. They also stated that such unsolicited funds were disbursed in arrangements in which they would 
send out a call for proposals against which NGOs would submit bids; such arrangements were ideal for 
it ensured that only those NGOs for which the specified activities were their mandate and/or were 
interested in, would submit proposals. Another very interesting reason given by a government 
respondent was that in the event of a likelihood of closing the year with a large positive balance of 
funds earmarked for engagement with non-state actors, a call for project proposals would be sent out to 
the NGO community so that the funds can be exhausted. They however admitted that such 
arrangements created problems for NGOs for the project cycle was often extremely short since the 
activities had to be implemented, completed and reported on before the end of the running financial 
year. In addition to the problem of short project cycles, the funds would be strictly earmarked to fit the 
purpose for which they were allocated in the first place. For the corporate; the respondent stated that 
unsolicited offers were sometimes made in response to results of market research pointing to a need to 
increase disposable income in the market. He cited the example of a project in which in partnership 
with an NGO, the corporate built a shed for the informal sector so that artisans could continue work 
even when it was raining.  
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With respect to response to appeals, government and the institutional donors indicated that their NGO 
partners are not always successful and the main reason given was that they can only respond positively 
if the proposals are for interventions for which there is an allocation of funding in the budget in any 
given financial year. The corporate indicated that given that such appeals are normally launched in 
response to emerging societal concerns and which concerns might be having an impact on the 
robustness of the market; NGOs are usually successful in securing funding through appeals. 
Furthermore, this was the preferred arrangement for the corporate for often, this led to market 
intelligence which the company was unaware of hitherto; besides, since by the time NGOs appealed for 
support, the needs are already identified and the project is already designed, the company was spared 
of the tedious ground and paper work. 
 
6.9.2 Partnership considerations  
 
On the criteria the agency/company used in selecting NGOs for awarding grants or contracts, the 
results were as elaborated in Table 6.29.  
 
Table 6.29: Criteria for selecting NGO partners 
Criteria G1 G4 G5 G6 I C 
Home registered NGOs   √ √ √ √   
NGOs registered in a member state of a regional economic 
block  
    √  
International NGO alliances √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Any “tried and tested” local NGO      √ 
Other criteria 
       
Source: Field research 2011 
 
As is evident from above, government donors primarily engaged their own home NGOs as well as 
international NGO alliances of which their home NGOs were members; the same was the case with the 
institutional donor; the preference was international NGOs and/or alliances even though an emerging 
trend was increasing engagement of local NGOs particularly in advocacy interventions.  In certain 
situations however, a donor government funded the activities of a local NGO but only through a home 
NGO or international alliance; thus for example, DFID could fund the Kenya Red Cross activities but 
only through the British Red Cross; Action Aid Kenya activities through Action Aid International etc. 
The practice with the corporate donor was engaging with local NGOs directly understandably, funds 
were usually availed through local subsidiaries. At the same time however, at the global level, the 




arrangements, it is up to the alliance to decide which of the members would be allocated the funds for 
use in their respective countries.  
 
For government and the institutional donor, the criteria and decisions on the selection of NGO partners 
were made centrally at headquarters abroad. For the corporate donor, decisions on the criteria for 
selection were made centrally at the headquarters in the case of global cooperation agreements, while 
in the case of cooperation agreements with national NGOs, decisions were decentralised to the country.  
 
On the factors which determined the level of funding for a given programme/project; the response was 
the same with all categories of donors namely, record of performance and accountability. In addition, 
they all stated that on initial engagement, they started “small” increasing the amount as the NGO 
proved beyond any reasonable doubt that it was a partner that could be trusted to deliver and to account 
for the funds. On earmarking of funds, the donor government representatives stated that increasingly, 
funding for NGO interventions was earmarked for the simple reason that decisions on what the funds 
could be used for was part of the overall national development cooperation and aid budget architecture. 
As such, they were only conduits for transferring funds whose purpose was voted for at the 
parliamentary level. For the institutional donor, the nature of funding, earmarked or otherwise, was 
determined by the instructions from the back donor providing the funds, a government or a regional 
bank. 
 
It was put to the respondents that they were the donor-NGO partnership interface; as such, they were 
privy to the real issues and needs on the ground as articulated by NGOs; with such information at hand, 
was there any scope for them to influence aid allocation decisions. The response was that they tried to 
influence decisions however, the government’s and/or regional block members states’ priorities were 
the ultimate determinant of budgetary allocation decisions. For the corporate donor, allocation 
decisions were a function of the profit margin in any given year and as for earmarking, this was not the 
practice for the simple reason that NGOs acted as their market and community welfare intelligence 
agents; as such, they were better informed on the needs within communities and the issue of 
earmarking funds simply did not arise. 
 
On the question on whether or not there was a stipulated threshold above which an NGO partner 
cannot incur expenditures on core costs (personnel administration etc.) the government and 
institutional donors stated that they had. They went on to explain that the position of their government 
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and/or regional block  member states was that the bulk of the finds availed to NGOs must be used on 
the beneficiaries and not to create jobs or to increase NGO staff salaries and benefits. On how NGOs 
react to such arrangements, the response was that they did not like it; one government donor 
respondent and the respondent for the institutional donor were sympathetic to NGOs and admitted that 
this was not fair especially given “...what we demand of them in terms of reporting...” The corporate 
donor respondent stated that as long as an NGO partner could justify the percentage of the budget 
going towards core costs and it was “...delivering...” the company was flexible on such matters. 
 
6.9.3 Working relationships with NGOs 
All the categories of donors stated that there was an annual forum in which they met with the NGO 
partners to discuss issues of mutual interest however, government donor respondents stated that in the 
main, such interaction was with the NGO headquarters staff. They lamented that sane for a few NGO 
partners, field operatives never attended these meetings adding that their accounts from the lived 
experience would go a long way towards strengthening their case for flexibility in decisions on 
allocation of funds. The institutional donor respondent stated that hitherto, the agency was also meeting 
with NGO headquarters staff however, borrowing a leaf from a partner that from time to time brought 
along its field staff to the meetings, they had started encouraging other NGOs to do likewise. The 
corporate donor also had a forum in which the company met with partners at least once a year and 
given that partnerships were at the local level, there was always a good representation of field staff at 
these meetings; the company found the forums very useful in terms of getting a good insight into some 
the challenges the partners faced in the course of implementing the activities. 
 
The government and institutional donor respondents all stated that in addition to the forums, they 
required and received periodic reports bi-annually however, they all stated that they did not 
systematically give feedback; instead, they only asked for clarifications and/or raise issues whenever 
there was a need. Feedback of a general nature was however given during the annual forums convened 
to review progress; during these meetings, issues and any concerns raised by the NGO partners were 
addressed to the best extent possible and within the parameters of the government or agency policy on 
cooperation with non-state actors.  The corporate representative stated that they required NGO partners 
to submit progress reports at intervals aligned to the company’s own business reporting calendar and 





On visits to programme and project sites interestingly, one government systematically organised such 
visits on an annual basis. The visits were organised for groups of public opinion leaders (business, the 
media amongst others) to selected countries with which the government has bilateral cooperation 
agreements. While they were in the country, their Embassy they would take them on a tour of both 
bilaterally funded projects as well as those for which funding was channelled through NGOs -
accountability to the primary constituency (the tax payer) indeed! The other government donors did not 
have such a system in place; instead, they would visit programmes and projects if they happened to be 
in the country for some other business and the reason given for this was that responsibility for such 
visits was delegated to their foreign missions. For the institutional donor, the agency had regional 
and/or country offices in many parts of the world and it is through these offices that funds were 
disbursed as such, responsibility such monitoring visits was left to the said offices. For the corporate 
donor, such visits were regular and on request by either party; the company usually took advantage of 
the annual shareholder meetings to showcase what the company was doing in the sphere of CSR by 
taking delegates on a tour of company supported projects.  
 
On the donors’ experience with NGO partnerships in terms of conformity with the terms of 
engagement, they all stated that in general, NGOs conformed; the institutional donor respondent went 
further to state that the level of conformity was impressive relative to what he referred to as “...our 
often unreasonable demands...” 
 
6.9.4 “Return on Investment” 
 
On what percentage on average; of the donor’s development assistance had been channelled through 
NGOs in the past ten years, the corporate donor’s response was that all its development assistance was 
channelled through NGOs as part of its CSR policy. However, once in a while, the company made a 
direct contribution to the government’s national development efforts and usually infrastructural (roads; 
construction of rural health and business centres etc.). On conditions of anonymity, he stated that 
whatever the company did in this respect, it had to be such that there are direct or indirect benefits to 
the company; access to markets, a healthy market etc. Government and the institutional donor 
respondents could not give an estimate of the percentage of development assistance channelled through 
NGOs all the same, they stated that the allocation for non-state actors was on average 2.5% of the total 
development cooperation budget including advocacy activities; in addition, a provision of an average 
of 5.0% was always made for relief. In the event that any one of the cost centres did not exhaust the 
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provision made, the funds would be re-allocated to ensure that they are exhausted by the end of any 
given financial year. On the differences in the level of budgetary provision, the explanation was that 
while short term in nature, relief operations were more expensive especially given that disasters often 
occur in poor countries and characterised as they are by poor infrastructure, logistics was always a high 
cost centre. For the corporate donor, the same system prevailed whereby a provision was made for 
CSR with the level determined by the profit margin of the previous year. 
 
On the government/agency/company’s expectations of the outcomes of the assistance channelled 
through NGOs, the response for all categories of donors was the same; with respect to relief operations, 
saving lives and in development, changing the conditions of the poor. With respect to relief operations, 
goals had been met to a greater rather than lesser extent; with respect to development, all respondents 
across the board stated that poverty reduction was the expectation. On whether the expectation in 
development had been met, the responses were not straight forward instead; they were elaborations on 
views on why development had not taken place in the targeted communities. The arguments ranged 
from the view that poverty was an outcome of complex interrelated issues which could not be tackled 
with a single intervention to the fact that development was a process as such; it was not possible to 
judge the outcomes after a limited period of intervention.  
 
None of the government or institutional donors had ever prematurely terminated a partnership 
agreement with an NGO; however in some partnerships, they had had to avail extra support for an 
NGO partner including placing their own reporting specialists as well as accountants. It turned out 
these arrangements had been put into place in partnerships in which the funding was an unsolicited 
offer and/or in response to a realisation that the NGO partner was stretched to the limit with respect to 
manpower considerations. For the corporate donor, such a situation had never arisen and the 
respondent put it down to flexibility in which even mid-cycle in a programme or project, the company 
was open to negotiation on the modalities of implementation of the projects. 
 
Finally, they all stated that NGOs were indispensable development partners and their 
governments/agency company was always striving to improve working relationships with NGOs to 
ensure that through the partnerships, the shared goal of reducing poverty amongst the poor and 






6.10 Examination of records for cross-validation of information gathered during the interviews 
In addition to the interviews with the various categories of subjects; desk research of records of vital 
indicators of the impact of a drought were examined. Amongst these were records on health trends in 
the office of the District Medical Officer and in particular records pertaining to trends in the prevalence 
of nutritional disorders in pregnant and lactating mothers; new born babies and “under-fives”. The 
rationale for the choice of these categories was that these are categories which the law in Kenya 
requires that their health is regularly monitored at designated intervals or shorter if in the doctor’s or 
the midwife’s opinion warrants it. To this effect, pregnant and nursing women are expected to attend 
ante-natal and post-natal reviews and there is a system for monitoring child growth from birth until the 
child is five years old. Against this background, it was felt that statistics on these categories were more 
reliable since with other conditions and categories of the population; that some people do not 
necessarily go to the local health centre to seek medical attention when sick could not be ruled out. The 
findings are summarised in Table 6.30. 
 
Table 6.30: Health indicators of the impact of drought 
Division Prevalence rates of nutritional disorders  
Anaemia 
(pregnant/lactating mothers) 
“light for dates” 
(new born babies) 
“light for age” 
(“under-fives”) 
1999 2004 2006 1999 2004 2006 1999 2004 2006 
Kalama 22% 15% 24% 35% 29% 41% 41% 36% 46% 
Masinga 30% 25% 35% 45% 39% 51% 50% 45% 57% 
Yathui 19% 12% 18% 29% 26% 32% 34% 31% 41% 
Yatta 28% 21% 27% 37% 32% 46% 44% 38% 51% 
Source: Office of the District Medical Officer: Machakos District. 2011 
 
A second trend examined was that of school attendance and drop-out rates. The findings in respect of 
school attendance and attrition rates are summarised in Table 6.31. 
 
Table 6.31: School attendance and attrition rate indicators of the impact of drought 
Division Absenteeism Attrition rates 
1999 2004 2006 1999 2004 2006 
Kalama 27% 14% 31% 15% 9% 21% 
Masinga 40% 25% 43% 44% 19% 45% 
Yathui 24% 9% 29% 29% 7% 33% 
Yatta 33% 19% 37% 37% 16% 37% 
Source: Office of the District Education Officer: Machakos District. 2011 
Finally, trends in the market prices of domestic animals were examined; the rationale for examining 
records pertaining to these trend is that in an interview with the Machakos District Agricultural Officer, 
he stated that in the face of a drought; the tendency by households was to try and recover their 
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investment by selling off the animals before they succumb to the impact of the drought and/or to raise 
money with which to buy food. As each household took this course of action, excess supply was 
generated relative to demand with the result that prices fell. In any case, while people in the meat 
industry and/or ranchers in parts of the country which were not as badly affected by the drought had the 
potential to increase demand; often, the animals were in such a poor condition that they negotiated the 
prices downwards to a level where households did not realise much in terms of a return on investment. 
The findings in respect of market prices of domestic animals are summarised in Table 6.32. 
 
Table 6.32: Trends in the (average) domestic animal sale prices (in Kenya Shillings – KSH) 
Division Cattle Goats Chicken 
1999 2004 2006 1999 2004 2006 1999 2004 2006 
Kalama 1150.00 1,250.00 1,000.00 600.00 675.00 575.00 300.00 350.00 250.00 
Masinga 950.00 1,100.00 750.00 450.00 550.00 475.00 175.00 250.00 125.00 
Yathui 1200.00 1,400.00 1,100.00 650.00 750,00 650.00 375.00 400.00 325.00 
Yatta 950.00 1,150.00 950.00 500.00 600.00 500.00 250.00 275.00 175.00 
Source: Office of the District Agricultural Officer:Machakos District. 2011 
 
The trends in the indicators of the impact of a drought examined namely; health; school attendance and 
attrition rates and the “performance of the local market” support the accounts of both public authorities 




It is apparent from the findings that in many dimensions of the study which required cross validation of 
the accounts and views given by the various categories of respondents, there were no major 
discrepancies. This facilitated arriving at conclusions without leaving some questions unanswered.  In 
every respect, the findings were revealing with respect to the diversity of interests, expectations, 
interests and motives that influence the behaviour of the various stakeholders in the partnership for 
development of which NGOs are at the centre, “caught at crossroads” NGOs are indeed. The next 
chapter summarises the conclusions and makes recommendations with respect to how NGOs can meet 









CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
It will be recalled that in development interventions, NGOs are but only one stakeholder in a 
partnership in which the other stakeholders are the communities they serve; the host governments that 
allow them the space to work with communities and donors who facilitate their work through availing 
resources for the purpose. In the partnership, NGOs are the centre of delivering the services aimed at 
moving communities along the development continuum. This chapter summarises the findings from 
the research, draws conclusions and makes recommendations on what NGOs should do or not do; in 
order to meet the divergent and often conflicting interest and motives of the other stakeholders without 
losing their vision and/or compromising their principles.  
 
7.2 Summary of the research findings 
7.2.1 Findings in respect of communities 
In order to fill in information gaps from interviews conducted at the household level and to get an 
overall impression of the views of the communities on the post drought interventions implemented by 
NGOs between 2001 and 2006, focus group discussions were also conducted. The main findings are 
presented in three broad categories namely; views on food aid, interventions implemented by NGOs 
during the period under review and views on what NGOs can do better or differently in engagement 
with the communities for better results in the future. 
 
Views on food aid 
An impression given is that the subject communities had a strong sense of self pride and determination; 
this can be traced to the fact that self reliance is a core value in Kamba culture; as such, children are 
socialised to cherish and internalise the value from a very early age. To this effect, the communities 
studied acknowledged that during severe droughts as was witnessed in 1999-2001 and 2006; they 
would need assistance to ensure that they had enough food for their daily nutritional requirements. 
However, such assistance should be but only a short term stop gap measure to see them through until 
the next agricultural season; perennial reliance on food aid is considered humiliating. The importance 
attached to self reliance in food security is evident in the fact that historically; using albeit, not so 
scientific methods, when a drought was predicted, they did not invest heavily in planting crops. 
Instead; they would concentrate on crafts which they were good at making and they would trade these 
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with the Kikuyu’s in the greener Central Province in exchange for money which they then used to buy 
food or exchange the products for actual food.  
 
This importance attached self reliance in food security is also evident in the fact that the communities 
did not view the adequacy of the duration of the post drought interventions implemented by NGOs in 
terms of temporary considerations; months or years. Instead, they defined the adequacy of 
interventions simply in terms of a period long enough to regain their resilience and build their capacity 
to a level where they can be self reliant in food security even in the face of another drought in the 
future. Thus; even a three or six months duration would have been considered adequate if at the end 
thereof, the interventions rendered them better able to provide for themselves no matter how severe a 
drought in the future.  
 
Finally, communities’ longer term perspective on self reliance in food security was evident in 
expressions of disappointment with the lack of infrastructure and in particular, road networks and 
schools which communities cited as a threat to their food security. They explained that even in a good 
agricultural season, they had difficulties getting their produce to the market for lack of road networks. 
As such, they did not always get good returns on their investment; thus, in the event of a drought; they 
did not have a reserve of cash with which to buy food. With respect to schools, these were few and far 
between meaning that children had to walk long distances to school; during droughts, school drop-out 
rates increased. This in the main was because first of all, with no reserves of cash with which to buy 
food, the question of raising school fees did not even arise; secondly, on half empty stomachs, children 
were often not able to make the long walk to school. With little or no education, their children joined 
the ranks of the unemployed in later life and the only option for a livelihood was tilling the land 
however, with the same conditions prevailing namely; lack of infrastructure and distant schools, they 
would face the same fate as their parents; locked in poverty in the villages. The link between education 
and poverty as will be recalled from Chapter 1, is supported by a study conducted by FAO (2005b: 14) 
in which it was established that lack of education undermines productivity, employability and earning 
capacity resulting in the perpetuation of hunger and poverty. Furthermore, the study established that a 
farmer with four years of primary education is on average, almost 9 percent more productive than a 







Views on the interventions implemented by NGOs 
With respect to the organisation of activities; the funds that all six NGOs had available for the 
interventions were earmarked; as such, there was no room to involve communities in decision making 
on the nature or prioritisation of the activities. The same situation prevailed with respect to when the 
activities would be implemented understandably; a common feature of restricted projects is that the 
project cycle timelines are also stipulated in terms of when they start and by when they must be 
completed. On where the activities would be implemented, for four NGOs, this was a decision of the 
District authorities in so far as they allocated the NGOs the Divisions in which they would work; for 
the other two NGOs however, this was the decision of the NGOs themselves. Such latitude was 
facilitated by their long presence in the District and the fact that they had been working in all Divisions 
long before 1999. At the community level, in two Divisions in both human welfare and livestock 
interventions, decisions on where the activities would be implemented were made by the NGOs; the 
communities had no say in this respect. In the other two Divisions; where activities would be 
implemented was to the best extent possible, a joint decision between the NGOs and communities. The 
only exception to such an arrangement was in respect of sites at which boreholes would be sunk and 
wells would be dug for even the NGOs themselves had no say in such decisions. This in the main is 
because the identification of sites where the water table is such that the yield will be high is a highly 
technical exercise which only geologists can do. With respect to how the interventions would be 
implemented and by who, the same pattern emerged whereby in two Divisions, the NGOs made all the 
decisions to the exclusion of communities. In two other Divisions, it was a joint NGO-community 
decision how interventions would be implemented with the communities deciding who would be 
involved within their ranks. 
 
On organisational arrangements, sentiments of disappointment were strong in Kalama and Yathui  
where NGOs made all the decisions; such disappointment was a result of a perceived mismatch 
between some activities that the NGOs insisted on and the communities’ felt needs at that point in 
time. In this respect, they cited livestock interventions in which the main activities were the 
vaccination of animals; training on fortifying stock feed and the construction of cattle dips at a time 
when the herds were so badly depleted and there were hardly any animals left; the pressing felt need at 
the time was restocking of the herds. Disappointment was also expressed at the disjointedness of some 
activities; in this respect, they cited the example of health education teams which completed training in 
home hygiene at a time when water was still scarce because the boreholes had yet to be sunk and wells 
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dug. The lessons on the importance of hand washing before handling food and/or after visiting the 
toilet were thus to no avail. They would have preferred the health teams to come at a time that water 
was readily available.  
 
In Masinga and Yatta Divisions, the situation was different in so far as to the best extent possible, the 
NGOs involved communities in the organisation of the activities and decision making at the various 
stages from the outset through to the end of the formal interventions and/or leaving some decisions to 
be made solely by the communities themselves; this partially explains the enthusiasm with which the 
interventions were embraced by the communities.  
 
With respect to implementation modalities; in Kalama and Yathui, communities were of the view that 
even if the duration of the interventions had continued for a longer period; the outcomes would still 
have been poor. This they explained; was because the NGOs had head-hunted and selected members of 
project committees by virtue of their “qualifications” without any consideration of whether or not the 
selected people commanded respect within the communities. The practice in the community in such 
projects was that decisions on who would serve on the project committee were taken by the community 
as a whole; at a properly constituted baraza with the criteria for selection being the degree of respect an 
individual commanded within the community and their record of successfully leading community 
projects in the past. The NGOs had done the same with project staff; in a number of Locations in which 
they claimed they could not find enough people with the required “papers”, they brought in people 
from other Locations and/or even Divisions. The practice in the community in such projects was that 
project staff would be recruited from the CORPS with the criterion being the individual’s record of 
dedication and performance in previous projects. The communities acknowledged that in the livestock 
interventions, there was a need to bring in people from outside since the specialised skills required 
were not available within the communities.  
 
However, they questioned the wisdom of bringing in people from outside the Locations/Divisions for 
activities like health education when members of the CORPS had been carrying the activities for years. 
They felt alienated by this approach which they argued, totally ignored established patterns of 
community organisation besides; the NGOs were promoting methods for enhancing community garden 
yields, food preservation and animal care which they could never afford for they involved the use of 




respectively were methods that they had used throughout generations and they had worked for them. 
Besides, the livestock NGOs were promoting the feeding of animals in enclosures using stock feeds; 
this in their view could never work because their animals were used to freely grazing besides, they 
could not afford stock feeds. They felt let down first of all by being alienated and secondly, by being 
led in a direction that in their view, would exacerbate poverty within communities.  
 
The situation was different in Masinga and Yatta where the approach used by the NGOs in the 
implementation of activities was perceived as empowering communities by amongst other things, 
involving communities in decision making and even leaving some decisions to be made by the 
communities themselves. In addition, the approach increased their resource base in so far as it 
enhanced the knowledge and skills base of CORPS through appropriate training and deployment; in so 
doing and given that the CORPS were their own people; continuation of community initiatives was 
guaranteed even after the NGOs left. This had generated enthusiasm; a sense of ownership of the 
interventions and had fuelled the sense of self determination to the extent that households made modest 
financial contributions to maintain the momentum of the move towards self reliance.  
 
Views on what could have been done differently or better 
In this respect, four closely linked categories of issues were identified namely, community involvement 
(participation); change or lack of it in the situation of communities (impact); increase in community 
resources and capacity (empowerment) and self reliance in the future (sustainability). Views on these 
issues are elaborated below. 
 
With respect to community involvement, communities in Kalama and Yathui expressed strong 
disapproval of the approaches used in the implementation of activities because involving an imposed 
leadership and/or operatives considered strangers as they did; they changed little if anything in their 
situation. This they explained; was because people lost interest and were not enthusiastic about getting 
involved in what they perceived as activities by and for the NGOs and their chosen people. They would 
like to see the involvement of the community in decision making at every stage of such interventions 
including decisions on the choice of project leaders and operatives; people that have been tried and 
tested and people who will continue to be amongst them in the future and not those who come and go. 
Furthermore, while acknowledging that they were poor; in the view however, that did not mean that 
there was absolutely nothing in terms of resources within communities, on the contrary; they were 
endowed with people determined to turn their situation around and local knowledge which had seen 
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communities cope with drought without external assistance in the past. In their interventions therefore, 
NGOs should build on these cultural and traditional methods that had worked for communities for 
generations and were affordable rather than discourage their use and replace them with alien methods 
that communities cannot afford to sustain when the NGOs leaves.  
 
In Masinga and Yatta where the NGOs used an approach in which they worked for, with and through 
communities; the interventions were embraced with enthusiasm; the enthusiasm was taken to a greater 
height especially as the approach was perceived as increasing the communities’ resource base. This 
was particularly so in respect of knowledge and skills for through appropriate training and deployment 
and the broadening of the nature and scope of services provided by the CORPS  besides, the CORPS 
were their own people; people who would remain in the communities and continue implementing the 
interventions even after the NGOs left. To this effect, communities were satisfied with the approaches 
used by the NGOS and having benefitted from such an approach, they had since been insisting on the 
use of such an approach with NGOs which from time have expressed an interest in working with them 
in other dimensions of community welfare enhancing interventions.  
 
7.2.2 Conclusions on the findings in respect of communities 
In concluding this section, it is apparent that NGO interventions in Kalama and Yathui were headed for 
failure from the very outset; this can be traced first of all, to imbalance in power relationships between 
benefactors and beneficiaries. This is supported by Narayan et al (2000: 2) who argue that power 
imbalances in relationships between benefactors and beneficiaries is a significant contributory factor to 
the failure of development interventions to empower the poor.  In these two Divisions, such power 
imbalances are evident in the fact that all decisions; from what activities, when; where, how through to 
who would participate were made by the NGOs. Such an approach to engaging communities, 
Chambers (1983: 104) argues; can be traced to “outsiders” views of the poor; such views are distorted 
because for lack of contact or communication, it permits them to form such views without the 
inconvenience of knowledge and/or personal exposure.  
 
Indeed those NGOs which established a presence in response to the drought were outsiders to some 
extent not least; because the first time they came into contact with the communities was when the 
drought struck. In any case, except for one which belatedly tried to do so; they did not make any effort 
to attend the monthly barazas, a forum which would have presented them with the opportunity to get to 




(project committees and operatives) with which they interacted represented the whole community; the 
assumption was wrong especially given that these categories had been head hunted with the selection 
criteria being the level of education. As such, these individuals considered themselves or were 
considered a sort of “elite”; this is supported by de Berry (1999: 12) who in a study carried out in rural 
Uganda revealed that those who were “consulted” tended to be those who had had some education and 
had a good command of English with the rest left feeling disenfranchised from influence. Under such 
arrangements, Burkey (1996: xvi) notes that while aimed at improving the socio-economic and health 
conditions of the communities; projects were initiated, designed and implemented from “top-down” by 
the “elite” without systematic consultations and involvement of the beneficiaries.  
 
Such an approach first of all; alienates people and this evident in Kalalma and Yathui where 
enthusiasm for the interventions was simply not there for communities perceived the activities as for 
and by the NGOs and their chosen people. With such attitudes prevailing, communities did not 
participate in the activities; understandably, and as Swanepoel (1997: 5) argues, it is through 
participation that a solid local knowledge base is built; in turn, such knowledge is a pre-requisite for 
successful development initiatives. In addition, people who do not participate in their own 
development have no affinity for development efforts or their outcomes; lack of affinity for the 
development outcomes is evident in the perception of the activities as, for and by the NGOs. Secondly, 
the approach resulted in failure by the NGOs to recognise the potential inherent in communities as 
represented by the determination of the communities to turn around their situation irreversibly and 
local knowledge which had seen communities cope with drought without external assistance in the 
past. In turn, failure to recognise the potential inherent in communities resulted in the use of 
approaches which were alien and/or the introduction of methods beyond the means of the communities; 
under the circumstances, there was nothing to show for the NGOs “having been there”. This is 
supported by Burkey (1996: xvi) who argues that failure of development interventions can be traced to 
a misconception by development agencies that the introduction of modern technology and science 
would automatically lead to a decent standard of living for all.  
 
The relative success of interventions in Masinga and Yatta can be traced to meaningful participation of 
the communities to the extent of handing over responsibility for activities which communities were 
perceived as having the potential to implement with little if any support from the NGOs. Such an 
approach and the sense of being valued it generated in the process, was to be the magic wand that 
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unleashed the communities enthusiasm and zeal to the extent of making modest financial contributions 
to maintain the momentum of move towards realising the cherished goal of self sufficiency in food 
security and self reliance in other dimensions of daily living.  
 
7.3. Findings in respect of the host government 
District authorities made all the decisions on registration, licensing and the allocation of Divisions to 
NGOs wishing to work in the District. In many ways, such a decentralised system especially with 
respect to the licensing and allocation of Divisions was the best and the premise for this position is that 
District authorities know better than any other level of government where the needs are. However, as is 
evident in 1999, the nature and degree of need as criteria for allocating Divisions to NGOs was not 
strictly applied; instead, the guiding principle was simply; “equitable geographical distribution”. 
 
The contribution of NGOs in enhancing the welfare of communities was greatly appreciated; this 
evident in the fact that public authorities went out of their way to ensure that the establishment of a 
community presence by an NGO and/or getting started in a programme or project was smooth. Support 
by public authorities extended to facilitating the timely issuing of work permits for NGO expatriate 
staff by the Department of Immigration as well as expediting the clearance of imported 
programme/project inputs by the Kenya Revenue Authority. In addition, it is evident that public 
authorities were committed to engaging with NGOs in an open and transparent manner in an 
environment characterised by mutual trust. In this respect, public authorities used the monthly DSG 
meetings as a forum and mechanism for open and effective communication; such an approach to 
engaging with NGOs was mutually beneficial to both stakeholders. In addition, it engendered trust 
hence public authorities felt that there was no need to require NGOs to provide information on their 
sources of funding and related details in depth.  
 
7.3.1 Conclusions on the findings in respect of host governments 
Host governments appreciate the services NGOs deliver in communities as illustrated by the extent to 
which they will go to ensure an environment supportive of the latter’s work. Such appreciation is 
illustrated by Mutasah (2007) who as alluded to earlier, cites the glowing tribute paid to NGOs by late 
President Mwanawasa of Zambia for the role they had played by in the implementation of the country's 
fifth national development plan. Matenga (2001) traces such appreciation to the fact that as African 
governments increasingly found it difficult to provide an optimal level of basic services for their 




foreign debt, they exploited the good will and humanitarian spirit that is the defining philosophy of 
NGOs. To this effect, NGOs hey became indispensible in the provision of basic services and in 
emergency and/or disaster relief. Such a view of NGOs as indispensable in relief and development is 
evident in Machakos District for notwithstanding the fact that NGO interventions did not always result 
in sustainable development in communities, all the same, and no matter how little the contribution to 
this end; it was appreciated by public authorities. 
 
7.4 Findings in respect of NGOs 
First of all, the findings suggest that NGOs continue to be heavily dependent primarily on government 
donor funding; either directly from their home government or through multilateral donor institutions. 
This is supported by Eade (1999: 12) who notes that this was inevitable for NGOs are primarily 
involved in transferring resources from societies which have plenty to those who have little as such, 
their success more often than not, depends on their ability to mobilise resources primarily from their 
home constituencies and in particular, their governments. At the same time however, such dependence 
creates liabilities for NGOs as was evident in Kalama and Masinga where; were it not for the power 
imbalance in favour of NGOs relative to the communities served; they would have been sent packing 
even before the interventions started. Understandably, the approach was perceived as inappropriate 
from the very outset.  
 
The inappropriateness of approaches can be traced to dependency on donors for funding and just like 
the power relationship between NGOs and the communities they is skewed in favour of the former by 
virtue of resource endowment; the relationship between NGOs and donors  is skewed in favour of the 
latter. This is evident in the fact that by their own admission; NGOs had agreed to terms of engagement 
in which the decisions on what activities were to be implemented, when, how and by who were 
specified by their respective donors; a category of stakeholder located thousands of kilometers away 
and as such, has little idea on the situation on the ground in terms of pressing needs.  They had agreed 
to such arrangements because of a self perception that they did not have the power to influence 
decisions as well as a belief that if they did not agree to the terms of engagement, they would not 
secure the funding. Such a self perception of the “poor cousin” with little or no power to influence 
funding decisions by donors is supported by Rauh (2010: 34) who notes that the power relationships 
between NGOs and donors is skewed in favour of the latter; this allows donors to set the agenda and 
conditions that must be met in order to receive a grant. The end result is that programmes designed by 
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donors are often not suitable to the cultures in which they will be implemented. Understandably, donor 
priorities are heavily influenced by political and security considerations as well as their own norms and 
values. Jennings (1995: 18) concurs; adding that most development aid programmes claim to be based 
on partnership but the reality is usually very different not least, because donors have the financial 
power which they use to insist that the partner fulfil certain conditions. 
 
Faced with such a situation and by their own admission; the NGOs in Kalama and Yathui went along 
with the decisions made by their donors on the programme design; the prevailing attitude was that if 
the donor was providing the funds then it was its prerogative to decide how the funds will be used. In 
adopting such a defeatist attitude however, the NGOs generated liabilities for themselves in so far as 
they entered into agreements whose provisions were clearly counter- productive to sustainable 
development; in so doing, the NGOs compromised the impact of their interventions even before they 
started. Under the circumstances, the NGOS were clearly victims of the contradictions that often 
characterises the behaviour of donors in their relationships with NGOs. Victims they were indeed for 
on the one hand; the NGOs were “strangers” in the communities in which they worked and as alluded 
to earlier, community participation in the interventions would have enabled the former to build up local 
knowledge. However, under the agreements signed with the donors, there was no space for community 
participation for this is how projects had been designed; project committee members and staff would 
be selected based on specified minimum educational qualifications. In a situation in which 
communities had their own systems and procedures for organising such activities, it was as it were, 
communities were forced into a marriage arranged by the NGO which the latter hoped, would work out 
in time. The “marriage” failed to work however, realising that they did not have the power to 
unilaterally declare a “divorce”; all the same; communities estranged themselves from the union by 
amongst other things, lack of enthusiasm and affinity for the outcomes. The end result was little or no 
return on investment for the NGOs.  
 
It was also apparent that limited local knowledge by the NGOs in Kalama and Yathui resulted in a self 
perception of “donor-in-loco” and a corresponding self image of the “big brother”. The symptoms of 
the “big brother” syndrome are manifest in a “tunnel vision” of the communities as “poor and helpless 
victims of circumstances” to the exclusion of exploring potential for self sustenance that might exist 
within communities. This is supported by Shivji (2006: 11) who argues that in Africa in particular, the 




“the chronically poor” and marginalised as they were, they were excluded from being part of the 
development equation. Instead, they merely became the recipients of humanitarian aid provided by 
“true friends” and dispensed by non-partisan and non-political Non-Governmental Organisations.  
Under the misconception that communities are poor in everything, the dominant approach to engaging 
communities in development interventions is “working for communities” as opposed to “working with 
and through communities” as happened in Kalama and Yathui. The message from the vocal opinion 
leader in Kalama was clear in this respect; as communities, they were only poor in their pockets but not 
in their heads as such, they had the potential to contribute to their own development.  
 
In contrast to the situation in Kalama and Yathui, it is apparent that in relative terms, NGO 
interventions in Masinga and Yatta were successful and this can be traced first of all, to the fact that a 
comparative advantage that the latter had was that they were membership organisations with national 
affiliates in Kenya. Secondly, they worked in partnership with the local branches of their respective 
national affiliates as such, they had the advantage of local knowledge in respect of patterns of daily 
living, locally available resources; what works and what doesn’t and most importantly the intricacies of 
Kamba traditions including the importance of community power structures. Thirdly, through the 
experience effect, they were aware of the internal administration arrangements in their respective donor 
institutions. Amongst such arrangements were that after a provision for engagement with non-state 
actors had been made in the national budget in any given fiscal year, it was operatives in Development 
Cooperation Departments that made second level decisions on which non-state actor to engage; who 
would get how much, for what and how they would translate the funds into tangible results on the 
ground. Furthermore, they had become aware that these operatives often made such critical decisions 
based on very little information on the realities on the ground.  
 
Aware of these arrangements, the NGOs had come up with a system in which field personnel from 
operations facing challenges would be included in the NGO’s delegation to annual donor-NGO 
progress review meetings; a system designed to give the donors first hand information on the issues 
and the realities on the ground. In time, the system was advanced and they started regularly inviting the 
operatives to their own internal annual progress review meetings attended by Regional and/or   
Country Representatives and their Programme Coordinators. This was designed to create an 
opportunity for them to get an insight into the challenges in the field from no less than field personnel 
themselves and thus fill in the information gaps critical to informed decision making on the part of the 
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donor operatives as well as show case success stories. The arrangements were appreciated by the donor 
operatives and in a number of cases; the information gathered from such meetings had subsequently 
influenced donor decisions in favour of the NGOs.  
 
7.4.1 Conclusions on the findings in respect of NGOs  
The conclusions on the findings in respect of NGOs are linked to the objectives of the study as follows: 
 
Objective 1: To identify and analyse factors that facilitated gains made with respect to increased 
community resilience against drought between 2001 and 2004.  
 
First and foremost, following the drought of 1999-2001; in 2002, weather conditions in Machakos 
District assumed a near normal pattern increasing to a normal pattern in 2003; as such, the level of 
agricultural productivity assumed corresponding patterns. In addition, notwithstanding the less than 
optimal outcomes of some post drought intervention in some Divisions including Kalama and Yathui; 
the whole District had benefitted from the water interventions. Secondly, in Masinga and Yatta 
amongst other Divisions where interventions had been relatively successful, communities were the 
wiser with respect to household food security and in particular, food preservation of the surplus which 
due to poor infrastructure, they could not take to the market. Thirdly, having been working with 
communities even before the drought of 1999-2001; the NGOs in Masinga and Yatta, exploited the 
principle of familiarity with communities and were able to design the projects and use approaches that 
they knew would be acceptable to the communities.  
 
With respect to public authorities, the NGOs in Masinga and Yatta exploited the confidence and trust 
built over years of a presence in the District to their advantage. To this effect, they had been allowed to 
choose where in the District they would work during the relief phase of 1999-2001and by extension, 
during the post drought phase. Such a privileged position was to prove a comparative advantage for 
being aware of funding trends in post-disaster development interventions and by extension; the post 
drought interventions; they selected Divisions in which they could make a real difference. Against this 
background, they selected Divisions where they had a solid base in the form of strong local Branches 
of their national affiliates and strong volunteer networks. Fourth, enjoying a status synonymous with 
“honorary” members of the communities in which they worked; being treated as “...part of us...” and 




resources; people, materials, knowledge and indigenous technology with the result that the prospects 
for continuity and sustainability were good from the very outset.  
 
Finally, having been in existence for much longer than the rest and exploiting the experience effect, 
they had come up with innovative ways of overcoming the constraints and challenges presented by the 
new aid architecture involving as it does; unilateral decision making in project design by donors; ever 
increasing demands on reports and reporting and inflexibility in the nature and scope on interventions.  
 
In the light of the above, it is concluded that a combination of near normal weather conditions; local 
knowledge and corresponding appropriate approaches to development used by some NGOs and in 
particular, community involvement and participation; use of locally available resource and building on 
what exists rather than replacing it through the employment of methods alien to the communities; were 
significant factors that facilitated the gains made between 2001 and 2004. Unfortunately, the NGOs in 
Kalama and Yathui did not have the comparative advantage of local knowledge and all the advantages 
it carries hence they did not do so well in terms of the outcomes of their interventions during the period 
under review.  
 
Objective 2: To examine and establish why the success of NGO post drought interventions posted in 
2001-2004 were reversed in 2006. 
 
In this respect, first of all, development interventions aimed at building communities’ resilience against 
threats and hazards in their environment do not generate as much interest as emergency and/or disaster 
interventions. Thus, while the emergency phase in 1999-2001 was adequately funded; in the aftermath 
of the drought, funding for post drought interventions was very low; this was particularly so since 
Machakos District was declared food secure in 2004; the result was that the case for funding for 
consolidating post drought related development interventions was even weaker after 2004. Against this 
background, it is concluded that NGOs did not have funds to consolidate the work they had started in 
2001; as such, funding constraints were a major contributory factor to the reversal of the successes 
posted between 2001 and 2004.  
 
That where donors will spend their funds is increasingly influenced factors other than the situation and 
needs on the ground has been alluded earlier however; such decisions are also informed by trends and 
this is particularly so in the funding of development interventions.  According to Jennings (1995:13), 
being frustrated with state inefficiency in programme management coupled with frequent misallocation 
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of resources and an urban bias, official donors increasingly turned to NGOs as an alternative vehicle 
for channelling development assistance to the Third World. In making funding decisions on 
interventions implemented by NGOs; donors are informed by trends; these trends they are able to map 
from a number of sources including programme progress reports that NGOs generate and submit to 
donors. At the same time; donors are increasingly insisting that the programme progress reports are 
written on templates that they themselves develop.  The implication of such an arrangement is that in 
reporting, NGOs are limited to the nature and amount of information that the donors want and not 
necessarily the information that might make for informed decision making.  Under the circumstances 
and in a situation in which NGOs perceive themselves as having no power even to negotiate on 
reporting requirements that make for effective communication, funds may be allocated for non-priority 
interventions or may be allocated for short term interventions when in fact the needs are long term; 
worse still, funds may not be allocated at all This is what appears to have happened in Machakos 
District in 2001; worse still, funds may not be allocated at all as was the case three years later 
following the drought of 2004. 
 
In Kalama and Yathui, notwithstanding the inadequate duration of the activities between 2001 and 
2004 and the lack of funding to consolidate them between 2004 and 2006; the interventions might still 
have had impact in some community elsewhere in the District only the NGO self perception of lack of 
bargaining power was also at play in the relationship with the host government. It will be recalled that 
in allocating Divisions to NGOs, the host government simply used the principle “equitable 
geographical distribution”. According to Shoham (2001: 8), it was widely acknowledged in Kenya at 
the time; that politicians at various levels perceived the provision of emergency food aid and ensuing 
post relief assistance as a resource through which to gain political mileage; to this effect, they often 
insisted on humanitarian assistance being distributed fairly across all constituencies. It is possible that 
in adopting the principle “equitable geographical distribution”, District authorities were taking the cues 
from the politicians and used the system in order to be seen to be non-partisan. At the outset, the NGOs 
were not aware that this is how allocations were made; at a later stage however, they became aware of 
this but made no effort to re-negotiate the terms of engagement. Amongst the reasons they gave for 
going along with the allocation decisions decision was that they did not want to upset the authority to 





It appears that the self perception of powerlessness by NGOs in their relationships with donors and 
host governments alike as elaborated above; is replicated at the NGO-community interface where a 
“tunnel vision” of the communities as second level “poor cousins” as implied by Chambers (1983: 
104) results in engaging communities using the “working for” as opposed to “working with” approach. 
In the process and as did happen in Kalama and Yathui; due to limited local knowledge and in 
particular, community patterns of daily living, locally available resources; what works and what 
doesn’t and most importantly, community social organisation and power structures; as the “big 
brother” the NGOs made all the decisions for the communities; what will be done, where, when, how 
and even by who. Under the circumstances; even if the NGOs had had the resources to implement 
interventions after 2004; there was nothing to consolidate understandably; community capacity was 
still at the level at which it was at the beginning of the interventions in 2001as such, the NGOs would 
have had to start all over again.  
 
Finally, for the NGOs in Kalama and Yathui, their performance was further compromised by the fact 
that they were not really international organizations but instead, organizations working internationally. 
The latter operate using a unitary model in which the NGO is a singular legal entity as opposed to the 
former which are membership organisations with affiliates across the entire world. For the NGOs in 
Kalama and Yathui, with no national affiliate and local Branches or “troops at the frontline”; coupled 
with the fact that the communities had not had the opportunity for hands-on involvement; when the 
NGOs left, that marked the end of the activities. Understandably, there was no-one on the ground to 
continue with the interventions and/or simply to let them know what was happening after they left.  
 
In the light of the above, it is concluded that; that in some Divisions, the outcomes of the interventions 
were poor was certainly not by design on the part of the NGOs. This premise is based on the fact that 
as is evident from the experience of NGOs in Kalama and Yathui; in the quest to fulfil their 
humanitarian mandate, NGOs are caught in a vicious circle. Thus, on the one hand, they must continue 
to access donor funds; at the same time however; the funding is increasingly availed with conditions 
that compromise the fulfilment of that very humanitarian mandate. When their performance is so 
compromised and they seemingly fail to deliver on the mandate; it is the same donors that are at the 
forefront of criticising them; more seriously; they might even “apply the hand break” on funding. In 
the event that donors take this course of action, the tendency by NGOs next time round is to follow the 
terms of engagement even more stringently however, in a situation in which failure to deliver can be 
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traced to the terms of engagement in the first place; NGOs are back to square one with the donors 
leading the chorus of criticism. It is a vicious cycle that reinforces the self image of the “poor cousin” 
 
All the NGOs experienced funding constraints at the time and by implication, limitations in what they 
could do; for the sake “doing something in the here and now” some accepted their “poor cousin status” 
but then and in so doing, they failed to fulfil their mandate. Others, particularly those in Masinga and 
Yatta came up with innovative strategies for overcoming the constraints; amongst such strategies was 
the formation of partnerships with their national affiliate and more importantly with the communities 
served. In addition, their approach was one of maximum use of locally available resources and more 
importantly the use of first of low technology and low cost intervention methodologies which 
communities could afford to sustain even after they left.  
 
Objective 3 of the study is addressed under the section on recommendation. 
 
7.5 Findings in respect of donors 
It was established that save in emergency and/or disaster situations, donor funding priorities with 
respect to priority countries and the nature and scope of interventions determine what funding will be 
availed to non-state actor partners. In turn such priorities are influenced by the cues coming from the 
donors’ own “back donors”; tax payers in the case of governments; member states in the case of 
regional development agencies and shareholders in the case of the corporate sector. Cues coming from 
non-state actors through progress and trend reports were also taken into account in decisions on the 
nature and scope of interventions however; by their own admission, such influence did not extend to 
decisions on the priority countries and/or the level of funding for the interventions but in the main, in 
the implementation approaches and methodologies.  
 
There was a tendency by government and donors to prefer to directly engage only with their home 
NGOs; with respect to international NGO alliances, they preferred to engage those indirectly through 
multilateral donor institutions of which they were shareholders. The same trend prevailed with 
institutional donors; the preference was NGOs registered in member shareholder states and/or 
international NGO alliances. Both government and multilateral donors had no problems with funding 
local NGOs provided they were members of international alliances of which their home or regional 
NGOs were members but on the condition that the primary partner was the latter and they did not have 




Contrary to the perception by NGOs that donor decisions were “cast in stone” and as such, it was not 
possible to influence them otherwise; donors actually appreciated the learning opportunity direct 
interaction with field operatives presented; a system which some innovative NGOs had come up with. 
Such learning had seen some donors agree to modifications in the terms of engagement including 
reporting requirements; a dimension of partnership which often generated discourse in the partnerships. 
 
NGOs were valued as partners by both government and multilateral donors; this is supported by the 
Overseas Development Institute (1995: 3) which cites a number of factors which endeared the former 
to the latter. Amongst such factors first of all, the record of poor performance of official donor 
programmes in reaching the poor and the apparent lack of impact of rural development projects 
financed in the late 1960s and 1970s. Secondly, the perception that NGOs were an alternative means of 
getting around obstacles to the impact of aid caused by inefficient and corrupt recipient governments 
and finally, their capacity to reach and improve the lives of the poor in areas which due to limited 
resources, poor infrastructure and/or lack of will, governments could not reach. Chege (1999: 1) 
confirms these observations and notes that as donor confidence in NGOs increased, there was a 
corresponding increase in the level of resources channelled through the sector. He cites the example of 
a US policy adopted in 1992 in which the importance of working more closely with NGOs was 
emphasised. In time, other major donors notably Britain and Germany followed suit; government-NGO 
partnerships became the trend and a survey conducted in the United States in 2005 (Williamson 2005) 
suggested that in general, NGOs were more trusted to do what is right than governments and business. 
 
It was also established that in the event that the funds allocated for the delivery of development 
assistance through non-state actors were not going to be exhausted before the end of a running 
financial year; donors actually made unsolicited offers to NGOs to absorb what otherwise would be a 
positive balance. By implication, there are times that donors are as desperate for NGOs to take their 
money as NGOs are to secure it at other times. This suggests that contrary to NGOs self perception of 
lacking in bargaining power, in many ways they yield more bargaining power than donors do. There is 
evidence in support of this view for it is generally acknowledged within the NGO community that the 
fastest way to get “de-commissioned” by a donor is not so much about ending up with a deficit at the 
end of a project cycle but instead, to end up with a positive balance! 
 
Notwithstanding the contradictions that characterise working relationships between government and 
multilateral donors and non-state actors; NGOs are appreciated by donors and are rated highly with 
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respect to compliance with donor requirements albeit; such compliance is often under duress. That 
such compliance is often under duress is acknowledged in donor community circles; this is evident in 
the fact that realizing that there are times that their demands stretch NGOs to the limit; donors have 
often provided extra support to enable NGOs to meet the demands. 
 
Finally, corporate donors had no problems in engaging directly, local, international, NGOs working 
internationally or International NGO alliances. With respect to local NGOs, this was explained in terms 
of the fact that often, the funds were disbursed through local subsidiaries anyway and the problems that 
the company was trying to address through CSR were local; it made sense to directly engage with local 
NGOs. In addition, it appears that corporate donors afforded NGOs greater latitude in decision making 
within the partnership. 
 
7.5.1 Conclusions on the findings in respect of donors 
The relationship between NGOs and donors is indeed characterised by power imbalances however, this 
does not necessarily mean that donors are adamantly resistant to the influence of NGOs. Besides, 
Commins (1999: 70-71) observes that in the past, NGOs once perceived themselves having a 
significant impact in shaping donor policies and humanitarian responses. If they so perceived 
themselves then; by the same token, they can do so today; only they need to come up with innovative 
strategies for meeting the challenges of the day and in particular, the evolving donor culture and aid 
architecture as the NGOs which worked in Masinga and Yatta did. 
 
7.6 Recommendations  
This section addresses Objective 3 of the study namely;  
 
To explore and recommend how best NGOs can overcome the constraints and/or build on the 
facilitating factors for even greater impact in future interventions at the same time as meet the needs of 
all the stakeholders, donors, host governments and more importantly, the communities served.  
 
To this effect, the following recommendations are made: 
 
7.6.1 Recommendation in respect of donors     
Increasingly, donors are demanding accountability from NGOs at the same time however; donors are 
increasingly earmarking the funds they avail to NGOs; under these arrangements, donors decide on 




NGOs are not always able to address the most pressing needs in the most desperate places and/or to use 
methods and approaches that facilitate goal attainment; and when the goals are not attained, it is the 
same donors that criticise NGOs the loudest. Such a contradiction can be traced to power imbalances 
and has often led to strained relationships between these two stakeholders; in the light of this, is 
recommended that:  
 
Just as NGOs had a significant impact in shaping donor policies and humanitarian responses at one 
point in time; they should go back “memory lane” and establish what it is that so positioned them then; 
and come up with innovative strategies to reclaim the bargaining power which they seem to have lost 
over time. The ground is fertile for the engagement of such strategies not least; because there is 
evidence to suggest that while seemingly in a relationship characterised by power imbalances in which 
NGOs need donors more than donors need them; donors need NGOs as much. 
 
Adopting a defeatist attitude creates a vicious cycle which perpetuates the status of “poor cousin” for 
NGOs; Commins (1999: 70-71) argues that it is such self-perception that has seen NGOs pushed into 
roles that minimise their impact in the long-term. When this happens and needless to say, development 
outcomes are poor; it is the same donors who will be at the forefront of criticising NGOs for failure to 
deliver. In turn, when a donor is not happy with the performance of an NGO, the tendency by the 
former is put even more stringent conditions on funding; in response and in order to continue to 
accessing funding; the tendency by the NGO is to appease the donors by taking the degree of 
conformity to an even higher level. The end result is that the NGO compromises its performance to an 
even higher level and the vicious cycle starts all over again. In the light of this, is recommended that: 
 
In the pursuit of fulfilment of their humanitarian mandate; there is no place for a defeatist attitude; 
instead, NGOs should remain steadfast in the observance of their principles and values and loyal to 
their primary constituency, the communities serves after all, communities are their “raison d’etre”. 
Taking such a stand is not a matter of choice, neither does it compromise the chances of funding in the 
future after all; donors need NGOs as much as NGOs need them. 
 
In order for such a strategy to work in favour of NGOs; they must speak with one voice and not allow 







7.6.2 Recommendations in respect of host governments   
Indeed, power imbalances are also evident in the relationship between NGOs and host governments 
however; like with donors; public authorities are not adamantly resistant to the influence of NGOs; on 
the contrary, public authorities can be flexible as is evident from the fact that two NGOs actually 
decided where they would work. Given, these two NGOs had the comparative advantage of local 
knowledge and the experience effect both of which rendered their interventions more successful 
resulting in them enjoying the confidence and trust of public authorities and communities alike. 
However; it can be argued that the other NGOs could have so positioned themselves only they did not 
exploit the opportunity presented by monthly barazas to acquire such local knowledge. In any case, 
public authorities value the services provided by NGOs and this is evident in the fact even in cases 
where impact is not optimal; NGO contributions no matter how little; are appreciated.  In the light of 
this, it is recommended that: 
 
The common “denominator” between NGOs and public authorities is the communities served; a 
category for which the shared goal is that of moving communities along the development continuum; 
as such, the way to public authorities’ “heart” is doing exactly that; through interventions that make a 
difference in the quality of life in the communities served. In turn, interventions that make a difference 
in the quality of life in the communities are a function of project design and implementation 
approaches. To this effect, NGOs must endeavour to ensure that implementation approaches foster true 
partnerships with public authorities by amongst other things, aligning implementation approaches to 
public policy frameworks. This is important for approaches designed elsewhere by operatives who 
have little idea on the situation on the ground may not be suitable to the cultures in which they will be 
implemented.   
 
Like with donors, public authorities’ expectations on the outcome of development interventions 
implemented by NGOs within communities are increasing. At the same time and as has been 
illustrated, the increasing trend towards restricted projects compromises the outcomes of NGO 
interventions; in turn, less than optimal outcomes erodes the confidence and trust that public authorities 




expect to enjoy the degree of space that is conducive to the outcomes of interventions.  In the light of 
this, it is recommended that; 
 
NGOs should always remember that public authorities are the guardians of the communities they serve; 
as such, they should strive at all times to work within public policy frameworks. In situations where 
funding conditions are such that they are not aligned to otherwise very sound host government policy 
frameworks; NGOs should exploit the goodwill of public authorities as one NGO successfully did; 
inviting District authorities to be part of the delegation to the donor to defend the Machakos District 
Development Charter and negotiate for terms of engagement that would facilitate alignment of the 
interventions to the Charter. This is important for regardless of the amount of resources invested in 
community development initiatives; if the interventions are not in line with public policy, the outcomes 
will be poor. Poor outcomes erode the confidence and trust that public authorities might otherwise have 
in an NGO and the cycle of compromised performance starts all over again.  
 
7.6.3 Recommendations in respect of communities   
The conditions attached to funding by donors can be traced to the need by government and institutional 
donors to meet their own accountability obligations to their constituencies; tax payers and member 
state shareholders respectively. The same can be said of host governments; the constituency in this 
respect and at least in theory; is represented by national policy frameworks and the communities of 
which they are guardian. This suggests that these categories of stakeholders are aware of and are 
unwavering in their commitment to meet their accountability obligations to their respective 
constituencies. For NGOs, the constituency for primary accountability is the communities served. In 
the light of this, it is recommended that: 
 
NGOs unwaveringly live out their principles and values for their legitimacy is a function of the degree 
to which they fulfil their humanitarian mandate; a mandate which is conferred on them by the poor, 
disadvantaged and the voiceless of this world. By implication, fulfilment of their humanitarian 
mandate means that NGO interventions have impact and results in observable changes in the social and 
economic conditions of the poor, disadvantaged and the voiceless of this world. It was pointed out in 
Chapter 4 that according to the United Nations (Coetzee 1989: 257-8), community development was 
made up of two essential elements; the participation of the people themselves and the provision of 
technical support and other services in ways which encouraged initiative, self help and mutual help. On 
 276 
participation; under restricted project funding arrangements, NGOs are not always able to create the 
space for the participation of the communities served; understandably, how the interventions will be 
implemented is specified in the funding agreements as was the case in Kalama and Yathui Divisions. 
In the light of this, it is recommended that: 
 
While they may feel powerless to bargain on other conditions enshrined in funding agreements, NGOs 
should never agree to project designs and/or arrangements that exclude the communities served from 
participation and/or do not encourage “...initiative, self help...”. This is important for to agree to such 
conditions would be counter-productive to community development; the United Nations will argue. 
 
Community participation enhances an NGO’s knowledge and understanding of the served 
community’s “world”; its culture and traditions; norms; value systems; patterns of daily living; dreams 
and aspirations amongst other dimensions of the community’s world. In turn, local knowledge 
influences the nature, form and shape of approaches to the interventions will assume; approaches 
which take into account all these considerations are more likely to be successful in so far as they 
generate a sense of ownership and harness affinity for development efforts and their outcomes. In the 
light of this, and for those NGOs engaging communities for the first time, it is recommended that; 
 
NGOs include a “pre-engagement” phase as a standard feature in the work plan with “getting to know 
you” as the main activity during this phase. 
 
By implication, when communities participate in NGO interventions aimed at addressing their needs, a 
partnership is formed between the NGOs and the community. The establishment and nurturing of 
partnerships with communities served is a critical ingredient to the success of NGO development 
interventions. This is particularly so for under restricted projects; characterised as they are by amongst 
other things, specified project cycles; NGOs are often not in a position to engage communities long 
enough for the impact of interventions to be felt. In the light of this, it is recommended that; 
 
NGOs should endeavour to form and nurture partnerships with the communities they serve; be they 
formal or informal; in order to ensure continuity after the NGO leaves. 
 
NGOs cannot be everything to every community at all times and in all places; as such, whether by 




will come a time when an NGO has to leave a community. As elaborated earlier, the failure of 
development interventions in part, can be attributed to the misconception that the introduction of 
modern technology and science would automatically lead to a decent standard of living for all. Local 
knowledge facilitates informed decisions on approaches to interventions in so far as an NGO is able to 
accurately identify locally available resources; what works in the community’s “world” or otherwise. 
In turn, what works in the community’s “world” is amongst other things, a function of affordability; as 
such, affordability is an important determinant of the degree to which communities will be able to 
continue with the activities after the NGO leaves. In the light of these, it is recommended that. 
 
To the best extend possible, NGOs should use locally available resources; people, materials, 
indigenous technologies and methods of doing things that have worked for the communities over the 
generations and are affordable. 
 
7.6.4 Conclusions on recommendations 
In concluding this section on recommendations; it is apparent that over the years, NGOs have been 
making mistakes in the management of relationships with other stakeholders in the partnership for 
development. With respect to donors and host governments; the mistake has been in terms of a self 
perception that they lack the power to influence decisions. With respect to communities, the mistake 
has been in terms of a perception that communities are so poor; to the exclusion of recognising the 
potential and the sense of self determination that might exist within the said communities. NGOs have 
indeed made mistakes however; they must not become despondent about the seemingly lack of 
prospects for turning their situation around; instead, they should learn from the experience of a 
successful entrepreneur which goes as follows:  
 
Q: What do you owe your success to? 
A: To making the right decisions all the time. 
Q: How do you manage to make the right decisions all the time? 
A: Through experience. 
Q: How did you acquire the experience? 
A: Through making the wrong decisions most of the time! 
 
As is evident from the experience of the entrepreneur, NGOs can use the experience of making 
mistakes most of the time to their advantage in terms of avoiding such mistakes all the time in the 
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future; this is important for only this way, can they reclaim their power to influence decisions and 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR  COMMUNITY RESPONDENTS 
 
A. Profile of respondents 
 
1. Division        ......................................... 
 
2. Location        ......................................... 
 
3. Sub Location        ......................................... 
 
4. Name of Village       ......................................... 
 
5. Number assigned to respondent       □ 
 
6. Sex: Male          □ 
Female          □ 
 
7. Age Group: 55 yrs <        □ 
   46 - 55         □ 
   31 – 45        □ 
   20 – 30        □ 
 
8. Do you actively participate in community affairs?    
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
9. If yes, what capacity? 
 
Village Head          □ 
Deputy Village Head         □ 
VIDCO member (Village Development Committee)     □ 
CORPS member (Community Own Resource Persons)    □ 
 
10. If you belong to none of these bodies, in what way do you contribute to the welfare and/or affairs 





B Experience during the 1999/2001 Drought 
 
11. How was your family’s food security situation during the drought in 1991-2001?  
Had enough for our needs        □ 




12. If you had enough for your needs how did your family achieve position? 
We had food stocks from previous harvests      □ 
We had money with which to buy food.      □ 
 
13. If you had stocks from previous harvest, is it the practice in your family to keep the surplus in 
any given harvest for future use? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
14. If “yes” how do you preserve the food? 
Modern methods (freezing etc.)       □ 
Traditional methods (drying etc)       □ 
 




16. If you did not have enough for your needs how did your family survive? 
We were assisted by the broader family and/or the community   □ 
We were assisted by the government.       □ 
We were assisted by NGOs        □ 
 
17. If you were assisted by NGOs please name them.    
………………………….          .....................................      ..................................... 
………………………….          .....................................      ..................................... 
 
18. Were you attending school during this period     
  Yes           □ 
 No           □ 
 
19. Did the drought affect your schooling in any way? 
Yes           □ 
 No           □ 
 




21. If you were no longer attending school in what way did the drought affect your life? 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 







C. Experience during the period 2001- 2006: Assistance by government 
 
22. If you were assisted by government during the drought what services did the  
government provide you with after the drought to make sure you were better prepared 
in the event of another drought? 
Water infrastructural improvements       □ 
Agricultural extension services       □ 
Environmental conservation education      □ 
Livestock interventions        □ 
Health and nutrition education       □   
Any other services not listed above       …………............ 
             
23. Who decided what activities would be implemented? 
The government         □ 
The community         □ 
Joint decision          □ 
         
24. Who decided how the activities would be implemented? 
The government         □ 
The community         □ 
Joint decision          □ 
    
25. Who decided where the activities would be implemented? 
The government         □ 
The community         □ 
Joint decision          □ 
    
26. Who decided on when the activities would be implemented? 
The government         □ 
The community         □ 
Joint decision          □ 
 
27. Who decided who would participate in the activities? 
 The government         □ 
The community         □ 
Joint decision          □ 
 
28. What was the community’s contribution to the activities? 
Money           □ 
Labour           □ 
Ideas on how they should be provided      □ 
 
 
29. For what period of time did the activities continue? 
Through the entire period        □ 
 For the greater part of the period (more than 3yrs)     □ 
For a relatively short period (less than 3 yrs)      □ 
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30. In your view was this long enough? 
  Yes           □ 
 No           □ 
 
 
31. If “yes” can you explain why in your view the period of implementation of the activities was 













34. In your view what would have been a reasonable period for the implementation of the activities? 
Through the entire period        □ 
For ……years          □ 
 




36. Did the activities benefit your community? 
  Yes           □ 
 No           □ 
 
37. Please elaborate on the option you have selected above 
…………………………………………………………………………………….................... 
…………………………………………………………………………………….................... 
      
38. If the activities did not benefit your community at what point during the implementation did your 
community realise this? 
From the very beginning of the activities      □  
Half way through the activities       □ 











40. If the activities benefitted your community, what changed in the life of the community as a result 




41. Did the changes help the community to cope with the drought of 2006? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 








44. Please give your view about what could have been done differently to ensure the activities 




D. Experience during the period 2001- 2006: Assistance by NGOs during  
 
45. If you were assisted by NGOs during the period 2001-2006; in what activities did the NGOs 
engage your community to make sure you were better prepared in the event of another drought? 
 
Water infrastructural improvements       □ 
Agricultural extension services       □ 
Environmental conservation education       □ 
Livestock services         □ 
 Food preservation education        □ 
Health and nutrition education       □  
Any other services not listed above      …………..... 
 
46. Who decided what activities would be implemented? 
The NGOs          □ 
The community         □ 
Joint NGO-Community decision       □ 
 
47. Who decided how the activities would be implemented? 
The NGOs          □ 
The community         □ 






48. Who decided where the activities would be implemented? 
The NGOs          □ 
The community         □ 
Joint NGO-Community decision       □ 
         
49. Who decided when the activities would be implemented? 
The NGOs          □ 
The community         □ 
Joint NGO-Community decision       □ 
 
50. Who decided who would participate in the activities? 
 The NGOs          □ 
The community         □ 
Joint NGO-Community decision       □ 
 
51. What was the community’s contribution to the activities? 
Money           □ 
Labour           □ 
Ideas on how they should be provided      □ 
 
Indicate which NGO was involved in what activities and for how long from the list you gave 
earlier. (Respondents will be assured that the NGOs will be given a number and not cited by 
name in the text) 
 
NGO Activities Duration 
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
6   
 
52. In your view was this long enough? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
53. If “yes” can you explain why in your view, the period of implementation of the activities was 


















56. In your view what would have been a reasonable period for the implementation of the activities? 
Through the entire period        □ 
For ……years          □ 
 




57. Did the activities benefit the community? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




58. If the activities did not benefit at what point during the implementation did your community 
realise this?  
From the very beginning of the activities      □  
Half way through the activities       □ 
At the end of the activities        □ 
 




60. If the activities benefitted your community, what changed in the life of the community as a result 




61. Did the changes help the community to cope with the drought of 2006? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 









63. Please give your view about what could have been done differently to ensure the activities 




64. How would you describe your general food security situation during the drought of 2006 
Better than in 1991/2001        □ 
The same as in 1991/2001        □ 
Worse than in 1991/2001        □ 






































INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR  FOCUS GROUPS 
 
A. Profile of group 
 
1. Division        ......................................... 
 
2. Location        ......................................... 
 
3. Number assigned to focus group       □ 
 
4. Gender distribution: Male/Female ratio       ........................................ 
           
B. Experience during the drought 1999-2001 
 
5. How did the drought of 1999-2001 affect the community? 
 
6. Were you prepared for the drought?  
Yes           □  
Partially          □  
No           □ 
 












7. If you had been receiving assistance for the purpose by who? 
Government          □ 
NGOs   
 
C. Assistance given by government 2001-2006 
      
8. Did government continue with the assistance after the 1999-2001drought? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 






10. Did the activities make the community better prepared for the drought of 2006? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
11. If not, what could have been better or done differently to better prepare you to cope with the 
drought of 2006? 
    
D. Assistance given by NGO/NGOs 2001-2006 
 




13. Did the activities help the community to cope with the drought of 2006? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 





E. Experience during the drought of 2006 
 

























F. Towards the future 
 
How do think droughts should handled in the future to make sure that the community will be 

































INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR  HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONDENTS 
 
 
A. The background to NGO presence in Machakos District 
 
1. At what level of government are decisions of on criteria for qualification for the registration of an 
NGO made? 
Centralised at the Ministry’s Headquarters      □ 
Decentralised at Provincial Office       □ 
Decentralised District Offices        □  
 
2. At what level of government does the actual registration of NGOs take place? 
Centralised at the Ministry’s Headquarters      □ 
Decentralised at Provincial Office       □ 
Decentralised District Offices        □  
 
3. Have Machakos District authorities ever turned down an NGO’s application for registration/a 
recommendation to admit an NGO into District from Central government?  
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




4. Please provide information on NGOs that were operating in Kalama, Masinga, Yathui and Yatta 
Divisions during the drought of 1999-2001 through to the drought of 2006. 
 
NGO Division Activities Duration 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
 
5. How did these NGOs establish a presence in the District?  
Through an emergency relief operation       □ 
Through a development programme:       □ 
At the invitation of the Government       □ 
Requested a presence         □ 







If NGO community entry was through a development programme and at the invitation of the 




If through a development programme and the NGOs requested for a presence, what reasons did 




6. In your view, have they lived up to stated motivation for wanting to work with communities in 
Machakos District? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
Partially          □ 
 




B. Working relationships with NGOs 
 
7. Who decides in what Divisions of the District individual NGOs will be involved? 
The NGOs themselves        □ 
Government          □ 
 
 
8. If it is the NGOs, is the Government comfortable with the decisions? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 








10.    Do Machakos District Authorities have “preferred” operations/programmes for the NGO 
contribution to the enhancement of the welfare of communities? 
Yes           □ 









11. During the period 2001-2006, whose decision was the choice of post drought activities that 
NGOs engaged communities in Kalama; Masinga; Yathui and Yatta Divisions? 
The NGOs themselves        □ 
Government          □ 
 
12. In the view of government; were the activities appropriate relative to needs within communities 




13. For how long were the NGOs engaged with communities in post drought activities? 
˂ 2years           □ 
2-3years          □ 
3years˂           □ 
 
14. In your view was the duration of the activities long enough? 
Yes           □  
No           □ 
 




15. If the activities did not continue for long enough, what was the reason given by the NGOs for 




16. Did the District Authorities readily accept the reason given by the NGO? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
17. In your view what would have been a reasonable period for the implementation of the activities? 
Through the entire period        □ 
For ……years          □ 
 















20. Was there a forum in which District Authorities met with the NGOs to discuss issues of mutual 
interest including updates on progress and any constraints they may be facing in the 
implementation of the programmes and projects? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
21. If there was an established forum for dialogue with the NGOs at what level of District 
Authorities were the forums convened? 
District level          □ 
Division level          □ 
Location level          □ 
 Sub Location level         □ 
 
22. If yes, were these forums useful? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
          




24. If there were no such forums, what other channels of communication did the District Authorities 
have to engage the NGOs in dialogue? 
Written reports at designated intervals      □ 
Communication through telephone calls; electronic communication   □  
Ad hoc meetings.         □ 
 
25. If communication was through written reports at designated intervals was this a requirement by 
the District Authorities? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
26. If submission of regular reports was a requirement by District Authorities did NGOs always 
conform to this requirement? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
27. If NGOs always conformed to the requirement, did the District Authorities give feedback on the 
reports submitted by NGOs? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
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28. If yes, was the feedback useful as a formative evaluation tool for the NGOs (suggestions for 









30. Was there a system of scheduled visits by District Authorities to programmes/projects NGOs 
were implementing? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
31. If yes, how did the visits come about? 
District Authorities request        □ 
Always suggested by the organisation      □ 
A combination for the two        □ 
 









34. If the District Authorities never visited the programme/project sites, what means did the 




35. Have the District Authorities ever received complaints from communities about NGO conduct?  
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 













38. How is the District Authorities working relationship with NGOs in general? 
Excellent          □ 
Good           □ 
Fair           □ 
 




40. What is the experience of the District Authorities in terms of the honouring of commitments; 
conformity with operational rules of engagement etc. on the part of NGOs? 
Excellent          □ 
Good           □ 
Poor           □ 
 
41. In the experience of the District Authorities, please give four common areas in which NGOs do 




42. In the event that an NGO is not conforming to the rules of engagement how does the District 




C “Return on Investment” 
 
43. In your view did NGO interventions during the period benefit the communities? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
44. If yes, in what way did the benefits improve the welfare of communities?  Where possible please 
give statistical evidence of the changes. 
 
Dimension of welfare Improvements in the welfare of communities 
Water situation   
Environmental conservation  
Food security  
Health and Nutrition  
Livestock  
Any other  
  
 
45. Did these improvements render communities better able to cope with the drought of 2006? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
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48. Please give your view about what could have been done differently to ensure the activities 




49. In general, what are the District Authorities expectations of the outcomes of the assistance 




50. If the event when it is apparent that the approach that an NGO is using in the implementation of 




51. Please provide any other information that you think might help the researcher better understand 























INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR  NGO RESPONDENTS 
 
A. Profile of the NGO 
 
1. Name of NGO        ……………………… 
 
2. Number assigned to respondent NGO      □ 
 
3. Designation of respondent in organisation    ………………………  
 
4. No. of years NGO has been in operation in Kenya     
 20 yrs <          □ 
 10 - 19           □ 
 ˂ 9           □ 
         




6. What activities is your organisation involved in, in general?    
Relief           □ 
 Development          □ 
Relief/Development         □ 
Advocacy          □ 
 
7. At what level are operational decisions made in your organisation? 
All decision making at centralised headquarters abroad    □ 
Some decision making at centralised  headquarters abroad     □ 
All decision making decentralised at the field level     □  
 




B. Organisation of work at the field level 
 
9. How does you organise your work within communities? 
Directly implement activities with salaried staff     □ 
Community contributes “in-kind” (labour, materials etc.)     □  
Community implements and organisation only supervises    □ 
 




10. What is the percentage of personnel costs on your annual average budget in the past ten  
years?         ………………………. 
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11. Who decides the permissible percentage of personnel costs relative to the budget in any given 
programme? 
Donors           □ 
The organisation         □ 
 
12. If it is your donors who decide, in your view is this a reasonable amount to allocate to personnel 
costs? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




13. After drought relief operations, what activities did your organisation engage communities; whose 
decision was the choice of activities and for how long did your organisation implement the 
activities? 
 
Activity Decision Duration 
(years) Government. Organisation 
Water infrastructure installation     
Environmental conservation     
Food preservation     
Health and nutrition education    
Livestock interventions    
Other activities     
 
14. In your view was the duration of the activities long enough? 
Yes           □  
No           □ 
 
15. Please explain why in your view the period of implementation of the activities was adequate or 




16. If in your view the duration of the activities was inadequate what was the reason for your 












C. Relationships with host government 
 
18. During the 1999-2001 drought did your organisation already have an established presence in 
Machakos District? 
Yes           □ 
No            □ 
 
19. If yes, who decided in which part of the District where your organisation would be involved in 
relief opeartions? 
The Organisation         □ 
Government          □ 
 
20. If the decision was that of the government, were you comfortable with the decision? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




21. Was the process of getting your organisation registered made easy for you by the host 
government? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




23. Is there a forum in which NGOs meet with the host government to discuss issues of mutual 
interest including updates on progress and any constraints you may be facing in the 
implementation of programmes and projects? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




24. If no; what other channels of communication are available to your organisation to dialogue with 










26. Did the host government require your organisation to report on your activities? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




27. If no, did your organisation voluntarily share its reports with the host government?  
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




29. Did the host government require your organisation to declare the source; level and/or how funds 
were disbursed in the course of implementing your activities? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
30. If yes, is your organisation comfortable with the requirement that your organisation declares  
its sources of funding and how you use these funds? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




31. Did the host government ever visit the programmes and projects your organisation was 
implementing within communities? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
32. If yes, are such visits requested by the host government or they are or always suggested by your 
organisation? 
Government request         □ 
Always suggested by the organisation      □ 
A combination for the two        □ 
 








34. Has there ever been an occasion in which your organisation and the host government differed in 
opinion in the use of funds?  
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 








37. How is your working relationship with the host government in general? 
Excellent          □   
Good           □ 
Fair           □ 
 




D. Relationships with communities 
 
38. Following the drought of 1999-2001; to what extent were communities involved in decision 
making on what activities would be implemented; where water point world be sited; when 
activities would be implemented and how? 
Actively involved         □ 
Involved to a certain extent        □ 
Not involved at all          □ 
 
39. If actively involved, at what level of the community were the decisions made? 
Community leadership        □ 
Community Development Committee      □ 
Project Committee         □ 
The community as a whole        □ 
 
40. If Project Committee who selected the project committee members? 
The organisation         □ 
The community         □ 
 
41. What criteria was used in the choice of project committee members 
………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………...……….. 
42. If involved to a certain extent, what dimensions of the decision making processes were the 




43. In the community was not involved at all, did the communities readily accept the decisions?  
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




45. Did your organisation require the communities to make a contribution to the activities other than 
in the decision making processes? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




46. In your view did the community willingly make a contribution or there was a need to convince 
and persuade? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 












49. If you did not achieve as much as you had initially planned, in what aspect of the interventions 














51. Was there a forum in which your organisation met with the whole community to discuss issues of 
mutual interest including updates on progress and any constraints you may be facing in the 
implementation of activities? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
52. If yes; did your organisation find these forums useful (your concerns and those of the 
communities are listened to and issues and concerns are openly discussed, addressed and the way 












55. If not, what has your organisation done to ensure open and ongoing dialogue with the community 




56. Your organisation was involved in the 2006 drought relief operation; how would you describe 
the situation of the people during the drought? 
Better than in 1999-2001        □ 
The same as in 1999-2001        □ 
Worse than in 1999-2001        □ 
 




58. Please give any other information that you think may assist the researcher to better understand 













E. Relationships with donors 
 
59. Provide the following information on your regular donors over the past ten years or longer. 
 







     
60. For development funding; what is the average duration of the funding arrangements? 
˂  2years           □ 
2years ˂           □ 
 
61. Under what arrangement are the development funding provided?  
 
NGO Attributes of development funding 
Activity earmarked Country earmarked Region earmarked Un-earmarked 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
 




63. Has there been an occasion in which your position on the earmarking of funding had 
compromised your chances of securing funding?  
Yes           □ 















64. On the occasions that your organisation has accepted earmarked funding, at what level are 
decisions on project management including reports and reporting intervals?  
 
NGO 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dimension Locus of decisions       
Project design Donor decides       
NGO decides       
Joint decision       
Implementation 
method 
Donor decides       
NGO decides       
Joint decision 
 
      
Frequency of reporting 
 
 
Quarterly       
Half yearly       
Yearly       
Format of reporting Donor’s format       
NGO’s format       
Agreed with donor       
Other dimensions        
        
 
65. Is your organisation comfortable with these arrangements? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




67. Do you have a forum in which you meet with your donors to discuss differences of opinion on 
management of projects? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




69. Do you ever get feedback on the reports you submit to your donors? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 









71. If no, has your organisation ever taken up the matter with the donors?  
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 








74. Do your donors visit the programmes and projects your organisation in implementing with their 
support? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
75. If yes, are such visits:  
Scheduled at regular intervals from the outset of the partnership   □ 
Not scheduled but occasionally requested by the donor    □ 
Never requested by the donor and instead, always suggested by the organisation □ 
Even on suggestion by the organisation, the donor has no interest in visiting the  
projects.          □ 
 




77. In your view are there clearly identifiable behavioural patterns distinguishing government, 
multilateral and corporate donors you have engaged with over the years? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 



















INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR  DONOR RESPONDENTS 
 
A. Internal administration profile of the donor 
 
1. Name of donor                           ………………… 
 
2. Category of donor     
Government          □ 
Multilateral          □ 
Corporate          □ 
 
3. Coded number assigned to respondent to donor (G1..; I1...; C1…)           .............................. 
 
4. Designation of respondent in organisation             .............................. 
          
5. Does your agency/company have “preferred” categories of operations/programmes for funding 
NGO work? 
 
Category G1 G2 G5 G6 I C 
Development       
Relief       
Both       
Advocacy       
Other       
 




7. Give reasons why your agency/company does not prefer the activities you have not selected. 
  .................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................... 
 
8. How do you avail funding for development NGO work? 
 
Donor G1 G2 G5 G6 I C 
Unsolicited offers       
Respond to appeals       









B. Partnership considerations  
 
9. What criteria does your agency/company use in selecting NGOs for your grants/contracts? 
 
Criteria G1 G2 G5 G6 I C 
Home registered NGOs         
NGOs registered in a member state of the region        
Any “tried and tested” international NGO       
Any “tried and tested” local NGO       
Other criteria 
       
 
10. At which level of your agency/company are decisions of on criteria for the selection of NGO 
partners made? 
Centralised at headquarters abroad       □ 
Decentralised at regional/country offices      □  
 
11. What are the major determining factors for the level of funding for a given programme/project? 
Needs           □ 
Availability of resources        □  
The profile of the NGO        □   
The home country of the NGO       □  






12. Does your agency/company earmark funds availed to NGOs? 
All the time          □ 
Sometimes          □ 
Never           □ 
 




13. Since your office is at the donor-NGO partnership interface, is there any room for you to 
advocate for the issues which NGOs from time to time bring to your attention with respect the 
priority needs? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 







14. Does your agency have a predetermined threshold above which an NGO partner can spend funds 
on core costs?   
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 








C. Working relationships with NGOs 
 
16. Is there a forum in which your agency/company meets with the NGOs you fund to discuss issues 
of mutual interest including updates on progress and any constraints they may be facing in the 
implementation of the programmes and projects? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




17. If no, what other channels of communication does your agency/company have to dialogue with 
the NGOs which your agency funds? 
Periodic reports         □ 




18. If through periodic reports, at what intervals does your agency/company require an NGO partner 
to submit reports? 
Monthly          □ 
Quarterly          □ 
Bi-annually          □ 
Annually          □ 
 
19. Do you systematically give feedback on the reports NGOs submit to your agency/company? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 





20. Is there a donor forum where you discuss modalities of cooperation and issues of mutual concern 
with NGOs with which you have a shared partnership? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




21. Does your agency/company ever visit the programmes and projects being implemented by NGOs 
with your funding support? 
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 
22. If yes, how are such visits generated? 
A regular schedule of visits is agreed at the outset.     □ 
Visits are always requested by agency/company at its discretion.   □ 
Visits are always requested by NGO(s) at its discretion.    □ 
 




23. What is the experience of your agency/company with NGOs partnerships in terms of conformity 
with your terms of engagement? 
Excellent          □ 
Good           □ 
Poor           □ 
 




25. In the experience of your agency/company, please give four common areas in which NGOs do 




26. In the event that an NGO partner does not strictly observe your conditions of partnership how 












D. “Return on Investment” 
 
27. On average, what percentage of your agency/company’s development assistance has been 
channelled through NGOs in the past ten years? 
Relief          …………… 
Development         …………… 
Advocacy         …………… 
 
Can you elaborate on the reasons behind the differences (if any) on the level of funding between 




28. What are your agency/company’s expectations of the outcomes of the assistance channelled 




29. Have these your agency/company’s expectation been met? 
All the time          □ 
Sometimes          □ 
 












31. Has your agency/company ever terminated a partnership agreement with an NGO prematurely?  
Yes           □ 
No           □ 
 




32. Has an NGO ever terminated a partnership agreement with your agency/company prematurely?  
Yes           □ 









33. Please provide any other information that you think might help the researcher better understand 
how partnerships between your agency/company and NGOs work. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
